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THE TRUTH ABOUT THE  
PEACE TREATIES





THE AUTHOR AT WORK

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE  
PEACE TREATIES

BY

DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

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## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE LIBERATION OF OPPRESSED PEOPLES

THE Treaties of Paris constitute the greatest measure of national liberation of subject nations ever achieved by any war settlement on record. Most historical treaties have transferred dominion from a defeated to a victorious despotism without reference to the wishes of the inhabitants. A few only have achieved liberty for an oppressed country struggling to be free. The War of American Independence may be placed in that category. There was also the War of Greek Independence. The Russo-Turkish War freed Christian populations in the Balkans. But no Peace settlement has ever emancipated as many subjugated nationalities from the grip of foreign tyranny as did that of 1919.

*Most treaties only change rulers*

In order to understand and appreciate fully the extent and area of this process it is necessary to take a survey of the position on the 1st of August, 1914. In the East the Arab countries of Mesopotamia and Arabia, Palestine and Syria—once upon a time independent realms of great renown—had during thousands of years been subjected to continuous transfer from one conqueror to another. The Slavonic peoples and the Magyars of Central Europe had for centuries been subjected to foreign rule. The adjacent kingdom of Poland had been rent like a garment and the pieces distributed between three Empires. Polish traditions and patriotism were suppressed as manifestations of treason against their conquerors and their

language discouraged because it preserved memories of a great past inimical to their new masters. Alsace-Lorraine was wrenched by force from the side of the France it loved and forced to dwell in an Empire it loathed. The Finns and Balts of Russia were held in subjection by the brute force of the ruthless Empire of the Czars. At the commencement of the War there were in the belligerent countries 100,000,000 men and women with a tradition of racial independence in the more or less distant past, the denial of whose claim to free nationhood constituted a crime against the State which governed them.

In the initial stages of the War the Allied commitment did not go beyond Mr. Asquith's famous declaration that the sword would not be sheathed "until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed on an unassailable foundation."

In effect that declaration merely assured the security of small independent countries like Belgium and Serbia against the aggression of powerful neighbours. France cherished a faint hope that victory would bring her back her lost provinces. But there was nothing contemplated in the way of emancipating the oppressed races of Europe and the Turkish Empire from the bondage imposed upon them by alien conquerors. It was a war of protection for weak nations against arrogant and aggressive militarism, and not a war of liberation for oppressed races. The Allies only gradually, by tentative advances, added to their war aims the achievement of liberation for races long ago absorbed into the systems of great military Empires. As the struggle went on from year to year, this objective sprang up from the blood-drenched soil of the

*Protection not  
liberation  
first object of  
Great War.*

battlefields and grew into greater prominence as the battles multiplied and the sacrifices increased. Just as the emancipation of the slaves developed out of the great conflict for the maintenance of the Union in the American War, so did the freeing of subject nations in the Great War.

In all these developments of human purpose the motives are mixed. In the American Civil War the liberation of the slaves was not the original cause or motive of the struggle, or its initial purpose, but the sentiment already existed in the hearts of multitudes of those who sustained the burden of the War on the side that ultimately won, and the exigencies of the War brought it more and more into action as a combative element in the fight.

In the struggles for national independence which were such a characteristic feature of the history of the nineteenth century, both Britain and France had played a great and a sympathetic part. The same observation applied to Russia. Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Serbia owed their national regeneration to the assistance rendered by these great countries to the patriots who were struggling to free their respective countries from a foreign yoke. Although the effort to achieve Hungarian independence failed, the passionate wave of enthusiasm for Kossuth and his heroic compatriots which swept over Britain and France is attributable to the same impulse. The remarkable development of the British Empire along the lines of self-government is attributable to a similar movement. Gladstone, whose fiery eloquence had been engaged in the cause of national freedom in Greece, in Italy and in the Balkans, soon realised that liberty, like charity, is not a virtue for external application. If it does not begin at home it must at



least extend to the home. That accounts for his attitude towards the Transvaal, and the heroic efforts to give national freedom to Ireland to which he directed the last years of his great life. One of the notable results of the War was the uniting of all parties in the grant of a more far-reaching measure of national autonomy to Ireland than that for which Gladstone fought. When the War broke out in 1914 we were on the brink of civil war over the granting of more limited powers of self-government for Ireland than those ultimately conceded by the War Government of Britain.

The concession of a measure of self-government to India with the unanimous assent of all parties in Parliament is another indication of the genuine character of the movement for national independence which widened the War aims of the Allies in the last years of the War. Apart altogether from the grateful recognition by the British nation of the spontaneous outburst of loyalty by the Indian people, which had given us the valuable aid of hundreds of thousands of volunteers to fight and labour on our side in the War, there was a feeling of comradeship which arose out of years of sharing the same perils and the same privations. Without the effective help of the Indian contingents we could not have held the Germans in France and at the same time beaten the Turkish Army. When the collapse of Russia and the consequent withdrawal of masses of German troops from the Eastern to the Western front forced us to draw on our forces in Mesopotamia and Palestine for reinforcements in the French battle area, we had to fill up our divisions on the Turkish front with Indian units. All this gave force

*Indian  
self-government  
one outcome*

to the plea that the principle of government with the consent of the governed should be extended to India.

Similar considerations influenced the Czar of Russia when in the last year of his reign he decided to grant autonomy to the whole of Poland.

In all human action, the best as well as the worst, there are mixed motives which compose the elements

*Mixed motives in offers of independence* of power that propel the machine. The ingredients which helped the movement of liberation, although in themselves honourable, were of less exalted character.

It was discovered that the strength of the enemy might be undermined by taking advantage of disaffection amongst the subject races. Centuries of misgovernment had by no means reconciled the Arabs to the supremacy of their Turkish masters. The peasants of Arabia and the Bedouins of the desert, who constituted the material for the formidable armies that conquered Mesopotamia, Syria and Northern Africa for Islam, and who finally beat off the chivalry of the West in the crusades, had never had their independent spirit broken by the Turk, and they were ready to take advantage of this supreme opportunity to throw off his noxious rule. Their independence was guaranteed to them as the price of their active aid in overthrowing the Turks. The Arabs of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine did not respond to the appeal except to the extent of deserting in great numbers from the Turkish Armies. But the horsemen of the Yemen under the leadership of Feisal and the guidance of the brilliant Lawrence formed companies of light cavalry which materially assisted the British Army in its conquest of Palestine.

The promise of self-government for Czechoslovakia had an even greater effect in the weakening of the

military power of Austria. Whole regiments of Czechs deserted and marched with flags flying across the lines into the Russian camp. The Austrian commanders realised they could not depend upon the Slavonic troops to put up an effective resistance to a Russian advance. The promise of liberation for the Roumans of Transylvania brought Roumania on to the side of the Allies.

The first promise of national liberation given by the Allies was the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May, 1916. It guaranteed freedom to the Arabs from the shores of the Red Sea to Damascus. When, before we entered on the crucial campaign of 1918, I came to a considered statement of war objectives, the Allies had decided definitely to convert the struggle into a war of liberation.

The joint reply of the Allies (January 10th, 1917) to President Wilson, who had asked them to define their War aims, contained the following:—

“These War aims will only be set forth in detail, with all the compensations and equitable indemnities for harm suffered, at the moment of negotiation. But the civilised world knows that they imply, necessarily and first of all, the restoration of Belgium,

*War aims  
statement  
in 1917*

Serbia and Montenegro, with the compensations due to them; the evacuation of the invaded territories in France, in Russia, in Rumania, with just reparation; the reorganisation of Europe, guaranteed by a stable régime and based at once on respect for nationalities and on the right to full security and liberty of economic development possessed by all peoples, small and great, and at the same time upon territorial conventions and

international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack; the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of the inhabitants; the liberation of the Italians, as also of the Slavs, Rumanes, and Czechoslovaks from foreign domination; the setting free of the populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; and the turning out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as decidedly foreign to Western civilisation."

In the declaration I made of the 5th of January, after full deliberation by the War Cabinet and consultation with the responsible leaders of the Liberal Party and the representatives of organised labour, I stated that:—

"The consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war."

President Wilson, in his famous "Fourteen Points" speech delivered three days later, followed on the same lines, except that in this deliverance he did not lay down any general principle of delimitation. His well-known phrase about self-determination came much later.

The two speeches covered the same ground and were applicable to the same areas: Alsace-Lorraine, Poland, the non-Turkish portions of the Turkish Empire, and the peoples of the Austrian Empire who sought freedom from the Hapsburg rule. But both speeches had another feature in common, that, with the one exception of Poland, they did not so much contemplate complete independence for the various nationalities held in subjection by the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Turkish Empires as some

*Autonomous  
development  
the original  
proposal*

special arrangement which—to use President Wilson’s phrase—“accorded to them the freest opportunity of autonomous development.” As far as Austro-Hungary was concerned, President Wilson had already declared that he was not in favour of breaking it up. I used similar words in my declaration of the 5th of January, 1918:—

“Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the breaking up of Austro-Hungary is no part of our War aims, we feel that, unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for the removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened its general peace.”

General Smuts, in his interview in Switzerland with Count Mensdorff, had already propounded the idea of setting up in Austro-Hungary a Federal Empire with a number of States enjoying complete autonomy as far as their internal affairs were concerned. President Wilson in his Fourteen Points committed himself to the same idea.

As to the subject nationalities of the Turkish Empire, it was proposed to emancipate them from Turkish control, but no decision had yet been reached amongst the Allies as to the form and conditions of government to be accorded to them. In my speech on War aims (January 5th, 1918), I said:—

“Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What

the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred."

President Wilson, dealing with the same topic in his speech on the Fourteen Points, declared that:—

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

*Wilson's statement in 14 Points*

To avoid unjust use of this phrase against the idea of a Jewish home in Palestine, it must be remembered that President Wilson was at that date fully committed to the Balfour Declaration and was, in fact, an enthusiastic supporter of the project it involved.

In dealing with the various declarations made during the War on the subject of national emancipation, it would not be fair to suppress the part which the Bolshevik Government played in this development. Amongst the six points proposed by the Russian peace plenipotentiaries at their first meeting with the Germans and Austrians at Brest-Litovsk on the 22nd December, 1917, were the following:—

" . . . 2.—Complete political independence to be given to those nationalities which had been deprived of it before the beginning of the war.

3.—Nationalities not hitherto in the enjoyment of political independence to be allowed the right to decide by means of a referendum whether they elect to be united to other nations or to acquire independence. The referendum should be so arranged as to ensure complete freedom of voting."

These proposals account for the recognition by Russia of the independence of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and for the fact that the Soviet Union has not sought to interfere with the integrity of these little Republics on its borders.

France, true to her best traditions, entered with whole-hearted sincerity into all these projects for the liberation of subject races. The Allied countries were of one mind and purpose in adding this aim to their War objectives.

I propose to deal with the subject as it affected Italy in a separate chapter.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE ITALIAN CLAIMS

WHEN the War broke out Italy was a member of a Triple Alliance with Germany and Austria. One of its conditions exonerated her from any obligation to make war on Britain. When, therefore, Great Britain declared war against Germany, Italy felt that under the terms of the Pact she was free to maintain an attitude of neutrality. As the War progressed, certain elements in the country were anxious to throw in their lot with the Allies, and they made a strong appeal to popular feeling on the ground that this conflict provided a supreme opportunity for recovering the Italian areas which Austria still retained, and which were consecrated in the public sentiment by the name of Italia Irredenta. It was known that Baron Sonnino, the able and resolute Foreign Minister, sympathised with this movement. The Vatican sympathy was on the whole believed to be pro-Austrian, and it carried with it the clerical forces of the Catholic Church throughout the peninsula. But as the War went on the Italia Irredenta movement gathered strength, and d'Annunzio became its orator. He addressed immense crowds in Rome and other Italian towns, and his fiery appeal roused a frenzy of enthusiasm for a war of liberation. The veteran statesman Giolitti was opposed to war. He was not pro-Austrian or anti-French, but he believed that adequate concessions

*The appeal  
for Italia  
Irredenta*



might be secured from Austria under German pressure without drawing the sword in a mighty quarrel where Italy was bound to be hurt badly even if she won. He was able to induce Germany to exert that pressure on her Austrian confederates, and von Bülow was despatched to Rome to negotiate with the Italian Government for a re-adjustment of frontiers between Italy and Austria. On the 15th January, 1915, Baron Sonnino informed Prince von Bülow that a permanent condition of harmony between Italy and the Central Powers would not prevail until it were possible entirely to implement the Irredentist formula of "Trent and Trieste."

As the campaign developed and it became more and more clear to the shrewd eyes of the Italian Foreign Secretary that the German plans on the French front had failed, and that their hopes of a speedy decision in that direction were disappointed, that Russia had recovered from the reeling blow of Tannenberg and was inflicting crashing defeats on the Austrian army and, above all, that Britain, to the surprise of friend and foe alike, was taking advantage of the stalemate to build up an immense army, the Italian terms were raised. The Italian frontiers with Austria were extremely vulnerable. They had been deliberately drawn with a view to placing Italy at the mercy of her old oppressors. The invasions which ultimately overwhelmed the Roman Empire came through those north-eastern passes. In these mountains there lurked a constant historical menace for Italy. The barriers of the Julian Alps and the Dolomites were no defence for her. On the contrary, the mountains were in the possession of Austria for whom they were not only a bastion, but a screen for

*Unsuccessful  
negotiations  
with  
Germany*

offensive operations against the Italian plains. In the north, the Asiago plateau was like a broad spear blade pointed at the throat of Italy. The islands of the Adriatic and the ports on its northern and western shores converted that sea into an Austrian lake dominated by the Austrian navy. Sonnino came to the conclusion that this was Italy's chance to rectify such a perilous position. He soon found that although German diplomats were willing to pay a high price—at Austria's expense—the Austrian Government was not prepared to make the necessary sacrifices to secure the adhesion, or at least the neutrality, of Italy. He therefore responded to the advances made to him by the British Government through the Marquis Imperiali, the tactful and dexterous Italian Ambassador in London, and entered into negotiations with the Western Allies, who naturally were more amenable to persuasion on a question of concessions which in their case would be made at the expense of an enemy country.

The discussions between our Foreign Office and the Marquis Imperiali lingered some weeks, as Sir Edward Grey was reluctant to concede some of the extreme demands made by Baron Sonnino. They were undoubtedly in contravention of the principles upon which we entered the War, as they involved the handing over to Italy of territory to which her ethnological claim was more than doubtful. The demands pushed the Italian frontiers far beyond the boundary which could legitimately be termed Italia Irredenta. Sonnino's defence for this excessive claim was based mainly upon strategical grounds. Sir Edward Grey was prepared to meet him part of the way, although

*Hagglings  
with Sir  
Edward Grey*

his concessions marked a departure from principle. But he would not go far enough to make it worth Italy's while to incur the sacrifice and run the risks of a great war. Had Sir Edward Grey stood immovably on the rock foundation of international right and refused to budge in the direction of strategic exigencies, one could have respected his moral rigidity. But once he admitted strategic considerations, there was no point in reducing them to a futile minimum. He wasted valuable time and opportunity in haggling between slight and inadequate transgression on the one hand and sufficient concession on the other.

Two incidents finally decided the British Government that this was not a transaction in which we could afford to spend time in the chaffering of the diplomatic market. Promptitude was of the very essence of decision. The first was a change in the fortunes of war on the Eastern Front. There were indications that the Germans were coming to the aid of the Austrians in the East and that they were preparing a great blow at the Russian Armies. Our information with regard to the conditions and equipment of those armies forced us to the conclusion that, although they were more than equal to any encounter with the armies of Austria, they did not possess the equipment, the organisation or the leadership which would enable them to stand up against a formidable German attack, and that the impending battle might end in an overwhelming defeat. From our knowledge of the Italian mentality we were apprehensive that such a catastrophe might have the effect of inducing them to hesitate to commit their fortunes to the cause of the Allies.

Another incident which was responsible for an immediate decision was that during the temporary indisposition of Sir Edward Grey, Mr. *Asquith takes charge and makes terms* Asquith took over the reins at the Foreign Office. When he arrived the negotiations had reached a fidgety stalemate. Whether it was Sir Edward Grey's scruples about the character of the Pact or his temperamental hesitancy, decision was put off from day to day. Mr. Asquith had no such doubts. If he had any, the news from Russia, which was distinctly anxious, swept them all aside and he decided to agree to the Italian terms. France readily assented to the Italian conditions. Any proposal for diminishing the territory of the Germanic Powers was received with alacrity by French statesmen. I have no recollection that the details of the agreement were ever given to the Cabinet. We were only too well pleased to secure the adhesion of another Ally to scrutinise closely the proposed territorial re-adjustments which were the conditions of the bargain. War plays havoc with the refinements of conscience. The result was that the Treaty of London was signed between Italy and the Allies on the 26th April, 1915. As it came in for a good deal of rather contentious and sometimes acrimonious discussion during the Peace Conference, it is necessary to give here its main provisions:—

By the Treaty of London, Italy was to receive:—

- (a) Tyrol, as far north as a line running from Stelvio through the Brenner Pass up to the Venediger-Spitze, and then south to the old Italian frontier east of Cortina.
- The Treaty of London*

(b) The Austrian provinces of Küstenland and Istria up to a line running from Triglav east of Adelsberg down to the coast just west of Fiume.

(c) All the islands of the Adriatic except Veglia, Arbe, Solta, Brazza, and Sabbioncello.

(d) Northern Dalmatia down to Cape Palanka.

(e) Valona and an enclave round it.

(f) There was to be an Italian Protectorate over Central Albania.

(g) The Dodecanese Islands, which had been in the military occupation of Italy since the Turkish War, were to become Italian possessions.

(h) There was a recognition of Italy's interest in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and, in the event of the partition or the partial partition of the Ottoman Empire, or even the redistribution of zones of interest in Turkey, an equitable share in the region of Adalia was to be given to Italy.

(i) If Britain or France obtain an increase in their colonial possessions in Africa, Italy might in principle claim equitable compensation, particularly in the shape of a favourable settlement of questions affecting frontiers between Eritrea, Somaliland, and Libya, and the adjacent British and French colonies.

Italia Irredenta was to be redeemed to the last kilometre. But the Treaty proposed to give Italy territory beyond her ethnographic frontiers, territory which possessed great strategic value, but which could not by any interpretation be regarded as part of Italia Irredenta. The Southern Tyrol, which was purely Germanic, was to be handed over to Italy, as were also certain

*Why  
ethnographic  
rights were  
set aside*

purely Slavonic regions in Dalmatia and the Adriatic isles. Mr. Asquith, when challenged on the subject of the Treaty which he had concluded, defended his action on the ground that the French and ourselves were fighting for our lives on the Western Front and that "Russia, after a very valiant effort, had a setback." But he further justified the Pact on the ground that it was "then a most complex and difficult question, just as now the Conference in Paris was finding it difficult to disentangle the problems of nationality upon the two sides of the Adriatic and the adjacent countries to the north. It was an almost hopeless task, and he was perfectly prepared to justify, under all the circumstances of the case, every one of the conditions as being justified by ethnological, historical, or strategic considerations."

As far as the Tyrol and Dalmatia were concerned, the considerations that weighed with the negotiators must have been exclusively strategic, for they certainly could not be ethnological. Nor could they have been historical unless one goes back to the days of the Roman Empire, when both France and Britain were under Italian rule. Sir Edward Grey's defence of the Treaty was characteristically simple and direct:—

"In War you will have secret treaties. Many things regarded as criminal are regarded as inevitable in time of war."

The real defence of the Treaty, as far as Italy was concerned, was to be found in the perilous strategic conditions of her frontier on land and sea. For us our excuse was the grim necessity of a war where defeat would have meant unutterable disaster. Without the timely intervention of Italy that was

not an improbable contingency, for the huge armies of Russia were soon broken by the crashing blows of the German artillery and staggering back in headlong defeat from which they never really recovered.

A week after the signature of the Treaty of London, Baron Sonnino intimated to the Austrian Govern-

*Italy joins the Allies*      ment that Italy "must renounce the hope of coming to an agreement . . . and proclaims that she resumes from this moment her complete liberty of action, and declares as cancelled and as henceforth without effect her Treaty of Alliance with Austro-Hungary." War was declared and before it was over Italy had sent millions of her best young men into the battlefield, where they acquitted themselves with a valour and skill which added distinction to the annals of a people whose courage and capacity once upon a time acquired and directed a World Empire. Their sacrifices were great and their burdens were heavy.

But no heroism on the part of the Italian soldiers could alter the fact that Italian statesmen made war not to vindicate international right or to protect the weaker nations of Europe from the arrogance and rapacity of great military empires, but on a bargain which ensured material advantages for their own country. Italia Irredenta had a patriotic and sentimental appeal to the Italian heart, but the compact entered into with the Allies included the annexation of territory populated by races which had no affinity with the Italians. They were German, Slav, Turk or Greek. That huxtering spirit entered into all our dealings with the Italian leaders, military as well as political, during the War. It was with difficulty that we secured from Italy any modicum of support for any

*Italy's incessant bargaining*

enterprise, military or naval, which was not purely and strictly Italian, however important it might have been for the success of the common cause of the Alliance. The burden of the Salonica expedition to save the Balkans and Greece from falling entirely into the hands of the Central Powers fell almost entirely on Britain and France. Had Germany and Austria not been checked on that front, Italy would have been the next victim of their conquering hosts. Even the conquest of Turkey, out of which Italy stipulated that she should be given a fat slice of territorial loot, was left mainly to the British army. The Italians declined to fall in with the arrangements entered into by the British and French fleets for the control of the Mediterranean and the protection of that important sea route against the depredations of enemy submarines. They were not prepared to risk their fleet in a common endeavour under a united command. Their contention was that they were fully discharging their obligations to the Allies by holding up the Austrian army on the Italian frontiers and by forcing it to divert a considerable force from the campaign against Russia. Even on that front they were not too anxious to throw their full strength into the attack on the Central Powers. In January, 1917, they refused a powerful reinforcement of heavy artillery—which they sadly lacked—that we offered to send them on the express condition that they should conduct a vigorous offensive against the weakening Austrian front, with a view to breaking through and thus threatening the position of the Central Powers on a vulnerable flank. They considerably outnumbered the Austrians in the infantry available for such a fight and, with the aid of some hundreds of heavy guns promised by the British



Government, they would have secured a superiority in artillery.

These considerations left an unpleasant impression on the French and British mind that the Italians were not pulling their full weight in the Alliance. The French had put their last available man into the army and the British were rapidly exhausting their man power. The refusal of the Italian High Command to organise an offensive on their front in the spring and summer of 1918, in order to relieve the dangerous pressure on the Allied line in France, confirmed the French and British in their impression that the Italians were not placing a very liberal interpretation on their part of the bargain of April, 1915. Sonnino, who was much the strongest man in all the successive Italian War Governments, was not specially interested in the military side of the conflict. He left that to the men to whom these duties were officially delegated, whether they were soldiers or ministers. I failed to induce him at the Rome Conference in January, 1917, to concentrate his acute and astute mind on the urgent problems of the year's campaign. His concern was only aroused when there was some question raised as to the Italian requisitions which would follow victory. How that victory was to be achieved, he left to others.

These circumstances, coupled with the fact that Paris and London were at a distance of only eight hours from each other, whereas Paris and Rome were eighteen hours and London and Rome twenty-six hours, combined to make the relations between the Italian Government and the Allies far less intimate than those between French and British Ministers. The

*Resulting  
isolation  
of Italy*

latter constantly met in consultation. The Italians rarely attended these conversations. The French and British had a common front in France and Salonica and questions arising out of the exigencies of co-operation had constantly to be adjusted. On the other hand, Italy fought on her own front, and, except after Caporetto, fought it alone. After that disaster a powerful contingent of British and French troops was sent to her aid.

These circumstances, operating on Latin jealousy and suspiciousness, gave Italian statesmen a sense of being left out in the cold. This feeling was deepened by the negotiations between Russia and her Western Allies about the ultimate disposal of Constantinople, and the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain about Syria and Palestine angered Sonnino beyond the bounds of control. He had not been consulted or even informed about either of these transactions. The discussions with Russia about Constantinople began before Italy entered the War, but the negotiations about Syria were initiated and concluded some time after the signing of the London agreement. They were only concluded in 1916. As far as Syria and Palestine were concerned, they did not directly affect the area assigned under that Agreement to Italy in the event of an ultimate partition of Turkey. The Italian Foreign Secretary contended that the arrangement between three of the Allies for parcelling out portions of Turkey without bringing Italy into the discussions was a violation of the Treaty of London, and he more than once alluded to the matter in very bitter terms. I thought he had legitimate ground for complaint at the treatment accorded to him. It is inconceivable that Lord Grey

and the French Foreign Secretary should not at least have informed Sonnino of what was taking place. It was not straightforward. It was discourteous and foolish.

When the irate—and justly irate—Italian Secretary discovered what had been going on, he insisted on discussing with the British and French the delimitation of the Italian sphere. By this date (early in 1917) Lord Grey had left office and the worry of clearing up this muddle was bequeathed to his successor. Mr. Balfour had a series of conversations on the subject with the French and Italian Ambassadors in London. In these talks Mr. Balfour found that the Italians had increased extensively the demands for territory in Turkey which had been agreed upon as a condition of their entering the War. They had added the vilayet of Smyrna to that of Adalia. The attempt to arrive at an agreement broke down mainly owing to the irreconcilable nature of the French and Italian *desiderata*. To quote a record made at the time by the Foreign Office for my information:—

“A complete deadlock was threatened and there was a serious prospect of a breakdown on this important question and the creation of a bad atmosphere in which the transaction of further business on any subject would be difficult.”

As the military situation was not too promising owing to the collapse of both Russia and Roumania,

*I decide to clear the air* . . . I decided that we must run no risks of a quarrel with Italy and that immediate steps must be taken to settle any differences that might have arisen between the Western Allies. When the full facts were brought to my notice, I realised that France and ourselves

were not free from blame for the misunderstanding. There was another episode which might have provoked a worse misunderstanding with Italy unless cleared up in time. In Volume V of my "War Memoirs" I have given a full account of the strange and tragic letter written by the worried young Emperor of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, pleading for peace between France and Austria. We were enjoined by the Prince not to inform the Italians of this approach. But I felt that no peace negotiations were possible, short of a betrayal, without sounding the Italian Government. A conference was therefore arranged to take place on the Franco-Italian frontier to discuss both of these troublesome questions. It was attended by the Prime Ministers of Italy, France and Britain. Monsieur Ribot was at that time French Prime Minister. The Italian Prime Minister, Signor Bosselli, was accompanied by his Foreign Minister. It was essential to secure the presence of Baron Sonnino at the discussions. Signor Bosselli was rather an unobjectionable link between divergent parties and groups than a national leader in a great war. He was a man of much sense and he possessed an agreeable personality, but at a conference of this kind he confined his contributions to an occasional nod of assent and approval. Sonnino clearly was the only personal force that counted in that Ministry and, as far as diplomatic questions were concerned, his voice was final.

We met on the 19th April, 1917, in a railway carriage at a little village called St. Jean de Maurienne, well up in the mountains that divided Italy and France. The snow was still on the ground in the valley so that there was a definite chill in the physical as well as in the diplomatic atmosphere. The Emperor Karl's

*The  
Conference at  
St. Jean de  
Maurienne*

peace overture intensified the refrigeration. Sonnino, like most Italians, viewed French diplomacy with anxious suspicion. Karl had employed a relative who was an officer in the French Army as the medium for communication between himself and the French Government. The Italian Foreign Secretary knew that France desired no territorial compensations from Austria and that she would be only too glad to eliminate Austria as an adversary without demanding any price. Baron Sonnino was exasperated by the proposal. He regarded the correspondence as an enemy artifice to divide the Allies by making a separate peace with France and Britain which would leave Italy in the lurch and make him the laughing stock of the Giolittists. He was flushed with suppressed anger. He clearly suspected treachery and it added to the attitude of resentful and unaccommodating combativeness which he displayed throughout our interview. He indignantly refused to countenance any secret talks with Austria.

When it came to the Italian claims in Turkey, I own that I was less concerned about the boundaries already fixed by the London Treaty for Italy in Asia Minor, than to secure some pledge from the Italians that, as a condition of any fresh concession made to them, they should enhance their military effort. Our General Staff, after consultation with Mr. Balfour and myself, had sketched a very large and comprehensive sphere of influence for Italy in Southern Anatolia, where the population was by no means predominantly Turkish by race. Greece had rejected Sir Edward Grey's offer of Smyrna as a condition of help to the Allies in the Balkans. We were free, therefore, as far as Greece was concerned, to

*Sonnino not  
satisfied with  
offered sphere  
in Anatolia*

include Smyrna in the Italian sphere, but we were determined to press Italy to take an effective part in the overthrow of the Turkish Empire without which this territory would not be available for disposition. But Baron Sonnino was by no means satisfied with the proposed sphere of Italian influence. His ideas had extended far beyond these boundaries. He made difficulties about accepting our proposal. He was now by no means satisfied by the prospect of a mere zone of influence in Turkey in Asia alone, although the whole dispute, which had taken weeks of vain endeavour to compose, had been confined to Turkey. He thereupon proposed:—

“It is understood that if general consent is given to a peace which does not permit total or partial possession of the territories contemplated in the above agreement to be allocated equally to the three Powers, a settlement shall be reached in order to determine what is due to the Power which has to be content with a zone of influence, so as to compensate that Power for the difference between the mere zone of influence acknowledged by Turkey and the Allies, or by the Allies alone, and territorial possession.”

It is rather significant, in view of recent events, that although at first Baron Sonnino had seemed pleased with the British proposal, after consultation with his experts he took a different view and began to make difficulties and increase his demands. In view of this change of front, I deemed it necessary to state quite plainly the British and also the French view as to the contrast between the Italian attitude towards the

*My frank  
speaking to  
Sonnino*

spoils of victory and the Italian contribution towards achieving it:—

“Against this proposal the Prime Minister felt it his duty to enter a strong protest. In the course of a somewhat obstinate discussion he pointed out perfectly plainly to Baron Sonnino that Italy was doing nothing at all to support the war against Turkey, whereas we had hundreds of thousands of troops, exclusive of the Salonica operations, engaged against that country. When Baron Sonnino suggested that it was necessary to consider the efforts of the Allies as a whole, and not in one theatre only, the Prime Minister pointed out that Italy’s effort was practically confined to a defence of her frontier against greatly inferior enemy forces, and that if she had ambitions in the East she ought to be ready to support them. At one point the Prime Minister made an offer to Baron Sonnino to concentrate against Turkey the greater part of the British forces now employed in the Balkan theatre, and so, in all probability, to win Italy’s territorial *desiderata* for her, on condition that Italy sent infantry to replace the British infantry at Salonica. Baron Sonnino, however, refused even to place this proposal before his colleagues, as General Cadorna, he said, would unquestionably say that the safety of Italy would be jeopardised thereby, and he himself shared this view. The Prime Minister barely concealed his realisation of the fact that Baron Sonnino’s claim for compensation was simply unfair pressure in order to obtain elsewhere *desiderata* that Italy was neglecting to earn and was unlikely to earn in Turkey. He hinted very strongly to Baron Sonnino that, if

Italy was promised so much at this stage without fighting for it, she would have practically no reason for increasing her military efforts, particularly if she was promised compensation in the event of a failure to obtain whatever was now promised. He said that he could not assent to breaking up the British Empire in order to compensate Italy for what she was not lifting a finger to gain. While he was willing to reconsider the matter at the end of the War, if Italy did not achieve her territorial *desiderata*, the Prime Minister set his face altogether against compensation, but he urged that the Allies must then take into account the efforts each had put forth."

As an alternative to Baron Sonnino's proposal, I put forward the following:—

*My proposal  
adopted* "It is understood that if at the time when peace is declared the total or partial possession of the territories contemplated in the agreements come to between France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as to the disposal of part of the Ottoman Empire cannot be fully accorded to any one or more of those Powers, then the interests of the Powers concerned will be again taken into equitable consideration."

After some discussion, in which Baron Sonnino put forward some fresh demands of a territorial character, the above text was adopted.

The provisional decisions arrived at were referred to the various Governments for their consideration. There is an interesting note at the end of the record of this occasionally heated Conference:—



"In conclusion it should be mentioned that, in spite of the great freedom of utterance which was indulged in at times, the temper of the Conference as a whole remained admirable throughout, and it broke up with the utmost cordiality."

On the 25th of April, 1917, the British War Cabinet considered the report which I gave of the proceedings at St. Jean de Maurienne. It was pointed out by the Foreign Office that no modification of the London Pact was possible without the consent of Russia. After some discussion a statement to be sent to the Italian Government was drafted by Lord Robert Cecil and agreed to. It pointed out that

*Provisos  
inserted by  
British  
Cabinet*

"Although the partition of these regions is one of the aims of the Allies in this war, it is still far from realisation. Nevertheless, *subject to the consent of the Russian Government*, the War Cabinet agree conditionally to the zones of occupation and of interest respectively to be attributed to Italy, as defined at the St. Jean de Maurienne Conference."

Then the proposal which I made at St. Jean de Maurienne, which I have already quoted, was added. The Cabinet, however, were emphatically of opinion that a condition ought to be added with regard to the effort made by Italy to realise her aspirations in Turkey:—

"The War Cabinet desire, however, to point out to the Italian Government that the allocation to Italy of such large territories of the Ottoman Empire can hardly be regarded as justified by the effort hitherto made by Italy

*Meagreness  
of Italian  
War effort*

in the War as compared with the sacrifices already made by Great Britain, France, and Russia, more particularly in their conflict with Turkey, in which no Italian forces have so far taken part.

While a considerable French naval and military force co-operated with British ships and troops in the attacks on the Dardanelles, Great Britain has during the past  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years maintained a force of more than 300,000 men\* in operations undertaken against the Turks on the confines of Egypt and in Mesopotamia, while Russia, during the same period, has carried on a successful campaign in Eastern Asia Minor, and inflicted serious losses upon Turkey of territory, men, and material. The exhaustion of Turkey, which alone could render such a partition as now contemplated possible, will, if realised, be chiefly due to efforts of the Allies not shared by Italy. Under these circumstances, the War Cabinet strongly urge the Italian Government to make an increased effort to co-operate with the Allies against the common enemy, and they trust that they will understand that the achievement of Italian aspirations in Asia Minor must be conditional on such an effort being made."

Baron Sonnino accepted the condition as to the assent of Russia being required for the Agreement, but objected strongly to any condition being inserted as to "the efforts made by each of the Powers in the War."

Ultimately, in June, 1917, this was eliminated as a condition, but the Cabinet decided that Lord

\* These numbers were increased considerably during the campaigns of 1917 and 1918.

*Revised  
proposal of  
the Foreign  
Office*

Robert Cecil—who was then acting as Foreign Secretary in the absence of Mr. Balfour—whilst being authorised to inform the Italian Government that the condition of increased effort be waived, “should be instructed to make it clear that if and when the moment arrives the British Government will expect the Italian Government to render assistance in some form in any operations undertaken in the East.” After a great deal of haggling about words, the final arrangement stood as follows:—

“(a) Italy might administer a zone consisting of the southern half of Asia Minor stretching from the northern point of the Gulf of Smyrna, east to the Erjies Dagħ, and bounded on the east by a line running thence south-west to the coast between Mersina and Maidan.

(b) In the zone north of this, running up to just south of Edrimid and Brussa, and including Kutaya and Ak Sheh, Italy might appoint functionaries, etc., on the same terms as France and Britain are allowed to do in the zones created under the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

(c) Italy was to enjoy reciprocal commercial privileges in the Allied zones.

(d) If, as a result of the War, it were found impossible to partition the Ottoman Empire to the full extent contemplated in the above agreements, then the principle of the balance of power in the Mediterranean will be observed in any distribution which takes place.”

The condition as to the approval of Russia was retained, but the stipulation as to the military

contribution was modified into an expectation, in order to save Italian pride.

The whole of these negotiations occupied a great deal of the attention of the Allied Governments at a time when the mighty strength of Russia was paralysed by the shock of the Revolution, and the unsurpassable efficiency and valour of the French Army was almost neutralised by a disaffection which in one instance broke into a serious mutiny; and at a period, also, when the condition of the Italian Army was such that it soon culminated in the rout of Caporetto. During this period the most forceful personality in the Italian Government seemed more deeply concerned with making sure that the French should not grab a larger share than Italy of the spoils of a victory which was then more than doubtful. The Italian attitude justified a penetrating and pungent note communicated to me by an able and independent observer who was fully acquainted with the whole position. It was written at a time when Sonnino was still nagging about Italian claims in Asia Minor, during the height of the great military crisis in 1918, when Russia had retired finally from the struggle and the German Army had crashed into the British and French Front in France and Belgium.

*Italy's  
blinkered  
greed: an  
observer's  
comment*

#### "ITALIAN POSITION

In considering the Italian attitude we have to take into account the following facts:—

- (a) Italian influential opinion has no ideas about the modern outlook at all. They only think of annexations, strategic frontiers, etc.

(b) They stick to the idea of equal shares, irrespective of effort, expenditure, participation, or previous events.

(c) They are fully aware that the Anglo-French Agreement gives them a castle in Spain, that no one can put them in possession, that they could not take it, that they could not hold it if they took it.

(d) They are bitterly jealous of the French and cannot bear the idea of anything being done without their assent."

The consent of Russia, I need hardly say, was not obtained. Although still in alliance with the Western Powers, and therefore entitled to her say on these questions, she was pledged to a policy of peace without annexations or indemnities. It has been contended that the failure to secure the consent of Russia did not vitiate the agreement and that the objection to the validity on that ground is purely legal and technical. But it must be recollected that Russia's assent to any arrangement which affected the future of Turkish territory was fundamental. Russia had until recently formidable armies on Turkish soil. Throughout the War her contribution against Turkey had been very considerable. Her armies on the Armenian front had been large enough to justify the appointment of the Grand Duke Nicolas to their command. Next to our own, the Russian pressure on Turkey had been for three years the weightiest. Next to the Russians came the French who sent a considerable contingent to the Dardanelles. The Italian contribution was negligible. America was not at war with Turkey and took no part in

*Effect of  
Russia's  
consent being  
withheld*

the operations against that country. Mr. Balfour asserted that he had informed President Wilson of the general character of the Treaties which the Allies had entered into between themselves in reference to Austrian and Turkish territory. The President offered no objection to the areas of influence assigned to France and Britain in Turkey, but he took a different view of the Italian claims.

At the date of the Armistice the position in reference to the Treaty of London as interpreted by the

*Position  
at the  
Armistice*

St. Jean de Maurienne negotiations stood as follows. Russia had never given her assent to the transaction. Turkey had been conquered by British armies without any assistance from Italy. Greece had entered into the War and, at a time when France and Britain had almost exhausted their man-power, had come to their aid in the north-east with 300,000 excellent troops. America, which in the last few months of the War played a much greater part than Italy in the breaking down of our most formidable enemy, disapproved strongly both of the Treaty of London and of the St. Jean de Maurienne Pact. As to the former, it constituted the basis upon which Italy entered the War. The latter was an interpretation by three out of the five Allied Powers of one of the conditions of the London Pact, an interpretation from which the other two Powers wholly dissented.

The Italian sentiment about the Slavonic populations of Austria was bitter. This antagonism was not without cause. It was the Croats who

*Italian  
hatred of  
the Croats*

had been used by the Hapsburgs to crush and keep down Italian liberty, to hunt, imprison and execute Italian patriots. Even when Magyar regiments were confounded

with Croats, all were alike feared and hated under the same generic name of Croat. Some lines of Clough have embodied this conviction burned into the Italian heart, that the Croat was the instrument of Austrian tyranny. An eminent diplomat who knew Italy well and loved the Italians, explaining to me the Italian detestation of the Slav, wrote:—

“It was the Croat soldier who was regarded as the instrument of Marshal Hainault of sinister memory. You remember Clough’s lines:

‘ I see the Croat soldier stand  
Upon the grass of your redoubts;  
The eagle with his black wings flouts  
The breath and beauty of your land.’

It is difficult to eradicate these prejudices from the memory of a people and persuade them that the Croatsians are their friends, especially as they have been among the hardest fighters against them up to the last.”

The Serbs being at the time Turkish subjects took no part in the infamies and atrocities of Austrian oppression in Italy. But when it was clear that the Southern Slavs meant to come together and form one united commonwealth of Yugoslavs, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Italian hostility was roused against the idea. In view of the fact that Italy contemplated taking 600,000 Croatsians and Slovenes into its extended boundaries, an effort was made during the War to soften animosities, and at a Conference summoned at Rome early in 1918 between the Italians

*Opposition  
to new  
Yugoslavia*

and a few stray Yugoslavs, there was an interchange of amenities. But it was all a hollow sham. Sonnino never softened his asperity nor did that gentler but equally fanatical Italian, Orlando. A proposal was made to the Italian Government during the last stages of the War, when man-power was becoming exhausted, that the Allies should be allowed to recruit volunteers amongst the thousands of Slavonic prisoners of war immured in Italian camps. Sonnino's response to this was to flare up into one of his choleric moods. Czechoslovakian prisoners in Russia had been organised into an army which effectively helped to block the Germano-Austrian advances into the coal, corn and oil areas of Russia. We had reason to know that the Southern Slav prisoners of Italy were equally prepared to fight their Teutonic and Magyar masters. But Sonnino did not wish to afford them an opportunity for winning the good will of the Allies. He had made his bargain with the Allies to annex Slav towns, islands and valleys to the Kingdom of Italy and he meant to cling to his bond, however much Slavonic blood there might be in it. The Italians did not work in well with the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. One of them, Point 9, was specifically directed against the Slavonic Clause in the Treaty of London.

*Conflict with  
Wilson's  
14 Points*

It proposed that "a re-adjustment of the frontier of Italy should be effected *along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.*" That meant Italia Irredenta, neither less nor more. Both Orlando and Sonnino were up in arms against this particular limitation of their claims. Sonnino put his protest into the form of a specific reservation to any acceptance of the Fourteen Points as a condition of the Armistice.



"The Italian Government considers that the 're-adjustment' raised in point 9 does not imply a mere rectification of frontiers; but that for Italy it is a question of obtaining the liberation of provinces of Italian nationality, and simultaneously to define a frontier between Italy and Austria-Hungary, or the other States which have hitherto comprised Austria-Hungary, which shall afford the necessary conditions of military security adequate to ensure independence and the maintenance of peace, allowing for geographical and historical grounds, and applying the same principles affirmed towards Germany in the delimitations ensuing upon the present war."

This declaration contained all the old diplomatic views as to the principles upon which frontiers should be delimited. "Military security"—the ground on which Alsace-Lorraine had been annexed by Germany and Italia Irredenta had been retained by Austria—was placed in the forefront of the considerations which were to determine the new frontiers of Italy.

A decision was postponed at the Conference on Armistice terms by the expedient of pointing out that we were discussing a suspension of arms with Germany alone, and that the Italian considerations had reference to Austria and to Turkey. The Fourteen Points therefore constituted no part of the conditions upon which an armistice was conceded to these Empires. The further discussion of the application of the principles of self-determination to any other belligerent except Germany was postponed until the Peace Conference.

Nevertheless the Italian delegates left the Paris

conversations, which preceded the termination of hostilities, with a strange sense of doubt and disgruntlement. The main cause of their discontent was the friendliness displayed by their Allies to the Yugoslavs. In order to do justice to the Italian cause, I will quote the reasons given by Orlando himself at the time to an English friend to whom he unburdened his emotions, with a view, no doubt, to their being transmitted to those who mattered in the conduct of Britain's foreign affairs:—

*Orlando's  
attitude to  
the Slavs*

“Orlando said that he came away with a sense of disappointment from the meetings, not that the points he had to uphold were not finally conceded, but because he found that old friends and Allies and their interests seemed to count for much less than the newly discovered Yugoslavs, of whom the Croatsians at any rate had been up to the very last fighting bitterly against us.

M. Clemenceau seemed, now that the armistice with Germany was on the point of being signed, much preoccupied by the fact that there might be no Germany on which to put the screw. But it had not at all preoccupied him when the same phenomenon was manifested as regards Austria. There was a disposition at the Conference to make out that the component parts of the old Austria had suddenly become allies, and should be immediately recognised as such, even before they had really agreed among themselves as to the nature and constitution of the new State, and that they should be allowed to take over the Austro-Hungarian fleet, which had been handed over to them by a

sort of trick, in despite of the terms of the armistice. He (Orlando) had agreed to the proposal that this fleet should be sent to Corfu, though it was not in accordance with his views, but he did not wish to oppose the general sense of the Conference. As to recognising the Yugoslav State there and then he could not possibly agree to that. The so-called National Council at Zagabria (Agram) had so defined its boundaries, that Italy was limited to the line of the Isonzo, less even than what was included in the 'something' (parecchio) of Signor Giolitti, and he was nevertheless pressed to recognise this self-constituted and self-defined State without further consideration. Italy had been struggling and often fighting for the best part of a century to accomplish her destiny and obtain a livable frontier, and had always had the sympathy of Great Britain and France in these efforts, and now suddenly a State which had hardly been heard of before the War, some parts of which had been among the hardest fighters against the Allies, seemed to have a monopoly of sympathies and suffrages. M. Clemenceau had eventually agreed that the recognition of the Yugoslav State would be premature. He (Orlando) did not at that moment refer to our attitude at the Conference. But he said there was a disposition to speak of Italy's imperialistic aims in the Adriatic, as if what had been agreed to had not been the result of a compromise after long discussion. They had not maintained a claim to Fiume which after all was as Italian as anything could be. In the end he had gained his point, but he had had to say some hard things, and it had been painful to him to find such a spirit prevailing. Many of these Yugoslavs, not of

course the Serbians, had been seeking to have it both ways. If the Austrians had won in the War the Croats would have had their autonomy, for remaining faithful to Austria-Hungary. If the Allies won they were to have it all their own way by coming over at the last moment when it was clear to which side victory would incline. Whereas Italy, which for a young and poor country had made very great sacrifices and had lost a very large proportion of lives in hard fighting, seemed to be quite elbowed out by the new friend. He was at a loss to account for this attitude. The friendship of Italy could be counted as a sure asset for the future, whereas little could be known of what the orientation of this new State might be in the future. It would march with Germany and Hungary and could do hardly otherwise than after a brief interval cultivate economic relations with the border States. Why was so much more interest felt in this unknown and unknowable quantity than in the old friend of many generations?

And after speaking for some time in this strain Signor Orlando apologised for his warmth and said as he could not help feeling it acutely, so he could not help expressing himself with heat."

He was particularly incensed by a letter written by Lord Northcliffe to an Italian official whom he knew. The Italian Prime Minister thought the letter was "of a comminatory character" and that Northcliffe threatened that unless Italy immediately recognised the new Yugoslav State there would be trouble. He attributed this communication to Mr. Wickham Steed, who was known as an implacable Yugoslavian

*Annoyance  
with  
Northcliffe*

advocate. I have since seen this letter. It is couched in tempered and respectful language and it is certainly not threatening in its tone. But Orlando attributed official importance to its contents because of Northcliffe's position as head of the British Propaganda Organisation.

When the Imperial War Cabinet of the British Empire met after the Armistice to review the most salient features of the peace settlement, with a view to defining clearly the attitude of the Empire on all these subjects, the Italian claims naturally came up for consideration. The Dominions had not been consulted about the Pact of London nor about the difficulties which had arisen in its interpretation. They did not take any particular interest in any of the controversies that arose upon that part of the peace settlement which affected the Italian demands. Italian troops had fought in France late in the last campaign of the War, but no Dominion contingents had been sent to Italy, and I doubt whether they had an opportunity of fighting side by side with Italian soldiers in any part of the immense battlefield.

It was, however, generally known that President Wilson was opposed to the arrangements entered into by Britain and France with Italy in the Treaty of London and in the confirmatory Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne. He regarded the territorial concessions promised to Italy as being a violation of the principles of self-determination laid down in the Fourteen Points. And so they were, in one if not in two of their stipulations. If the President adhered to the attitude which he now took up there was every prospect of a serious rupture amongst the Confederate Powers when they

*Wilson  
opposed to  
Italian  
claims*

came to draft the Peace Treaties with Austria and Turkey.

The Foreign Office view was that the whole situation had changed since 1915, when the Treaty of London was signed; that the Italian case for a strategic rearrangement of frontiers might be sound at that date; but that now that Austria-Hungary was broken up and could no longer be a military menace to Italy, the strategic reasons for the frontier deemed essential for security in 1915 had entirely disappeared, and there were other irresistible reasons for modifying the arrangement then entered into between the Allies and Italy. To quote the statement made by Mr. Balfour to the representatives of the British Empire when they met to consider the outline of a Peace settlement:—

“ . . . The same difficulty arose in the case of the Trentino. There was no difficulty in drawing an ethnographic frontier there. But the *Foreign Office view*: 1915 Treaty took the frontier up to the *Mr. Balfour's statement* Brenner Pass, and included an unquestionably German population—the very people who had fought heroically for the Hapsburgs against Napoleon—in order to give Italy the crest of the Alps. A similar difficulty arose between Italy and the Greeks in the debatable country claimed as ‘Southern Albania’ or ‘Northern Epirus.’ Again, the Treaty of 1915 specifically gave to the Italians the Dodecanese, a group of islands, entirely Greek in population, which the Italians had retained after the war with Turkey in 1912, but which, on the principle of self-determination, ought to go to Greece.

As regards the second category of Italian claims, Italy's attitude was based on the assumption that

France was her future rival. Italian statesmen, looking at the population of France, which was stationary at about 40,000,000, and at the increasing Italian population of 38,000,000 considered that if Italy could get means of expansion she had the right to become a great Mediterranean Power, or, indeed, as the heir of Rome, the predominant Mediterranean Power. He felt that nothing was more embarrassing than the fact that, after four years of alliance, the Italians and French hated one another more than before. . . . Baron Sonnino's diplomacy, based on the Metternichian principle of keeping his hand on everything he could get for the sake of subsequent bargaining, was making things difficult for everybody. Mr. Balfour said he was afraid every morning that he might read that a free fight had happened between Italians and French or Italians and Yugoslavs.

As regards the African questions, he did not think Italy's ambitions in that quarter would affect the Dominions, though their desire for an Abyssinian Protectorate, and an enlargement of the frontiers of Tripoli, etc., would affect the Colonial Office."

It was suggested by someone in the course of the discussion:—

"That it might be possible to leave the Italian representatives to be dealt with by those of the United States, who might perhaps induce Italy to agree to reduce her claims under the Treaty, having regard to the fact that Italy was very dependent upon the United States for finance and raw materials."

I protested strongly against this point of view:—

*My support  
for Italy* “Italy would know quite well that if we really pressed her claims they would be obtained. It was a question of policy involving the relations of this country with other nations in Europe. We were signatories of a bond with Italy which ought to be honoured, and we had to decide whether we were going to give Italy our whole-hearted support, in which case we might have the Yugoslavs against us, or leave Italy in the hands of the United States. We ought not to leave the United States to persuade Italy to reduce her claims; if there were any persuasion in this respect it should be applied by us in the form of advice by a friend. It would be wrong to use President Wilson to get us out of our bargain with Italy. It must be remembered that Italy had fought throughout the war with only about one-tenth of the equipment which we and the French had had, and the marvel was how, with her shortage of coal and steel, she had managed to keep her guns fed at all.”

I pointed out during the discussion that there was no reference to the Fourteen Points in the Armistice concluded with Austria, and that in reply to a protest entered at the time by Signor Orlando during the discussion on the German armistice, the French and ourselves, in the presence of Colonel House, who was President Wilson's representative, had called the Italian Prime Minister's attention to the fact that we were agreeing to the Fourteen Points only in so far as they affected Germany. It is recorded in the minutes that:—



"the general trend of the Cabinet discussion was that:—

'while every effort should be made to persuade Italy to take up a reasonable attitude on these questions, the British Government was undoubtedly bound to give Italy its genuine support if Italy insisted on the fulfilment of the terms of the Pact of London.'

The Peace Conference met in Paris early in January, 1919, but no issues especially affecting Italy were raised during the whole of that month. On February 22nd, when there was some *Sonnino impatient at question of speeding up the course delay in settling of business, Baron Sonnino, who had Italian claims* been very impatient, not so much with the slowness of the proceedings, but with the fact that they seemed completely to ignore the part of the settlement which more particularly affected Italy, entered a protest on that ground. He said:—

" . . . that he had no objections to raise against the proposal to speed up as much as possible the settlement of Peace preliminaries. But he must draw attention to the fact that Germany alone had so far been mentioned (e.g. the military conditions to be imposed on Germany, the economic, financial conditions to be imposed on Germany, etc.) and all other questions were presumably to be adjourned indefinitely. Now, the other questions were frequently just as complicated and contained elements even more dangerous than those included in the German settlement. In the case of Germany,

as a matter of fact, the Allies were faced by one enemy only with whom an Armistice had been signed, with whom negotiations were being carried on, and by whom certain terms had already been accepted. For Italy, the Austrian question was more complicated in that the former Austrian Empire was now divided into various States, some of whom were friendly, others semi-friendly, and others hostile. The Austrian question was, therefore, a delicate and awkward one to settle.

Should the military, economic, and financial conditions to be imposed on Germany first be settled, what would happen to the other questions requiring settlement? He felt compelled to ask that question in the interests of his own country. Germany was an enemy of Italy, and the Italians had fought against her. But Italy also had another enemy—Austria, and in fighting her she had borne the full burden of the war. (This was hardly fair to Russia who had inflicted several smashing defeats on the Austrian armies and captured hundreds of thousands of Austrian prisoners.) The Russian question, which had given rise to an infinity of dangers during the last few months, must also not be lost sight of.

What guarantees, what pledges would Italy have that all these other questions would be dealt with? Mr. Balfour had said that the German question should first be settled and then demobilisation could proceed. It seemed to him that Mr. Balfour's proposal would have the effect of adjourning all these other questions indefinitely.

When the British Army had been demobilised, and the American Army had gone home, Italy

*Fear of new  
attack by  
Germany* would be left to face alone a difficult situation. What would she be able to do? Whatever conditions the Allies might impose on Germany, she would be able to start again as soon as she saw fit, and no one would be there to prevent her doing so. He (Baron Sonnino) agreed that everything possible should be done to hasten the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. Some time had, perhaps, been wasted. That had been inevitable. But, in his opinion, the conditions of Peace to be imposed on all enemy countries should be drawn up as quickly as possible and presented for acceptance. Otherwise, a separate peace having been made with Germany, the Allies might a few days later find themselves at war with half of Austria and perhaps also with Russia. What forces would the Allies then possess with which to defend themselves, and what would be the final consequences?"

M. TARDIEU replied by saying:—

"He agreed with Baron Sonnino that after the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace with Germany difficult questions would still remain to be settled with other enemy countries.

*M. Tardieu's  
reply* Nevertheless, it would be agreed that all other problems would become easier of solution once Peace with Germany had been concluded. For instance, the question of German Austria would become easier to solve after the frontiers of Germany had been fixed. Similarly, the conclusion of Peace with Germany would remove one of the disturbing factors in the Russian situation. Consequently, he thought it

would be possible to reconcile the two proposals before the Conference, namely, Mr. Balfour's proposal for a separate Peace with Germany, and Baron Sonnino's desire to include all enemy countries. Meanwhile, he would urge all the Commissions and Committees to expedite the submission of their reports with as little delay as possible.

MR. BALFOUR pointed out that the third paragraph of his draft note covered the last point raised by M. Tardieu.

MR. HOUSE enquired whether the final Military Terms would be embodied in the Armistice, or in the final Peace Treaty.

MR. BALFOUR thought that Mr. House's question did not arise out of the proposals now being discussed, since the present Armistice could be terminated at three days' notice.

M. PICHON thought the Conference should consider first of all the German question, because it was, as M. Tardieu had said, the principal and the essential question. . . .

BARON SONNINO here interjected 'for you.'

M. PICHON, continuing, said that he thought it was the principal and essential question for the Italians also, because Germany was the principal enemy.

BARON SONNINO said that when last treating the question of the Armistice, the Conference had decided to invite the Allied Military Advisers to propose final Military Terms of Peace. The reason then given for agreeing to that procedure had been the desire to settle the military question with as little delay as possible, so as to remove

*Sonnino urges  
coincident  
treatment of  
Germany and  
Austria*

once for all the necessity for the constant renewal of the Armistice, and also because once the Military Terms had been accepted by Germany, it would be easier later on to impose all other necessary conditions. On that occasion, Signor Orlando, supported by President Wilson, had asked that the same procedure should be followed in regard to Austria-Hungary. That proposal had also been accepted, and consequently no distinction had then been made between the two cases of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The two cases could not, therefore, now be separated, thereby creating a dangerous distinction. He (Baron Sonnino) fully agreed that everything should be done to speed up the settlement of all questions. He would prefer first to get the military conditions out of the way, after which all the rest could be examined together. But, if the Conference decided to make a distinction and to separate the German question from the Austro-Hungarian question and let everything else slide, the situation so created would spell revolution in Italy. Such a procedure would mean an indefinite prolongation of the Peace negotiations with all other enemy countries; Italy would be obliged to keep up armaments whilst the other Allies were demobilising, thus bringing about in Italy a state of general discontent, which could not with safety be allowed to continue.

In order to show a conciliatory spirit, he would be prepared, however, to accept the proposal made by Mr. Balfour on the understanding that wherever the word 'Germany' appeared in his draft note, the words 'and Austria-Hungary' should be added. Otherwise the words 'enemy Powers' should be substituted for 'Germany'. As far as the *military*

conditions were concerned, he held the view that it would be preferable to settle the Military Terms at once, as the Allies would then be in a position to impose on the enemy the economic, financial, and other conditions which might be considered just and equitable.

MR. BALFOUR said that all he pleaded for was that the Conference should at all events get through with Germany with all due speed; *Mr. Balfour's second proposal* that the settlement of Germany should not be held up until the more complex problems of Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria had been solved. The latter questions were, no doubt, fully as important, but the German question was more ripe for decision. Baron Sonnino had expressed the view that after Germany had been got out of the way, serious military troubles would arise with Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In his opinion that was a delusion. It was very difficult to believe that military troubles would arise in those countries once Peace had been concluded with Germany. He (Mr. Balfour) was willing to accept any course that would not delay peace with Germany.

M. TARDIEU thought that . . . it would be relatively easier to make peace with a country like Germany, which still existed as a whole, rather than with Austria-Hungary, which had now disintegrated into a number of entities, partly friendly, partly hostile."

It was decided that it was desirable to proceed without delay to the consideration of the preliminary peace terms and to press on the necessary investigations with all possible speed. That included the setting up of

Commissions to inquire into the problems of Austria-Hungary, of Turkey and of Bulgaria. The two former directly concerned Italy.

The first indication of the coming storm over the claim of Italy to purely Slavonic territory came when the Yugoslav Delegation presented their case for recognition in the Treaty and for a definition of the boundaries of the new State on ethnic lines. One of the delegates (M. Vesnitch) who came before the Council of Ten read out with striking emphasis the following significant declaration:—

*The  
Yugoslavs  
claim an  
ethnic frontier*

“The Delegation he represented regarded the right of self-determination of peoples as an inviolable right. It could not recognise any treaty, public or secret, which did violence to these principles, proclaimed by the Allies and latterly endorsed by the United States of America. The Delegation which he represented therefore regarded as null and void any agreement disposing of the Yugoslav people without its consent. He felt obliged to make this declaration in the name of his Government and of his colleagues present in the room. Had he not made it, he would have betrayed his obligation to the Yugoslav people.”

The Italian Delegation were quick to note the challenge and to take it up. All questions of boundary were referred for investigation to Commissions or Committees of Experts set up for the purpose. The Italian Ministers were not prepared to refer their territorial demands to any such tribunal. Discussing the procedure regarding Yugoslav claims:—

*Italy refuses  
to allow  
discussion of  
her claims*

"BARON SONNINO said that they were now on very difficult ground. He wished to be quite frank. Italy could not take part in any Commission or in any discussion outside the Conference, or allow any Committee to make recommendations, regarding questions outstanding between Italy and the Yugoslavs. He would also oppose any Committee which was to examine collectively all questions raised by the statements heard that day. The question of the difference between the Yugoslavs and the Roumanians was already being examined by a Committee; to this he had no objection."

The Conference decided

"That the questions raised in the statements of M.M. Vesnitch, Zolger and Trumbitch, on behalf of the Serbian Delegation, on the Serbian territorial interests in the Peace settlement (*excepting only the question in which Italy is directly concerned*), shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee similar to that which is considering the question of the Banat.

It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

The matter was raised again at the Conference on March 11th, when M. Clemenceau read a letter received from M. Pashitch, the Serbian Premier, containing a request from the Serb-Croat-Slovene

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Delegation to be present when boundaries between Italy and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom were discussed.

M. Pashitch was a patriarchal figure with a great head and a flowing white beard. On his face was an expression of simplicity and softness which was entirely misleading, for he was one of the craftiest and most tenacious statesmen in South Eastern Europe. No other man could have maintained authority and power for so long a period amongst the turbulent and fearless mountaineers of his native land. The foundation of the Yugoslav Kingdom was largely his doing. When the Austrian Empire was broken up, it was he who gathered up the Southern Slav fragments and consolidated them into one Confederation under the Serbian Monarch. He took care that this extended realm was an accomplished fact before the Peace Congress had time to approach the problem of adjusting boundaries. He viewed the Italians with a deep dislike and distrust, which Sonnino's hostility to the Yugoslavs completely justified. When in conversation with him on the Italian claims to Dalmatia, I pointed out the sacrifices made by Italy and the heavy losses incurred by her in her struggle with Austria, he replied in his quiet and gentle voice: "In battle many more men are killed in running away than in fighting."

He was one of the most picturesque figures in the Conference, and no country could boast of an abler or more sagacious or tenacious champion of its claims. Had he survived a few more years the friction which has arisen between Croats and Serbs, and which culminated in the tragedy of Marseilles, would have been avoided. These two valiant branches of a

common race would have been welded into one people. The Croats would not have been alienated by measures which gave them a feeling that they were being treated not as equals with their Serbian brethren but as a subject race under Serbian dictation. He would have respected their traditions, and avoided every offence to their legitimate susceptibilities. He had a wise head and a fearless heart.

In the discussion that arose on the request put forward by M. Pashitch, it is recorded that

“BARON SONNINO agreed that the interested parties would have the right to appear before the Conference to express their views, and to take part in the discussions; but the Small Powers could obviously have no voice in drawing up the final decisions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE hesitated to accept Baron Sonnino's interpretation of the question. In his opinion the decision (regarding the Belgians) could not be interpreted to mean that the Small Powers should retire when a decision had to be taken.

MR. LANSING thought that, in justice, when the decision came to be taken, either both parties should be present, or both parties should retire.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed with M. Clemenceau that the final decision would rest with the Conference itself, but enquired whether both parties should be present during the discussion which led up to the final decision. That was the question under consideration. In other words, should one of the two interested parties be turned out, while the other party remained to take part in the final discussion?

M. ORLANDO agreed that if the rule had been applied to a single State, called Serbia, he would

not have disputed the fact that questions concerning Italy and Serbia should be discussed as between equals. The Conference however had no longer to deal with the Kingdom of Serbia, but with a new State consisting partly of the old Kingdom of Serbia, and partly of other territories which belonged to an enemy State.

The whole question therefore turned on whether this new State should or should not be recognised.

Obviously he (M. Orlando) could not prevent the friendly and Allied Powers from recognising it, even though agreements to the contrary had been entered into. It would, of course, not be

*Italy not  
willing to  
recognise Yugo-  
slav State*

particularly pleasant for Italy if the other Powers recognised the new State, but however that might be, his Allied and Associated colleagues would not hesitate to admit that Italy was entitled to a free choice in the matter; and so far Italy had not recognised the new State. He, personally, did not recognise the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Furthermore, he regarded the Croats and the Slovenes, that is to say the people whose frontiers were in question, as his enemies. As far as Italy was concerned, these people had merely taken the place of the Austrians; and he would ask his colleagues to consider whether the representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could have done anything worse to Italy, had they been present instead of the Croats and the Slovenes. Consequently, as far as he was concerned, the question presented itself as follows. No appeal lay to an article of the Rules which did not apply to the case under consideration. The question for the Conference to decide was whether matters

relating to frontiers between enemy and Allied countries should be discussed in the presence of the enemy. He (M. Orlando) could never accept such a proposal. Italy's Allies and Associates could naturally do as they pleased, but in regard to matters in which he was concerned, he would never agree to discuss them under those conditions, any more than France would ever agree to admit Germany to take part in a discussion on the settlement of her frontiers.

Baron Sonnino, with whom he found himself in complete agreement, had stated that instead of imposing our conditions on the Croats and the Slovenes, as would be done in regard to other enemy countries, he would agree to their being given a hearing. In agreeing to that, he had made a great concession, and that showed how great was the desire of the Italian Representatives to be conciliatory. He himself, however, could never agree to go beyond that point, and he would absolutely refuse either to discuss or to dispute with his enemies."

It was agreed to adjourn the further consideration of the question to a later meeting.

The unconcealed hostility of the Italian delegates towards the new Yugoslav Confederation was rather inconsistent with the propagandist declaration of the Italian Government issued on the 8th September, 1918, with a view to influencing the Croatian troops in the Austrian Army:—

"Italy had considered that the movement of the Yugoslav people for independence and for the constitution of a free State corresponded to the

principles for which the Allies were fighting and to the aim of a just and lasting peace."

That was issued when the loyalty of the Croatian troops to Austria, which had hitherto been unshaken, was showing visible signs of crumbling.

Throughout the whole of my negotiations with the Italians I found that their foreign policy was largely influenced by a compound mixture of jealousy, rivalry, resentment, but, more particularly, of fear of France. The dread of France was once expressed to me in a sentence by an Italian Foreign Minister of whom I had asked the question "Why at all the Conferences—especially the post-War Conferences—Italy never stood up to the French? In private talks with him outside the Conference room he and his predecessors agreed with the policy I constantly urged of reconciliation with our old enemies and a general European appeasement which would include Russia and Germany. When these ideas were put into the form of a proposal at the Conference, I received no support from the Italian Ministers. They were timorous and faint-hearted and either dumb or elusive when they came face to face with the French." The only explanation I got from him was "that terrible army across the Alps." It is easy to explain why the British mentality never suffers—at least not until recently—these diplomatic shivers when a foreigner talks to us in hectoring and dictatorial tones. No foreign invader has trodden British soil for nearly nine centuries. But a nation which has been the prey of foreign invaders from the north for fifteen centuries has a different psychology injected into its soul. When one recalls that historical background,

*Fear of  
France*

it is easier to understand the motives and the methods of Mussolini and the response they have for so many years called forth in a nation whose acquaintance with liberty is comparatively new, but which has had a long, poignant and humiliating experience of foreign oppression. He is not merely blustering and bluffing the nation out of its rooted fears; he is building up its fighting strength so as to give Italians the confidence that drives out fear.

But the diplomacy of Italy at the date of the War was not governed merely by a sense of apprehension derived from an ever-present consciousness of the superior military power of France, but also by a determination on the part of Sonnino that in the Mediterranean that power should not be further increased at the expense of Italy. Every demand for more territory for Italy on the Mediterranean seaboard was always therefore extended or circumscribed according to the area which it was proposed should be added to the Mediterranean Empire of France. The balance of power in this historic inland sea began to assume a greater importance in the diplomacy of nations than it had done since the days of Carthage. If not directly, at least indirectly, it entered into the calculations of Italian Ministers in their demands for the Dalmatian coast and in their stipulations for a lengthy frontage on the shores of the Levant. In the Adriatic it was not only that they had a natural desire to acquire these strategic ports and islands for themselves; they also had in mind the possibility of the new State of Yugoslavia entering into an alliance with France with a hostile intent against Italy. All the conversations I had with Italian statesmen and all the reports I received from our agents in Italy proved that the

Italians were convinced that France meant to keep them in a subordinate position. Here is an extract from one of these reports which came into my hand from a competent authority just before the meeting of the Peace Conference:—

“ . . . Behind the actual issue under discussion is another which I think people at home often overlook. I have several times drawn attention to it. This country has a rapidly augmenting population, and I believe a big economic future. The population of France is stationary if not declining. In a few years' time the Italians will outnumber the French, and very considerably so in ten or fifteen years. The French are well aware of this and are against Italian expansion and development. They are clear-sighted enough to divine a rival. Therefore while the Governments are externally on the best of terms as allies, individual Frenchmen in authority in the Adriatic, in Greece, in Abyssinia—wherever it may be—are always out to make difficulties for the Italians and to encourage their opponents. Here they know this perfectly well, though they dare not say it openly, and they feel it and resent it bitterly. Our officers, military and naval, who sometimes know a little French, but hardly ever any Italian, are apt, with some exceptions, to listen to and assimilate the French point of view, on these questions.”

That represents faithfully the deep conviction of intelligent Italians in the War and post-War period.

The meeting of the Council of Four on April 19th considered the claims of Italy, but before that date a

further complication had arisen which provoked a still more embittered controversy between Italians and Yugoslavs. D'Annunzio, the furious orator of Imperialistic Italy, who, apart from his patriotic interest in every place that was or ought to be Italian, had a special, that is a personal, interest in the port of Fiume on the Adriatic west of Yugoslavia, had raised a dangerous agitation against handing it over to the Yugoslavs. Trieste and Pola having been conceded by the Treaty of London to Italy, it had been deemed advisable to leave Fiume as an outlet for the trade of Hungary, but the majority of the population in the old town of Fiume was Italian. It was once upon a time Venetian territory. Upon these grounds d'Annunzio roused the enthusiasm of the Italians for its restoration to Italian rule. The fact that it was surrounded by people who were almost exclusively Slavonic, and that if its suburbs were included in the census, the majority of the population would be non-Italian, did not abate his zeal. He carried matters so far that without seeking the consent of the Government of his own country, he marched at the head of volunteers into Fiume, set up the Italian flag there and governed the town in the name of Italy.

*President Wilson's rage* President Wilson was furious at this defiance of the Conference and for months an angry quarrel raged between him and Italy over the rape of Fiume. He worked himself to such a pitch of indignation that for some time he concentrated his thoughts and his energies upon this comparatively trivial incident to the exclusion of vastly more important subjects which were still awaiting decision. The President raised no objection to carving out of the Tyrol a slice containing a



purely Germanic population of 200,000 that was sacred ground to the Tyrolese because within its bounds was the birthplace of Andreas Hofer, who won immortal fame by his fight against the legions of Napoleon for the independence of the Tyrol. That territory he surrendered to the Italians without a qualm or a query, but the annexation of Fiume raised his ire to a heat which it had never yet reached at any time during the Conference.

It was in this sultry and electric atmosphere that the Council of Four met on the 19th April to settle the claims of Italy. The record of the debate that took place is interesting and instructive.

*Orlando puts  
Italian case  
to Council  
of Four* Signor Orlando, hypothecating that no engagements already existed (such as the Treaty of London), made a "comparison between the principles underlying Italian claims and the general principles on which the Treaty of Peace was being based."

As to Italy's desire for union with the territories on the Italian side of the natural frontiers of Italy, he said:—

"He did not know whether the incorporation of these territories in Italy would bring a hundred thousand, more or less, Slavs under Italian rule. Every time, however, that the Peace Conference had had to determine frontiers, or to fix limits of a new State, it had been recognised that the inclusion of different races was not a reason for overriding strong strategic and economic reasons. He asked that that same principle might be applied to the Italian claims."

With regard to Fiume, Signor Orlando said:—

“For Fiume, Italy appealed to the principle of self-determination of the people. . . . The principle of self-determination ought to apply just as much to little peoples as to great nations, particularly where there was an historical claim.”

Italy's third claim related to Dalmatia and the islands off the coast.

“The case of the islands, said Signor Orlando, applied also to Istria with which must be considered the large islands of Cherche and Lussin, which were largely Italian in character. Italy's claims here were of a strategic order.”

*The  
Dalmatian  
Coast*

The strategic argument, however, was not the only one on which Italy based her claims. There was a national question as well. In the course of those conversations it had been stated that historical claims must not be allowed to possess a decisive influence. He, himself, recognised that. There were, however, cases where history must exercise a deep influence.

Since historic days right down to the Treaty of Campo Formio, Dalmatia had been connected with Italy—first as part of the Roman Empire, subsequently as part of Venice. One factor of the case resulted from the dispositions of nature. The mountains divided the coast from the interior. For this reason the whole culture of Dalmatia gravitated inevitably towards Italy. There still remained in Dalmatia a flourishing Italianism. Was it possible, he asked, after all the sacrifices

of the War for Italy to see this Italianism devoted to destruction? What Italy demanded was only a small part of Dalmatia, leaving to Yugoslavia Spalato, Ragusa and Cattaro. He considered that this was a very modest demand, and he only asked that the existing agreement in regard to Dalmatia should be adhered to."

PRESIDENT WILSON said:—

"It was not reasonable—and he thought his Italian friends would admit this—to have one basis of Peace with Germany and another set of principles for the Peace with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. He must assume that the principles in each case would be the same. The whole question resolved itself into this: we were trying to make peace on an entirely new basis and to establish a new order of international relations. At every point the question had to be asked whether the lines of the settlement would square with the new order.

. . . There was a certain claim of argument which must be brushed aside, namely, the economic and strategic argument. Within certain limits he agreed that natural boundaries . . . must be taken into consideration. The whole course of life in these regions was determined by such natural boundaries. The slope of the mountains not only threw the rivers in a certain direction but tended to throw the life of the people in the same direction. These, however, were not strategic nor economic arguments. On these grounds he felt no difficulty in assenting to that part of the Italian claims included in Signor Orlando's first point. Nature had swung

*President  
Wilson's  
rejoinder*

a great boundary round the north of Italy. It included Trieste and most of the Istrian Peninsula on which Pola lies. He had no great difficulty there in meeting the Italian views.

Outside of these, however, further to the South all the arguments seemed to him to lead the other way. A different watershed was reached.

*Attitude on Fiume* Different racial units were encountered. There were natural associations between the peoples and this brought him to the question of Fiume.

Signor Orlando would remember that at the time that we were trying to detach the Yugoslavs from Austria we spoke of them as friends. We could not now speak of them as enemies. By separating from Austria-Hungary they had become connected with the new and disconnected from the old policy and order. Signor Orlando had argued the case of Fiume as though it were purely an Italian and Yugoslav interest. Fiume was undoubtedly important to Yugoslavia whatever the proportion of the Yugoslav trade to the whole might be. But above all its importance was that of an international port serving Roumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. In the past Hungary had had the principal interest in Fiume. Hence, it had been the policy of Hungary to encourage the Italian element and to use it to check the Slav population round about Fiume. He conjectured that Hungary had encouraged the idea of the autonomy of Fiume as a check to the surrounding Slovak population. This did not lead to the natural conclusion that Fiume should be joined to Italy.

To put Fiume inside Italy would be absolutely inconsistent with the new order of international

relations. What should be done was a totally different question. The essential point to be borne in mind was that Fiume served the commerce of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Roumania as well as Yugoslavia. Hence it was necessary to establish its free use as an international port. The Italian population at Fiume was not connected with Italy by intervening Italian population. Hence, to unite it with Italy would be an arbitrary act, so inconsistent with the principles on which we were acting that he for one could not concur in it."

*Claims to  
Dalmatia  
invalid*

With regard to Dalmatia, Wilson rather belittled the strategic argument put forward by the Italians. In any case

"the strategic argument must be rejected. Military men with their strategic, military, economic arguments had been responsible for Alsace-Lorraine. It was military men who had led Europe to one blunder after another. It would be quite detrimental to the peace of the world if Italy insisted on a lodgment on the east coast of the Adriatic.

The claim for Fiume was a recent one put forward only within the last few months. As far as self-determination was concerned, Fiume was only an island of Italian population. If such a principle were adopted generally, we should get spots all over the map."

BARON SONNINO said:—

"He must point out that Italy had never asked for any strategic advantage from an offensive point

of view. All that they had demanded was the necessary and indispensable conditions of defence. . . . All he wished to avoid was the continuance of the tragic history of Italy as open to attack from across the Adriatic. Without this the east coast of Italy was helpless. . . . The present situation provided a temptation to war, or at least, to the menace of war. . . . The League of Nations might be compared to any civilised community which possessed a police force, but in every town people had to shut their door at nights. Italy could not do without this.

. . . To revert to a worse situation—for Austria had offered Italy the Adige and the islands—would not be explainable to the Italian people. They would not understand why Italy had entered the War.”

M. CLEMENCEAU said:—

“To the powerful arguments given by President Wilson he would add one other. Great Britain and France were bound in advance. The *Clemenceau underlines* Treaty with Italy had not been signed by him, but it bore the signature of *Italian breach of treaty* France. In that Treaty Dalmatia had been given to Italy, and this was a fact he could not forget. In the same Treaty, however, Fiume was allotted to Croatia. Italy had at that time no pretensions to Fiume. They had granted it as a gift to the Croats. M. Barzellai had told him that since that time Austria had disappeared, which altered the situation. This was true, but, nevertheless, Italy had signed a document allotting Fiume to Croatia. He was astonished that Italy, while

claiming Dalmatia under the Treaty, also claimed Fiume, which had been given to the Croats. Signatures counted no longer. It was impossible for Italy to claim one clause of the Treaty and to cancel another clause. It would be deplorable if his Italian friends on such a pretext should break away from their Allies. He believed they were making a great mistake.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as the representative of a Power which had signed the Treaty of London, he must express his views. He had not much to add to what M. Clemenceau had said, but in the present grave situation he must express the British point of view, since Great Britain had also been a signatory to the Treaty. His personal position was much the same as M. Clemenceau's since he had not been a signatory to the Treaty. He realised the strength of President Wilson's arguments, but he thought he was entitled to say that if we felt scruples about the Italian claims they should have been expressed before Italy had lost half a million gallant lives. He did not think we were entitled to express these doubts after Italy had taken part in the War and made such sacrifices for the common cause. He wished to say that Great Britain not only stood by the Treaty, but that she stood by the whole of the Treaty. The map which he had in his hand attached to the Treaty showed Fiume in Croatia. This was known to Serbia. We could not break one part of the Treaty while standing by the other. On merits he did not understand how the principle of self-determination could be applied. If it was applied at all, it must be applied to the whole area. There

*My support  
for  
Clemenceau*

must be a plebiscite from Trieste to Spalato. This, however, was not the proposal, which was merely to take the views of the inhabitants of Fiume. It was only proposed to apply this method to the ancient town of Fiume itself. If the suburb across the river—a narrow river as he was informed—were included, his information was that the majority would be Yugoslav. (Baron Sonnino interjected that the majority would still be Italian.) If Signor Orlando's argument in regard to the strategic position of Trieste and its danger from the guns in the hills were applied to Fiume, the Yugoslav majority would be overwhelming. The population of the valley was some 100,000 people, of whom only 25,000 were Italians. He could not see that any principle could be established for giving Fiume to Italy. If Fiume were included in Istria, exactly the same thing would apply. The Italian claim was only valid if applied to a little ancient town where an Italian population had grown to a majority of some 8,000. To give Fiume to Italy would break faith with the Serbs, would break the Treaty on which Italy entered the war, and would break every principle on which the Treaty of Peace was being based. . . . M. Clemenceau had spoken of Italy going out of the Conference. This was a very grave decision which he had not been made aware of. What was the reason for it? It was that a population of 25,000 people in a single town had an Italian majority; it was a case where the majority was doubtful if the suburbs were taken into consideration, and where, if the surrounding country were taken into consideration, the population was overwhelmingly against Italy. He asked his Italian friends to consider the position they would create



by such action. We thought Italy was in the wrong and was making an indefensible claim. If war and bloodshed should result, what would the position be? Surely, there must be some sanity among statesmen! To break an Alliance over a matter of this kind was inconceivable. If Italy should do so, however, the responsibility would not be ours. We stood by our Treaty and the responsibility would rest with those who broke the Treaty."

Later, PRESIDENT WILSON said:—

"The Pact of London was inconsistent with the general principles of the settlement. He knew perfectly well that the Pact of London had been entered into in quite different circumstances, and he did not wish to criticise what had been done. But to suggest that the decision should be taken on the basis of the Treaty of London would draw the United States of America into an impossible situation." He "begged that the Italian plenipotentiaries would not decide the question in a hurry" . . . and "not to think of action which would be one of the most tragic results of the War."

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked that the Italians would remember one factor. If they were not present on Friday when the German delegates arrived, the Allies would have no right to put forward a claim for compensation for Italy. This was a matter that they ought to take into consideration "

But popular sentiment in Italy had been excited beyond the control of Signor Orlando and Baron Sonnino. The former was in sympathy with that emotional craze. Baron Sonnino never took any part in the negotiation. I doubt whether he approved of it. He was apprehensive lest Italy should sacrifice bigger things in the frenzy for this trivial claim. Nevertheless he stood by his political chief.

When the Council of Four met on the following day, Signor Orlando read the following declaration to the Conference:—

“I must maintain all the declarations which I have made so far as the question of Fiume is concerned. In reducing the matter to its minimum terms I must observe to President Wilson that, from the point of view of his noble intention of maintaining peace in the world, he is too eminent a politician not to realise that an essential condition for arriving at this object is that of avoiding between peoples the sentiment of reaction against injustice, which will form, without doubt, the most fatal germ of future wars. But I affirm here that if Fiume is not granted to Italy there will be among the Italian people a reaction of protest and of hatred so great that it will give rise to violent explosion within a period that is more or less close. I think, then, that the fact that Fiume may not be given to Italy would be extremely fatal just as much to the interests of Italy as to the peace of the world. Nevertheless, since the British and French Allies have declared yesterday that they do not recognise the right of Italy to break the Alliance in the event of her being accorded only

*Orlando  
reads a  
Manifesto*

what the Treaty of Alliance guarantees her, I am so convinced of my responsibility towards the peace of the world in the event of a rupture of the Alliance as to consider it necessary to safeguard myself against every possible accusation in this respect. I declare in consequence formally that, in the event of the Peace Conference guaranteeing to Italy all the rights which the Treaty of London has assured to her, I shall not be obliged to break the Alliance, and I would abstain from every act or deed which could have this signification.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was incredible to him that the representatives of Italy should take up this position. At the centre of the War

*Wilson's  
rebuttal*

there stood three Powers—France, Great Britain, and Italy—which undoubtedly had borne the brunt of the War, especially the two first engaged. Undoubtedly, however, the whole world perceived that the War had been largely undertaken to save these Powers from the intentions of the Central Powers. These Powers, however, had not brought the war to an end. Other Powers had come in which had nothing to do with the Alliance, and were not bound by the Pact of London. These Powers had rendered indispensable assistance; for example, the material and financial assistance of the United States of America had been essential to the successful conclusion of the War. (M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George interrupted to express agreement in this.) As soon as the United States of America entered the War they declared their principles. These were acclaimed particularly by those peoples to whom they gave a new assurance of peace,

namely the smaller Powers. . . . If we did not do what Signor Orlando had so eloquently referred to and carry out our principles, but were to base ourselves on the Treaty which Italy invoked, we should be raising antagonisms which would never be stamped out until what we were now doing was rectified. . . . It was the supreme completing tragedy of the War that Italy should turn her back on her best friends and take up a position of isolation. He deplored it as one whose heart was torn. But as representative of the people of the United States of America he could not violate the principles they had instructed him to carry out in this settlement. . . . He fully realised that Italy was not bound by the Fourteen Points in making peace with Austria. He was not inclined to insist on any particular principle in the Fourteen Points, but his position was that he could not make peace with Germany on one set of principles and with Austria on another set. Throughout their consultations the drawing of frontiers had been based on ethnic lines as a principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE regretted that the Supreme Council found itself confronted with the most difficult situation that had faced it since the beginning of the Conference. *A difficult dilemma* The question was a very troublesome one, and he could not see a way out. We were first confronted with the possibility that Italy was feeling she could not continue her association with her Allies in making peace, because of this vexatious but comparatively unimportant question. Another alternative was that the United States of America could not assent to a Treaty based on principles involving a grave

departure from those for which she had entered the War. Either way, it was a very serious matter. Personally, he did not feel free to discuss the question of merits, because he must respect his bond."

Later BARON SONNINO said:—

"The War undoubtedly had had the effect of over-exciting the feeling of nationality. This was not Italy's fault. Perhaps America had fostered it by putting the principles so clearly."

The next day, April the 21st, the matter was again under discussion.

"M. CLEMENCEAU said he had been talking to M. Pichon about this subject all the morning. The position was that France had signed the Treaty of London and if their Italian friends asked for it, they would stand by it.

*Another day's wrangle*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no question about this. He thought it right to point out, however, that it would be a serious matter if the United States of America did not sign the Treaty. It would be all the more serious for Italy since she would be including two very formidable races within Italian territory. In the Tyrol there were Germans in many of the valleys; on the Dalmatian coast were Slavs. If the United States were outside the Treaty, these races would feel that the sympathy of America was behind them and might give very serious trouble with guerilla warfare. If President Wilson would sign, it would make a great difference

in the position of Italy and the ease with which she could keep order among the Slavs and Germans. Another point was that it would be very difficult to restart Europe unless the United States could be induced to put some oil into the machine.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had, at one time, hoped to find some possibility of accommodation in regard to the offers that Austria had made to Italy before the war. The suggestion had been made that Italy would end the war poorer than if she had accepted Austria's offers and had never entered the war. In fact, however, he found there was no argument here. Austria had never included in her offer Istria (including Pola), Trieste, or the Tyrol.

BARON SONNINO said Italy felt that she had been opposed to the whole strength of Austria; she had made arrangements with the Allies; then a third party came in and obstructed it because he believed in some system in which Baron Sonnino did not believe. Human beings were not changed by means of a document prepared in a room by half a dozen diplomats. Let the League of Nations go into the Balkans and see what it could do there. It could not change man. . . . For five months there had been no complaint about the Treaty of London. Because America had given in in the case of France and Great Britain; because she had been immoral here she tried to re-establish her virginity at the expense of Italy. The impression in Italy was that for five months she had been allowed to expect all she had asked for and now she was asked to give up because of President Wilson's principles.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said that if he went back to Italy with a peace which would create rebellion among his people this would be bad service to the peace of the world. He declared that if President Wilson's opinion prevailed without doubt there would be revolution in Italy. It was impossible to doubt this. . . . Hence, if Italy was satisfied the whole country would be solid. If they were disappointed there would be a revolution and intense anger. Italy was absolutely firm on the matter and revolution was certain in the event of a bad peace."

*Danger of  
revolution in  
Italy*

Asked by M. Clemenceau if he would accept a scheme of conciliation eliminating Fiume,

"SIGNOR ORLANDO said that it was absolutely otherwise, and he felt it was better not to leave the world in an embarrassing, equivocal situation about this. Up to the point which had been reached Italy remained apart. No amount of discussion could make her give way on this.

M. PICHON asked if Signor Orlando had no conciliation to offer.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said No. Italy must have Fiume. If she was to have it the question was what was she to give up for it?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that this practically put an end to the matter. On Fiume he was with President Wilson. He took his stand on the Treaty of London. He was only trying to find a basis of a solution. But Fiume had been given to the Serbs in the Treaty, and the Serbs knew it. He could not betray the Serbs any more than he could betray Italy.

*My support  
for Wilson  
on Fiume*

M. CLEMENCEAU said that was his position. Were we, he asked, within the Treaty of London or not?

SIGNOR ORLANDO said we were within the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that if Signor Orlando would keep to the Treaty his Allies would stick to him. They were not keeping to it, however. We could not go back on the promise of Fiume to Serbia.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said he was seeking for a scheme of conciliation outside of the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE produced the Treaty showing Fiume marked on the map in yellow (Serbian); Italy was marked in blue. We adhered just as much to one part of the Treaty as the other."

On April 22nd, 1919, when the question of the Italian claims in the Adriatic came up, the Italians were not present.

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE reported that, on his return from the morning meeting he had found Signor Orlando's Chef du Cabinet awaiting him. He had arranged to see Signor Orlando in the afternoon and had just come from the interview. Signor Orlando had had the intention of writing a letter saying that Italy could not be represented at Versailles when the Germans came unless the Italian claims were conceded. Mr. Lloyd George had said that in that event Italy's claims for reparation could not be put forward. Signor Orlando had said that this was a settled matter. Mr. Lloyd George had

*Orlando with-  
draws from  
Council of  
Four: my  
interview with  
him*



pointed out that this was not the case, and that a number of questions were outstanding. He asked to whom Signor Orlando proposed to entrust Italy's claim against Germany—France, or England, or the United States? He had told him he thought that he was in a very serious situation. He himself and M. Clemenceau stood by their Treaty, but he had told him that if the Treaty was signed without the United States of America it meant disaster. He had pointed out to him that President Wilson was immovable. Moreover, he wanted to present his case to the public immediately. Signor Orlando must realise that once President Wilson had done that he could not go back on it, and there would be no chance of conciliation. He had also told him that it was only with the greatest reluctance that President Wilson would consider the idea of handing over the islands to Italy. After that he had asked Signor Orlando what he thought about the establishment of a free city in Fiume instead of handing it over to Croatia. Signor Orlando had then harked back to Zara, Sebenico, and Spalato.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Italy would never get these.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had one last suggestion to make, that Fiume should be a free city and that Zara and Sebenico should also be free cities with provision for a plebiscite at the end of three years to ascertain whether they would wish to join the mainland.

PRESIDENT WILSON doubted whether this would help the peace of that coast.

M. CLEMENCEAU feared collisions between the Italians and the Yugoslavs."

After further discussion it was agreed that:—

“MR. LLOYD GEORGE should be authorised to see M. Orlando at once and to ascertain from him whether Italy would discuss the following conditions:—  
*Terms proposed at the Council*

1. Fiume, together with the surrounding territory, to be a free city:
2. The islands of strategical importance to Italy to be ceded to her, excluding islands such as Pago, which are almost an extension of the mainland:
3. Zara and Sebenico to be free cities without any definite provision for a plebiscite, but with the power that all countries have under the League of Nations to appeal to the League for an alteration of their boundaries.”

The situation had suddenly become tense, and there was engendered an atmosphere of hostility which had hitherto been absent from our deliberations. There was a danger that when Italian emotionalism, which had been excited to a pitch of sizzling and sparking heat, came into conflict with President Wilson's rigid and frigid idealism from outside, there might be an explosion which would break up the unity of the Allies. France and Britain were in honour bound by the Treaty of London. Neither of us approved of its terms, which were in complete antagonism to all the principles upon which we were seeking to recast national boundaries. But it was a bond signed on behalf of our respective countries for which they had received valuable and indispensable service; as such

*Hot passions  
at the  
Conference*

we were prepared to honour it. Fiume, however, was outside that obligation. But Fiume was a comparatively trivial issue upon which to wreck a peace settlement for the world. Trifling incidents have often precipitated some of the worst catastrophes. That was the danger and it was real. President Wilson, with a nature rich and varied in animosities, cordially disliked the Italians. It was not a personal dislike of the genial Orlando or the courtly Sonnino, but he disliked them as an embodiment of the Italian policy of making war an instrument of violent appropriation of other people's towns and villages. War divorced from all idealistic aims was to him greed employing murder to achieve its base purposes. The Italian representatives seemed to him to take no interest in any of the peace conditions except the sharing of the spoils. As the argument proceeded, and the Italian point of view became more and more clear, Wilson's anger flamed up beyond control. He prepared a Manifesto outlining his views on the Italian situation, which infuriated the Italians still further.

To avoid a fatal rupture M. Clemenceau and I put our heads together and decided to make a considered appeal to Signor Orlando, stating clearly the French and British view of the merits of this unfortunate misunderstanding. The document which we prepared has an interest which goes far beyond the controversy about Fiume and the Dalmatian coast, for it reveals clearly the attitude adopted by the negotiators of the Peace during the Conference towards the principles on which they were resolved to base the whole of the peace settlement. It is a considered and authentic exposition of their

*Clemenceau  
and I state  
our view*



CLEMENCEAU, 1919



views at that critical and creative moment in the history of nations. It was as follows:—

“FIUME AND THE PEACE SETTLEMENT

We learn with a regret which it is difficult to measure that, at the very moment when Peace seems almost attained, Italy threatens to sever herself from the company of the Allied Nations, through whose common efforts victory has been achieved. We do not presume to offer any opinion as to the effects which so momentous a step would have upon the future of Italy herself. Of these it is for the Italian people and its leaders to judge, and for them alone. But we, who have been Italy's Allies through four anxious years, and would gladly be her Allies still, are bound to express our fears as to the disastrous effects it will surely have upon us, and upon the policy for which we have striven.

When in 1915 Italy threw in her lot with France, Russia, and the British Empire in their struggle against the Central Powers, Turkey and Bulgaria, she did so on conditions. *Italy's war conditions* She required her Allies to promise that in case of victory they would help her to obtain in Europe the frontier of the Alps, the great ports of Trieste and Pola, and a large portion of the Dalmatian coast with many of its adjacent islands. Such accessions of territory would enormously strengthen Italy's power of defence, both on land and sea, against her hereditary enemy, and would incidentally result in the transfer of over 200,000 German-speaking Tyrolese and over 750,000 Southern Slavs from Austrian to Italian

rule. Under this arrangement Fiume was retained by Great Britain, France and Italy herself for Croatia.

Such was the situation in April, 1915. In November, 1918, it had profoundly changed. Germany was beaten; the Dual Monarchy had ceased to exist; and side by side with this Military revolution, the ideals of the Western Powers had grown and strengthened. In 1915 the immediate needs of self-defence, the task of creating and equipping vast Armies, the contrivance of new methods for meeting new perils, strained to the utmost the energies of the Allies. But by 1918 we had reached the double conviction that if the repetition of such calamities was to be avoided, the Nations must organise themselves to maintain Peace, as Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey had organised themselves to make war; and that little could be expected, even from the best contrived organisation, unless the boundaries of the States to be created by the Conference were framed, on the whole, in accordance with the wishes and lasting interests of the populations concerned.

This task of re-drawing European frontiers has fallen upon the Great Powers; and admittedly its difficulty is immense. Not always, nor indeed often, do race, religion, language, history, economic interests, geographical contiguity and convenience, the influence of national prejudice, and the needs of national defence, conspire to indicate without doubt or ambiguity the best frontier for any State:—be it new or old. And unless they do, some element in a perfect settlement must be neglected, compromise becomes inevitable, and there may often be honest doubts as to the form the compromise should take.

Now as regards most of the new frontier between Italy and what was once the Austrian Empire, we have nothing to say. We are bound by the Pact of London, and any demand for a change in that Pact which is adverse to Italy must come from Italy herself. But this same Pact gives Fiume to Croatia, and we would very earnestly and respectfully ask whether any valid reason exists for adding, in the teeth of the Treaty, this little city on the Croatian coast to the Kingdom of Italy. It is said indeed, and with truth, that its Italian population desire the change. But the population which clusters round the port is not predominantly Italian. It is true that the urban area wherein they dwell is not called Fiume; for it is divided by a narrow canal, as Paris is divided by the Seine, or London by the tidal estuary of the Thames, and locally the name, Fiume, is applied in strictness only to the streets on one side of it. But surely we are concerned with things, not names; and however you name it, the town which serves the port, and lives by it, is physically one town, not two; and taken as a whole is Slav, not Italian.

But if the argument drawn from the wishes of the present population does not really point to an Italian solution, what remains? Not the argument from history; for up to quite recent times the inhabitants of Fiume, in its narrowest meaning, were predominantly Slav. Not the arguments from contiguity; for the country population, up to the very gates of the city, are not merely predominantly Slav, but Slav without perceptible admixture. Not the economic argument; for the territories which obtain through Fiume their easiest access to the



sea, whatever else they be, at least are not Italian. Most of them are Slav, and if it be said that Fiume is also necessary to Hungarian and Transylvanian commerce, this is a valid argument for making it a free port, but surely not for putting it under Italian sovereignty.

There is one other line of argument on this subject about which I would ask leave to say a word. It is urged by some, and thought

*The question  
of spoils  
of victory*

by many, that the task of the Great Powers is not merely to sit down and coldly re-arrange the pieces on the European board in strict, even pedantic, conformity with certain admirable but very abstract principles. They must consider these great matters in more human fashion. After all (so runs the argument), the problems to be dealt with arise out of a Great War. The conquerors in that War were not the aggressors; their sacrifices have been enormous; the burdens they have to bear seem well-nigh intolerable. Are they to get nothing out of victory, except the consciousness that State frontiers in Europe will be arranged in a better pattern after 1918 than they were before: and that nations who fought on the wrong side, or who did not fight at all, will have gained their freedom through other people's losses? Surely the victors, if they want it, are entitled to some more solid reward than theoretical map-makers, working in the void, may on abstract principles feel disposed to give them.

There is something in this way of thinking which at first sight appeals to us all; and where no interests are concerned but those of the criminal aggressors, it deserves respectful consideration. But

in most cases of territorial redistribution it is at least as important to enquire what effects the transfer will have on the nations to whom the territory is given, as upon those from whom it is taken: and when, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the nation from whom it is taken happens to be a friendly State, the difficulty of the problem is doubled.

We do not presume to speak with authority on the value of the strategical gains which Italy anticipates from the acquisition of the islands and coastline of Dalmatia. They seem to us to be small; though, small as they are, they must greatly exceed the economic advantages which will accrue to Italian trade from new opportunities, or to the Italian Treasury from new sources of revenue. We cannot believe that the owners of Trieste have anything to fear from Fiume as a commercial rival, or the owners of Pola from Fiume as a naval base.

But if Italy has little to gain from the proposed acquisition, has she not much to lose? The War

*Profit and  
loss of  
questionable  
annexations* found her protected from an hereditary enemy of nearly twice her size by a frontier which previous Treaties had deliberately left insecure. Her eastern sea-board was almost bare of harbours, while Austria-Hungary possessed on the opposite side of the Adriatic some of the finest harbours in the world. This was her condition in 1914. In 1919 her northern and eastern frontiers are as secure as mountains and rivers can make them. She is adding two great ports to her Adriatic possessions, and her hereditary oppressor has ceased to exist. To us it seems that, as a State thus situated has nothing to fear from its neighbours' enmity, so its

only interest must be to gain their friendship. And though memories belonging to an evil past make friendship difficult between Italians and Slavs, yet the bitterest memories soften with time, unless fresh irritants are frequently applied; and among such irritants none are more powerful than the constant contemplation of a disputed and ill-drawn frontier.

It is for Italy, and not for the other signatories of the Pact of London, to say whether she will gain more in power, wealth and honour by strictly adhering to that part of the Pact of London which is in her favour, than by accepting modifications in it which would bring it into closer harmony with the principles which are governing the territorial decisions of the Allies in other parts of Europe. But so far as Fiume is concerned the position is different. Here, as we have already pointed out, the Pact of 1915 is against the Italian contention; and so also, it seems to us, are justice and policy. After the most prolonged and anxious reflection, we cannot bring ourselves to believe that it is either in the interests of Yugoslavia, in the interests of Italy herself, or in the interests of future peace—which is the concern of all the world—that this port should be severed from the territories to which economically, geographically and ethnologically it naturally belongs.

Can it be that Italy on this account is prepared to separate herself from her Allies? The hope that sustained us through the perilous years of War was that victory, when it came, would bring with it, not merely the defeat of Germany, but the final discredit of the ideals in which Germany had placed

*Folly of  
division  
among the  
Allies*

her trust. On the other hand, Germany, even when she began to entertain misgivings about the issues of the campaign, felt sure that the union of her enemies would never survive their triumph. She based her schemes no longer on the conquest of Europe, but on its political, and perhaps also on its social disintegration. The Armistice might doubtless produce a brief cessation of hostilities; but it would bring no repose to a perturbed and over-wrought world. Militant nationalism would lead to a struggle between peoples; militant internationalism would lead to a struggle between classes. In either event, or in both, the Conference summoned to give us peace would leave us at war, and Germany alone would be the gainer.

This, or something like this, is the present calculation of a certain section of German politicians. Could anything more effectually contribute to its success than that Italy should quarrel with her Allies, and that the cause of quarrel should be the manner in which our common victory may best be used? We are calling into being a League of Nations; we are daily adding to the responsibilities which, under the approaching Treaty, it will be called upon to assume; yet before the scheme has had time to clothe itself in practical form, we hasten to destroy its credit. To the world we supply dramatic proof that the association of the Great Powers which won the War, cannot survive Peace; and all the world will ask how, if this be so, the maintenance of Peace can safely be left in their hands.

For these reasons, if for no other, we beg our Italian colleagues to reconsider their policy. That it has been inspired by a high sense of Patriotism

we do not doubt. But we cannot believe either that it is in Italy's true interests, or that it is worthy of the great part which Italy is called upon to play in the Councils of the Nations.

G. CLEMENCEAU.

D. LLOYD GEORGE.

*Paris,*

23.4.19."

*Wilson and  
Orlando  
issue  
manifestoes*

But before any reply could be given to our appeal to the Italians, President Wilson decided to publish his Manifesto. It ran as follows:—

“STATEMENT OF PRESIDENT WILSON REGARDING THE  
DISPOSITION OF FIUME

Paris, April 23, 1919.

In view of the capital importance of the questions affected, and in order to throw all possible light upon what is involved in their settlement, I hope that the following statement will contribute to the final formation of opinion and to a satisfactory solution.

When Italy entered the war she entered upon the basis of a definite, but private, understanding with Great Britain and France, now known as the Pact of London. Since that time the whole face of circumstances has been altered. Many other Powers, great and small, have entered the struggle, with no knowledge of that private understanding. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, then the enemy of Europe and at whose expense the Pact of London was to be kept in the event of victory, has gone to pieces and no longer exists. Not only that. The

*Pact of  
London no  
longer  
applicable*

several parts of that Empire, it is now agreed by Italy and all her associates, are to be erected into independent states and associated in a League of Nations, not with those who were recently our enemies, but with Italy herself and the Powers that stood with Italy in the great War for liberty. We are to establish their liberty as well as our own. They are to be among the smaller states whose interests are henceforth to be as scrupulously safeguarded as the interests of the most powerful states.

The War was ended, moreover, by proposing to Germany an armistice and peace which should be founded on certain clearly defined principles which should set up a new order of right and justice. Upon those principles the peace with Germany has not only been conceived, but formulated. Upon those principles it will be executed. We cannot ask the great body of Powers to propose and effect peace with Austria and establish a new basis of independence and right in the states which originally constituted the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in the states of the Balkan Group on principles of another kind. We must apply the same principles to the settlement of Europe in those quarters that we have applied in the peace with Germany. It was upon the explicit avowal of those principles that the initiative for peace was taken. It is upon them that the whole structure of peace must rest.

If those principles are to be adhered to, Fiume must serve as the outlet and inlet of the commerce, not of Italy, but of the lands to the north and north-east of that port: Hungary, Bohemia, Roumania, and the states of the new Yugoslavic group. To assign Fiume to Italy would be to create the

*Function of  
Fiume*

feeling that we had deliberately put the port upon which all these countries chiefly depend for their access to the Mediterranean in the hands of a Power of which it did not form an integral part and whose sovereignty, if set up there, must inevitably seem foreign, not domestic or identified with the commercial and industrial life of the regions which the port must serve. It is for that reason, no doubt, that Fiume was not included in the Pact of London, but there definitely assigned to the Croatsians.

And the reason why the line of the Pact of London swept about many of the islands of the eastern coast of the Adriatic and around the portion of the Dalmatian coast which lies most open to that sea was not only that here and there on those islands and here and there on that coast there are bodies of people of Italian blood and connexion, but also, and no doubt, chiefly, because it was felt that it was necessary for Italy to have a foothold amidst the channels of the eastern Adriatic in order that she might make her own coasts safe against the naval aggression of Austria-

*Pre-War  
strategic  
conceptions  
out of date*

Hungary. But Austria-Hungary no longer exists. It is proposed that the fortifications which the Austrian Government constructed there shall be razed and permanently destroyed. It is part, also, of the new plan of European order which centres in the League of Nations that the new states erected there shall accept a limitation of armaments which puts aggression out of the question. There can be no fear of the unfair treatment of groups of Italian people there because adequate guarantees will be given, under international sanction, of equal and equitable treatment of all racial or national minorities.

In brief, every question associated with this settlement wears a new aspect,—a new aspect given it by the very victory for right for which Italy has made the supreme sacrifice of blood and treasure. Italy, along with the four other great Powers, has become one of the chief trustees of the new order which she has played so honourable a part in establishing.

And on the north and north-east her natural frontiers are completely restored, along the whole sweep of the Alps from north-west to south-east to the very end of the Istrian peninsula, including all the great watershed within which Trieste and Pola lie and all the fair regions whose face nature has turned towards the great peninsula upon which the historic life of the Latin people has been worked out through centuries of famous story ever since Rome was first set upon her seven hills. Her ancient unity is restored. Her lines are extended to the great walls which are her natural defence. It is within her choice to be surrounded by friends; to exhibit to the newly liberated peoples across the Adriatic that noblest quality of greatness, magnanimity, friendly generosity, the preference of justice over interest.

The nations associated with her, the nations that know nothing of the Pact of London or of any other special understanding that lies at the beginning of this great struggle and who have made their supreme sacrifice also in the interest, not of national advantage or defence, but of the settled peace of the world, now unite with her older associates in urging her to assume a leadership which cannot be mistaken in the new order of Europe.

America is Italy's friend. Her people are drawn,



millions strong, from Italy's own fair countrysides. She is linked in blood as well as in affection with the Italian people. Such ties can never be broken. And America was privileged, by the generous commission of her associates in the War, to initiate the peace we are about to consummate,—to initiate it upon terms she had herself formulated, and in which I was her spokesman. The compulsion is upon her to square every decision she takes a part in with those principles. She can do nothing else. She trusts Italy, and in her trust believes that Italy will ask nothing of her that cannot be made unmistakably consistent with these sacred obligations. Interest is not now in question, but the rights of peoples, of states new and old, of liberated peoples and peoples whose rulers have never accounted them worthy of right; above all the right of the world to peace and to such settlements of interest as shall make peace secure.

These, and these only, are the principles for which America has fought. These, and these only, are the principles upon which she can consent to make peace. Only upon these principles, she hopes and believes, will the people of Italy ask her to make peace."

The excitement and indignation now reached their height. The Italian Ministers regarded the publication of President Wilson's statement as an insult to their dignity and an offence against comradeship. They were outraged. It was not playing cricket, or whatever is the Italian equivalent for that game.

SIGNOR ORLANDO instantly issued his reply:—

“Paris, April 24, 1919.

“Yesterday, while the Italian delegation was assembled discussing an alternative proposal sent to it from the British Prime Minister, which had as object the conciliation of the opposing tendencies manifested on the subject of the Italian territorial aspirations, the Paris newspapers published a message from Mr. Wilson, the President of the United States, in which he expressed his own opinion in regard to some of the most serious problems that have been submitted to the judgment of the Conference.

The employment of a direct appeal to the different peoples is certainly an innovation in international relations. It is not my intention to complain about it, but I take official notice of it in order to follow this principle in my turn, inasmuch as this new system without doubt will contribute to giving the peoples a broader participation in international questions, and inasmuch as I have always personally been of the opinion that such participation was a sign of a new era. However, if such appeals are to be considered as being addressed to peoples outside of the governments which represent them, I should say, almost in opposition to their governments, I should have great regret in calling to mind that this procedure, which, until now, has been used only against enemy governments, is to-day for the first time being used against a government which has been, and counts on remaining, a loyal friend of the great American Republic—against the Italian Government.

I could also complain that such a message, addressed to the people, has been published at

*Orlando's  
rebuttal to  
Wilson*

the very moment when the Allied and Associated Powers were negotiating with the Italian Government, that is to say, with the very government whose participation has been solicited and appreciated in numerous and serious questions which, up to now, had been dealt with in intimate and complete solidarity.

To oppose, so to speak, the Italian Government and people would be to admit that this great free people could submit to the yoke of a will other than its own, and I shall be forced to protest vigorously against such suppositions, unjustly offensive to my country.

I now come to the contents of the President's message: it is devoted entirely to showing that the Italian claims, beyond certain limits defined in the message, violate the principles upon which the new régime of liberty and justice among peoples must be founded. I have never denied these principles, and President Wilson will do me the justice to acknowledge that in the long conversations which we have had, I have never relied on the formal authority of a treaty by which I knew very well that he was not bound. In these conversations I have relied solely on the force of reason and justice upon which I have always believed and still believe the aspirations of Italy are solidly based. I have not had the good fortune of convincing him: I regret it sincerely, but President Wilson himself has had the kindness to recognise, in the course of our conversations, that truth and justice are the monopoly of no one, and that all men are subject to error.

While remarking that more than once the

Conference has been brought to change its sentiments radically when it was a question of applying these principles, I do not believe that I am showing disrespect towards this high assembly. On the contrary, these changes have been, and still are, the consequence of all human judgment. I mean to say only that experience has proved all the difficulties which are met in the application of these principles of an abstract nature to infinitely complex and varied concrete cases. Thus, with all deference, but all firmness, I consider the application made by President Wilson in his message of his principles to Italian claims is unjustified.

It is impossible for me, in a document of this nature, to repeat the detailed proofs which have been produced in great abundance.

*Italy's wide  
claims*

I shall only say that one cannot accept without reservation the statements according to which the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire implies a reduction of the Italian aspirations. It is even permissible to believe the contrary, that is to say, that at the very moment when all the varied peoples which constituted that empire seek to organise themselves according to their ethnic and national affinities, the essential problem set by the Italian claims can and must be completely solved. Now this problem is that of the Adriatic, in which is summed up all the rights of Italy, both ancient and modern, all her martyrdom throughout the centuries and all the benefits which she is destined to bring to the great international community.

The presidential message affirms that with the concessions which she has received Italy would

attain the barrier of the Alps, which are her natural defences. This is a concession of vast importance on condition that the eastern flank of that barrier does not remain uncovered and that there be included among the rights of Italy the line from Monte Nevoso separating the waters which flow toward the Black Sea from those which flow into the Mediterranean.

Without that protection a dangerous breach would remain open in that admirable natural barrier of the Alps, and it would mean the rupture of that unquestionable political, historical and economic unity constituted by the peninsula of Istria.

I believe, moreover, that he who can proudly claim that it was he who proclaimed to the world the right of self-determination of nations, is the very person who must recognize this right to Fiume, ancient city, which proclaimed its Italianity even before the Italian ships were near; to Fiume, admirable example of national consciousness perpetuated throughout the centuries. To deny it this right for the sole reason that it has to do only with a small community, would be to admit that the criterion of justice toward nations varies according to their territorial expansion. And if, to deny this right, we fall back on the international character of this port, we see Antwerp, Genoa, Rotterdam—all international ports serving as an outlet for a variety of nations and regions without their being obliged to pay dearly for this privilege by the suppression of their national consciousness.

And can one describe as excessive the Italian aspiration for the Dalmatian coast, this boulevard

*Demand for  
Fiume and  
Dalmatia*

of Italy throughout the centuries, which Roman genius and Venetian activity have made noble and great, and whose Italianity, defying all manner of implacable persecution throughout an entire century, to-day shares with the Italian nation the same feelings of patriotism? In regard to Poland, the principle is held forth that denationalisation obtained by violent and arbitrary methods cannot constitute rights. Why not apply the same principle to Dalmatia?

And if we wish to support this rapid synthesis of our good national rights by cold statistical facts, I believe I can state that among the various national reorganisations which the Peace Conference has already brought about or may bring about in the future, none of the reorganised peoples will count within its new frontiers a number of people of another race proportionately less than that which would be assigned to Italy. Why, therefore, is it especially the Italian aspirations that are to be suspected of imperialistic cupidity?

Despite all these reasons, the history of these negotiations will demonstrate that the firmness which was necessary to the Italian delegation was always accompanied by a great spirit of conciliation in seeking the general agreement that we all wished for fervently.

The Presidential message ends by a warm declaration of friendship of America toward Italy. I answer in the name of the Italian people, and I proudly claim this right and this honour, which is due to me as the man who in the most tragic hour of this war uttered to the Italian people the cry of resistance at all costs: this cry was heard and answered with a courage and abnegation of

which few examples can be found in the history of the world. And Italy, thanks to the most heroic sacrifices of the purest blood of her children, has been able to climb from an abyss of misfortune to the radiant summit of the most brilliant victory. It is, therefore, in the name of Italy that, in my turn, I express the Italian people's sentiment of admiration and deep sympathy for the American people."

It seemed useless at this point to attempt to placate the Italians, or to reconcile the two extreme policies of President Wilson and the Italian delegation.

No written answer was given to the Memorandum which Clemenceau and I had sent, but Signor Orlando saw me personally on the 24th of April, and unburdened his soul about Italy's demands and his own difficulties. At the Conference the same afternoon (which the Italians did not attend) the following conclusions were reached:—

"1. Mr. Lloyd George should ask Signor Orlando if he would issue the following communiqué:—

*Proposals  
of the  
Conference*

At the request of President Wilson, Monsieur Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George, Signor Orlando has agreed to defer his departure to Italy with a view of seeing whether it is not still possible to accommodate the difficulties which have arisen about Fiume and the Dalmatian coast.

2. Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau should arrange for the final draft of the letter to Signor Orlando and sign it jointly.

3. Mr. Lloyd George should send President Wilson a copy of the proposed letter to Signor Orlando.

Mr. Philip Kerr was sent by Mr. Lloyd George with the draft communiqué to Signor Orlando but the latter did not consider publication desirable. At the very end of the meeting, at the moment of adjournment, Count Aldrovandi arrived with a message from Signor Orlando to the effect that he and his colleagues had come to the conclusion that the best plan would be for them to meet the Supreme Council that afternoon at President Wilson's house."

The meeting was held later in the day at Mr. Lloyd George's house, not at President Wilson's, where our Conferences were usually held. This change had its significance.

"SIGNOR ORLANDO declared the situation to be a very painful one. There was one very difficult aspect of the situation which came before the territorial difficulty, namely, the effect produced by President Wilson's declaration. . . .

Thus the impression of this document, which he himself declared had nothing in it that was not friendly and courteous, nevertheless was that of an appeal to the people of Italy and to the people generally. The consequence of this was that it put in doubt

*Orlando  
resolves to go  
back to  
Italy*

M. Orlando's own authority, as representative of the Italian people. That was the impression that he had received, and, consequently, it was necessary for him to return to consult the source of his authority, that is to say, the Italian Parliament.



The situation, therefore, was a very delicate one and it was only after much reflection that he had decided to return to Rome; his doing so had no connection with the territorial arrangements. There was no rupture of negotiations but his conscience compelled him to return to his people, and to call Parliament together within 40 hours so as to consult as to his position and establish his authority. For the moment the territorial situation was, for him, in the background. If his colleagues were to repeat to him the proposals that had been suggested yesterday, even so, it would be necessary for him to reply 'I must return to Italy.' His difficulty was as to the plenitude of his powers.

PRESIDENT WILSON hoped that Signor Orlando would make it evident to the world that his errand was to seek the instructions of Parliament, and not what the public believed a withdrawal from the Peace settlement.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said it was necessary, therefore, to explain this situation to his people. He would explain to Parliament the result of those conversations, namely, the choice that Italy had to make. Speaking among friends, the fact was that Italy had made Fiume a national question. On that point not only the United States of America but also Italy's allies had declared quite specifically that they could not consent. In these circumstances to continue the conversations was useless. The people must decide when he explained the situation to them.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked Signor Orlando to call attention to the fact that, in view of the United States of America, the Treaty of London was not in the interest of the relations that ought to prevail

between Italy and the Yugoslavs, nor to the peace of the world.

M. CLEMENCEAU asked to explain his point of view which he thought was also Mr. Lloyd George's point of view about Fiume. This was that the same treaty which bound the Allies to Italy also granted Fiume to the Slavs. If they could not fail in their word to Italy, neither could they fail in their word to the Slavs."

I agreed, and then made a suggestion which subsequently had the effect of settling this bubbling and frothing dispute over Fiume. I indicated that Fiume might be used as a counter for modifications in the Treaty of London:—

*I propose a compromise*

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that beyond this there was no use in pretending that a new element had not been introduced since the signature of the Treaty of London. There was the advent of the United States of America into the war, unbound and free not only from treaties but from the necessity that had compelled us to sign treaties and covenants all the world over. He would not say that this modified his views in regard to the Treaty of London, but, in certain circumstances, it would necessitate a reconsideration in regard to Fiume as well. In the circumstances, he felt justified in modifying the Treaty in regard to Fiume. The Treaty gave Fiume to the Croatsians. If it was modified in part with the assent of Italy in regard to Dalmatia, we should be free to make a modification also in regard to Fiume. This modification would be to make Fiume a free port

HT 2

controlled by its own population, Italians, Hungarians, and Slavs, with free and equal access to all parts served by the port. To that extent he felt free to assent to a change in the terms of the Treaty if his Allies agreed. He did not feel free to challenge the decision of Signor Orlando to go to Rome. He, himself, had felt it necessary to go to London in much less serious circumstances, so he could understand Signor Orlando's position. Meanwhile, he asked what was the position of Italy? If this were an ordinary week, the absence of Signor Orlando would not be so very serious. But on Tuesday next, the Germans would most likely be coming to Versailles. Would Italy be represented there? Mr. Lloyd George referred to the questions of indemnities, coal, joint credits, etc. Who was to discuss these questions on Italy's behalf? Because Italy was not satisfied about the prospective peace with Austria, was she to have no peace with Germany?

SIGNOR ORLANDO hoped he would be back before the Germans came."

Asked by M. Clemenceau whether Italy would be represented at the meeting with the Germans or not,

"SIGNOR ORLANDO said it would depend on the decisions taken in Italy. He argued that to make

*Orlando's distrust of the League* peace with Germany and postpone the Treaty with Austria (Wilson's suggestion) would mean that it would not be a general peace, and he pointed out

that in signing the Treaty of Peace with Germany, the League of Nations Statute would also be

signed. One clause of the League of Nations Covenant provided for mutual and reciprocal guarantees of territory among the signatories. The effect of this would be that Italy would engage herself to guarantee the territories of other countries without being guaranteed herself. Another difficulty was that the League of Nations Covenant included an arrangement for avoiding future wars, and for resolving difficulties between nations. If Italy adhered to the League of Nations, that would mean that the question of frontiers between Italy and the Yugoslavs would have to be resolved through the League of Nations instead of as the direct result of the war which had been won. This was a reason of grave difficulty in signing the peace with Germany, if questions affecting the peace with Austria-Hungary—that is to say, the question of the frontiers—was not also settled.

BARON SONNINO complained that no suggestion of the latest point of view of the Allies had been given, but Mr. Lloyd George had said, in regard to Fiume, for example, that he would not refuse to change in some degree the elements of the Treaty of London provided that concessions were made by Italy. M. Clemenceau did not take the same point of view, and said that Fiume had been promised to Croatia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he never went beyond what his colleagues had agreed to. The Treaty of London gave Fiume to Croatia. He now proposed that it should be a free port, or rather he should say a free city. He would take it from the Croats and give it to its own inhabitants of all races. This was a serious modification of the Treaty from

his point of view, but he would agree to it if Italy would modify the Treaty of London.

BARON SONNINO asked if M. Clemenceau agreed.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he did. Mr. *Clemenceau supports my suggestion* Lloyd George's point of view was his OWN.

BARON SONNINO asked if that was President Wilson's view also.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that in his memorandum he had expressed his readiness to the erection of Fiume into a free city, and he had accompanied his memorandum with a map.

SIGNOR ORLANDO wanted to be able to tell his Parliament what was the middle situation in which all parties are agreed.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that if he agreed to any middle course, it would be contrary to what his people expected and had given him authority for.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that his impression was not that President Wilson had proposed a middle course, but the exact contrary. He himself and M. Clemenceau had suggested a middle course, which did not commend itself to President Wilson, but which, as he understood the matter, President Wilson was prepared to accept if the Italians would agree. He himself had taken the liberty to tell the Italians that this was the position. If he had been wrong in this, he regretted it. He put it to the Italian representatives that if they would be prepared to abandon their rights in Dalmatia, leaving Zara and Sebenico as free cities, and would content themselves with the islands other than those which form practically part of the mainland, he thought an agreed basis might be arranged.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he had never committed himself in this arrangement. All he had done was to ask Mr. Lloyd George to ascertain if the Italians would be ready to discuss on this basis, and the reply he had received was that they were not. He had reserved his judgment in every case. He regretted if there had been any failure on his part to make his position clear.

*Wilson  
reserves  
judgment*

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had understood that if the Italians saw their way to assent, President Wilson would not have stood in the way.

PRESIDENT WILSON said his point of view was that he did not want his Italian friends to think that he would not discuss any aspect of the question. He was willing to go over the ground a hundred times if necessary.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he thought from the way that President Wilson had pressed for Spalato and the inner islands to be left out, that he would have been willing to agree."

According to BARON SONNINO, on the previous afternoon,

"the Italians had sent proposals which would have given the line of the Alps to the sea east of Volosca to Italy, and would have put Fiume under the sovereignty of Italy and provided for the establishment by Italy in the port of Fiume of free zones. Italy would also have received all the islands mentioned in the Pact of London except Pago; and Zara and Sebenico would have been placed under the League of Nations, with Italy as Mandatory Power. If that had been

accepted, Italy would have had some assurance. An answer was received in regard to the sovereignty of Fiume, namely: that this could not be a basis of discussion, but, as regards the rest, it had been understood that if Italy gave up Fiume, it would form a basis of acceptance in a general way. This had been the impression received.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked if it was an impression of a joint agreement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had understood this to be the case, except as regards the question of Mandates, which was a point that he had overlooked. He understood, however, that the remainder was generally agreed.

BARON SONNINO said the reply had been that Fiume was not acceptable, but that the rest might be acceptable. The Italian Delegation had sent word to say that if Italian sovereignty over Fiume could not be accepted, no explanation was available as to what would be substituted for it."

*Italians  
unwilling  
to make  
concessions*

There had evidently been some misunderstanding in the exchange of messages. However, it did not make any difference to the situation, for Sonnino later said that he and his colleagues, after receiving a copy of Wilson's statement,

" . . . had then felt that the whole position was changed, and it was no use discussing details any more. He expressed his thanks for Mr. Lloyd George's intervention. He had narrowed the gulf between them to some extent, and he had hoped that they might learn to what extent their three colleagues could agree on a basis for discussion.

If they had such a basis, things could be stated in a clear way. It was no use telling Parliament that two of the Allies would do one thing, and the third another."

Later I asked the Italian representatives:

"Would they take the responsibility of recommending an arrangement?"

BARON SONNINO said if it were acceptable they would.

Signor ORLANDO said he would not have the power to accept any proposition whatever it was. To do so would be contrary to his original declaration at the beginning of the meeting. He had to put his position before Parliament. He had asked the three Powers, two of whom were allied and the other associated, whether they were agreed. The reply was in the negative. This was all he wanted to know. In their latest proposal, as he understood it, they had spoken of making Zara and Sebenico free cities and of handing over the islands to Italy and making Fiume a free city, but they had overlooked one point, namely Istria. It was essential to Italy that the frontiers should go right down to Volosca.

BARON SONNINO recalled that Mr. Lloyd George had asked whether the Italian Delegation would be prepared to accept a proposal if the three were in accord. He had asked if they were in a position to recommend acceptance. He had replied that if the proposals were acceptable they would recommend them to Parliament. Mr. Lloyd George had explained President Wilson's difficulties in making a precise proposal. The chance, however, was not great if the whole case had to be presented



to the Italian Parliament without receiving a detailed proposal.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that unless the Italian Ministers were prepared to take the responsibility of recommending the proposal to Parliament, it was idle to discuss the matter further.

BARON SONNINO said that if proposals could be made to them that were acceptable, they would undertake to recommend them with all their weight. Up to the present, however, he had not received an offer."

SIGNOR ORLANDO, taking up President Wilson's point, said that:—

"the best course was to go back and explain the situation to Parliament and ask for a general authority."

BARON SONNINO differed from his colleague and was of the opinion that:—

"it would be much harder to make a compromise after going before Parliament. If only a compromise could be agreed to now, Parliament could be asked to accept it.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that unfortunately there was a conflict of principles in this case.

*A conflict of principles* There were President Wilson's principles, which he agreed to and which he had defended in spite of a certain amount of opposition. There was also the principle of international engagements and standing by the signature of treaties. He could not see the danger or indefensibility of a compromise. In such a case it was best to make the

best arrangement and the best compromise possible. The proposal he had made did not give way on any of the principles. If the Dalmatian coast were free, President Wilson's principles were not impugned.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the Italians could state that neither the Allied nor Associated Powers could consent to give them Fiume. The British and French felt bound to stand by their agreement as allies. In regard to the agreement they could state that he, himself, understood the difficulty of his colleagues and was ready to agree with anything consistent with his principles, although he had no proposal to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that President Wilson's position seemed to be that he was unwilling to propose any arrangement but that he insisted that it must be made clear that Fiume was not to go to Italy.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he must remind his colleagues that the Italian Parliament had never known the position of the United States Government which had been set forth in his Memorandum. His proposals in that Memorandum had been not merely negative, they had also been positive. It included measures necessary for providing the security of the eastern coast of Italy in the Adriatic. It called attention to the necessity of providing for this and included the limitation of armaments, the destruction of fortifications, etc., to meet these difficulties. Hence it was constructive as well as negative."

*Wilson  
stands by his  
Memorandum*

It will be seen that the attitude of the Italian delegates on my proposal was throughout friendly and

encouraging—but it failed of acceptance owing to President Wilson's rigidity.

The Italians temporarily withdrew from the deliberations of the Council of Four. Signor Orlando went back to Rome and was enthusiastically acclaimed for his stand over Fiume. Baron Sonnino was opposed to this excursion. He knew how dangerous it would be to transfer diplomatic discussion to the fervour and clamour of the rostrum.

At the session on April the 30th, in reply to my question as to whether the Allied and Associated Powers were to put the claims of Italy in the German Treaty, President Wilson replied that "we could not do so."

*Risk of  
omitting  
Italy from  
Treaty of  
Versailles*

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE reminded his colleagues that he had asked Signor Orlando if they would be justified in putting forward claims on Italy's behalf, if Italy was not present at Versailles to meet the Germans. Signor Orlando had recognised that this was impossible.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled a conversation he had had with Signor Orlando in which the latter had shown quite clearly that he realised that if the Italian Delegates did not return, they could not sign the Treaty with Germany; they would be outside the League of Nations; and he had said some words which indicated that he considered they would be, in a sense, outcasts. He had then pointed out that they were quarrelling with their best friends and Signor Orlando had replied in some phrase to the effect that Italy would rather die with honour than compromise.

(No action was decided on as to making any communication.)"

On May the 2nd it was urged that the letter signed by Clemenceau and myself and handed to Orlando should be published. Both Clemenceau and Wilson wished this to be done.

I said I had received a letter from the Marquis Imperiali requesting that it should not be published.

“MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the first thing was to patch up an arrangement with Italy if it could be patched up honourably. He *My efforts to prevent the breach widening* would like Italy to be represented at the Council if this could be arranged without any sacrifice of principle. (President Wilson agreed.) The second point was that if they did not come back the responsibility must not be with the Allied and Associated Powers. He was afraid that publication would prejudice the position. He was not sure that publication would not make it impossible for the Italians to return. It was well known that a letter had been written, and he and his colleagues, with whom he had discussed it, took the view that the longer the declaration was withheld, the greater would be the effect. British public opinion was not with the Italians in this matter, but it really had no great interest in it. It wanted the dispute patched up. It was not indifferent to principle, but it did not understand the question. . . .”

PRESIDENT WILSON said his experts assured him:—

“that the only way was to show Italy that she was in an impossible position. Once Italy realised that, a result was much more likely. If Italy was kept in a state of hope as regards Fiume, she would

go on scheming, and putting her views in the Press, and would get no further. M. Clemenceau's and Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum was unanswerable."

After stating that "Italian public opinion regarded Great Britain as more hostile than she really was," I said that: "British officers had been insulted in the streets of Italian cities, and the feeling was running strong against us." Continuing, I said,

"If I thought that public opinion would bring matters to a head and force Italy to take a decision, I would agree to it. But I feared it might only prolong the crisis by making it difficult for Italy to come in. Sooner or later, Italy must come in, and must do so voluntarily. Publication might cause a ministerial crisis in Italy, and bring back M. Giolitti and M. Tittoni, which would not be at all desirable at that stage. Moreover, to publish in the face of the Marquis Imperiali's letter, which was based on information from Signor Orlando, would, I thought, be a very serious matter."

President Wilson thought that we should prolong the present situation longer by the method of leaving matters alone, than by a drop in the test-tube which was to produce precipitation. I interjected that I was afraid it might produce an explosion.

The President said the Italians had sent a ship to Fiume and were increasing their troops there, and had despatched a battleship, two cruisers and a destroyer to Smyrna.

"This confirmed what Signor Orlando had told the United States Ambassador in Rome that they

would not go into the League of Nations unless they got what they wanted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he had sent to M. Venizelos a telegram that he had received from the Central Committee of unredeemed Hellenes at Athens, to the effect that recent events, especially in the Smyrna district, indicated that the Turks, stimulated by some outside power (this, no doubt, was Italy) were continuing their policy of oppression and massacre; the telegram concluded by asking for forces to be sent. M. Venizelos had replied that the Italians were undoubtedly stirring up the Turks, and no doubt there was an understanding between them. This strengthened the view that an Inter-Allied force should be sent to Smyrna.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that the Italian policy was clearly to lead the Allied and Associated Powers to the point where they could not make peace in common because Great Britain and France were bound by the Treaty of London which President Wilson could not recognise. We ought to let them know beforehand that by not coming to Versailles they had broken the Pact of London to which they had adhered, and by which it was agreed not to make peace separately. We should show that if they broke the Pact of London we were not bound.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that it depended upon how the promise not to make a separate peace was interpreted. The Italians had been a party to the Armistice, they had been a party to the preliminary peace, a party (as Mr. Lloyd George pointed out) to the basis of the peace, and

a party to the discussions on the peace. On the very eve of the negotiations with the Germans, they had withdrawn on a matter that had nothing to do with those negotiations.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that we should let them know that if they withdraw they are breaking the Pact of London, and we are not bound by the Treaty. We must let them know that if Italy breaks it, she must take the consequences.

*Clemenceau  
suggests a  
warning*

PRESIDENT WILSON said it must be made clear that it was Italy and not France and Great Britain that were breaking the Treaty.

M. CLEMENCEAU said the day was coming when this must be made known.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had told the Marquis Imperiali that if Italy abstained from being present it would be an end to the Pact of London. Unfortunately there was no note of this conversation.

PRESIDENT WILSON recalled that Mr. Lloyd George had told him."

Another long discussion took place on May 3rd when the Foreign Ministers were introduced. Information from the Embassies at Rome indicated that the Italians were expecting an offer. Baron Sonnino had sent a letter to the French Ambassador in Rome commenting on the fact that the Delegates of Austria and Hungary had been asked to Paris without consultation with the Italians. As the decision to invite the Austrians and Hungarians had been taken after the Italian Delegation had left, how, I asked, could the Italians have been consulted?

*Italy stays  
away*

M. Clemenceau said they had been informed immediately the decision had been taken.

Later,

“PRESIDENT WILSON said that the whole trend of the Press was to show that France and Great Britain were not acting with the United States and that he (Wilson) had not the support of the heads of those States. This is why he wanted the memorandum to Signor Orlando to be published so as to show clearly that their views were similar to his own. . . . He wanted to warn his colleagues that if they were not careful an impression would be given that there was a serious rift between France and Great Britain on the one hand and the United States on the other. The effect of this would be that United States’ opinion would say: ‘We will get out of this.’

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said it was necessary to speak very frankly in the intimacy of these conversations. It must not be forgotten that there was a growing feeling that Europe was being bullied by the United States of America. In London this feeling was very strong and the matter had to be handled with the greatest care. Any such rift would be the saddest possible ending to the present Conference. It would put an end to the League of Nations. He understood that the London Press had behaved extremely well and had not gone as far as British public opinion. The position was one of real danger and wanted to be handled with the greatest care, otherwise we might have the worst catastrophe since 1914.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was indispensable clearly to show Italy that in all essentials Great Britain,



France and the United States were united, otherwise the Italians would continue to be troublesome.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that in fact they were not completely united. In regard to Fiume they were united. M. Clemenceau and he, *Our loyalty to the Pact of London* however, were not in the same position as President Wilson, owing to the fact that they were bound by the Treaty of London.

PRESIDENT WILSON pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau had both signed the memorandum to Signor Orlando. This showed that they were united with him in judgment even though not in position.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that it was no use being united in judgment when a decision was wanted about the fundamentals on which you differed. France and Great Britain were bound by the Treaty of London. If Italy insisted he was bound to stand by the Treaty. He could not possibly help that. This was the bottom fact of the whole situation.

PRESIDENT WILSON thought that this was a position which could not be got out of. Moreover, it was an indefensible position. The Treaty had been entered into when only a little group of nations was at war. Since then half the world had joined in. There could be no right in coercing other parties to this Treaty which were just as much bound by conscience as Great Britain and France were by the Treaty. It was neither good morals nor good statesmanship.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Great Britain had been brought into the war largely in protest against the breach of a Treaty. She could not contemplate herself breaking a Treaty at the end

of the War when the other partner to the Treaty had lost half a million lives in giving effect to it. This had been worrying him for several days past.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this made it the more important to find some way out. The stage ought to be so set as not to encourage the Italians to come back. M. Clemenceau's document was more than an invitation for them to return. It was a challenge. He would prefer the first document that had been read with a recital of the facts added. A clear narration should be given of the facts and a very important statement in Signor Orlando's letter to M. Clemenceau dated April 23rd in which he stated that: 'The terms of Peace with Germany may henceforth be considered a settlement in their essential elements' should be referred to. Then the case would be clear that if Italy were to break off the responsibility would be theirs.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Italians would then formulate a long reply, and a controversy would be commenced. He agreed to every word that President Wilson had said but he was really afraid that they might come back.

MR. BALFOUR said . . . The difficulty was how to get a real agreement in conformity with our treaties. The only way seemed to be to get the Italians to admit that they had broken the Treaty which they really had done.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Italy had broken both treaties, because her demands were more than the Treaty of London gave her. He had never for a moment given the smallest indication that he agreed to the Treaty of London.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he could not altogether accept any suggestion that President Wilson's  
IT °

*My appreciation of the Italian difficulty* statement voiced the British view. He thought that Italy had a real case connected with her security in demanding the islands in the Adriatic. President Wilson had agreed that the ethnic principle was not the only one that could be adopted by admitting that Italy should have a great part of the Tyrol. He himself would apply the same principle to the Islands, in default of which, Italy's east coast would be seriously menaced.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that against Austria-Hungary this was the case.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the same applied if Austria-Hungary had allies. If we were to say 'You have broken the treaty,' there would be an end of the matter. In M. Clemenceau's document we said 'You will have broken it if you do not come back.' If there must be a break, a break with Italy would be bad enough, but not a disaster; a break with the United States would be a disaster.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked why the Treaty of London should be mentioned in the Note. Mr. Lloyd George had been almost brutally frank with Signor Orlando on this point. He wished that the memorandum to Signor Orlando might be published. (M. Clemenceau interjected that this was his view.) All that was now necessary was to show that Italy was breaking the Pact. The first document read, however, did not prove the case sufficiently.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he would prefer to publish the memorandum signed by Mr. Lloyd George and himself first. If any other document were published first, the public would not understand the situation, which could not be made clear without the  
*Clemenceau wants to publish our joint memorandum*

memorandum. There were certain objections, but by this means alone could the position be fully explained. He and Mr. Lloyd George had all along approved of the general lines of President Wilson's statement, and it must be made clear that they had not differed from it. On the eve of very serious events, it must be shown that Great Britain and France had always stood with the United States of America, otherwise if some other documents were published first, it would be said that they had wavered. It was true that Signor Orlando did not want the memorandum published, but this was a case of a choice between two evils and the least disadvantageous was to publish the memorandum.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he must make it clear that President Wilson had not put the view of the British Government in his statement, and that was why he had wanted a separate document to be sent to Signor Orlando. Without it, Signor Orlando would not know what the British attitude was.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that memorandum showed clearly what the British and French view was as matters stood. He said that he had to keep his private secretary in the United States reassured that there was no difference between him and Great Britain and France.

MR. BALFOUR confirmed this by stating that he had received a telegram from Lord Reading who was about to make a speech in New York, and who had indicated that there was this idea of a separation between the American view and the British and French view. He had telegraphed back that there was not the smallest difference in policy between them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said not at present.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he was not shrinking from the results of our policy. The League of Nations, however, would be finished, *Danger of fresh warfare* if the first Power that defied it did so with impunity. Moreover if Italy was left in Fiume, there would be fighting between her and the Yugoslavs. Were we to allow the Italian armies to march to Belgrade? He only said these things to show that we were really determining a great policy at the present time.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that Mr. Lloyd George had been arguing that if the memorandum were published, it would prevent the Italians coming back.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said the indications at the present time were that if the Italians came back, they would ask for impossible terms. He, himself, hoped that Italy might still be willing to accept the compromise that he had proposed, namely, that Fiume should remain an absolutely free port; that they should evacuate Dalmatia, perhaps with some provision for free cities; and that they should take the Islands.

M. CLEMENCEAU doubted if this was possible.

At a later meeting on the same day, May 3rd, I described an interview I had had with the Marquis Imperiali, and M. Clemenceau told of a conversation he had had with the Italian Ambassador, Count Bonin. *My plain speaking to the Italians*

The Marquis had communicated to me the gist of a telegram he had received from Rome. He had not given me a copy, and I had to rely on my memory. "Signor Orlando had said that there was

very little object in returning to Paris. There was no basis for an agreement in regard to Fiume."

I told the Marquis that:—

"If Italy was not present on Tuesday then the Allies would no longer be bound by the Pact. The Marquis had replied that this was a very serious situation. Mr. Lloyd George's rejoinder was that it was no more serious than he himself had in that very room warned the Marquis Imperiali that it would be. He had warned Signor Orlando in exactly the same sense. He had also reminded him that Signor Orlando had acted against the advice of Baron Sonnino. The Marquis Imperiali had then said: 'Won't you make us some offer?' Mr. Lloyd George had replied: 'To whom shall we make it? Can you receive an offer?' The Marquis Imperiali replied that he could transmit one. Mr. Lloyd George then said that it was impossible to deal with people who were hundreds of miles away, and had no responsible person with authority to act for them. If the Italian representatives did not come back, there was no official person with whom negotiations could take place. The Marquis Imperiali then said that the Italian representatives ought to know this."

I told the Marquis that:—

"the Italian Government would be under an entire delusion if they thought they could get Fiume. The Allied and Associated Powers were absolutely united on that point. They were united quite apart from the question of principle, because the Treaty of London gave Fiume to the Croats."

A compromise that had been suggested was that it might be arranged that Fiume should become a free port, instead of being given to the Croats, on condition that the Italians gave up to the Serbo-Croats the Dalmatian Coast. The Marquis Imperiali had asked Mr. Lloyd George if he would put this in writing, and Mr. Lloyd George had declined."

M. Clemenceau's conversation with Count Bonin had been almost identical. Count Bonin had asked M. Clemenceau what his point of view was. He had replied that he would certainly give it, and he had given him a piece of his mind. "He had told him that he could see what was the game they were playing, but they could not get a quarrel between the Allies and President Wilson about Fiume." Count Bonin said that Orlando could not come back and conduct the negotiations, because he could not afford to fail. Count Bonin added: "I suppose we must hurry up." M. Clemenceau replied: "Yes, you had better be as quick as you can." Asked if he would help them, Clemenceau replied: "Certainly, if your proposal is a feasible one."

M. Clemenceau told the Conference that he thought that in 24 hours suggestions would come from Italy.

I recalled that I told the Marquis that the Allies were going to "press on with making these Treaties of Peace, and they could not delay simply because Italy would not settle on the subject of Fiume. I had impressed strongly on him that peace would be made whether Italy were represented or not."

Two days later (May 5th), the Italians intimated that they were returning.

"M. PICHON said he had had a verbal note from Count Bonin, conveying a message from Baron Sonnino. The gist of this was that, having received a vote of complete confidence from the Italian Parliament, and not desiring to complicate the situation at this very serious moment by any positive or negative act which might be interpreted as putting back the peace, and confident in the assurance by their Allies of their desire to obtain a peace satisfactory to all and in the general interest, the President of the Council and Baron Sonnino had decided to leave for Paris, arriving on Wednesday morning, with the hope of being present when the Treaty of Peace was handed to the Germans."

*Italians  
decide to  
rejoin  
conference*

It was reported that:—

"1. Additional Italian troops had been sent to Sebenico.

2. There had been serious oppression by the Italians in the Dodecanese and in a village in Rhodes named Allanova a bishop had actually been killed in the church where he was officiating, while a woman had also been killed by the Italians."

On May 6th I drew attention to an article in the *Matin*, which was generally well informed about Italian affairs. This indicated that Italy would now claim the sovereignty of Fiume under the League of Nations.

"PRESIDENT WILSON asked how long it would take the Italians to realise that they could not



get Fiume under any circumstances. The only advantage in letting the Italians have Fiume would be that it would break the Treaty of London, which he was disturbed to find allotted the Dodecanese to Italy.

M. CLEMENCEAU said he had bad news of Italian military movements. . . .

Italy had seven battleships at Smyrna. This meant that they intended to land troops. It was said that Italy was making trouble between the Greeks and Turks, and having done so they would land troops with the ostensible object of keeping the peace."

*Trouble  
brewing in  
Asia Minor*

At a meeting of the Council of Four on May 12th, during a discussion on the expedition to Smyrna, I said that:—

"according to my information, three Italian landings had taken place without any notice to their Allies, namely, at Makri Marmaris, Budrum and at Scala Nuova. I asked if that was true and what was the reason for them.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that there was also a landing at Adalia.

M. ORLANDO said it was on this question that he wished to consult Baron Sonnino, who knew all about the matter.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked that he would take particular note of the landings mentioned by Mr. Lloyd George."

Italian problems were again discussed by the Council of Four on May the 13th, 1919. The Italian

Ministers were absent. President Wilson produced some suggestions for the solution of the Adriatic problems—a plebiscite all down the Dalmatian coast, a plebiscite for the area between the “Wilson line” and the line drawn by the Treaty of London, and a plebiscite in Fiume. Later he said:—

*Wilson  
makes fresh  
suggestions*

“that the decision from which he could not depart was that the Conference had no right to hand over people to a sovereignty they did not wish. If, by hook or by crook, the Italians obtained Fiume, how were the British and French then bound to give them Dalmatia?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that if the Italians obtained Fiume, the British and French were entitled definitely to say that they must give up Dalmatia.

PRESIDENT WILSON said the difficulty was that public opinion in Italy was far more inflamed about Fiume than about Dalmatia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he wished to explain the conception he had formed of the Italian case, which he thought had never been quite understood. Italy had a good deal of national pride. Their feelings of resentment had sprung not merely from their treatment in regard to Fiume, but over the whole field of the Treaty of Peace. They were not being treated quite as a great first-class Power. In fact, not quite as equals of the other great Powers. They realised that there were a certain number of backward people to be taken in hand by more efficient nations. They knew the question had arisen, for example, as to whether the United States could take in hand certain parts

of Turkey, an onerous and difficult task. No one, however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. Consequently their pride of race was hurt. They knew that the Japanese were being allowed to accept a mandate in the Pacific, but no one was saying to Italy 'will you not take charge of this or the other backward people? It would be much better to settle the question of Fiume in this sort of atmosphere. The principal Allied and Associated Powers were the real trustees for the League of Nations looking after the backward races, and, for a long time, they would remain the trustees for the League of Nations.

(President Wilson agreed.)

. . . The question now arose as to whether Italy should not be asked to take charge of a certain area in the dismembered Empire of Turkey. The Italians, he pointed out, were an extremely gifted race. It was curious in this war, how they had developed some of the qualities for which the Romans had been famous. For example, they were amazingly good engineers and had created the most wonderful roads. . . . He had been trying to give his colleagues a picture of what was in his mind. Why should we not say frankly to the Italians 'we have not quite worked you into the picture yet'? He thought that the Italians had been underrated. Consider for example, the question of police. . . . He was not proposing that Italy should be offered a mandate for the whole of Anatolia, but why, he asked, should they not be invited to police and develop a part of Anatolia, where they would find a country not dissimilar from their own. . . . Many of its southern valleys—

*I suggest an  
Italian  
mandate*

formerly fertile—were almost devoid of population. He was told that before the War, Italian emigration had been as great as 800,000, to 900,000 a year. Why should these not be diverted to these undeveloped and unpopulated regions in Turkey? He felt that the whole frame of mind of the Italian representatives would change if questions could be discussed as a whole in that spirit. There was Somaliland. He knew there were difficulties in regard to this. Directly the question was raised, the French said they could not live without Djibouti, and the British said much the same about their Asia. Turning to M. Clemenceau, he said that if France could not give up something here, neither could we. He thought, however, something might be done even in that quarter.

PRESIDENT WILSON agreed that Mr. Lloyd George had stated the case on right principles. He would like, however, to set out the plan in parts. Considering first the part of Anatolia which needed supervision, he would like Smyrna and the adjacent district, as proposed in the report of the Greek Commission, to be united to Greece, in complete sovereignty. The same would apply to the Dodecanese. In addition, he would like to give Greece a mandate for the remainder of the territory claimed by M. Veniselos."

A suggestion was made by me that the United States should undertake the mandate for Armenia and Constantinople.

"PRESIDENT WILSON said he could not settle this question until he had returned to the United

States and definitely ascertained whether the United States would accept a mandate."

Later it was agreed that I should draw up a scheme for Asia Minor and President Wilson one for Dalmatia.

During the period when Orlando was at Rome the Italian Government had decided to take action on the coast of Asia Minor and Dalmatia.

*Italian  
moves at  
Smyrna*

It also practically recognised the irregular occupation of Fiume. The Conference was to be faced with accomplished facts in Austria and Turkey. The threatened occupation of Smyrna by Italians created serious disturbances in the town, which was overwhelmingly Greek. But Greek and Turk alike resented and dreaded an Italian occupation. The Greeks were invited to land a force at Smyrna to preserve order. Orlando had provisionally agreed that an occupation by a Greek force was necessary to avoid disturbance.

The Italians had broken the Pact of London by their occupation of Fiume. The Turkish clauses of the Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne were nugatory owing to the failure to secure Russian assent, which was an essential condition.

Before the next meeting of the Council of Four, President Wilson and Clemenceau agreed to act upon the suggestion I had made at the last meeting, to present to the Italian delegation, if and when it returned, a fairly complete picture not only of the territorial obligations which the United States should be invited to undertake in Turkey, but of the Italian claims and interests which the Council proposed should be conceded in that Empire. The actual proposals put forward will be dealt with in the chapter

dealing with the Turkish Treaty. It will suffice here to say that the territory to be placed under Italian control in Anatolia was considerable.

When the Council met on May the 26th, 1919, the question of procedure to be adopted with regard to the Austrian Treaty was again discussed. Signor Orlando demurred at the proposed difference of procedure as compared with the German Treaty.

“M. CLEMENCEAU said that he was ready to make every effort to meet Signor Orlando, because he had learned from experience that, when the Allies were not in agreement with Italy, the immediate result was anti-French and sometimes even pro-German demonstrations in Italy that were extraordinarily disagreeable. He wanted, above all things, to avoid any differences with Italy. . . . The Austrian Peace was very different from, and, in many respects, much harder to arrive at than the German, for the reason that the country had fallen to pieces, raising all sorts of questions of boundaries and there were conflicts arising on the Polish front and elsewhere in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Istria, he learned that trenches and barbed wire were being put up by both sides. President Wilson had come to Europe with a programme of peace for all men. His ideal was a very high one, but it involved great difficulties, owing to these century-old hatreds between some races. We had in Central Europe to give each what was his due not only between them, but even between ourselves. For example, to take the question of disarmament? Signor Orlando had been good enough to visit him on the previous day to

*Clemenceau  
appeals to  
the Italians*

discuss the question of Dalmatia; but the Yugoslavs would not agree to disarm themselves while Italy adopted her present attitude. . . . There was a pronounced pro-German propaganda in Italy, where enormous sums were being expended by Germany. All this ought to be stopped and there was only one way to stop it. It was necessary to have the courage to tackle and solve the most difficult questions as soon as possible. It was not at all easy to do so and could only be done if Signor Orlando would take the standpoint that he must preserve the Entente with his Allies. He recalled that, in the previous week, he had a serious disagreement with Mr. Lloyd George on the question of Syria when both had spoken very frankly. Nevertheless, both had concluded by saying that they would not allow their differences to upset the Entente. The same was not said in certain quarters in Italy.

SIGNOR ORLANDO in his reply said: The trouble there (in Italy) arose from uncertainty. Once the Italian claims were settled, it would be found that Italy was as sincerely loyal to the cause of the Entente as before.

At a meeting later in the same day:—

“M. CLEMENCEAU said he wished to make a last appeal to his Italian colleague. The situation had fortunately not as yet reached the worst point of gravity. Nevertheless, it was necessary to present the terms to the Austrians very shortly, and consequently it was impossible to leave them much longer at St. Germain without a conversation. Yesterday he had seen Signor Orlando, and had explained to him

the gravity of the present situation for France as well as for Italy. Signor Orlando, with his usual open-mindedness, had said that some proposal must be made. First, however, some definite conversations must take place. He did not want to anticipate Signor Orlando's proposals, but he hoped that some proposal would be made to get out of the difficulty. It would be an immeasurable relief, even if an unsatisfactory solution could be reached, and this relief would extend not only to Governments but to peoples. If Signor Orlando was not prepared to propose anything to-day, he hoped he would do so as early as possible.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said that, as he had remarked this morning, it would be a veritable liberation to get a solution. . . . M. Clemenceau had asked what was the decision of Italy? . . . From the Italian point of view, what he desired was some transaction which would involve an agreement, but, failing that, he must claim the Treaty, however undesirable.

PRESIDENT WILSON said . . . If Italy insisted on the Treaty of London, she would strike at the roots of the new system and undermine the new order. The United States would be asked under the Covenant of the League of Nations to guarantee the boundaries of Italy, and they could not do so if this Treaty were insisted on. Later he said he was willing that Italy should have any part on the eastward slope of the Istrian Peninsula whose population would vote to be attached to Italy. Only he could not assent to any population being attached that did not so vote. He wanted to point out to Signor Orlando that Great Britain and

*Wilson  
suggests a  
plebiscite  
in Dalmatia*



France could not hand over any part of Yugoslavia to Italy, and that it could not be a legal transaction, except in accordance with the general peace; that is to say, only in the event of all parties being in agreement. It was constantly urged in the Italian Press and by Italian spokesmen that they did not want to abandon the Italians on the other side of the Adriatic. Was it not possible to obtain all she desired by means of a plebiscite? There would be no risk to Italy to leave the operation of a plebiscite to be carried out under the League of Nations. Italy herself would be a member of the League of Nations, and there would be no possibility of her being treated unfairly. . . . It was impossible for Italy to adopt both methods. Either she must abandon the new methods altogether, or else she must wholly abandon the old methods and enter into the new world with the new methods under conditions more hopeful for peace than had ever before prevailed.

SIGNOR ORLANDO said he could not admit that the Treaty of London was a violation of the principles of justice and right. . . . It was a com-

*Orlando* promise because of the admixture of  
*rejects it* races. . . . He much regretted that he could not possibly accept a plebiscite.

His first reason for rejecting it was that it would prolong the present state of anxiety in Italy. His second objection was the complexity of the problems. He could not deny, for example, that on the eastern slope of the Istrian Alps, the majority of the inhabitants were Slavs. Consequently, a plebiscite would not give the right result to Italy. But in this case he had to seek a different principle from the ethnographical principle, namely, that the line

of the Alps was the defence of his country. His third reason—and he did not wish to make comparisons detrimental to other peoples—was that there was a different state of culture in Yugoslavia from Italy, because there was a different state of civilisation.

M. CLEMENCEAU said that what struck him was that Signor Orlando never made a proposal. From the beginning of these discussions he had never once made any definite proposal. He had made a claim to Fiume. He had applied the principle of self-determination to Fiume. But when he came to discuss Dalmatia he had dropped the principle. There was another contradiction in his method. He had claimed the Treaty of London as regards Dalmatia, but when it came to Fiume, he had proposed to break the Treaty of London. Yet another argument was that, as President Wilson said, the Treaty of London was not really a solution. . . . M. Clemenceau again insisted that Signor Orlando never made a proposal. To-day, all he could suggest was the Treaty of London, but this meant anarchy and the continuation of war. He asked Signor Orlando to make proposals.

SIGNOR ORLANDO undertook to do so."

On the 25th of May the Italian Premier wrote me a letter which was an informal and unofficial communication of his own personal and confidential opinions. The earnestness, intimacy and frankness with which he expressed himself gives it special value at the present time.

"I refer to the Italian situation. Public opinion in Italy, already irritated by the unusual public statement which President Wilson saw fit to make, has been more and more exasperated by the neglect in which it feels it is left and by the failure to come to any decision on the most important problems which concern it.

The Italian public believes that it has the right to be relieved from this situation of absolute uncertainty, which not only affects its vital interests, but also its dignity and its right to enjoy that peace and security which it has made such great sacrifices to conquer.

It is this feeling of neglect which most deeply wounds public opinion in Italy at this time. I have every reason to believe that if the anxiety and tension now prevalent in Italy are not soon relieved, the consequences may be of incalculable gravity.

Were Italy to be the sole sufferer from all this I feel sure that even then the situation would claim your earnest attention and that you would do all in your power to avert the consequences. I know the friendship you profess for my country, and I also know that that friendship is in accordance with the traditional policy of Great Britain. But speaking to a statesman of your calibre I feel sure that you cannot fail to realise the absolutely intolerable situation which would arise in Europe if the peace which is about to be concluded were to give rise in the Italian people to the impression that its position is that of a conquered rather than of a victorious nation.

*Orlando's  
letter to me*

*Appeal to  
Britain*

As it is, I cannot look forward without grave apprehensions to the future of continental Europe; the German longing for revenge must be considered in conjunction with the Russian position. We can thus see even now that the settlement to be arrived at will lack the assent of more than half the population of the European continent. If we detach from the block on which the new European system will have to rely for support forty million Italians, and force them into the ranks of the malcontents, do you think that the new order will rest on a firm basis? Do you not think that a dreadful period of absolute international anarchy will dawn for continental Europe?

You are an eminent statesman, the representative of a noble and powerful nation with a great political tradition. I am confident that you will fully appreciate the gravity of this appeal, and that the extraordinary resourcefulness, which characterises you, will enable you to find an adequate and rapid solution, such as will avoid the realisation of events pregnant with terrible possibilities.

This letter is in no wise to be taken as an official utterance, it is merely personal, and does not even call for an answer. My only wish is to acquaint you with my views, in this hour fraught with such grave difficulties and dangers.

Cordially yours,

V. E. ORLANDO."

To this friendly letter I replied in the same spirit:—

"28th May, 1919.

My dear Friend,

I am very grateful for the frankness with which you have written to me, for if we are to solve

the difficulties of the present situation  
*My reply* it is essential that we should be able to  
 maintain those cordial and friendly  
 relations which have always characterised our intercourse hitherto.

You put before me very clearly the view of the present situation as it appears to the Italian Government and people. I hope you will allow me to set forth the situation as I view it with equal clearness. What has the present trouble arisen out of? It is due entirely to the fact that Italy is claiming to annex to her dominion territories, the overwhelming majority of whose peoples would prefer to attach themselves to another sovereignty. If a plebiscite were taken in the disputed regions, there can be no doubt in anyone's mind that a vast majority would cast their votes in favour of the Slavonic flag rather than the Italian. Put quite brutally that is the fundamental fact which underlies the present differences. The Dalmatian coast claimed by Italy is at least five to one Slavonic. That is the case with regard to the Islands. It is true that the old town of Fiume possesses a slight Italian majority, but if you take the suburb which is indistinguishable from ancient Fiume the majority is slightly Slavonic. The surrounding country is almost exclusively Slav. Italy could not submit her claims to any test which would be recognised by modern democratic principles. Is there any claim put forward by any other country of which this can be said? If not, it is no use suggesting that there is one rule being applied to the claims of Britain and France and another rule to Italy. In Mesopotamia and Palestine we have agreed to abide by the Report of

an impartial Commission sent there to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants. Would Italy be prepared to accept the Report of a Commission appointed by the Powers as to the wishes of the inhabitants of the claimed territories? That is the real test of the validity of Italian claims.

*A challenge  
to Italy*

I am sincerely apprehensive lest Italy should pursue a course which will lead to disaster for her future. She is one of the great free countries of the world and any harm that would befall Italy would damage the cause of freedom everywhere. As you point out, she is in danger of becoming estranged from the three Great Powers who, together with Italy, defeated the enemy coalition and are now both in prestige and strength incomparably the greatest combination in the world. Yet while pressing claims which France, America and the British Empire are unable or reluctant to concede, because they feel they cannot be justified by the principles upon which they are endeavouring to found the peace, Italy is at the same time laying up a blood feud with the other two great races of Europe—the Germans and the Slavs. On the one side she is forcibly incorporating territories populated almost exclusively by hundreds of thousands of people of purely German stock within her own territory, people with an intense national consciousness, as Napoleon discovered to his cost over a century ago. On the other side she is endeavouring to take for herself territory and peoples who are universally recognised to belong to the Slavs. If Italy pursues that course I don't see how she is to escape a position of dangerous isolation.

I write as I do in response to your letter both as a sincere personal admirer of Italy and because it has always been a fundamental British tradition to sympathise with the Italian people and their aspirations. I earnestly hope it will be possible for Italy to apply to the settlement of her own problems the principles which have been universally accepted elsewhere. You may rest assured that neither the British Delegation nor the British people have the slightest desire to keep from Italy whatever can be justly given to her in view of her great sacrifices for the common cause of freedom. If difficulties have arisen it is not from any want of friendship for Italy. As you know I have throughout done my best to explore every possible method of making a general settlement which would be satisfactory to Italy's national aspirations. If we have not succeeded it is simply because we have been unable hitherto to reconcile the claims of Italy with the ideals and principles which we have been endeavouring to apply to the other parts of the settlement of the Great War.

*British  
goodwill  
for her*

Ever sincerely,  
D. LLOYD GEORGE."

Signor Orlando wrote me again on June 3rd, as follows:—

"Paris, June 3rd, 1919.

Dear Friend,

Your reply of 28th to my letter of 25th is all the more welcome as in that letter I had pointed out that it was not my intention to open up an exchange of views, but that it was to be understood as a purely personal and friendly step, which did not even call for a reply.

*Orlando's  
rejoinder*

This is an additional reason for thanking you for the trouble you have taken in answering and for your expressions of friendship towards my country, a friendship of which I have never doubted but of which it is always pleasant to receive the assurance.

I regret however that your letter compels me to reply, for I cannot leave unanswered some of the opinions you express unfavourable to Italian National aspirations. Not indeed that I am sorry that you should have given me your opinion, for frankness, even in saying disagreeable things, has always been deemed by me a proof of friendship. But it remains to be seen whether the severity of your judgment is or is not justified by facts.

You say, in substance, that the aspirations of Italy seem excessive, and are contrary to those principles of democracy which have guided the decisions of the Peace Conference. Your letter only adduces two facts in proof of this grave assertion:

1. that we would annex some few hundred thousand people of alien race;
2. that Italy refuses to submit to the test of a plebiscite the manifestations of the wishes of these people.

Allow me to say in reply that neither of these arguments are sufficient to justify your conclusion. As far as the numerical statement is concerned, I will only say that the number of people of alien race annexed by our decisions to other States is far in excess of that claimed by Italy when considered in proportion to the total population of those States. What are the 700,000 Germans and Slavs included in the integral claims of Italy which has a population of forty million Italians,

*Precedents  
for Italian  
proposals*



when compared to the three million Hungarians and Germans given to the Czechs, the total population of whose State is ten millions? And the same holds good of other countries.

As for the Plebiscite, can you claim that it is a rule followed by the Conference? We see on the contrary that most of the annexations which the Conference has so far sanctioned have not been based on a plebiscite, which is provided for only in exceptional circumstances and in restricted cases.

I therefore think that I am right in saying that the two arguments which you bring forward do not seem adequate to substantiate your assertion that Italian aspirations are in contrast with the fundamental principles of the Conference. Rather it seems to me that it would be more correct to say that the principles which our Conference has followed, far from excluding, have sanctioned the right of uniting considerable numbers of alien people to a country without having recourse to a plebiscite.

The only essential thing to know is whether there are valid reasons for so doing, and to show that such reasons exist in the case of Italy I should have once more to call your attention to the books we have published and to the long speeches made by myself and by my Colleague Sonnino in several of our meetings, and this would be out of place in this letter.

I cannot however refrain from adding a point which links up the recognition of the justice of Italian aspirations with a document in the drafting of which your Government solemnly participated,

*Appeal to  
Pact of  
London*

I refer to the declarations contained in the Treaty of 1915 which you have always said that you stand by. Now for my part the value of that document

consists in the fact that it anticipated the decisions to be taken for arriving at a just settlement of Italy's frontiers; in other words, France and Great Britain in 1915 anticipated the settlement to be made at the close of the war. Any other interpretation of that document which would imply that it made an arbitrary assignment of the populations involved, and one not based on just motives, would certainly be discreditable to Italy, but it would also be discreditable to the other Governments which participated in that act, who would thus have assumed responsibility for an act contrary to justice; and this we must exclude.

However considerable may be the progress which has been made during this terrible war by the human family, it would seem to me an exaggeration to suppose that in a lapse of four years, from 1915 to 1919, the basic elements in the conception of justice, a conception born with man, have been so profoundly modified as to make unjust to-day that which seemed just four years ago.

Anyhow, this does not mean that I have not always been and am desirous of finding a compromise which will solve the present difficulties, and you have seen how far I have been willing to go, but I consider that as a question of political opportuneness, and not as a necessity of justice.

With renewed thanks for your expressions of friendship which I cordially reciprocate in behalf of my Country,

I am,

Sincerely yours,

V. L. ORLANDO."

To which I replied:—

“11th June, 1919.

My dear Friend,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 3rd June. In view of the frank and friendly manner in which we have exchanged our opinions I do not think there is much to add to the letters which have already passed. I should like, however, to point out that there is all the difference in the world between transferring territories inhabited by minorities of Germans or Hungarians, however much the total number, and transferring territories inhabited by overwhelming majorities of peoples alien in race and sentiment from the country to which they are to be annexed. I have always understood that the principle we were following in the peace settlement was that frontiers should be drawn, to the utmost extent practicable, in accordance with ethnic majorities. In almost all cases where there is serious doubt as to the wishes of the population we have provided for plebiscites.

I should also like to point out that the Treaty of 1915 was not drawn up on the basis that it was a just settlement as between Italy and its neighbours in the light of the tremendous transformation which had been brought over the scene by the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It represented an arrangement between the Italian Government on the one side and the Governments of Great Britain and France on the other, which settled the terms and conditions under which Italy would join the Allies against Germany. It was a bargain rather than a settlement based upon

*My counter  
arguments*

justice, and as a bargain the Government of Great Britain is prepared to honour its bargain, even though it considers that in the interests of Italy no less than in the interests of Europe modifications in the Treaty ought to be made in view of the tremendous change in the conditions which have come into being since 1915."

There were many further conferences and informal consultations with a view to arriving at a compromise which would be acceptable to both Signor Orlando and President Wilson. We all exhausted our best endeavours to find a solution; but they were in vain. It was a conversation over this raging dispute, to which M. Clemenceau and myself had been invited by Colonel House to talk over the position, that created the breach between Wilson and House which I have described in a previous chapter, and which was never repaired. The former resented House's unauthorised intervention and as a result withdrew from him his confidence.

The failure of Orlando and Sonnino to achieve the Italian objectives, especially in reference to Fiume, brought about the resignation of the Orlando Ministry on June the 21st. A new Ministry was formed by Signor Nitti, with Signor Tittoni as Foreign Secretary. I am persuaded that Signor Orlando was anxious to settle, and that personally he would have been satisfied to do so on the terms which I sketched at the meeting of the Council of Four on the 24th of April. But his impulsive flight to Rome, and his public commitments to the excitable crowds that met him there, created for him an insuperable obstacle in the path of reconciliation. He was not only an impressive but an impressionable orator. That is,

he was the type of speaker who allows himself to be led along beyond his reasoned objective by the intoxicating applause of a friendly crowd. He had been greeted as a hero for the stand he had made in Paris for his country against the heads of the most powerful countries in the world, and he wanted to assure his countrymen that he would not in the future fall short of the role they had assigned to him.

Signor Nitti was a man of exceptional quality as an administrator and a statesman. He did not belong to the Imperialistic school founded by Crespi. Neither had Signor Tittoni the annexationist instincts of his distinguished predecessor. They were both more concerned with the internal conditions in Italy after the exhaustion and the burdens of the War.

As President Wilson left for the United States and I left for England immediately after the signature of the German Treaty on the 28th day of June, there was no opportunity for a collective discussion with the new Italian Ministers of any proposals—new or old—for settling the Italian claims. But negotiations continued partly by correspondence, partly by conversations with Nitti and Tittoni. They were prolonged into 1920.

I discuss the Italian claims further in Chapter VIII (Turkey).

Memoranda stating and restating the case on both sides, rebutting and surrebutting arguments for or against, were interchanged from time to time between the representatives of *More memoranda :* France and Britain on the one hand and *Mr. Balfour's argument* of Italy on the other. There was nothing fresh in any of these documents. But there is an extract from a Memorandum prepared by M.

Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour which has a special interest, because of its bearing on the situation in Czechoslovakia:—

“Italy desires to maintain the Treaty of London: and also to obtain Fiume. She cannot evidently do both. Italy desires to regulate European frontiers according to the principle of self-determination: and also to obtain large portions of the Dalmatian coast and the adjacent islands. Again she cannot do both.

Italy recognises the need for including America in any settlement that may be arrived at: but she also desires to acquire territories which cannot be hers with the good will of America if the latter adheres to President Wilson’s declared interpretation of the Fourteen Points. Again we must observe that no one has yet suggested a scheme by which these two apparent incompatibles may be reconciled.

The difficulties we have enumerated are familiar to Your Excellency, and doubtless all the other Associated Powers, are, in their several degrees, confronted like Italy with problems arising out of the unforeseen historical developments of the last four years. But so far as the Adriatic question is concerned, it is Italy which should provide us with a solution. For *there* Italy alone, among the Associated Powers of the West, has material ambition to satisfy. All four are pledged to the principle of self-determination; three have signed the Treaty of London. But only to Italy can it matter from a territorial, military, naval or economic point of view, what arrangements be finally adopted. Let Italy then suggest a policy which, without being

forgetful of her interests, is consistent with her principles—and with ours.

There is one subsidiary contention contained in Your Excellency's Memorandum on which it is necessary to say a word before bringing this portion of our reply to a close.

Your Excellency writes as if Italy were receiving less considerate treatment from her associates than other Allied States, and in particular as if the principle of self-determination and nationality were applied in her case with a rigidity of interpretation quite absent in the cases, for example, of Poland or Bohemia.

We are unable to agree with this view. It is of course true that in this world of complex relations no abstract rule can be simply and (as it were) mechanically applied. Considerations based on history and ethnology; on religion, culture, and language; on administrative conveniences; on economic independence and military security, may unite districts which would otherwise be separated, and separate districts which would otherwise be united. The determination of the new frontier of Italy in the North presents an example of this procedure which, to many lovers of Italy, has been a cause of painful surprise. They say, and say truly, that if language, race, and the wishes of the population had in this case governed the decision of the Conference, Southern Tyrol would never have been Italian. Self-determination, however, and nationality were outweighed by strategic considerations; and Italy obtained what she desired—the frontier of the Alps.

The case of Bohemia also presents difficulties.

Here also there is a German area included in a non-German State; and here also geographical and strategical reasons may be fairly urged in favour of the anomaly.

*The precedent  
of Bohemia  
examined*

But historical and economic considerations have even a greater weight. Since the Middle Ages Bohemia has been a political unity, sometimes a separate and independent Kingdom, sometimes an independent Kingdom united to its neighbours through the person of its monarch, sometimes within and sometimes without the Holy Roman Empire, latterly a unit in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. But through every change she has possessed a continuous unity, and a national territory immemorially divided from Germany proper by its range of encircling mountains. To cut this territory in two by a strictly linguistic frontier, in defiance of historic sentiment and economic expediency, would surely have been to misuse the principles of self-determination. With this view we know that Your Excellency agrees: we are also confident that you hold, with us, that no parallel case can be found among the Italian populations sparsely scattered along the Dalmatian coast.

With these two exceptions—Southern Tyrol and German-speaking Bohemia—we are unaware of any case in which frontiers have been so drawn as to leave important areas on what *they* would deem to be the wrong side of the line. No doubt there are many cases of isolated settlements which have necessarily been left in the midst of an alien population. This is inevitable. No doubt there are also cases where, for sufficient geographical, economic, or strategic reasons, slight deflections of



the ethnographical frontier have been deliberately sanctioned by the Conference. But broadly speaking, we see no ground for Your Excellency's suggestion that our principles become inflexible only where Italy is concerned. On the contrary, we think that if Italy would apply to the Istrian and Dalmatian coast-line south of Pola the methods which, in conjunction with her Allies, she has applied elsewhere, the Adriatic question would not exist.

Paris.

July 29th, 1919."

President Wilson, notwithstanding the serious illness which had stricken him down and paralysed his energies, still retained his interest in the settlement of the Istrian frontier. With the marked tenacity of a sick man he clung desperately to the quarrel that had contributed to his indisposition. He was insistent that no arrangement with Italy should be effected without his consent. From his sickroom he dictated a lengthy message restating his objections to the Treaty of London. French and British activities took the form of direct efforts to promote an agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia. In the course of these negotiations I had conversations with M. Pashitch, and with King Alexander, who impressed me as an able, resolute and sagacious ruler.

Despite President Wilson's protests, we felt bound to notify the Yugoslav representatives that, failing an agreement, the British and French Governments—much as they disliked the Treaty of London—were in honour bound to support Italy if she were driven back on that Treaty by a refusal to make any concession about Fiume. This notification was helpful

*Wilson's  
sick-room  
activities*

to the conclusion of a settlement. The Serbs did not want to lose the coast of Dalmatia and the whole of the islands.

Signor Nitti then entered into direct negotiations with the Yugoslav Government. When he retired from office in 1920, those negotiations were continued by his successor, Signor Giolitti, and a Treaty between the two States was ultimately signed at Rapallo on the 12th day of November, 1920, which finally defined the boundaries between Italy and Yugoslavia.

Italy was entirely left out of the distribution of the German oversea possessions. This was the contingency contemplated by the Treaty of London, when Italy agreed to join the Allies upon terms. Article 13 of that Treaty stipulated:—

*Italy and  
African  
colonies*

“In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.”

In the course of the discussion on Mandates the Italian representatives put in no claim for any of the German Colonies, but they demanded “compensation” under Article 13. Personally, as I have already stated, I was prepared to concede to them British Somaliland and Jubaland, provided the French redeemed their part in the London agreement by

similar concessions. In so far as British Somaliland was concerned, I encountered insurmountable opposition on the part of some of my colleagues. Their case was stated by Lord Milner in a letter which has a special interest in view of recent developments over Abyssinia:—

“British Delegation,  
Paris.

16th May, 1919.

My dear Prime Minister,

Our conversation of yesterday has left an uneasy impression on my mind.

I do not think you realise the seriousness of giving away all, or almost all, that the Italians ask of us in Africa.

*Lord Milner  
opposes cession  
of Somaliland*

Even if the French gave up French Somaliland, which is a very tiny strip of country compared with British Somaliland (8,000 square miles against our 68,000), we should still be contributing out of all proportion of what France would be contributing to the ‘equitable compensations’ to Italy.

It seems a bad plan to regard the existing British possessions under our direct control, which is all that we really own and are reasonably certain of retaining, as something to be lightly parted with.

It is a considerable sacrifice to give up Jubaland, which is a really valuable portion of our existing East African Protectorate. There is certain to be a great outcry about it both from the British settlers in East Africa and the Cotton Growing Association at home. But Jubaland, some 30,000 square miles of good country, is only of economic importance. The transaction begins and ends with



LORD MILNER



the surrender of territory. It has no grave ulterior consequences. I dislike giving up valuable territory to the Italians when the French give up nothing, but that is the beginning and end of the matter. Not so the surrender of British Somaliland. That involves a weakening of our strategic position at one of the 'nodal points' of the Empire, and will have far-reaching effects upon the future of both Abyssinia and Arabia.

We cannot afford to disinterest ourselves in Abyssinia. The plain and indeed the avowed object of the Italians in trying to get hold of all the approaches to Abyssinia from the sea is the ultimate absorption of that country. One has only got to look at the map to see how serious the setting up of an Italian Empire, half as big as British India, in the north-eastern corner of Africa, would be. It would cut right into the heart of that great sphere of British influence extending from the centre of East Africa through the Sudan, Egypt, Arabia and the Persian Gulf to India, which is the real British 'Empire,' apart from the Dominions. The present Italian strips along the coast of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean are not of the first importance and some extension of them would not greatly matter. But the establishment of a huge Italian block flanking our main route to India and bringing Italy into close relations both with Arabia and with the Sudan would be a very different matter. It would certainly mean trouble for us in the future in both those countries.

I had an indication of this only yesterday at the discussion which took place between me, M. Simon

*Italian  
menace to  
Abyssinia*

and M. Crespi about 'equitable compensations' for Italy. M. Crespi tried to set up an Italian claim to the Farsan Islands on the coast of Arabia with regard to which we have just concluded a treaty with the Idrisi, and in that connection

asked whether we were prepared to discuss the 'independence' of Arabia.

*Arabian*  
 "independence" I objected to this as entirely outside the terms of our reference, but it is

no less significant. The independence of Arabia has always been a fundamental principle of our eastern policy, but what we mean by it is that Arabia while being independent herself should be kept out of the sphere of European political intrigue and within the British sphere of influence: in other words, that her independent native rulers should have no foreign treaties except with us. But what the Italians evidently mean by it is that those rulers should be able to enter into any relations they please with any foreign country, which is the exact opposite to our policy and threatens any amount of future trouble for us. The Italians are, as a matter of fact, at this very moment trying to make trouble for us with the Idrisi.

But even supposing that we were prepared to regard the establishment of Italian authority over Abyssinia with indifference, we have certain vital interests in that country which we *must* safeguard. I refer especially to the head waters of the Blue Nile, upon which the cotton cultivation of the Sudan, essential as it is to the greatest of our domestic interests, absolutely depends. If we give up Somaliland, we give up the only lever we have got for ensuring the protection of those interests when the Italians proceed to penetrate Abyssinia,

as they certainly will do, when they have got possession of all her accesses to the sea.

There are many other reasons why we should not give up, at any rate, the *whole* of British Somaliland. The western portion of that country, including Berbera and Zeila, is required for the supply of Aden. Berbera itself is a considerable port, with a growing trade. There are oil fields in the hinterland of Berbera which, though their extent and value is still problematic, are of interest to the Navy. But these considerations, though by no means unimportant, do not appear to me of the same order of magnitude as those which I have just urged.

The very furthest distance which we can safely go with the Italians (this concession is objectionable but not vital) is to offer them the Eastern portion of British Somaliland, about 30,000 square miles, which adjoins Italian Somaliland.

Yours very sincerely,  
MILNER."

Ultimately we decided to hand over Jubaland, but not British Somaliland, to Italy.



## CHAPTER XX

### THE NEW STATES

#### I. AUSTRIA

THE problem of the Peace settlement for Austria-Hungary was essentially different from that which confronted the Congress when they drafted the Treaty with Germany. Nine-tenths of the population of Germany was German by origin, language and tradition. On the other hand, "the ramshackle Empire" was a federation of peoples of various races, languages and historical traditions, for the most part welded together by military force and kept together by the same process. Had they been left to their own free will and disposition, Austrians, Magyars, Czechs, Roumans and Yugsolavs would each have gone their own way long ago, and either formed their own separate communities, or joined their kinsmen across the border. Insurrections by each of them in turn to achieve independence had been suppressed by a combination of the other races. That is why during the War I always regarded Austro-Hungary as the most vulnerable flank of the Central Powers, and urged an attack directed against that front, with the aid of men of the same race and tongue in the lands across the Danube.

The whole Empire, soldered together by fear and a modicum of interest, but with no common sympathy or racial attachment, fell to pieces as soon as defeat shattered the power and prestige of the dynasty and the dominant race. No more accurate or eloquent

exposure of this fundamental weakness of the Austrian Empire has ever been uttered than that which is contained in the speech delivered at the Austrian Constituent Assembly by Secretary Bauer, the first Premier of the new Austrian Republic, on the 7th of June, 1919, which I quote in my section on Czechoslovakia. He was criticising the composition of the polyglot Czechoslovakian State, and quoted the collapse of the Austrian conglomeration as a warning.

Although Germany had a few millions of Poles and Frenchmen dwelling on her Eastern and Western borders, the centre and bulk of her population was German. It is true that the Bavarians did not love the Prussians. Who did? Not the Saxons nor the Rhinelanders. None of them however had any desire to break away from the Germanic Confederation that included them all. But in the case of Austria, the Empire fell to pieces as soon as it had to depend on the elements of cohesion and not on the weapons of coercion. The decrees of Vienna became, at the end of the War, no longer valid in Prague, Budapest, Zagreb, or the Carpathians. The allegiance formerly accorded to the Emperor was given to the new States which had distributed between themselves the territorial assets of the defunct Empire, and Vienna now governed only one-ninth of the area over which it once ruled with an autocratic sway.

The duty of the peace negotiators was to define the boundaries of the newly-risen communities. In

*Problem of  
racial  
boundaries* large areas the races were so intermingled that the task presented almost insurmountable difficulties. The pattern did not in those areas present even a predominant colour. Such official statistics as existed in any district of the Empire were vitiated by the

obvious bias of the Imperial bureaucracy, either for or against any particular race. Each of the races in turn cast doubt on the impartiality of the figures collected and published by Imperial census takers. There was no official census upon the accuracy of which we could implicitly depend. We had, therefore, to check the registers by such evidence as was available. The witnesses who came before us, or supplied us with written statements, belonged to the rival claimants, and their testimony was naturally prejudiced. Events have proved that, as far as the disputed areas are concerned, the statistical evidence as to racial majorities furnished to us in many cases was grossly erroneous and misleading.

It is generally assumed that the Delegates of the Peace Conference took upon themselves the task of carving up Austria-Hungary into slices to feed the voracity of the conquerors and their friends. It is a complete fallacy however that the Conference was responsible for the defacement and dismemberment of Central Europe. The War had torn off the Imperial masks that had cast a dark shadow on the face of Europe, and revealed the real features underneath. When the Allies met after the Armistice to discuss plans for the Conference, every feature was distinct and visible. They could not have been altered without an operation which would have involved a struggle and the shedding of blood. I will quote in support of this statement a Memorandum which  
*Foreign Office*  
*Memorandum*  
*of Dec. 1, 1918* was drawn up by the Foreign Office and submitted to the British Cabinet in December, 1918 (before the Peace Conference ever met). It gives an accurate account of the complete and irreparable disintegration of the

Austrian Empire which had already taken place. It starts with the words:—

“Austria-Hungary has ceased to exist and there is no possibility of negotiating with it.”

It expresses a doubt as to whether it would be desirable to do so:—

“. . . for the simple reason that none of the factors through which its relations with the outside world were hitherto maintained, namely, dynasty, joint army, Foreign Office, and bureaucracy now survive.

(a) The Hapsburgs are eliminated by their own act, and can no longer be regarded as in any way a determining factor.


(b) The joint army has already been dissolved into its national component parts: the Magyar troops owing allegiance to the new National Council in Budapest; the Yugoslav troops, to the National Council in Zagreb; the Czechoslovak troops, to the Czechoslovak Republic in Prague; Poles, to the Warsaw National Government under General Pilsudski; it appears that a Ukrainian military organisation is being formed under the National Council of Lemberg. The Roumanians of Hungary have formed their own National Council, and, declaring their full right to self-determination, have denounced their connection with Hungary, and appealed to the decision of the Peace Conference.

(c) The Ballplatz, as joint Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, has also ceased to exist, and the last joint Foreign Minister, Count Andrassy, has

himself declared that he could in future under no circumstances act, save for Hungary alone. There are now in his place regularly constituted Ministries for Foreign Affairs for Hungary, German-Austria, Bohemia, the latter being already recognised by the *Entente* and having its provisional seat in Paris. In addition to these, the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb exercises full authority in the Southern Slav territories of the former Monarchy in foreign and military affairs, and its authorised heads have formed a joint Cabinet for themselves and for Serbia, by which the foreign policy of the whole Yugoslav race is to be conducted. Further, at their invitation, the Prince Regent of Serbia has assumed the regency of the united Yugoslav State. A united Yugoslavia is thus an accomplished fact, with which the *Entente* must reckon. The only matter of principle not yet regulated as regards the Yugoslav question is, whether the present Serbian diplomatic channels are to be treated as the sole intermediary, not merely between the *Entente* Governments and Belgrade, but between them and Zagreb also, or whether the official recognition demanded for the National Council in Zagreb, both by itself and by the Serbian Government for it, is to be accorded by the *Entente* Governments.

With regard to the *Roumanians of Hungary*, their representatives in the Budapest Parliament have publicly and formally declared in the name of the Roumanian National Party of Hungary, both at its executive committee and at a meeting of delegates

*Moves of  
racial groups  
towards self-  
determination*



from all parts of the Roumanian territory in Hungary, that they do not recognise the competence or jurisdiction of the Hungarian Government and administration, and that they claim the right to be represented at the Peace Conference. They have already formed a National Council at Sibin (Hermannstadt), and are organising a National Army and Administration, with a view to the achievement of the national union of all Roumanians in a single state.

With regard to the *Slovaks*, their National Council is acting in complete accord with the Government of the Republic in Prague, and the integral union of Czechs and Slovaks, which both peoples demand, has already been accepted as the basis of recognition of the new Czechoslovak Republic by the Allied Governments.

The *Poles* of Galicia and of East Austria and Silesia have already declared their union with Poland, and are working in accord with the Government in Warsaw, which has its own Foreign Minister and state organisation, and is engaged in creating its National Army.

*The Ukrainians* of Eastern Galicia have also formed a National Council at Lwow (Lemberg) and a National Militia of their own: but it is not yet clear what are their relations with the Ukrainian Government in Kiev, or what action, if any, has been taken by the Ukrainians of Northern Hungary.

(d) The same considerations apply to the bureaucracy. The jurisdiction of the officials of the Joint Ministries of Foreign Affairs, War and Finance have come to an end; and doubtless a certain proportion of them would be incorporated in the new Government offices of Vienna

and Budapest. The Joint officials who have hitherto governed Bosnia-Herzegovina are withdrawing, or are being expelled, and the administration in Sarajevo is now under a provisional government, which in its turn recognises the supreme authority of the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb. In Istria, Dalmatia, and Carniola the Central Austrian 'Political' authorities are also in process of being removed, all the other local officials remaining in office under the new National Council. In Croatia-Slavonia, which has formally severed all connection with Hungary (by the annulment of the Hungaro-Croatian Ausgleich or Nagoda of 1868), the entire administration, from the Ban or Governor downwards, has passed under the jurisdiction of the National Council. Meanwhile, the Czechs and Poles are adequately provided with their own officials, who have already taken over control in accordance with an elaborate plan worked out long before the final collapse of Austria-Hungary.

## II

Under these circumstances the *Entente* Powers are confronted with the necessity of dealing with the following authorities, in place of the former Austro-Hungarian Government:—

*Allies faced with six independent Governments*

- (a) The Government of the German-Austrian Republic, with Dr. Karl Renner as President of the National Council, and Herr Otto Bauer in succession to the late Dr. Viktor Adler, the



Socialist leader, who was the first Foreign Secretary. Judgment can be reserved as to any separate action on the part of German Tyrol or Vorarlberg.

(b) The Government of the Hungarian Republic, under Count Károlyi, as President of the National Council.

(c) The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic, under Professor Masaryk, as President, Dr. Kramar as Prime Minister, and Dr. Benes as Foreign Minister.

(d) The Yugoslav National Council, in Zagreb, with Father Anto Korosec as President, MM. Pavilic and Pribicevic as Vice-Presidents, and representatives (selected on a proportional basis according to party and population) from Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Istria, Carniola, Southern Carinthia, and Southern Styria, and with provisional sub-governments in Sarajevo and Ljubljana (Laibach).

(e) The Provisional Government of Warsaw, which has taken over the authority of the Council of Regency, and to which the Poles of Galicia and Austrian-Silesia have formally adhered.

(f) The President of the Roumanian National Council, already mentioned, is Mr. Maniu. The position of the Ukrainians of Hungary is still fluid.

### III

The only logical principle upon which the Governments of the *Entente* can act in their relations with the former Dual Monarchy, is a recognition of the duly accredited National Assemblies of each

of the above nations (German-Austrians, Magyars, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Poles, Roumanians, and Ukrainians, it being assumed in all this that the Italian Irredentist populations are automatically united with Italy), and of their National Councils as possessing mandates from them.

It is clear (*a*) that of these various units, three can in no case be denied access to the Peace Conference, namely, German-Austria, Hungary, Bohemia (Czechoslovakia); (*b*) that in the case of two others, namely, the Yugoslavs and the Roumanians, separate access can only be avoided by an acceptance of their integral union with Serbia and Roumania respectively, in which case the two latter States would of course represent them (in the form of combined delegations) officially at the Peace Conference, and (*c*) that Polish Galicia (with the Polish portions of Austrian Silesia), may in any case be regarded, for the purposes of the Peace Conference, as merged in the new State of Poland, and (*d*) that the Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia and Northern Hungary must either be admitted as a distinctive national unit, or treated as identical with the Government of Kiev, whether the latter Government be admitted as an independent State or only as a part of Russia, whether on a federal basis or otherwise.

N.B. The above suggestions are of course not intended to prejudice in any way the question whether these various national units will be admitted to the whole labours of the Peace Conference, or only certain sections dealing with their own specific problems."

It is clear from this lucid and reliable review of the position in Austria-Hungary, written a few weeks after the War was over, that the delegates at the Peace Congress were presented with a *fait accompli* in Central Europe, and that what remained for them to do was to regularise the division of the Austrian Empire, and to establish the boundaries between the rival legatees so as to ensure a just distribution amongst the nationalities who were claimants for their share of the inheritance. Temperley puts it that they had to "decide on the amount of air, space, and freedom necessary to the life of the new peoples."<sup>1</sup> The Conference had an even more intricate and perplexing task—the disentanglement of the ethnological muddle in considerable regions of Austria-Hungary, having regard to economic exigencies, historical associations and vital strategic considerations.

This chapter will give some indication of the difficulties with which the Paris Conference was presented, not so much in separating but in distinguishing the predominant races in any given area—difficulties which did not appear to diminish as the Conference examined more closely the endless complications. Internal problems arose within some of the new States, famine and disease became urgent in a few of them, the spirit of greed and aggrandisement developed in all. These added to our other preoccupations.

Of all the baffling problems which statesmanship is called upon to solve, there is none more difficult or dangerous than the adjustment of boundaries which are genuinely doubtful and confusing. To what extent were strategic and economic considerations to

*Difficulties  
inherent in  
boundary  
problems*

<sup>1</sup> Temperley: "History of the Peace Conference," Vol. IV, p. 191.

be allowed to enter into the consideration of boundaries? Some frontiers which were ethnically indefensible provided the natural military defence for the protection of a country against potential invaders. In others, market facilities for transport by rail or river interfered with the rigid application of the racial factor. Dr. Benes claimed territory inhabited by a preponderant majority of Magyars because it was essential to the Slovak population that they should have access to the Danube. M. Bratiano advanced similar claims in Bessarabia. It was necessary, he contested, that this province should extend to the Dniester because that river was essential to its economic existence. It was the only case he advanced against the ethnic claim made by Yugoslavia to the Banat frontier. He said it was indispensable that the Roumans of Northern and Eastern Hungary should have full use of the river Theiss. There are many similar illustrations which I could quote from the demands presented to the Boundary Commission by the various champions of the new States.

Both the American and British representatives on the Commission expressed the opinion that it was proper to take into consideration other factors than that of racial predominance in certain areas—as, for instance, means of communication for the inhabitants with their accustomed markets. But the greatest difficulty arose from the impossibility of deciding which of the contending races did actually predominate in border areas. The Slavs, according to the Imperial Census of 1910, numbered a little over one-half of the total population of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Germans just under one-fourth, the Magyars about one-fifth and the Roumans one-seventeenth. But although each of these races was congregated in

such preponderant numbers in certain areas as to give those regions a Slav, Czech, German, Magyar or Rouman character, there were districts on the border where the races were so confused that it was impossible to draw any conclusion as to ethnic majorities. Even in the middle of the more clearly defined provinces there were enclaves of a totally different race, and these could not be taken into account in defining the limits of a new state. But the considerable areas on the borders where the mixed populations dwelt presented a problem which had to be solved before frontiers could be fixed. Statistics were in hopeless conflict. Each party exaggerated or minimised according to the exigencies of their contention. I am convinced that there was some deliberate falsification. But most of the misrepresentation from which the Peace Conference suffered arose from such unutterable confusion and intermixture of races along boundaries as to produce a racial blur, where no distinctive lines could be drawn. Language did not determine race. The ancestors of men who by origin belonged to one race, in the course of generations acquired the language of their conquerors, just as the vast majority of the Irish race dropped their ancient tongue and have for centuries spoken the language of the hated oppressor and denounced him in his own language. Slavs and Roumans had either forgotten their own language and talked Magyar, or they had become bilingual, or they used a patois which partook of both tongues. In these cases there were no acute racial loyalties. In other districts German was the prevalent language, even in areas where the native population was ethnically Slavonic. Apart

from the lingual factor there was a complete mixture of races through intermarriage, and myriads could legitimately lay claim to any racial ancestry that suited them for the time being. For instance, the ascertainment of the true racial frontier of Yugoslavia presented difficulties of this kind. M. Tardieu, the Chairman of the Commission which was set up to inquire into boundaries, stated that "the linguistic frontiers do not only fail to coincide, in any place, with the natural or administrative frontiers, but they are uncertain among mixed populations. The ethnographic statistics cannot then be sufficient to lead to the solution of the problem."

In such a confusion of tongues and origins no statistics could be regarded as reliable. They depended entirely on the bias of the authority that took them. I recollect the statistical conflict provoked in Wales by the Controversy over the Disestablishment of the Church. Even in a religious community like Wales a large section of the population was not attached to any particular denomination. When efforts were made by partisans on either side to ascertain the relative strength of Church and Dissent, the indifferents, who constituted the largest element, were all registered as belonging to one or other—or often to both—of the rival parties, the bias of the persons who collected the figures being the determining factor in each case. Parliament therefore discounted and discredited all these statistical productions. The same thing applied to the mixed boundary populations of Austro-Hungary. In the regions which I have described the considerable proportion of the population which had no racial pride or propensity, and whose loyalties were purely

*Statistics  
unreliable*

commercial or provincial, would have been equally contented to belong to whichever of the rival States the Peace Conference chose to consign them.

Disputes over frontiers very nearly developed into serious conflicts between Czechs and Hungarians,

*Illustrations  
from the  
Banat*

Roumanians and Hungarians, Yugoslavs and Germans, and even between Allies such as the Roumanians and the Yugoslavs, the Poles and the Czechs, and the Italians and the Yugoslavs. As an example of the hopelessness of determining certain frontiers on ethnological principles, I will offer one illustration from the Banat, one of the richest agricultural areas of Hungary and one which formed a considerable part of Hungary, but was populated by a conglomeration of Roumans, Magyars, Germans, Croatsians, and Slovaks. When the Committee which was trying to determine the appropriate boundary was taking evidence, it found that in one particular region there were 160,000 Yugoslavs (130,000 of whom were Serbo-Croats, and 30,000 Slovaks), 140,000 Germans and 130,000 Magyars. The population to the west was Slavonic; the population to the east was Roumanian; the population to the north was Magyar. On what principle could you determine the future destiny of this particular area? Ethnological considerations were too indeterminate and inconclusive. Other elements had to be introduced into the decision.

How in these circumstances could the peace negotiators apply any infallible tests which would enable them to draw the boundaries in such a way as to avoid grumblings and grievances on both sides? At one moment it looked as if the Roumanians and Yugoslavs might come to blows over the Banat.

*Danger at  
fighting over  
the division*

Their armies were advancing towards each other almost in forced marches to occupy as much of that territory as they could possibly lay hold on before the Conference decided the boundary line. It was reported to the Supreme Council in Paris that there was a real danger of blood being spilt. It was almost a repetition of the situation which arose in the Balkans after the conclusion of the first Balkan War, when a second war broke out between the Allies over the distribution of territory which their joint efforts had liberated from the Turks. The Council decided to interpose immediately a curtain of French troops between the two armies.

It is easy to lay down general principles such as "self-determination" or "government with the consent of the governed." How are these principles to be applied in the delineation of boundaries under confusions of this kind? These conditions affected the frontiers of over a score of separate States, new and old, from the Rhine to the Euphrates. Above all, how was it to be done when the exigencies of dangerous world conditions imposed a time limit on the decisions of the negotiators? Had there been time to arrange a series of plebiscites to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants in the doubtful areas, more satisfactory results might have been secured. But the definition of what constituted a doubtful district and what were its limits would have been essential before undertaking any reliable plebiscite. To ensure a vote free from pressure and coercion, every area would have had to be occupied by Allied troops drawn from an impartial country. At least fifty such plebiscites would have been required. It would have been an impracticable proposition. A

*Difficulty  
of applying  
principles*



few plebiscites were held and they worked well because, being few, the Allies could concentrate upon them. But they took a long time, and one or two, for instance, Silesia, led to unpleasant recriminations between the Allies.

Perhaps boundary commissions might have been usefully set up in some cases to take evidence and to determine the result on the spot. Had that been done, and time given for the Commissioners to take evidence, serious mistakes would have been averted. But the same difficulty arose here as to the provisional government of the disputed area. Had it been occupied by the forces of either one of the contestants, it would have been difficult to secure free and unbiased testimony. Feeling ran so high and the violent and intolerant temper of war was still so prevalent, that armed partisans would not have hesitated to use methods of barbarism to procure or suppress evidence. We found many cases of high-handed treatment by occupying troops in order to suppress any manifestations hostile to the claims of the Government in possession.

The actual determination of boundary questions was left by the Peace Conference to the Foreign Secretaries of the four great Allied Powers. They were equipped with the information gathered by the Intelligence Departments of the Foreign Offices. A great deal of the facts had been accumulated before the War; much information had been derived from reports received during the War for military purposes. The racial complexion of Austria-Hungary constituted an important, and, as it turned out, a decisive element in the military prospects. All this information was fortified and checked by inquiries instituted by

*Boundaries  
settled by  
Foreign  
Secretaries*

the agents of the various Allied Powers who had functions of one kind and another to discharge in the provinces of Austria-Hungary and Turkey after the conclusion of the Armistice. In collecting and sifting the facts some allowance had to be made for predilection and prejudice in the reports. The discussions which took place in the various boundary commissions revealed the prepossessions of individual Powers. The French, with a steady, but not always a foreseeing eye on the prospects of alignments in another war, decided every issue in such a way as to strengthen their problematical friends and weaken their probable foes. As an illustration of their general attitude, I will quote an observation made by the French representative in the Inter-Allied Commission appointed to consider boundaries between Roumania and Serbia. He stated that,

“having a choice to make between an Allied and an enemy country, the Commission must not hesitate, however strong its desires of legitimate impartiality may be, to favour the Allied side. It cannot forget that the Ally in question has fought for the freedom of Nations while the enemy, after enslaving foreign races and setting them against each other, then joined the power whose desire it was to destroy freedom in Europe.”

*Favourable  
terms for  
our Allies*

It is only fair to quote in this connection the remarks made by the British representative, Sir Eyre Crowe, on the same Commission. Sir Eyre Crowe, in his speech before the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Roumania on February 25th, said that:—

“When we come to face these ethnographical difficulties it makes a great difference whether they arise between the Roumanians and the Hungarians who are our enemies, or between the Roumanians and the Serbs, who are our Allies. In the first case if it were found to be impossible to do justice to both sides, the balance must naturally be inclined towards our ally Roumania rather than towards our enemy Hungary. At the same time this principle must not be carried too far, for our ultimate duty is to produce a condition of things likely to lead to permanent peace.”

The French, therefore, leaned heavily against the Germans in Poland and Austria. They also treated the Hungarians as an enemy people who could not be depended upon in any future struggle to range themselves against the Teuton. Wherever there was any conflict of evidence between Poles, Czechs, Yugoslavs or Roumans on the one hand, and Germans and Magyars on the other, the French members of the Boundary Commission showed a distinct and obvious bias in favour of the former and against the latter. They leaned as far in that direction as any plausible argument or testimony would afford support to propensity, or as far as America, Britain and Italy would allow. Italy, on the other hand, was hostile to the Yugoslavs and did not wish their dominions extended. As between Hungary and Yugoslavia they gave eager support to the Magyar case. It would afford amusement to cynical minds to hear the representative of Italy, which without compunction annexed Slavonic islands and Germanic populations for strategic and economic interest, take the high line when Yugoslavia made similar claims in respect

of Hungarian towns and regions, and urge the importance of "not playing into the hands of the enemy for the future by leaving causes of friction." As between the Roumans and the Hungarians, the Italians were sympathetic to both and therefore helped in arriving at a fair decision.

America was not altogether unbiased. There is a powerful Polish, Czech, Slovak and Croatian vote in the States. The millions of immigrants belonging to these various races had been organised in America to exert pressure on the President and his Ministers. As soon as President Wilson, with his honest devotion to the principle of government with the consent of the governed, left Paris, the American bias became more apparent. The friendships or animosities towards the various races which the principals could not conceal were heartily shared by the officials who prepared their briefs and the agents who collected information on the spot.

Britain had a not unnatural leaning towards those nationalities which had helped us in the War. But there never was any bitterness in Britain towards Austria, and Hungary with its memories of Kossuth was still popular. There was nothing further from the minds of British statesmen than the possibility of another war in which any of the populations of the Austrian Empire would come face to face with British troops again in the battlefield as they did on the Piave in 1918. Our representatives were therefore free from any antipathies or apprehensions which would interfere with the balance of their judgment between the litigants.

The representatives of the competing States were invited to present their case to the Council of Ten and

*Friendly states invited to put their case* afterwards to the Commissions to which their presentation was delegated for investigation. This privilege was confined to the friendly States. Austria and Hungary offered their criticisms after the draft Treaties had been delivered to them for their observations on the terms proposed.

The future peace of Europe may depend on the question of whether those terms were fair and just to all parties and, in the event of their having subsequently turned out to be in some respects demonstrably unjust, on the measures adopted to ensure speedy redress. It is therefore of primary importance to give a detailed and accurate account of the steps taken by the Peace Congress to ascertain the facts. I will give extracts from the elaborate and carefully prepared statements read to the Council of Ten by the Czech, Roumanian and Yugoslav leaders respectively and of the answers they gave to questions addressed to them concerning their statement. None of these documents gave much space to the claim to national independence put forward by those who were genuinely their own countrymen in Austria-Hungary. That was taken for granted. They devoted the bulk of the argument to justifying their demands in regard to the disputed border territory where the population was acknowledged by them to be mixed, or where their demand was based on strategic or economic reasons.

*Council of Four pre-occupied* The Council of Ten, and subsequently the Council of Four, had to devote so much of their time to the drafting of the provisions of the German Treaty and to dealing with the innumerable difficulties and troubles that arose from time to time in the whole of the vast area of disturbance created by the War from Vladivostok up to the Rhine, that they were unable to do

more than make a preliminary investigation into the conditions of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria.

On the 25th day of March the Council of Four passed a final resolution that the settlement of the draft Treaties dealing with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria should be left entirely to the Foreign Ministers. The terms of the Treaties with these latter countries were therefore not fully considered and discussed by the Council of Four before their delivery for examination and discussion to the Austrian and Hungarian Governments. As soon as the German Treaty was signed on the 28th June, 1919, President Wilson, Signor Orlando and I had to leave Paris. Grave domestic problems awaited our return to the capitals of our respective countries. Although I had delegated full authority to my colleague, Mr. Bonar Law, to act in my absence, he had hesitated to decide some troublesome issues and much important business was thus held up. I am offering no criticism of his hesitancies. After all, the supreme responsibility for decision was mine as Prime Minister. I am stating the fact as an explanation of my immediate return to London, leaving the tasks of settlement of the conditions of world peace uncompleted. Responsibility was irksome to Mr. Bonar Law. He was ready to share it, but he shrank from taking it alone. I saw him on his occasional visits to Paris and we constantly interchanged messages on home as well as foreign affairs. But that was an inadequate substitute for actual contact with the endless Cabinet and parliamentary discussions, the deputations and interviews which formed part of the preoccupations of a deputy Prime Minister and which constituted the material out of which his decisions were distilled. The Cabinet as a whole took the same view as Mr. Bonar Law as to the absence of the Prime Minister

from the seat of direction and felt I ought to be back in Downing Street. There were murmurs in Parliament and in the Press about my prolonged absence.

What applied to me was equally applicable to President Wilson and Signor Orlando. Italy was in a very disturbed, discontented and disillusioned frame of mind. It would have been better for the Italian Premier to have left the negotiations in Paris to his more resolute and experienced colleague, Baron Sonnino. By the time he resumed the direction of affairs in Rome the situation was irretrievably out of hand, and he was soon forced to resign.

Clemenceau was on the spot for consultation with his colleagues on questions of home policy.

The negotiations of the Treaties with Austria and Hungary, which affected the settlement of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and with Bulgaria, having been left to the Foreign Secretaries of the Great Powers who had taken upon themselves the full responsibilities of the Peace Settlement, I can only speak of the preparations for these Treaties from my own personal knowledge of the part played in them by what is known as the Big Four.

*My limited  
contact with  
details of  
drafting  
settlement*

The fact that it was the Foreign Secretaries, and not the Big Four, who decided these matters, probably accounts for some fundamental difference in the approach and attitude of the draftsmen towards some of the problems upon which they were called to adjudicate. This was evident in the greater weight attached in the Austrian and Hungarian Treaties to strategic and economic considerations as against those of ethnic origin, language and national sentiment. In the settlement of the German Treaty the Big Four repeatedly overruled claims made by France and

Poland for the annexation of territories whose population was German on the ground that those areas were either essential to secure a defensible frontier, or that they constituted an economic unit which could not be divided without injury to the trade or transport of the inhabitants on both sides of the frontier. We turned down these demands over the West bank of the Rhine, the Saar coalfield, Northern Silesia and the boundaries of East Prussia and the Polish Corridor. But full and probably undue weight was attached to them in the fixing of boundaries for Austria-Hungary.

## 2. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia was virtually recognised by the Allies before the Armistice with Austria-Hungary—before even the negotiations for an armistice had commenced. Three Czechoslovak armies, organised from amongst prisoners of war, were operating on the Allied side in Russia, France and Italy. Britain was the first to grant recognition to their country. The United States then followed suit. President Wilson declared on the 2nd of September, 1918, that:—

*Recognition  
of Czechs as  
allied Power*

“the Czechoslovaks having in the prosecution of their struggle for independence in the present war confided the supreme political authority to the Czechoslovak National Council, the Government of the United States recognises that a state of belligerency exists between the Czechoslovaks thus organised and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.”



The Czech leaders were exiles who had found refuge in Paris. There they formed a national organisation which found means of issuing directions both to their fellow-countrymen in the homeland and to those who were prisoners in Russia.

Early in October, 1918, the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris issued its decree of independence. The French Foreign Minister published a statement that he "unreservedly recognises . . . the new government and adds an impression of his profound satisfaction." Baron Sonnino on the 24th of October, 1918, followed the same line. His distrust and detestation were reserved for the Yugoslavs.

But Czechoslovakian territory was still under the control of Vienna. There was no assembly inside the State which could speak on its behalf. Immediately after the Armistice, however, the Czechoslovaks emancipated themselves from the dominion of the Austrian Empire, proclaimed a republic, raised an army and occupied the whole of the territory to which they laid claim. The boundaries were practically identical with those subsequently allocated to them by the Treaty. The Viennese Government protested to the Allies against the inclusion in Czechoslovakia of the German population of Bohemia. The Supreme Council of the Allies decided that until the Peace Conference met and considered this question, the boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia should be drawn along the old historic lines which included the Germanic population in those provinces.

As soon as the Peace Conference met in Paris, the Czechoslovakian Government presented their case. It is summarised in a statement prepared by the Foreign Office for the use of the British Delegation:—

“As regards the claim to the historic frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the Czechs do not deny that this area includes a very large German minority—roughly,  $3\frac{1}{2}$  million Germans (34.9 per cent.) to  $6\frac{1}{4}$  million Czechs (62.5 per cent.). But they base their claim on the fact that this area is (a) a geographical (and historical) unit, (b) an economic unit.

As to (a), these three countries were originally in the ninth century one State (together with the Slovak country). Apart from the loss of Prussian Silesia they have been so ever since. The frontiers are exceptionally clearly defined by three remarkable geographical features, namely, the Böhmerwald, Erzgebirge, and Riesengebirge.

(b) Economically the whole area is closely interconnected. The German industrial area is dependent on the Czech agricultural area, and *vice versa*. German Bohemia does *not* form a compact area attachable, *e.g.*, to German Austria.

It is added that:—

(c) The German population in *Bohemia* is much (800,000) less than the Austrian statistics state ( $2\frac{1}{2}$  millions).

(d) Assured of full cultural rights they will soon be content to remain an important part of the Czechoslovak State.

(e) In *Moravia* the populations are completely intermingled, the Czechs constituting three-quarters of the total.

(f) In *Silesia* the Czechs are outnumbered by the Germans (44 per cent.) and the Poles (32 per cent.).

But alike for *economic* reasons (the coalfields of Karvin are vitally necessary to Bohemia, while Poland is already well supplied) and because of *railway connections* (the chief route between Moravia and Slovakia passes through Teschen) they claim that it is necessary to take the whole of Austrian Silesia.

*Slovakia*.—Area claimed. Line of the Danube (if 'the Corridor' with Yugoslavia be excluded) from Pressburg to Waitzen, thence to Miskolcz, and south of Sátoralya-Ujhély to Roumanian frontier. This frontier is demanded for reasons *geographical* (line of Danube, Matra Mountains, etc.) and *economic* (to include Miskolcz-Kremnitz and Miskolcz-Komorn railways), though it 'violates the principle of nationality.' The Danube frontier is of the most vital importance alike *politically* and *economically*. 'An almost equal number of Slovaks will be abandoned to the Magyars.'

'*The Corridor*.'—Junction with the Yugoslavs extending from Pressburg to St. Gothard, on the Yugoslav frontier here, 200 kilometres long. Although the population (700,000) of the 'Corridor' is five-sevenths German or Magyar, its creation is claimed as an urgent *strategic*, *political*, and *economic* necessity. It would secure Czechoslovakia's free access to the Adriatic.

The internationalisation of the Elbe, Danube, and Vistula, especially the Danube, is, it is claimed, essential to the State's economic existence. The

necessity of internationalising the railways connecting Paris-Prague-Warsaw, Prague-Trieste, Pressburg-Fiume, and Prague-Limburg-Moscow is strongly insisted on.

*Czechs in Vienna.* Official statistics give 100,000 Czechoslovaks in Vienna. The Czechs argue that there are 400,000, and demand international guarantees for this minority."

This is the commentary of the Foreign Office Memorandum on the Czech claim for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia:—

"For Bohemia and Moravia the Czechs' argument is acceptable essentially on *geographical* and *economic* grounds. German Bohemia cannot form a separate *political* unit owing to its *geographical* position, nor be allowed what it asks, *i.e.*, union with German Austria. *Economically* the real future of the Germans in Bohemia lies with Bohemia, which is equally dependent on them. It is obvious that they must be guaranteed cultural, linguistic and equal political rights. In the case of (c) *Silesia*, the Czechs' claim is a flagrant violation of the ethnic principle. Western Silesia is purely German; only Central Silesia, south of Troppau and round Friedek, is Czech. Eastern Silesia is 70 per cent. Polish. The Czechs' case on economic grounds, however, is very good. The Poles have already more than adequate supplies of coal which the Czechs lack, and to the latter the coalfields of Karvin are essential. Similarly, the railway through Teschen is the sole main route directly connecting Moravia and Slovakia. On the other hand, Polish feeling in Teschen

NT 2

strongly opposes cession to Czechs. Teschen could only be left to Poles if railway communication south of it could be assured to the Czechs. This is extremely difficult. The best solution, therefore, seems to leave Teschen to the Czechs. East of that, the Bielitz region should go to Poland."

The Foreign Office conclusions on these claims were:—

*"Historical frontiers of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia.*  
Bohemia and Moravia completely justified.  
Silesia: (1) Troppau-Silesia justified except in west (German section).  
(2) Teschen-Silesia economically justified except in east (Polish section).

*Slovakia.*

All frontiers claimed are justified except southern (Hungarian) frontier, where Czech claims are excessive.

*'Corridor' with Yugoslavs.*

Unjustified and impracticable.

*Internationalisation.*

Justifiable in principle. Practical application and examination to be left to experts.

*Vienna Czechs and Serbs of Lusatia.*

Can be met by guarantees of minority rights."

On February 5th the Peace Conference invited Dr. Benes, the Prime Minister of the new Czechoslovak State, to appear before them and state his case. He presented it with great skill and craft. He either ignored or minimised the fact that he was claiming the incorporation in the Czechoslovak Republic of races which, on the

*Benes  
addresses  
the Peace  
Conference*

principle of self-determination, would have elected to join other States. He was full of professions of moderation, modesty and restraint in the demands he put forward for the new Republic. He larded his speech throughout with phrases that reeked with professions of sympathy for the exalted ideals proclaimed by the Allies and America in their crusade for international right. Czechoslovakia

“had not fought for territory, but for the same principles as the Allied nations. It had risen against a mediaeval dynasty backed by bureaucracy, militarism, the Roman Catholic Church, and, to some extent, by high finance. . . . All the nation wanted was to control its own destinies. . . .

“The nation, after 300 years of servitude and vicissitudes which had almost led to its extermination, felt that it must be prudent, reasonable, and just to its neighbours, and that it must avoid provoking jealousy and renewed struggles which might expose it to fresh dangers. It was in this spirit that he wished to explain the territorial problem.”

He said that

“the first territorial question was that of the four provinces—Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and Slovakia. . . . They contained 10,000,000 inhabitants. The first three had been one State from the sixth century. . . . Three times the Czech people had rebelled not merely against Germanism, but also against a system of aristocratic and Roman Catholic privilege; three times the nation had been stifled by the superior numbers of the German peoples. . . .

*Historic  
struggles for  
independence*

Since the end of the eighteenth century the nation had worked so hard that at the beginning of the twentieth century it was industrially, intellectually, and politically, the most developed community in Central Europe. . . .

Dr. Benes said that he must draw attention to the exposed situation of the Czechoslovak nation. It was the advanced guard of the Slav world in the West, and therefore constantly threatened by German expansion. The Germanic mass, now numbering some 80,000,000 could not push westwards as its road was blocked on that side by highly developed nations. It was, therefore, always seeking outlets to the south and east. In this movement it found the Poles and the Czechs in its path. Hence the special importance of the Czechoslovak frontiers in Central Europe. It might be hoped that the Germans would not again attempt forcible invasions, but they had done so in the past so often that the Czechs had always felt that they had a special mission to resist the Teutonic flood. This accounted for the fanatical devotion of the Czechs which had been noticed by all in this war. It was due to the deep feeling of the Czechs that they were the protectors of democracy against Germanism, and that it was their duty at all times to fight the Germans."

In view of the grave dispute which has arisen over the organised demand put forward on behalf of the German population of Bohemia for national autonomy if not independence, it is advisable and fair that I should quote fully the case presented by Dr. Benes to the Council of Ten for rejecting the German claim for division of Bohemia into two sections. He had

*Case for  
incorporating  
Sudeten  
Germans*

already pointed out that ever since the sixth century, Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia had constituted one State. The boundaries of Bohemia had not changed for at least seven centuries. He then developed his case on statistical, geographical and economic grounds.

“The first territorial claim of the Czechs was to Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia, which formed a geographical and ethnographical whole. However, there were some 2,400,000 Germans in Bohemia according to Austrian official statistics.

The presence of these Germans was the result of centuries of infiltration and colonisation.

The statistics, however, were only official statistics drawn up with a deliberate political purpose. It was easy to prove their mendacity.

The Czech figures showed that the Austrian census exaggerated the number of Germans in Bohemia by 800,000 or a million. The Czech statistics had been very carefully made. When the Austrian census in 1910 was in course of preparation, State and Municipal authorities sent to each village in the mixed districts warning that the census would be established on the lines of spoken language, not of mother tongue. If, therefore, a workman conversed in German with his employer, he was set down as a German, under pain of losing his employment and of being evicted from his home. The same method had been employed in the other territories with mixed populations in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. According to the Czech calculations there were about

*Low estimate  
of their  
number*

1,500,000 Germans in Bohemia.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked when the previous census had taken place.



DR. BENES replied that it had been in 1900, and that the same methods had been employed and the same results obtained.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked how many Czechs there were in Bohemia.

DR. BENES replied that in Bohemia proper there were 4,500,000.

He wished to add that in the Bohemian territory alleged to be German there was also a native Czech population representing about one-third of the whole.

The constant fluctuations of the industrial populations must also be considered. He explained by the help of a map the progress of the German encroachments on Bohemia. Four distinct spheres could be distinguished, and it was noticeable that the greatest German advance had always taken place after a defeat of the Czech nation.

The most notable encroachment had occurred at the end of the 17th and during the 18th century.

The progress had been checked in the 19th century and in the 20th a beginning of the reverse process had been perceptible. It was on these considerations that the Czechs founded their claims to have the land restored to them.

The best argument, however, on which to establish the rights of the Czechs was of an economic order. The Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries of the country.

*The economic argument*

Bohemia as a whole was the most important industrial centre of Austria-Hungary. It possessed 93 per cent. of the sugar industry (it was the fourth sugar-producing country in the world).

The whole of the glass works of Austria-Hungary were on the Czechoslovak territory. It possessed 70 per cent. of the textile industry, 70 per cent. of the metal industry, 55 per cent. of the brewing, and 60 per cent. of the alcohol production.

Nearly all these industries were on the confines of Bohemia in the mixed territory, and without these peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. The centre of the country was agriculture and the two parts were so interdependent that neither could exist without the other. If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia they would also possess the hinterland. Most of the workmen on which these industries depended were of Czech nationality.

In particular, the mining regions attracted large numbers of Czechs. The whole country was really homogeneous, and must remain united. . . .

He would urge one more point. The Bohemian Germans fully understood their position. Whether they were bourgeois, workmen or peasants, they all realised that they must remain in Bohemia. They said freely in their Chambers of Commerce that they would be ruined if they were united with Germany. The competition of the great German industries was such that they could not possibly survive. If they forbore from expressing this feeling openly, it was only because they were terrorised by a small number of Pan-German agitators from Vienna. It was not the Germans of Germany proper who exercised any pressure on them, but only the Germans of Austria, for it had always been a deliberate policy of the Austrians to set German and Czech against one another.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the area in question had been represented in the Reichsrat by German deputies.

DR. BENES replied in the affirmative, and explained that the voting areas were so contrived as to give the Germans a majority. Nevertheless, in two such districts the Czechs had put up candidates of their own who obtained substantial minorities in their favour.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the inhabitants of these districts, if offered the choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czechoslovak State or for inclusion.

DR. BENES replied that they would vote for exclusion, chiefly through the influence of the Social Democratic party, which thought that Germany would henceforth have a Social Democratic régime. The Czech Government was a coalition Government, and was regarded by them as bourgeois. It would be for reasons of this kind and for nationalist reasons, rather than for economic reasons, that the German Bohemians would be likely to adhere to their fellowcountrymen outside Bohemia.

DR. BENES said that to close the question of the German Bohemians, he wished to observe that the Czechoslovak Government had no intention whatever of oppressing them. It was intended to grant them full minority rights, and it was fully realised that it would be political folly not to do so. All necessary guarantees would be accorded to this minority."

Dr. Benes followed up his promise with a Memorandum which he addressed to the New States Committee of the Peace Conference (May 20th, 1919) declaring that:—

“It is the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to create the organisation of the State by accepting as a basis of natural rights the principles applied in the constitution of the Swiss Republic, that is, to make of the Czechoslovak Republic a sort of Switzerland, taking into consideration, of course, the special conditions in Bohemia.”

Among the more detailed pledges given by Dr. Benes were the following:—

(a) Proportional representation for the minorities under universal suffrage.

(b) State-maintained schools for all nationalities where the number of children seem to require it.

(c) Equal access to all public offices to the various nationalities.

(d) The Law Courts to be mixed, Germans to have the right to plead in their language before the highest Courts.

(e) Local administration to be carried on in the language of the local majority.

(f) Equal status and freedom for all religions.

(g) The official language to be Czech, but in practice the German language to be the second language of the country, and to be employed concurrently in administration, before the Courts, and in the central Parliament, on an equal footing with Czech.

In conclusion Dr. Benes promised "an extremely Liberal régime, which will very much resemble that of Switzerland."

As far as Teschen was concerned, he admitted that the Poles were a majority of the population. There were 230,000 Poles, 115,000 Czechs and 80,000 Germans. He contended that the Polish majority was due to the industrial exploitation of the country which began about 50 years ago, when cheap labour, mostly Polish, had been introduced. The coal in Teschen was absolutely essential to the development of the Czechoslovak industry and by losing this region the Czechoslovak State would lose one of the essential things on which its life depended. Moreover, the only important railway linking up Bohemia, Moravia and Northern Slovakia passed through Teschen. This territory also contained the only pass through the mountains affording connection between Silesia, Moravia and Slovakia.

When he came to deal with the boundaries of Slovakia, where the claim of the Czechoslovakian Government involved the inclusion in their State of a large number of Magyars, Dr. Benes said:—

*Slovakia  
and the  
Magyars*

"that the Danube frontier was claimed as a matter of principle. Slovakia was a Danubian country. At the time of the Magyar invasion, the Slovaks had occupied the whole of Pannonia. The Magyars had thrust the Slovak populations into the mountains and, after clearing them from the right bank of the Danube, had come into contact with the Germans. On the left bank the Slav population had not been exterminated. They had remained on the land,

though they had become more or less Magyarised. The deepest strata of the population in the villages on the northern side were Slovak. Only the upper strata artificially superimposed were Hungarian."

I asked him "what percentage of Slovaks inhabited the Danubian regions." Dr. Benes replied that "by taking over this region the Czechoslovak State would include some 350,000 Magyars." (This turned out to be an under-estimate.) "He again pointed out that the country had been forcibly Magyarised." After some further questions by President Wilson and Baron Sonnino, Dr. Benes "admitted that the greater part of the riverain population was Magyar."

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if the territories claimed declared themselves Magyar, free access to the internationalised route of the Danube through the rivers of Slovakia would satisfy M. Benes.

M. BENES replied that these rivers were not at present navigable, with the exception of the Vah. The whole of Slovakia would be cut off from from the Danube.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, if the Czechoslovaks obtained access by railway to fixed points on the Danube, this would satisfy them.

*Magyar  
repression  
of Slovaks*

M. BENES replied that the valley and the uplands were so interdependent that great disorganisation would result from their separation. These territories lived by the exchange of industrial and agricultural necessities. The uplands of Slovakia were industrial and the valley was agricultural.

M. BENES said that the claim for this frontier was

dictated by railway communications. The mountains ran from north to south and there was little communication from east to west.

It was therefore necessary to include the only railway offering lateral communications. He admitted that a considerable Hungarian population would thus be brought into the Czechoslovak State, but he would point out that the Hungarian census was even worse than the Austrian. As a whole, 250,000 Magyars would be included, while 350,000 Slovaks would be left out. In all, 650,000 Hungarians would become subjects of the new State, while 450,000 Czechoslovaks would remain within Hungary. Racial confusion in Hungary, owing to the savage persecutions of the past, was very great.

The Slovaks had been particularly oppressed and even Kossuth had said that the Slovaks could not be granted the franchise. Magyars freely said that the Slovaks were not men. Out of 2,300 officials in Slovakia only 17 had been Slovaks.

Out of 1,700 judges only one, and out of 2,500 collectors of taxes only 10 had been Slovaks.

Consequently nearly one-third of the Slovak population had emigrated to the United States of America. Others had left their homes and settled in places in Hungary where it was easier to make a living, which accounted for the 90,000 Slovaks found near Budapest, and the 80,000 round Debreczin."

Dr. Benes, in conclusion, put forward one very audacious and indefensible proposal. He demanded that there should be a corridor joining up Czechoslovakia with Yugoslavia. He thought that this could be done by means of a strip of territory, either under the

*Claim to  
corridor with  
Yugoslavia*

Czech or Yugoslav Government or under the League of Nations, and that thus a means of communication could be established.

The questions I put to Dr. Benes show that I viewed his proposed incorporation of territory occupied by German and Magyar majorities with serious misgiving. It was a departure from the principles laid down by the Allies during the War. He defended it partly on historical but mainly on economic grounds. I was so much disturbed about Dr. Benes' proposals

*I bespeak  
enquiries by  
General Smuts*

that I requested General Smuts, when he visited Buda-Pesth to deal with the Bela Kun incidents, to extend his journey to Prague and to investigate the effects of these proposals there, and report upon them. His enquiries on the spot filled him with serious doubts as to the wisdom and fairness of the proposals put forward by the Czechs to extend the territories of their new State right up to the Danube without reference to the racial composition of the population. On his visit to President Masaryk he gave outspoken expression to his doubts and apprehensions. He pointed out to the President the grave undesirability of including in the Czechoslovak State a very large purely Magyar population living north of the Danube. According to his report to us, President Masaryk agreed and said that he would prefer to waive all claims to the Magyar territory and withdraw the Czech frontier to the North, so as to leave all this ethnologically Magyar territory to Hungary; but he made one condition that, in exchange, Czechoslovakia should get a small strip of Hungarian territory south of the Danube at Pressburg. General Smuts urged us very strongly to agree to this suggested exchange and he gave as his reason that:—



"With some millions of Germans already included in Bohemia in the north, the further inclusion of some 400,000 or 500,000 Magyars in the south would be a very serious matter for the young State, besides the grave violation of the principle of nationality involved."

When the Council of Four came to consider this proposal, Dr. Benes interposed with a statement that President Masaryk had been entirely misunderstood and that he had never agreed to the proposition. Of the many misfortunes that befell Austria in the day of her great calamity, one of the worst was that Czechoslovakia was represented at the Peace Conference not by her wise leader, President Masaryk, but by an impulsive, clever but much less sagacious and more short-sighted politician, who did not foresee that the more he grasped, the less could he retain. But the Czechs were specially favoured by the Allies. They had rendered considerable service to the Allied cause by starting the rot in the Austrian Army which hastened that process of disintegration that destroyed its value as a fighting machine. The result was the recognition of the polyglot and incoherent State of Czechoslovakia, and the incorporation in that State of hundreds of thousands of protesting Magyars and some millions of angry Germans. The angrier they became, the less consideration they received from the Czech Government. Hence the present trouble.

When the terms of the proposed Treaty were sent to the Austrian Government for consideration, a storm of passionate indignation swept over the whole German community in Austria. The proposal that

*Unwisdom  
of Benes*

*Austrian  
indignation  
at Treaty  
proposals*

roused the greatest feeling was the severance of the German population in Bohemia from their fellow nationals in Austria. The case against this mutilation was stated in the remarkable speech to which I have already alluded, delivered by Mr. Secretary Bauer at the National Constituent Assembly of German Austria on the 7th of June. He was an able and eloquent leader of the Socialist Party in Austria. The salient passages will bear quotation and perusal to-day:—

“Ten million Germans lived in former Austria in contiguous linguistic territories. When the former Austria collapsed and our young republic arose on the ruins of the late Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, it was our intention to unite those ten million Germans in our new State. But by the peace which is now to be imposed on us, German soil, with more than four million Germans, is to be torn away from our Republic. No less than two-fifths of our people are to be subjected to foreign domination, without any plebiscite and against their indisputable will, being thus deprived of their right of self-determination.

We are first of all to lose the richest industrial portion of German-Austria, the most highly civilised portion, the parts in which our largest manufactures and most highly developed agricultural undertakings are situated, and the inhabitants of which surpass those of all other parts of German Austria in industrial and intellectual activity; I refer to our German Bohemia and Sudetenland. If the victor had remained bound by the principles which he himself announced during the war, if the principle had prevailed that no nation could be transferred from one sovereignty to another against its will,

if the people of German Bohemia and Sudetenland had been granted the right to decide their own political lot by a free plebiscite under neutral control, we should have had no cause to fear the loss of those countries. But the victors no longer consider themselves bound to the democratic principles proclaimed by them before their success. The ancient brute law of the victor has replaced the promised victory of right. An appeal to the principles by which the victory was won would be vain in face of that victory. It is therefore no longer a question of right with which we have to deal to-day, but merely whether such a use of power is, or is not, in the interests of the powerful.

The Allied and Associated Powers are creating a Czechoslovak State inhabited not only by 6,500,000

*Revolt of  
Sudetens  
forecast*

Czechs, but also by 3,500,000 Germans—who will revolt from the very outset against the hateful foreign domination—and by 2,000,000 Slovaks who, in spite of their affinity with the Czech nation, have their own language; who, from the historical point of view, have nothing in common with Bohemia and Moravia; who have an entirely different social structure from that of the Czechs, and who, as regards their civilisation, have totally different traditions from the latter. And besides these Germans and Slovaks, 750,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ukrainians and at least 100,000 Poles will also be incorporated in the Czech State. Czechs, Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles, Ukrainians—is this not a new Austria which will thus arise under the Czech banner a new polyglot State\* in which

\*In the Memorandum sent in to the Peace Conference as the result of this debate the population of the new Czechoslovak State is thus analysed:—

six nations will be parked together, all filled with hatred one against the other, arrested in their whole economic and social development and in the progress of their civilisation by hate and national strife, nourished by tyranny and poisoning their whole public life?

The former Austria-Hungary, by the very fact of her existence in opposition to the desire of the nations for political independence, was bound to set the whole world aflame. Being based on the domination of nations and fragments of nations mingled haphazard, she was bound to refuse the Yugoslavs, Roumanians, Italians and Poles the right of self-determination, the right to unity and liberty; she was bound, in order to preserve her own existence, to enter into an endless conflict with Serbia and Roumania, as well as with Italy and Poland. The endless conflict between the old polyglot State, and the national principle represented by the young ascendant nations who opposed its existence, has turned the whole world into a heap of ruins and destroyed the youth of all civilised nations. And now that the national principle has at last triumphed over the polyglot State, that the peoples are freed from its chains and it is at last possible to grant to each people the right to govern itself in absolute liberty on its own soil, preparations are being made to create, between Eger and Kaschau, Bodenbach and Pressburg,

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"The proportion of nationalities inhabiting the Czech State, after deducting the Polish districts which will eventually be incorporated therein, is as follows:—

Czechs	6,291,237	or 48
Germans	3,719,147	„ 28
Slovaks	1,770,614	„ 14
Magyars	876,643	„ 7
Ruthenes	437,000	„ 3

a new polyglot State, only distinguishable from the old State (which fell ignominiously and shamefully in its own blood, amid the maledictions of the nations) by the lack of that cohesive force which was given to the old polyglot State by age-long community of political and economic interests, and the mysticism of centuries.

The former polyglot State fell into ruins in spite of man's veneration for what is old; how can the new polyglot State, the artificial work of an imperialist diplomacy, exist without any economic community, geographical unity, or common history? In its fall, the old polyglot State swept the whole world into a fearful disaster; how can the new polyglot State, when it is ultimately destroyed by the desire of the nations for liberty, fall without setting the whole continent once more ablaze?

They try to console us by saying that the Czechoslovak Republic might become another Switzerland, in which six peoples would live together in peace and liberty. But a formation as marvellous as the Swiss

*Impossibility  
of reproducing  
Swiss system*

Confederation only arises under special historical conditions, as the product of a special historical development. Only a superficial nationalism, with no idea of the historical conditions which govern political order and common national life, can think that the Swiss example could be imitated in any place and in any geographical, economic and historic conditions. Switzerland arose from a common fight for liberty, and not from the coercion of a conqueror, subjecting peoples to foreign domination against their will. Switzerland is a voluntary confederation and not an association created by force, in which peoples are formed

and held together by the victor's sword. The sanguinary 4th March was neither a Sempach nor a Norgarten. The polyglot State created by force can only continue to exist by force, and must be opposed to the desire of the nations for freedom; its very existence must be a continual menace to the peace and liberty of the nations of the whole continent, as was the existence of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

We do not envy the Czechs and Slovaks their political independence. My numerous Czech friends are aware that I myself upheld the absolute right of the Czechoslovak nation to self-determination at a time when the Central Powers were still at the height of their power, and everybody upholding such a right risked being accused of high treason. But, now as ever, I am convinced that the right of the Czechoslovak people to political independence does not extend beyond its contiguous linguistic territory, and that it is not only to the national interest of the German people, but of international interest, and to the interest of the peace and liberty of the nations of the whole of Europe, that the Czechoslovak State should be limited to the territory inhabited by the Czechoslovak nation. Thus limited, the Czechoslovak Republic would have every chance of a successful economic, social and intellectual development."

On the 15th June a Memorandum was submitted to the Peace Conference which had been drawn up by the representatives of the German parts of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia "with a view to prove the injustice with which 3½ millions of German Austrians

*Memorandum  
of the Sudeten  
Germans*

are threatened by the Conditions of Peace presented to German Austria." It presented with considerable ability and force the case against the Czech claim to incorporate the German population of Bohemia in their new State. It enters into greater historical and statistical detail than the Viennese protest:—

" . . . the Czechoslovak Republic . . . would, if it contented itself with the domain of its own peoples, be one of the richest countries in Europe, in view of the fact that it would always have at its disposal most important agricultural resources in the plains of Bohemia and of Moravia, vast forests on the hills lying between the countries in question as well as in Slovakia, coal mines near Kladno and Pilsen, treasures of the Slovak soil, which it has hitherto not been possible to extract or to exploit to their full value, considerable machinery workshops at Prague, Pilsen and Königgratz, textile industries in the Czech-speaking districts of Moravia and Eastern Bohemia, distilleries, sugar and beer produced by the industrial establishments scattered all over the country. Now if German Bohemia, the Böhmerwaldgau, the Sudeten country and the district of Znaim are incorporated in this happy and fertile State, if these German regions are united to Czechoslovak territory against the wishes of their inhabitants, the former Austria would be replaced, in so far as the Germans and the Czechoslovaks are concerned, by two small States continually struggling with one another; and it must be remembered that the former Austria, however problematical its existence may have been, always assured more or less the material existence of its peoples. The Powers would thereby create in the

middle of Europe a centre of civil war which might become much more dangerous for the world and its social life even than the continual ferment in the Balkans. This judgment may seem hard but it is based on the firm conviction of the German Austrian people. This conviction is unanimous and may be summed up in the following watchword: 'Let us leave this house which is burning, and let us join our country of origin.'

The wrong which is being done to German Austria is painfully apparent to all eyes. The extent of territory and the number of inhabit-

*Breach of self-  
determination  
principle*

ants concerned are more than double the territory and population of Alsace-Lorraine. Whilst wishing to repair the

wrong done to France in 1870-1871, the Allied and Associated Powers are about to create a double Alsace. Whilst proclaiming the right of peoples to dispose freely of themselves they at the same time pass a sentence of political death on a population more numerous than the whole of that of Norway or of Denmark. Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to Germany after a war; that was a basis for an annexation which is now with reason set aside by the conviction inspiring international morality; it was, however, recognised for thousands of years by international law as a title of legitimate acquisition. . . .

Three-and-a-half millions of Germans are to be handed over to the sovereignty of 6½ millions of Czechs! The subject nation can never tolerate such domination. The dominating nation will never be able to accomplish the task set before it! Both are condemned to fight with one another in a disastrous struggle which is far more tragic than were the



misfortunes which beset the former Austria, who at least was supported by the equilibrium of mutual hate caused by the different aspirations of eight different nationalities. This disastrous attempt means that after the most appalling carnage of all time the newly established state of things will be far worse and more threatening for European peace than before the war. . . .

. . . but the German people will never understand how, in view of the humanitarian declarations of the great Powers, a parliament at Prague in which there is not a single German can dispose of the fate of a German country *whilst the representatives elected in that country by the free votes of the people are gagged by police measures*. The people will never get over that. It will always feel the effects of such proceedings and will never be able to admit the idea that it was handed over without being consulted, by foreigners to foreigners!

A peace based on such principles can, still less than the peace of Frankfurt did for Alsace, form the basis of lasting right. The circumstances which have caused the birth of the Czechoslovak State are sufficient proofs of this. . . ."

The Czechs based their claim to include the Bohemian Germans inside the Czechoslovak Republic on two grounds. The first point they made was that the country now occupied by the German majority had always been treated as a part of Bohemia and was inside that realm when it had an independent existence. The second contention was that the original inhabitants of the whole of this area were almost entirely Czech, and that the Germans were a recent

*German and  
Czech  
arguments  
compared*

importation who had emigrated from Germany when mines and manufactures began to develop in this area. They flooded many of the Czech districts and thus obtained a majority.

The German protest hardly deals with the first contention—and that was unfortunate because it undoubtedly carried very great weight with the statesmen who drafted the Austrian Treaty. The view that prevailed with them was that Bohemia and Moravia were one and indivisible historically and economically. The only question therefore in their minds was, not whether the Germans preponderated in one section of these provinces, but which of the two races had a majority in these well-defined historical areas as a whole.

With regard to the second contention, the Germans made a better case, but that case ended with the sixth century. They demonstrated that up to that period Bohemia was inhabited by a Germanic population which had driven out the Celtic tribes that had hitherto populated it. Then the Slav irruption came in by way of Hungary, occupied the fertile plains of Bohemia, and drove the Germans to the inaccessible hills and marshes to the north and west.

“ . . . During the second half of the sixth century, the Avarco and the Slav tribes who were their vassals, conquered Hungary and spread thence into Silesia and Moravia. They then destroyed a great number of Germanic villages in the plain so that their inhabitants took refuge in the wooded Sudetian mountains, where they dwelt in compact German-speaking regions which still exist to-day. . . .

Towards the end of the ninth century the tribe of the Czechs joined up with a large number of other Slav tribes and formed a unit from which was eventually developed a State of the Przemyslybes. . . ."

The Czechs only conquered the descendants of the Germans who had taken refuge in the hills when they thought it worth their while, but that was, even according to the German statement, five centuries ago.

The German case is identical with that which Owen Glendower made for the absolute independence of Wales and its complete severance from England.

The Committee of Foreign Ministers considered the various protests submitted to them, but were unanimous "in recognising that the frontier between Czechoslovakia and Austria should, in principle, coincide with the administrative boundaries which formerly separated Bohemia and Moravia from the Austrian provinces." To this decision they firmly adhered. Provisions were inserted for the protection of German, Polish, Magyar and other minorities. These I deal with in a separate chapter, inasmuch as identical clauses were inserted in respect of territories conceded to Roumania and Yugoslavia.

Had the Czech leaders in time, and without waiting for the menacing pressure of Germany, redeemed their promise to grant local autonomy to the various races in their Republic on the lines of the Swiss Confederation, the present trouble would have been averted.

*Decision to  
maintain  
historic  
Bohemian  
frontiers*

### 3. YUGOSLAVIA AND ROUMANIA

When we came to the consideration of the boundaries of the Yugoslav State, the Peace Conference was presented with the difficulty of defining the frontiers of this new State with several nations: Austria, Hungary, Italy, Roumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and also Montenegro. According to a Foreign Office Memorandum, prepared for the Peace Conference, the territory inhabited by the Yugoslavs was broken up amongst ten provinces:—

*Vague outline  
of Yugo-  
slavia*

“They are politically oppressed, socially persecuted, and in every way hampered and menaced in their intellectual, economic and national development.”

There were 2,100,000 of them under the German administration in Vienna and 3,100,000 under Magyar domination. The joint Austro-Hungarian administration controlled 1,900,000 Yugoslavs living in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The frontiers that presented the greatest complications were those which had to be fixed between Yugoslavia and Italy, Roumania and Austria. The story of the protracted struggle over the Italo-Yugoslav frontier is told in detail in my chapter on Italy. The conflict with Roumania over the Banat I have already alluded to. The Yugoslavs, whilst admitting that the majority of the population in the Banat was Roumanian, claimed that the western part of this province was so predominantly Slavonic that it ought to be added to the kingdom of Yugoslavia. M. Bratiano, on the other hand, put forward the

demand that the Banat was one and indivisible, historically and economically:—

“From a geographic and economic point of view the Banat is made up of three different regions:

<i>Roumanian claim to Banat</i>	To the east, the mountains rich in forest and mines but poor in agricultural produce; to the centre, the industrial district; and to the west, the fertile plain. These regions cannot exist without each other. The mountain folk must seek their work and their food in the districts to the centre and to the west. The shepherds in particular must take their herds of sheep down into the plain during the winter. Further, all channels of communication from the mountain cross the plain to come out upon the Theiss and the Danube, which are difficult of access at all other points. In dividing the Banat as the Serbs request, we should not only cut the railways but also navigable waterways.”
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The investigation into the rival claims led to prolonged discussions, which at times developed into a recriminatory war of words as to which of the two countries had contributed the most or the least to the Allied victory. The Commission had a very difficult task, aggravated by the fact that both in the east and the west there was such a confusion of races that in considerable areas neither Roumans, Slavs, Magyars or Germans had a majority, and none of them could put in a claim which could be justified on ethnological grounds. In one particular contested area, according to Hungarian statistics, the figures of the population were given as:—

Roumans	266,000
Germans	328,560
Magyars	251,000
Serbs	272,000

M. Trumbitch, who appeared on behalf of the Serbs, admitted that "the above figures showed no great preponderance in favour of any race. Consequently the problem must be solved on other grounds than those of race." He submitted historical, economic and geographical reasons for attaching this region to the Serbian territory in the south and west. M. Bratiano, speaking on behalf of Roumania, contested this case with great vehemence.

I then proposed:—

" . . . that the questions raised in M. Bratiano's statement on the Roumanian territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred *I refer issue to a committee of Experts* for examination in the first instance to an expert Committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

The Committee is authorised to consult the representatives of the peoples concerned."

These proposals were agreed upon by the Council.

In support of this proposition, I said:—

" . . . speaking for myself and for many of those whom I have been able to consult, I thought it

extremely difficult to decide questions of boundaries on statements, however lucid, made in the course of a conversation. I wished, therefore, to propose that in the first place experts of the five Great Powers should examine such questions and, if possible, make a unanimous recommendation. It is quite possible that on many of the questions to be considered the experts would agree. Naturally, those experts could not decide the problem, but they could clear the ground, and, in cases of disagreement, the Representatives of the Great Powers would have to argue out the case there in that Council Chamber."

Ultimately, after a good deal of opposition from Signor Orlando, who would rather that the Banat should be consigned to any State other than the Yugoslavs, the proposition which I put forward was unanimously accepted.

The Report, which was issued as a result of the enquiry which took place, advised the division of the Banat. The eastern portion was assigned to the Roumanians, the Western to the Serbs, and a Hungarian zone was created on the south-east of Szegid.

This report, together with the recommendations with regard to the boundaries between Roumania and Hungary, and the decision to refer the question of whether the Klagenfurt Basin should be assigned to Serbia or Austria, came up for discussion before the Council of Four. The decisions which had already been arrived at were confirmed. M. Vesnitch, on behalf of Serbia, entered a strong protest against the Klagenfurt plebiscite. In the course of his observations he made

*Serbian  
anger at  
Klagenfurt  
plebiscite*

one statement which, in view of what has happened since, has turned out to be prophetic:—

“ . . . What was even more important was that in the German reply to the draft Treaty of Peace Count Brockdorff-Rantzau had insisted that Austria should have the right to self-determination. That is to say Count Brockdorff-Rantzau regarded it as a German question. The situation to-day enabled the Powers to compel Germany to accept what the needs of the moment required. But the nature of the peoples of Europe was much stronger than seemed to be thought. At the same time it had been decided that the peoples were to have the right to declare for themselves. Consequently, the time would come when Austria would declare her union with Germany and in doing so would consider that it was doing its duty. He did not believe that it would be possible to make war to prevent this from happening. Governments were not masters of public opinion and it was impossible to judge now whether public opinion would permit a war for this reason. Austria then would, in time, unite with Germany and the German policy of pushing towards the sea would again recommence with the benefit of the bitter experience of the past. . . . ”

What he did not foresee was that when the event he predicted actually took place, Yugoslavia, then in close friendship with Italy and Germany, would accept the incorporation of Austria in the German Reich without a protest.

When the Yugoslav representatives appeared before the Council of Ten on February 18th to state their



*Vesnitch  
states Yugo-  
slav case*

case, M. Vesnitch opened on their behalf with an exceedingly able statement. He made a very interesting statement as to the effect which Slavonic discontent had upon the military efficiency of the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the War:—

“The Yugoslav troops of the Dual Monarchy from the very first day of the war began to hamper by every possible means the action of the Central Powers. When other means failed, they surrendered in large numbers on the Russian and Serbian fronts and, at a later stage, on the Italian front. They felt that this was a war of extermination for their people. Encouraged by the promises made by the Great Liberal Powers, especially by the declaration that the war would decide the question of the liberation of oppressed peoples, they had contributed by every means in their power to the victory of the Allies. They were now inspired by the confident hope that their expectations would not be disappointed, and that the promises made by the victorious Allies would be kept, and they felt that their services to the common cause had earned the recognition of their independence.”

This remarkable passage once more confirmed the strategic wisdom of the advice given by those who urged the Allies to organise a strong attack on the Danubian front as the most vulnerable flank of the Central Powers. The main theme of M. Vesnitch's case was the effect which the policy of Pan-Germanism, initiated by Bismarck fifty years before the War, had had upon the fortunes and the liberties of the Yugoslav population.

*“Eastern”  
strategists  
vindicated*

His observations on this subject are full of significance in view of the developments of Nazi activity to-day:—

“ . . . In order to present the problem fully he wished first to draw the attention of the meeting to the origin of the war. This question had been dealt with publicly, but nevertheless he felt it must again be asserted before the Conference that the real cause of the war was the German tendency to expand towards Asia Minor and thereby to acquire dominion of the world. On its road Germany had encountered a number of obstacles, the first of which was the Yugoslav people. Hence it was decided in Berlin and Vienna that that people was the first fortress to be taken.”

Dr. Zolger, who followed him, further developed the same theme and in greater detail:—

“DR. ZOLGER then explained that the proposed boundary with the Germans and Magyars was drawn in such a way as to include all the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes along the Drave. The frontier would not accord with the results of the Austrian census. That census could not be trusted. It was not based on nationality, but professed to record the language usually spoken by the people. Workmen serving German employers and communicating with them in German would be reckoned as Germans. Even the German authorities admitted that this method was deliberately devised in order to favour Germanisation. The Delegation therefore proposed to neglect the Austrian census and pin its faith to certain other means of obtaining trust-

*Zolger  
defends  
proposed  
frontiers*

worthy information. Among these he would cite the ecclesiastical parish year-books published yearly, showing the language used in the parish for religious purposes. The language to which it was necessary to resort to read the Gospel must be the spoken language of the people. About a hundred villages shown in the Austrian census as German were proved by the parish year-book to speak Slovene. There were other documents which might be consulted, such as the census of 1849-1851. This census had been conducted in a less partial manner than its successor, for since 1870 the Pan-German idea had become the official doctrine of the Central Governments.

In pursuance of this doctrine the most consistent efforts had been made to establish German contact with the Adriatic. In this process the Slovenes had fared perhaps worse than any other Yugoslav nation. The process had, in fact, begun in the 12th century. The danger had been realised by Napoleon, who had set up the Illyrian Province after the Peace of Schönbrunn, comprising all Slovene lands, to prevent Vienna from reaching the Adriatic and to guard the road to the East . . . All writers, even the Germans, admitted that Celovec (Klagenfurt) was in 1850 two-thirds Slovene. At the present time the Slovenes were in a minority there. This had been brought about by the educational policy forced on the country. Children were only taught the Gothic script. Where there had been a hundred Slovene schools there were now but three. From all branches of the public service Slovenes had been extruded. The last Slovene judge had died some ten years ago. The last Slovene notary had been removed during the war. Barristers were not

allowed to plead before the Courts in Slovene. Only one Slovene Deputy was sent to the Reichsrat, though on the basis of population there should have been three. The people were afraid of speaking their own language, and a man had been arrested for asking for a ticket in Slovene at a railway station. The war had been used to give the death-blow to Slovene life in Carinthia. It was therefore fair to say that the reduction of the Slovene element was not the result of natural evolution, but the work of a deliberate and forcible policy, carried out in contempt of all morality and law. In fixing the frontier between Yugoslavia and German Austria the result of this policy should not be perpetuated. Wherever it was possible to show that 50 years previously the Slovenes had been in possession, he claimed that they should have ownership restored to them. The frontier suggested would be some compensation to the Yugoslav people for their losses in the long struggle with Germanism. He would point out that in the course of centuries the Slovenes had lost not only part of Carinthia and Styria, but also the Eastern Tyrol and Lower Austria. Wherever it was possible to establish an ethnic claim, he thought that it should be admitted."

The Yugoslav delegation protested very strongly against the proposals contained in the Treaty of London of 1915, by which the Dalmatian Coast and a part of Slavonic Istria were to be assigned to Italy.

*Protest against  
cession of  
Dalmatia to  
Italy*

"It was not in the habits of that people to sing its own praises, but it must be declared that if it

had endured martyrdom to assist the Allies, it was because its leaders had assured it that those sufferings were absolutely necessary; that it was probably the last effort which would be required of it; and that the open declarations of the Great Allied Powers were a complete guarantee for the future. The leaders of the people had made themselves responsible for the execution of these promises. The Yugoslav people, through them, had put complete trust in the Powers, whom he now begged to do nothing which might cause disappointment to the legitimate hopes aroused, and thereby sow the seeds of future deplorable conflict."

They claimed Trieste and other towns in these regions which had a preponderant majority of Italians in their population, on the ground that the surrounding population was overwhelmingly Slav, and that these coast towns purely served the commercial needs of the interior. The Council appointed Commissions to consider the frontiers of Yugoslavia.

#### 4. HUNGARY

After the Draft Treaty with Hungary had been presented to the Hungarian Government, the great Hungarian orator, Count Apponyi, appeared before the heads of the delegations of the five Principal Powers at a meeting held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 16th, 1920. He was a notable figure, not merely for his record as a statesman of European repute, but because of his striking, dignified appearance and his eloquence. His statement to the Allied statesmen and their

*Apponyi's  
polyglot  
oratory*

advisers was a *tour de force*. He delivered it first of all in fluent and elegant French. He then repeated it in idiomatic, incisive English. He then gave it in what I was assured was equally perfect Italian. He informed us that the terms of peace were unacceptable to his country, and that it was only a question whether it would not be better for them to take all the risks of refusal than to accept the dishonour of appending their signature to it.

“Somewhat rigorous conditions of peace have certainly been imposed on the other belligerent nations, Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. But none of them involved territorial adjustments affecting so essentially the very existence of the nations as those imposed on us.

In the case of Hungary, it would be a question of losing two-thirds of her territory and nearly two-thirds of her population, and would moreover mean that what remained of Hungary would lose almost all that was necessary to her economic prosperity, since this poor nucleus, separated from the surrounding districts which furnish the major part of her coal, ore, salt, timber, oil and bituminous gas, cut off from her sources of extra labour and from her Alpine pastures which contain her reserves of cattle, this poor nucleus, I say, would be deprived of all the resources and all the means of economic progress left to the country, while at the same time an enhanced production is demanded of her. In view of such a serious and exceptional situation, one wonders in what way the above-mentioned principles and interests can have required this special severity in the case of Hungary.”

In discussing the responsibility of Hungary for the War, he said:—

*Hungary  
opposed to  
the War*

“ . . . it seems to me that the punishment ought to be proportionate to the degree of culpability . . . it seems to us at the outset that this verdict could not be pronounced upon a nation which, at the date of the outbreak of war, was not completely independent, which had only a partial influence on the decisions of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and which, as is proved by the documents recently published by its representative, exerted that influence against such measures as were likely to lead to war.”

He urged that:—

“ . . . among these 11,000,000 persons whom it is wished to separate from Hungary, there are 35 per cent. of Magyars, three and a half million, if computed in the manner least favourable to the interests of our cause. There are approximately a million and a quarter Germans, which makes 45 per cent. of the total population which it is desired to cut off from Hungary.”

He further urged that:—

“The consequence would be the transfer of national hegemony to races which, at the present day, still stand on a lower level of civilisation, at any rate in the majority of cases. I wish just to lay before you a very few figures. Among the Magyars, the proportion of those who know how to read and

*Illiteracy of  
Slavs and  
Roumans*

write is 80 per cent.; amongst the Germans in Hungary it is 82 per cent.; amongst the Roumanians 33 per cent.; amongst the Serbians, 59 and a fraction per cent., nearly 60 per cent.

It seems to me that this transfer of national hegemony to an inferior civilisation is not a matter of indifference from the point of view of the great intellectual interests of mankind. We have already been furnished with a proof of this contention. . . .

Finally, Gentlemen, I consider that from the point of view of wide humanitarian interests, one cannot contemplate with indifference or with complacency this transfer of national hegemony to a race which, notwithstanding all its promise, stands on an inferior cultural level."

He did not explain that the Magyar and German majority, who were responsible for the Government of Hungary, were also responsible for the illiteracy of the Slavonic population.

He then put forward the claim for the historical and economic unity of Hungary, whilst admitting the variety of races that made up the combination. To quote his own words, "Hungary had all the conditions of organic unity with one exception—racial unity."

When he came to deal with those territories which were severed from Hungary and assigned to Roumania

*An un-  
convincing  
peroration*

and Yugoslavia, he made no attempt to establish by any statistics a case that the majority of the inhabitants were Magyar.

In fact, he admitted that 65 per cent. belonged to non-Magyar races, and 55 per cent. to the people to whom these regions were allocated. Having



regard to that admission, his peroration, which was eloquent in form, lacked substance and did not produce any effect on the judgment of the assembly:—

“I say that this does not appear to us to be the mentality of the great Powers who have emerged victorious. Do not take it amiss if beyond France, England and Italy (to mention only victorious European nations) I see the shadow of that other France which always led the van of noble endeavour, which was ever the mouthpiece of splendid ideas, of that England which was the mother of all political liberty, of that Italy which was the cradle of the Renaissance and of arts and letters. And even as I accept without murmuring this law of the victor, I bow before that other France, that other England, that other Italy, accepting them willingly as our masters and teachers. And—let me lay stress on this, Gentlemen—do not imperil the great moral influence which you are entitled to exercise, by forcing the note of that power which is now yours and which may suffer change. Do not let the finest portion of your inheritance be sullied in that way.”

It is unfortunate that he did not confine his case to those border areas which, in spite of the fact that the Magyars were in an undoubted majority, the boundary Commission had decided, for economic and geographical reasons, to assign to other States. Had he devoted his criticism to these areas, he had at his disposal material which would have enabled him to make a powerful and, as regards some districts, an irresistible appeal for redress on behalf of his fellow-countrymen.

The Roumanian, Serb-Croat-Slovene, and Czechoslovak delegations presented a joint reply on the 20th February. It constitutes a very well reasoned argument, and in respect of the general case presented by Count Apponyi it was crushing. The first part of this reply is an arraignment of Magyar domination over the subject races which had been emancipated by the Allied victory. It gives illustrations of the efforts which had been made to Magyarise Roumanians and Slavs—how the country had been run, even economically, in the interests of Magyar prosperity, and how liberty had been denied to the subject races.

*Crushing reply  
of the  
Succession  
States*

“ . . . The non-Magyar nationalities had no opportunity of exhibiting their true political sentiments either in parliament, in the press or at political meetings. . . .

As to the alleged unity of civilisation in Hungary, in Hungary there was officially only one civilisation—that of the Magyars. The Government never allowed the oppressed nations to submit the products of their own national civilisation except under a Magyar label. . . . ”

It furnishes striking examples of how the Hungarian oligarchy utilised the services of the religious hierarchy in the process of Magyarisation:—

“ . . . The history of the martyrdom suffered by the non-Magyar population in Hungary abounds in proofs that the dignitaries of the Churches, both Catholic and Protestant, were active agents of Magyar oligarchy, especially during the last century. The

*Ecclesiastical  
tyranny in  
Hungary*

statement that the ecclesiastical division of Hungary dates back for centuries, is an obvious error. The greatest part of the Catholic dioceses were established in the present limits during the course of last century. The administrative division of the Protestant Churches was carried out after 1890, contrary to all precedent and all right, and its exclusive purpose was to assume for the Magyars a majority in the ecclesiastical organisations. During the era of extremist Magyarisation the Catholic and Protestant bishops issued a whole series of regulations imposing upon the clergy the duty of supporting the Magyarising tendencies of the Government. What they, in common with the Government of Budapest, desired was that the priest in Hungary should not be spokesman of the population, with whose most private sentiments he was familiar, identifying himself with its ideals, but that he should be a kind of gendarme carrying out the nationalist orders of the Magyar Government, keeping watch upon and suppressing any Nationalist movements, however weak, in fact, he was to abuse his authority to help the Magyar Government in oppressing the non-Magyar nationalities. And if the lower clergy maintained, it is true, by the Holy See (and this fact should be especially emphasised) against denials of justice and abuses of power by the Magyar bishops (it is sufficient to recall the scandalous proceedings at the court of Rome instituted against Father Lucaci), if this lower clergy contrived to struggle against the tendencies pursued by the higher authorities,—the chronicle of Magyar politics abounding in cases of resistance by country priests,—it remains an historical fact that the Magyar statesmen endeavoured by all possible means to make use of the

ecclesiastical hierarchy for the purpose of stifling the nationalities. And in Hungary a system of this kind was all the more dangerous because the greater part of the schools are maintained by ecclesiastical communities.

It will now be understood what is really meant by the proposal of the Hungarian Delegation to maintain the present ecclesiastical organisation in Hungary in spite of the changes in the sovereignty. It would mean delivering the population of the regions detached from Hungary into the hands of an organisation of Magyar agitators—an organisation which is all the more formidable for being equipped with an authority over consciences, and for having at its disposal the funds and the schools of the ecclesiastical communities. . . .”

It then proceeds to answer the suggestion made by Count Apponyi that the responsibility for the war did not rest with the Magyars and that they simply joined in because they were loyal members of the Empire that declared war:—

*Magyar  
zeal for war*

“ . . . Nobody has forgotten either with what enthusiasm the war against Serbia was greeted in Magyar centres, and with what ferocity the Magyar politicians and the Magyar army backed up all the Pan-German aspirations during the war. Count Apponyi, the present head of the Hungarian Delegation, was the spokesman of Magyar public opinion when he greeted the proclamation of war against Serbia in the Hungarian Parliament with the significant exclamation ‘At last!’ emphasised by the applause of the whole Chamber. . . .”

Count Apponyi's arraignment had been too general and sweeping. He had not challenged any specific instances of injustice. On the main issue the negotiators had no doubt that justice had been done. After giving full consideration to the case made by the Hungarian advocate and the reply of the Yugoslavs, the Roumanians and the Czechoslovaks, the representatives of the Great Powers decided to stand by the recommendations of the boundary Commissions which had been approved by the Foreign Ministers.

## 5. POLAND.

The case of Poland presented a special difficulty to Allied statesmen when they were called upon to define their War aims. There was no clearer case for national emancipation than that of the Poles, the Finns and the other subject nations annexed and oppressed by the Russian Czar. But Russia had been an ally. And public declarations which indicated a partition of her Empire as one of the objectives of her Allies would naturally not conduce to co-operation. However, the Czar of Russia himself, on November 15th, 1916, announced his intention of establishing Poland, including Russian Poland, Galicia and Posnania, as an autonomous and united kingdom within the Russian Empire. This was referred to by the Allies in their Statement of January 10th, 1917.

President Wilson declared on January 22nd, 1917, three months before he entered the War, that Poland ought to be "united, independent and autonomous."

On January 5th, 1918, in my statement of British War and Peace Conditions, I said: "The consent

of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this War." This declaration inferentially included both Poland and Finland.

The four partitions of Poland represent examples of international rapacity as flagrant as any recorded in history. Dismembered originally because she was weak and helpless, and finally annihilated because her strength threatened to recover, Poland suffered intolerable humiliations and made many fruitless attempts to regain her freedom.

Her masters were determined to stamp out the Polish language, to suppress Polish institutions and organisations of all kinds, to stamp out ruthlessly every flame and ember of Polish nationality. Russian oppression was ruthless and brutal. German rule was not as savage as the Russian, but it was equally relentless in its suppression of any manifestation of Polish national sentiment. It was more subtle and insidious, for it sought to colonise Poland with Germans. Austrian rule was more indulgent and liberal. It extended to her Polish population in Galicia a measure of autonomy. As long as the Empires of Russia, Germany and Austria held together, the bondage of Poland was unbreakable. But when these Imperial pillagers fell out, then the triple chains of Poland were shattered by French, British and Italian guns and the enslaved nationality of Poland escaped. She had won freedom at last through the immense sacrifices of countries against whom a considerable number of her own people had been compelled to fight. To use my own words, when introducing the Treaty of Peace in the House of Commons, on July 3rd, 1919:—

"Poland had been torn to bits to feed the carnivorous greed of Russian, Austrian, and Prussian

autocracy. This Treaty has re-knit the torn flag of Poland, which is now waving over a free and a united people."

The Peace Settlement meant the bringing of freedom to over twenty million Poles. It was by no means a simple task to determine the borders of the new State. The difficulty of applying the principle of nationality was increased because the boundaries of "historic Poland" fluctuated from generation to generation and often included large areas where the population was not Polish by race and language. These memories of a Greater Poland were destined to give trouble to those who sought to settle national boundaries on ethnological and traditional principles. When the Poles presented their case to the Conference, their claims were by every canon of self-determination extravagant and inadmissible.

The Conference summoned the representatives of Poland before it on January 18th, and by so doing formally recognised the new State. Territorial Commissions were then set up to examine the Polish claims.

On the 29th of January, M. Dmowski appeared before the Conference, and in a long and exceedingly able speech, delivered first in pure and idiomatic French and afterwards repeated in perfect English, presented the case of Poland:—

" . . . M. Dmowski suggested that in reaching the settlement of the territory to belong to Poland, we should start from the date 1772, before the first partition. This did not mean that she must be reconstituted with the same boundaries as then

*Her  
fluctuating  
frontiers*

*Dmowski  
proposes  
1772 basis*

existed, but this must be the point of departure, and the boundaries should be rectified according to present conditions. France, Italy, Great Britain, and similar countries, owing to the statistics they kept and to their well-defined boundaries, were able to state immediately what their territory was and what their people were. But it was not so with Poland. In settling the boundaries of Poland, the principle of including within those boundaries only those territories where the Poles were in a large majority must not be accepted altogether. In the West, Poland could not be satisfied with the historical boundaries of 1772. For instance, Silesia was lost in the fourteenth century, but to-day 90 per cent. of the population, owing to the national revival, had kept its language and was strongly Polish. Thus, fifteen years ago, Silesia sent a Polish representative to the Austrian Reichsrat. Furthermore, geographically speaking, Silesia fell within the whole territory of Poland.

The whole territory of Eastern Germany was not naturally German but was Germanised. He quoted von Bülow as saying that what Germany had lost in the west as the result of the breaking up of the Empire of Charlemagne she had gained in the east. He quoted Danzig as an illustration, saying that though, according to the German statistics, only 3 per cent. of the inhabitants were Poles, he felt certain that at least 40 per cent. belonged to that nationality. As the Poles were mostly *employés*, they would be afraid of stating that their nationality was Polish for fear of being dismissed, and he referred to the fact that soon after the Armistice a protest meeting had been held by the Germans against Danzig being incorporated in Poland.



When the petition which had been drawn up at that meeting was circulated for signature, only sixteen signatories were to be found, and of those fourteen were those of officials. Ethnographically, the limits of Poland were irregular, and he pointed to the fact that some wrong would have to be done in East Prussia. Either a small island of Germans must be left in the midst of Polish territory, or the large Polish population must remain under Germany. His suggestion was that this small island of German people should be made a Republic with its capital at Königsberg. He maintained that it would be more just to expose a small Germanised country to infiltration by Poles, than to deprive all Poland of economic independence and to expose it to German aggression. Summing up the question of what is, or what is not, Polish territory, he said that a rough definition would be that such territory as had been oppressed by anti-Polish laws was Polish territory. From the point of view of the preservation of peace, it was evident that if the coast belonged to one nation and the land to another, there would be mutual tendency to conquest. This had been fully appreciated by the Germans, with the result that was apparent in their policy, which had aimed at the gradual absorption of Polish lands, and pointed out the colonisation schemes not only in German Poland but also in Russian Poland, and in this connection he quoted Herr Bebel, the Socialist Democrat, in his work *Die Frau*: 'Our task is not to colonise Africa, but to colonise the Vistula.' It could not be expected that this idea of absorbing Poland would die amongst the Germans. Therefore, he urged that the frontiers should be so arranged

that Poland should no longer be exposed to this danger.

. . . In German Poland specifically he stated that, according to German statistics, there were four million Poles in Eastern Posen, East Prussia, West Prussia, and Upper Silesia, but, according to the Polish estimate, this number was five millions. These Poles were some of the most educated and highly cultured of the nations, with a strong sense of nationality and of progressive ideas. Even according to the German statement, in these provinces it was admitted that the Polish farmers and merchants were of a higher standing than the German."

Dealing with the question of Teschen, which had even at that date become a source of disagreement between the Poles and the Czechs, and which is still a source of irritation and danger between the two countries, he said:—

*Polish view  
on Teschen*

"The province of Teschen, in Silesia, is occupied partly by Czechs and partly by Poles, the latter of whom are in a great majority. It was accordingly agreed in November, 1918, that that portion of the country where the majority of the inhabitants are Poles should be regarded as the Polish sphere, and that portion which is inhabited by the Czechs as the majority should be the Czech sphere. This agreement, which had been concluded by the local organisations, was approved by the Polish Government but not by the Czechoslovak Government and recently Czech troops had entered this disputed territory. This act was not only one of

violence but it was a dangerous act, because if the Czech troops continued to remain there bloodshed must inevitably follow, and much more harm might be done to the ultimate settlement of this dispute, thereby greatly delayed. M. Dmowski urged that the only settlement was that these Czech troops should be withdrawn to the territory prescribed in the terms of the agreement of the 5th November, pending a settlement by the Peace Conference. . . .”

There was constant and serious trouble on the Polish-German frontier, and the Conference was time and again called upon to settle outbreaks and to assist Poland in resisting the German attacks. The military situation in Poland was giving increasing anxiety owing to the menace of the Bolshevik armies on the eastern frontier. On February 13th the Conference agreed that Marshal Foch “should be authorised to settle a line of demarcation between the German and Polish armies without prejudice to the future frontiers of Germany and Poland.” On February 16th the following telegram was received by M. Clemenceau from M. Paderewski, who was then Prime Minister of Poland:—

*Unrest on  
Polish  
frontiers*

“German troops have commenced offensive on a large scale in German Poland. They have occupied the towns of Babimost and Kargowa. Their initiative will place them in an advantageous military situation before anticipated cessation of hostilities. Germans are making considerable use of asphyxiating gas. The Polish forces numbering twenty-five thousand, only ten thousand being

engaged, are insufficient to stop this offensive. The situation is grave. It is urgent that the situation be placed immediately before competent Allied authorities.

PADEREWSKI."

"M. CLEMENCEAU said that he had prepared a draft reply, which he submitted for the acceptance of his colleagues. It was agreed that the following telegram should forthwith be sent to Marshal Foch:—

*Foch ordered  
to restrain  
Germans*

'The Supreme War Council urgently draws Marshal Foch's attention to the following message received from the Polish Government. It is evident that the Germans have hastened their offensive in order to confront Marshal Foch with an accomplished fact.

The Supreme War Council holds the opinion that the line of demarcation between the German and Polish troops fixed by Marshal Foch must be maintained.'"

On February 17th, Marshal Foch reported to the Conference that he proposed to despatch the following telegram to the Commission in Warsaw:—

"I send you below the text of Article 1 of the Armistice Convention signed on February 16th:

The Germans must immediately desist from all offensive operations against the Poles in the region of Posen or any other region. With this object, their troops are forbidden to cross a line which is indicated. . . .

The Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw should at once inform the Polish Government and Command of this Convention, reminding them that all hostilities must cease on the Polish side as on the German.

The Commission must make sure that this injunction is observed on both sides."

Marshal Foch being unable to treat from a distance questions of detail which could only be settled on the spot, the Allied and Associated Governments instructed the Inter-Allied Commission at Warsaw to decide them.

With this object the Commission were directed to establish relations with the German Government and High Command through General Dupont at Berlin.

On March 19th Mr. Balfour asked the Conference to instruct the Commission to

"proceed without delay to fix the proper ethnographical limits of Poland in order that when the Conference came to deal with the question of Lemberg and the oil wells of Eastern Galicia it should have before it an impartial judgment. If the Ukrainian Delegation were to come before the Council, the Council should be prepared with the advice of an impartial body before attempting to adjudicate. The Commission, in his opinion, therefore, should be told to proceed with its labours."

When M. Cambon, the head of the Commission, produced the First Report, it was an indication of the almost insuperable difficulty of drawing a frontier line on a purely ethnological basis. It stated that:—

*Inter-Allied  
commission  
and Poles  
disagree*

"the red line represented the claims of the Poles and the blue line the frontier proposed by the Commission. In these regions, which were very flat, there were no natural frontiers. The population was very mixed, as was usual in Central and Eastern Europe. The Commission had followed as far as possible the ethnological principle, but it had been impossible to draw any lines which did not include alien populations on either side. Economic and strategic requirements had also been taken into account, in order that the new State thus delimited should have a fair chance of surviving. At all points, save one, the frontier adopted by the Commission gave the Poles less than they asked for. The exception was in the region of the River Bartsch. The reason in this case was of a military nature. Without this line of frontier Posen would be exposed, at the very outbreak of war with Germany, to being surrounded and captured at once. It was to render its defence possible that the Commission had placed the frontier further west than the Poles themselves had suggested. Further north the Commission had adopted a line considerably more to the east than the Poles had claimed. This region was sparsely populated and was the scene of the intense German colonisation which had been pursued of late years. In 1908, Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor, had secured the passage of legislation for the forcible expropriation of the Poles in this region. Not only could no land or houses be sold to Poles, but they were forbidden to build or even repair their houses. He had himself seen Poles living in abandoned trucks and omnibuses, and then evicted from them because they had placed stoves inside

them, which the Germans regarded as repairs. It was commonly supposed that the Russians had persecuted the Poles more than the Germans. That was not the case. German persecution even extended into private life, while the Russians had never gone as far as that. This had led to the emigration of Poles on a large scale. Still further north the Commission had adopted a line running across the lakes up to the sea. This line had been drawn in accordance with statistics of school attendance.

In order to give Poland access to the sea, the Commission allotted to Poland a strip of territory enclosing the port of Danzig. There was

*Danzig*

another port further east, namely, Elbing, which had once been Polish, but which the Commission had decided to leave in East Prussia. Danzig had been Polish until the first partition of Poland, and its possession was a matter of life and death to that country. The discussions at present proceeding in regard to the transport of Polish troops to Poland through Danzig indicated the importance of that Port. Without access to the sea, Poland would be stifled. There were commercial and economic as well as military reasons to justify the attribution of Danzig to the Poles. Since its annexation by Germany Danzig had diminished in importance, and there was every reason to suppose that it would revive under Polish rule. It was true that the townspeople themselves were mostly of German race, but the surrounding population was Polish. Danzig had communication with the interior by two railways, one leading to Thorn and the other to Mława. The Commission proposed to give both these lines to Poland.

East Prussia was doubtless the most Prussian part of Germany, and its capital, Koenigsberg, was a holy place of Prussianism. In the southern part of the province, notably in the district of Allenstein, the people were Polish, but the Poles here, unlike the majority of their countrymen, were Protestants, and had been very largely Germanised. They spoke German as much as Polish. The Commission therefore proposed that these people should be consulted concerning their future allegiance, and that a plebiscite should be held there."

The Report was the unanimous product of the Commission. It was signed by the British and American Commissioners as well as by the French and Italians. I was, however, *My dissent from Commission's findings* seriously opposed to some of its recommendations and delimitations, on the ground that they proposed to transfer definitely German areas to Polish rule. When the Report came before the Conference, I therefore challenged some of its conclusions. This gave rise to one of the most significant and fundamental discussions of the whole Conference.

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the bulk of the recommendations of the Commission represented views which had secured general agreement. He would suggest that only controversial questions should be discussed, and that M. Cambon should be asked to give replies to any points raised on questions which might appear still open to discussion. He himself had one general question to put. He noted that the number of Germans to be included in the future Polish State, as marked out



by the Commission, was not less than 2,132,000. This was a very large figure, and might spell serious trouble for Poland in the future. The Germans, moreover, might hesitate to sign any treaty containing such a provision. Any terms which no delegate or Government were likely to sign should make the Council hesitate. The present German Government had gained a temporary victory, but was not very strong. It was said that another rising was likely to take place in six weeks. The Government might not be able to withstand it. If the Allies should present a document requiring from Germany huge indemnities and the cession of a large German population to Poland, the German Government might collapse . . . He wished to ask whether the Commission could not restrict the Polish claims in such a way as to diminish the German population assigned to Poland. In the Danzig district alone 412,000 Germans were assigned to Poland. Was it necessary to assign so much German territory together with the port of Danzig? There was another district in which a German majority was being assigned to Poland, namely, that of Marienwerder. He asked whether this could not be avoided.

M. CAMBON said that in his general explanation he had pointed out that it was very difficult to make a frontier on purely ethnological lines. The same difficulty would be encountered in dealing with the frontiers of Greece and other countries in the east of Europe, where the population was very mixed. Economic and strategic reasons therefore must be given weight. In the case of Marienwerder, for instance, if this place were left to Prussia, all the lines from Warsaw to the sea would pass through

*Cambon urges  
economic and  
strategic  
reasons*

Prussian territory, and Poland would practically be cut off from the sea.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that it was hardly possible to draw any line which would not have Germans on both sides of it, but he thought it was very dangerous to assign 2,000,000 Germans to Poland. This was a considerable population, not less than that of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870. He would point out that the Germans had been accorded communication between East and West Prussia across Polish territory. Why was a similar arrangement not possible in favour of the Poles? To hand over millions of people to a distasteful allegiance merely because of a railway was, he thought, a mistake.

PRESIDENT WILSON drew attention to the very special effort made in late years by the German Government to colonise the very region to which Mr. Lloyd George had drawn attention. The Germans had sought to make a German cordon from Schneidemühl to Marienwerder in order to isolate Danzig from Poland. Hence, this was actually a region of political colonisation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he referred less to Marienwerder itself than to the country east of it, which was historically German.

M. CAMBON said that he regarded it as absolutely essential for Poland to have free access to the sea. This region afforded the best corridor from the inland districts to Danzig. He thought that a large proportion of the German population which was of recent importation would quickly emigrate to other parts of Germany when the Polish State was constituted.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he raised no objection in respect to the regions lately colonised by

Germany, but he did not feel that he could assent to areas whose whole history was German being assigned to Poland.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that this would only be justified by reciprocity. Many Poles in areas historically Polish were to be left within Germany.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether the Council proposed to define the frontiers of Germany finally on *ex parte* evidence alone. The other side had not been heard. It was not only a question of fairness to Germany but of establishing a lasting peace in Europe. It was neither fair nor prudent, because of a railway, to hand over large populations to a Government which they disliked.

*I demand  
hearing for  
German side*

M. CAMBON said that it was quite true the Commission had only heard the Poles, but he was not aware of any intention on the part of the Conference to listen to the Germans. The Commission had been asked to examine the means of setting up a Polish State with some prospect of continued life. The Commission had tried to approximate to the Polish State as it existed before the first partition. After thorough examination it had made recommendations of a far more modest character. What had caused the death of Poland was not merely its faulty political organisation, but principally its lack of communication with the sea. The real end of Poland did not come in 1772 but in 1743, when Danzig was lost. Without that port Poland could not live. By it alone could Poland have contact with the liberal Powers in the west. It was no use setting up a Poland deprived of access to the sea, as it would inevitably be the prey of Germany or of a reconstituted Russia. Poland must have not

only a sea-board, but also full and free communication with Danzig. If he had to choose between protecting German populations, largely imported since the eighteenth century, and protecting the Poles, he unquestionably preferred the latter alternative. There was no comparison between East and West Prussia and that of the Poles for communication between Warsaw and Danzig. East Prussia had very little railway traffic with West Prussia. Nine-tenths of its exports—chiefly timber—went by sea. The products of East Prussia, by reason of the high cost of land transport, at the present time went by sea. The Council need therefore feel no anxiety about the land communication between East and West Prussia. On the other hand, the two railways linking Warsaw to Danzig were absolutely essential to Poland.

M. TARDIEU said that he wished to draw attention to two points. One was that the Committee set up to co-ordinate recommendations as to boundaries had unanimously approved the report of the Polish Commission. Secondly, the situation which Mr. Lloyd George wished to avoid was bound to recur everywhere. The Conference had undertaken to revive ancient States subjected for a number of years or centuries to an alien domination. It was inevitable that in every instance some of the dominating race would be found settled in these areas. With the best will in the world it would not be possible to settle frontiers on ethnological grounds alone. If the submerged nations were to be revived a mixed population must be included in them.

M. CAMBON added that the Polish Commission had also been unanimous in its conclusions.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that though the British delegates had accepted the conclusions, they had done so reluctantly. They regarded them as a departure from the principles of the Fourteen Points which had been adopted by the Allies. In some parts of the territory assigned to Poland the argument of political colonisation did not apply. We were told, moreover, that a region colonised with Germans as far back as the eighteenth century should be restored to Poland. Because fifty years ago some capitalists had built a railway which was convenient to the Poles the area surrounding it must be assigned to Poland, in spite of the undoubted German nationality of the population. M. Cambon had said that a corridor to the sea was necessary to Poland. He had nothing to say against this. The Vistula was a navigable river and must be made the principal artery for Polish commerce. There were, moreover, other railways. A railway could be removed, but a long settled population was not removed with the same ease. He thought that in accepting these proposals the Council would be abandoning its principles and making trouble not only for Poland, but for the world. Whenever it could be shown that the policy aimed at reversing the German policy of Polish expropriation the decision might be accepted by the Germans, but the areas which he had in mind would be represented as a 'Germania Irredenta,' and would be the seed of future war. Should the populations of these areas rise against the Poles, and should their fellow-countrymen wish to go to their assistance, would France, Great Britain, and the United States go to war to maintain Polish

*My appeal to  
the 14 Points*

rule over them? He felt bound to make this protest against what he considered to be a most dangerous proposal.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the discussion had brought out a difficulty which, it had been said, would be encountered in many cases, and he had not reached a definite conclusion in his own mind on the particular point under discussion. He hoped that the discussion would be carried far enough to bring out all its elements. Everywhere in Europe lots of foreign people would be found whose possession of the country could be justified by historical, commercial, and similar arguments. He acknowledged that the inclusion of 2,000,000 Germans in Poland was a violation of one principle, that Germany had been notified that free and safe access to the sea for Poland would be insisted on. The Allied and Associated Powers were therefore not open to the reproach that they were doing this merely because they had the power to do it. This was one of the things they had fought for. The difficulty was to arrive at a balance between conflicting considerations. He thought that Mr. Lloyd George was misinformed in saying that the river carried the largest proportion of the commerce. He would find that the railroad along the river carried the greater, or at least an equal amount, of the traffic.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that he was referring not to the railroad along the river, but to the one further to the east.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that the proposal would, however, leave in German hands territories abutting on the easterly railroads at several points.

M. CAMBON said that the direct line to Warsaw through Mława was quite near the frontier.

proposed by the Commission. Mr. Lloyd George had mentioned the Vistula as the main artery of commercial traffic. Marienwerder dominated the Vistula as well as the railway lines, and anyone holding that place commanded the valley.

M. PICHON pointed out that there were only two railway lines from Danzig to supply 20,000,000 people. One of these was through Thorn and the other through Mława. The latter passed east of Marienwerder, and that was the one referred to by Mr. Lloyd George. Both were indispensable to the economic life of Poland.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE admitted that the line from Mława was important, but did not regard it as essential for Polish access to the sea.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that it must be realised that the Allies were creating a new and weak State, weak not only because historically it had failed to govern itself, but because it was sure in future to be divided into factions, more especially as religious differences were an element in the situation. It was therefore necessary to consider not only the economic but the strategic needs of this State, which would have to cope with Germany on both sides of it, the eastern fragment of Germany being one of a most aggressive character. There was bound to be a mixture of hostile populations included in either State. The Council would have to decide which mixture promised the best prospect of security. He was afraid himself of drawing the line as near the Danzig-Thorn railway line as Mr. Lloyd George suggested. He, however, felt the same anxieties as Mr. Lloyd George. The desire might arise among the Germans to rescue German

*Wilson  
inclined  
for a  
compromise*

populations from Polish rule, and this desire would be hard to resist. It was a question of balancing antagonistic considerations. He had wished to bring out the other elements in the problem.

MR. BALFOUR said that he agreed with President Wilson that a balance must be struck, and that it was necessary to admit that ethnological considerations must in many cases be qualified. The line under discussion was that joining the port and the capital of Poland. It might be presumed that no circuitous line was likely to be built which could compete with the direct line. If the ethnological frontier were adhered to, this line would cut German territory twice—at Soldau and Riesen-burg. This was doubtless inconvenient; but he would like to ask the experts whether Poland could be given such rights over this line as would preserve its character as a Polish line, in spite of crossing German territory at those two points.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Commission should consider the ancient boundary of the province of East Prussia as it existed in 1772. This line was in some cases intermediate between the line recommended by the Commission and the ethnological line advocated by Mr. Lloyd George. It would not cut the railway between Danzig and Mława and its adoption might offer a sentimental justification to Germany for the loss of some German population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE agreed that this might be considered with advantage. He proposed that the report on the boundaries of Poland should be referred back to the Commission for reconsideration with a view to readjustment of the boundaries of East Prussia in such a manner as to exclude from



the new Polish State territory historically as well as ethnologically Prussian, whilst ensuring to Poland secure access to the sea.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the Commission should be merely asked to reconsider its recommendations in the light of the discussion."

My criticism of the Report of the Commission provoked a series of acrimonious attacks in the French Press. The Northcliffe Press joined in the onslaught. These animadversions gave all the appearance of being concerted, inspired and intimidatory. They appeared simultaneously the day after the discussion took place. There was nothing in the official communiqué issued at the end of our meeting which gave any information upon which these diatribes could have been based.

The Commission, after considering the arguments urged by me, decided unanimously to stand by its original Report. Having regard to the composition of the Commission, this conclusion did not surprise me. Nor did it alter my view as to the essential injustice and imprudence of the suggested boundaries. I therefore persisted in my resistance. The French were obsessed with one idea, which poisoned and deflected their sense of justice in framing the Treaty. They were bent on taking the fullest advantage of this opportunity to reduce the potential strength of Germany. Any conceivable peace would leave that terrible foe with a substantially larger population than that of France. But every slice of territory cut off from the side of Germany meant a transfer of population and material resources from a secular enemy to a sound friend. It was always taken for granted that Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia

*French passion  
for weakening  
Germany*

and Roumania could be depended upon as sure allies for France in any emergency that might arise in the future. Hence, as Jules Cambon put it, the benefit of any doubt must be given to these friendly States as against practical and potential foes. So Poland had to be aggrandised at the expense of Germany, and Russia, Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Yugoslavia at the expense of Hungary and Teutonic Austria. The possibility that Germany and France could ever become friends never entered into the calculation of any French statesmen I ever met. Nor was the prospect that Poland and Yugoslavia might enter into amicable arrangements with Germany contemplated by the French delegation.

The American Polish experts were fanatical pro-Poles, and their judgment in any dispute in which Poland was concerned was vitiated by an invincible partisanship. There was therefore no hope of redress in a reference back to the Commission.

I was as sincere an advocate of Polish independence as any member of the Commission, but I was convinced that to add to Poland populations which would be an alien and hostile element inside its boundaries would be a source of permanent weakness and danger and not of strength to this resurrected State. I knew that a time would come when Germany would respond to the cry of its exiled people and restore them to the Fatherland by force of arms.

For that reason I renewed my pressure in the Conference to reject the recommendations which incorporated in Poland towns and territories which were overwhelmingly German by language, race and inclination. It was when the controversy was at its greatest intensity that I wrote my Fontainebleau Memorandum.\*

\**Vide* Vol. I., Ch. viii.

President Wilson was uneasy at the arguments advanced against the conclusions of the Polish Commission. His experts failed to remove his misgivings. Ultimately a compromise was reached by the creation of an independent State in and around Danzig under the control of the League of Nations. A plebiscite was also to be taken in the regions of Marienwerder and Allenstein, both of which were claimed by the Poles. The result of the voting, which took place in July, 1920, was a preponderating majority in favour of remaining inside Prussia.

*A compromise  
secured*

On the question of Upper Silesia the President was obdurate. When the provisional Treaty was submitted to the Germans, their reply made such a powerful case on the question of Upper Silesia that the British Imperial Delegation resolved to demand a reconsideration of this question. I have told this story in another chapter.\*

It was agreed to amend the Draft Treaty by providing that the apportionment of Upper Silesia should be subject to the wishes of the inhabitants, to be ascertained by a plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the Great Allied Powers.

Before finally deciding this issue, the Council of Four invited M. Paderewski to appear before them to present the Polish case against the proposed modifications in the Treaty.

In the course of his statement he challenged the justice of the plebiscite and he also entered into an elaborate defence of Polish aggressiveness in Galicia. Here the Polish Army was taking steps to annex by force the whole of this province against the obvious

*Paderewski's  
appeal.*

\* Vol. I, Ch. XVI.

wishes of the majority of the inhabitants, who resisted the advance of the Poles by every means at their disposal. By race, language and religion the people were Ukrainian. M. Paderewski explained to me that the action of the Polish Army was not "an offensive but a defensive advance." Here is a more detailed description of this "defensive" operation with which this charming artist beguiled the Council of Four:—

"However decisive were our efforts, we could not keep back those boys of twenty years of age. They went on. They simply marched like a storm. They made thirty-five, forty kilometres a day without any opposition, and they took back that territory, and if you are interested in the fact that there should be no bloodshed in the country, I am able to tell you that the whole offensive in Galicia has not cost us a hundred people killed and wounded. There were no battles. In many places, the population, stimulated by the news of Polish troops advancing, took the matter in hand themselves. The Polish population is very numerous there,—about a third of the inhabitants being Poles,—about 37 per cent.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Does Poland claim the whole of Galicia?

M. PADEREWSKI: Historically, yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: Do they claim that the whole of Galicia should be annexed to them?

M. PADEREWSKI: We have given autonomy to this country. We claim the whole of Galicia. We claim it for the simple reason that it is absolutely impossible to define ethnographically this country, because, curiously enough, and we should be

*Claim to  
Galicia*

rather proud of the fact, in the centre of Galicia there is more of a Ukrainian population than on the border. The farthest districts of Galicia are more Polish than the immediate surroundings of Lemberg. There isn't a neighbourhood of Lemberg which contains 80 per cent."

President Wilson explained the main point to which he desired M. Padcrewski to devote his observations:—

"The main point, I take it, is not so much the slight redrawing of the boundary so as to leave as many Germans outside of Poland as possible, but the question of Upper Silesia. My own judgment is that, notwithstanding the fact that they admit that it has an overwhelming Polish population, the very great mineral riches of Silesia are of great concern to them. We have been considering a plebiscite under international supervision and under such rules as an international commission should set up, to get the German troops out and any German officials who might be interfering with it, and it was on that general series of subjects that we were anxious to have your views."

M. PADEREWSKI replied:—

"In Silcsia there are two districts with a decidedly Polish majority, namely Gross Wartenberg and Namslau. On the other side there is a district wherein the majority is German, and that is the district of Leobschutz. The Upper Silesian territory is divided into two sections, one of which, the eastern, is

*German areas  
in Upper  
Silesia*

mining—industrial—and the other, the western part, is agricultural. The western part of the Silesian territory is under the influence of the Catholic clergy. That Catholic clergy has been brought up in a very strong German spirit by the Archbishop of Breslau, and the influence of that clergy is most dangerous for us, because those people rule absolutely our people, and in the case of a plebiscite, they would, even in spite of our majorities, amounting in many districts to 90 per cent. and more, they would decidedly follow the orders of that German clergy. From that point of view a plebiscite is absolutely impossible. In the eastern district the people, of course, are free from that influence; they are more conscious of their nationality and of their political aspirations, and they would, of course, declare themselves for Poland.

M. CLEMENCEAU: In what district is it that the Catholic clergy is so strong?

M. PADEREWSKI: In the western part of Silesia. In the eastern part the labour population—the workers, the miners—with them it is different. We are not afraid of that. The vote would be decidedly in our favour, but there would be some inconvenience in having that district alone assigned to us, because it would put the whole mining industry, the whole of those industrial plants, on the frontier. Consequently, they would be quite accessible to any invasion, accessible to the destruction of any gunshot. It is positively on the border. We could not really, if we were asked, agree to a plebiscite. . . .

THE PRESIDENT: Then your expectation would be that the agricultural communes would go to Germany?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Then your frontier would probably be the Oder?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: If you took the opinion of Silesia, as a whole, it would be German?

M. PADEREWSKI: Yes, as a whole it would be German.

If there is any essential change in that which has been already granted to Poland, I should immediately resign, because I could not return to my country if there is any such change as a plebiscite here, or any essential change in the disposition of the territory which has been already made public as granted to my country. If there are such changes, I couldn't have anything more to do with politics, because it would be absolutely impossible to rule my country. You know that revolutions begin when people lose faith in their leadership. These people have belief in me now, because they were told by me, and most emphatically, that these things promised to them would be given to them. Well now, if something is taken away from them, they will lose all faith in my leadership. They will lose faith in your leadership of humanity; and there will be revolution in my country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: No promises were made. We made certain proposals to the Germans. Nobody

*My insistence on right to revise draft terms* ever suggested that those were an ultimatum, and that the Germans must accept them, every line without alteration. We are actually considering now certain questions which affect my country and France. If we thought that this was an absolute ultimatum, there would be no use discussing it.

Here is Poland that five years ago was torn to pieces, under the heel of three great powers, with no human prospect of recovering its liberty; certainly without the slightest chance of recovering it by its own exertions. Why, during the four or five years of the War Poles were actually fighting against their own freedom in so far as they were fighting at all. We were capturing Poles on the Western front, and capturing them on the Italian front. That was the condition of things. Now, you have got at the very least, even if you took every one of these disputed parts away,—you have got twenty millions of Poles free, you have got an absolutely united Poland. It is a thing which no Pole could have conceived as possible five years ago; and in addition to that, they are claiming even populations which are not their own. They are claiming three millions and a half of Galicians, and the only claim put forward is that in a readjustment you should not absorb into Poland populations which are not Polish and which do not wish to become Polish. That is the only question in dispute. The Poles had not the slightest hope of getting freedom, and have only got their freedom because there are a million and a half of Frenchmen dead, very nearly a million British, half a million Italians, and I forget how many Americans. That has given the Poles their freedom, and they say they will lose faith in the leadership which has given them that, at the expense of millions of men of other races who have died for their freedom. If that is what Poles are like, then I must say it is a very different Poland to any Poland I ever heard of. She has won her freedom, not by her own exertions, but by the blood of others; and



not only has she no gratitude, but she says she loses faith in the people who have won her freedom.

M. PADEREWSKI: I am very sorry I gave you that impression. Perhaps I did not express myself precisely enough. If I say that I would not be able to lead these people any more because they may lose faith in my leadership, I don't mean to imply that they are losing faith in your leadership.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE: I was only referring to what you said. We won freedom for nations that had not the slightest hope of it,—Czechoslovakia, Poland, and others. Nations that have won their freedom at the expense of the blood of Italians and Frenchmen and Englishmen and Americans. And we have the greatest trouble in the world to keep them from annexing the territory of other nations and imposing upon other nations the very tyranny which they have themselves endured for centuries. You know, I belong to a small nation, and therefore I have great sympathy with all oppressed nationalities, and it fills me with despair the way in which I have seen small nations, before they have hardly leaped into the light of freedom, beginning to oppress other races than their own. They are more imperialist, believe me, than either England and France, than certainly the United States. It fills me with despair as a man who has fought all his life for little nations.”

M. Paderewski protested vehemently against the imputation that the Poles were animated by imperialistic ambitions. I replied:—

“ . . . What I mean by imperialism is the annexation of peoples of a different race against

their will, or even a people of the same race against their will. I consider the annexation of Alsace, though the race was German, as culpable as the annexation of Lorraine, when the people were French. It is the annexation of people against their will."

Subsequently both M. Paderewski and M. Dmowski came before the Council of Four to enter a final protest against the alterations made in the Draft Treaty. M. Paderewski spoke with an emotional fervour which from a man of his genuine and unselfish patriotism was moving:—

"He said that he could not conceal the fact that this decision was a very serious blow to Poland. First it would affect the people of Poland sentimentally. They believed *Paderewski's* President Wilson's principles like the *final protest* Gospel. The second reason was that it would cause bitter disappointment. If the plebiscite did not bring the result he hoped for it would be their poor neighbours of Polish race who would be the first to suffer. For centuries they had been treated like slaves. They had been driven out of their country and sent to Westphalia and compelled to forced labour in Berlin and elsewhere. They had hoped in future to live decent lives on their ancestral soil. If the plebiscite did not come up to expectations it would cause terrible disappointment. Thirdly, the country, owing to the plebiscite, would be in a chaotic condition and he hoped, therefore, that it would be taken within three or six months of the Peace, in order to quieten things down. It would increase the

excitement in Poland. The plebiscite was not like an election, since it was to decide the destiny of the country perhaps for centuries. The people would become demoralised. All sorts of impossible and unreasonable promises would be made. This was why the people of Poland did not accept the idea."

He ended by saying that the Polish Delegation could only accept the decision "with profound respect but with deep sorrow."

## CHAPTER XXI

# THE TURKISH TREATY

### GENERAL

ONE of the difficulties with which the Allied plenipotentiaries were confronted was the necessity for negotiating five separate Treaties of Peace with five separate and independent countries -- Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria; or, to be accurate, altogether with twelve more countries whose boundaries for the future were determined by the Treaties of Peace. The Allies found it impracticable to conduct negotiations simultaneously with all these countries. Commissioners were set up by the Peace Conference to make preliminary investigations and to frame recommendations, but definite conclusions had to be reached by the peace envoys of the Great Powers in the order of their urgency. The German Peace inevitably came first. It was the most pressing. A larger number of Allied troops had to be kept under arms on the German frontier than on any other. The complete disarmament of the only still formidable enemy army was delayed until the Treaty was signed. Thus demobilisation of the Allied armies was held up at enormous expense to the Allies and created irritation amongst the troops. The delay also produced dislocation in trade. When the Treaty with Germany was signed the Conference proceeded to deal with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Turkey came last. Bulgaria,

*Why settlement was postponed*

being a simple proposition, was disposed of before Turkey.

In some respects the settlement of the Turkish Empire presented greater difficulties than that of any other enemy country. There was a greater variety of races and religions to be dealt with. They were more hopelessly intermingled without any trace or hope of merger. There were historical complications which had never been unravelled. There were the jealousies of Powers, each of them with real or imaginary interests—historical, religious, financial or territorial—in some corner of this dilapidated Empire. There was a wilderness of decay and ruin, the result of centuries of misrule prolonged to the last hours of Turkish dominion, which had to be dealt with. There were whole provinces devastated and depopulated by butchery inspired, decreed and directed by the State. Records and ruins prove that during centuries of history there once existed in a vast area of this decadent Empire the most flourishing civilisations in the world. There was hardly one corner of it which would not have to be reconstructed and rebuilt from the foundation upwards to recall a faint memory of its pristine opulence and splendour.

The racial problems defied any satisfactory solution. In European Turkey, Turks, Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, Jews and Armenians were hopelessly mixed up in the same towns and villages. Statistics alone conveyed no clear notion of the desperate tangle. The position in Anatolia was equally confused. There was a hard core of Turks in the centre of Anatolia. But outside, the further from the centre, the greater the jumble and jostle of races and religions. In the extreme south-west of Asia Minor there was a Greek majority

*Complexity  
of Turkish  
problem*

*Medley  
of races*

over all races. In other districts bordering on the Straits, there was a non-Turkish majority composed of Greeks, Armenians and Jews—the Greeks predominating over any other single race. The prosperity and the productiveness of these areas were mainly due to the Greek settlers—peasants and merchants. They had been Greek in race and character and language for centuries before the Turk ever appeared in Anatolia.

In the province of Armenia, Abdul Hamid and the Young Turks had deliberately set themselves to the simplification of the Armenian difficulty by exterminating and deporting the whole race, whom they regarded as infidels and traitors. In this savage task they had largely succeeded. In the plains the Armenians had been wiped out. The survivors were to be found in the inaccessible mountains which gave a bleak and precarious shelter to the hunted refugees of Ottoman barbarity. Many also had escaped to Syria. Although they were still under Turkish rule, and were devout Mohammedans, the Syrian Arabs were not murderers and they refused to connive at the massacre of the helpless infidels who had trusted to the humanity taught by the Prophet.

The Greeks of Asia Minor had also suffered heavily from the brutalities of the Turks during the Great War. Hundreds of thousands were massacred in cold blood during the War and many more driven from their homes to find refuge in Greece and the Greek islands. The Turks worked incessantly and with a barbaric guile to improve their statistical position.

Should anyone unacquainted with the facts about the atrocities of Turkish misgovernment be inclined

*Official admission of Turkish atrocities* to regard my summary of the appalling results as exaggerated, I would invite their attention to a written statement put in by the Turkish Government on their

first appearance at the Peace Congress in June, 1919. The candour of its admissions is startling. Here is the considered document prepared by Turkish Ministers and read out by the Grand Vizier, His Highness Damad Ferid Pasha, to the representatives of America, Britain, France and Italy at the Quai d'Orsay:—

“I should not be bold enough to come before this high Assembly if I thought that the Ottoman people had incurred any share of responsibility in the War which has ravaged Europe and Asia with fire and sword.

I apologise in advance for the development which I must give to my statement, for I am in point of fact defending to-day before the public opinion of the whole world and before history a most complicated and ill-understood cause.

In the course of the War nearly the whole civilised world was shocked by the recital of the crimes alleged to have been committed by the Turks. It is far from my thought to cast a veil over these misdeeds, which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror for ever; still less will I endeavour to minimise the degree of guilt of the actors in the great drama. The aim which I have set myself is that of showing to the world with proofs in my hand, who are the truly responsible authors of these terrible crimes.

We are under no illusions in regard to the extent of the dissatisfaction which surrounds us;

*Germans  
blamed for  
the War*

we are absolutely convinced that a mass of unfortunate events has made Turkey appear in an unfavourable light. However, when the truth has once been revealed, it will warn civilised nations and posterity

against passing an unjust judgment on us. The responsibility for the War in the East—assumed, without the knowledge of the sovereign or of the people, in the Black Sea, by a German ship commanded by a German Admiral—rests entirely with the signatories of the secret Treaties, which were unknown alike to the Ottoman people and to the European Chancelleries. These agreements were concluded between the Government of the Kaiser and the heads of the revolutionary Committee, who, at the beginning of 1913, had placed themselves in power by means of a *coup d'état*. I call to witness the official despatches exchanged between the representatives of France and Great Britain and their respective Governments during the three months which preceded the outbreak of hostilities between Turkey and the Empire of the Tsars. When war had once been declared, the eternal covetousness of Russia as regards Constantinople was skilfully represented to the people as an imminent danger, and anxiety for the preservation of national existence thereupon rendered the struggle a desperate one. Our archives are, moreover, thrown entirely open to an enquiry which would enable the statements which I have the honour to make to this high Assembly to be amply confirmed.

In regard to the other tragic events, I beg leave to repeat here the declarations which I have repeatedly made to the Ottoman Senate. Turkey deplores the murder of a great number of her Christian co-nationals, as much as she does that of Moslems, properly speaking. In point of fact, the Committee of Union and Progress, not content with the crimes perpetrated against Christians,

*Massacres by  
Committee of  
Union and  
Progress*



condemned to death by every means 3,000,000 Moslems. Several hundreds of thousands of these unfortunate beings, hunted from their homes, are still wandering about to-day in the middle of Asia Minor without shelter and without any relief for their very existence; and even if they returned to their provinces they would find themselves just as destitute, for a large number of towns and villages, both Moslem and Christian, have been completely destroyed. Asia Minor is to-day nothing but a vast heap of ruins. The new Government, notwithstanding its vigilant care, has been as yet unable to mitigate the disastrous effects of the cataclysm. It will always be easily possible to confirm my assertions by an enquiry undertaken on the spot. It is necessary, however, to dismiss any theory of racial conflict or of an explosion of religious fanaticism. Moreover, the Turkish people, at a time when violence could strive successfully against right, showed itself able to respect the lives, the honour and the sacred feelings of the Christian nations subject to its laws. It would be fairer to judge the Ottoman nation by its long history as a whole rather than by a single period which shows it in the most disadvantageous light.

Whatever be the names by which they are called, the principles and the methods of both the Russian and Turkish revolutionaries are the same, namely, to destroy society in order to seize its ruins by putting its members out of the way and taking possession of their property. Europe and America are endeavouring, at the cost of immense sacrifices, to deliver the Slav people, whose ostensible attitude towards the Entente is scarcely different at the

*Bolsheviks  
to blame*

present time from that of the Turks, for both have been reduced to silence and both paralysed by an unheard-of tyranny. The Turks, who thus find themselves, under the domination of the Committee, in the same situation as that of the Russians under the Terrorists, deserve the same sympathy and the same humanitarian and kindly assistance at the hands of the rulers of the great nations which hold the destinies of the world in their hands.

Latterly the truth has begun to filter through into European public opinion. The great trial of the Unionists at Constantinople has proved the responsibility of the leaders of the Committee—who all of them occupy high positions in the State—for the War and the other tragic events; that is the rehabilitation of the Ottoman nation.

Thus rehabilitated in the eyes of the civilised world, our mission will henceforward be that of devoting ourselves to an intensive economic and intellectual culture in order thus to become a useful factor in the League of Nations. The Ottoman people hope that the chaos in the East, fostered as it is by this abnormal state of affairs which is neither war nor peace, may at last be replaced by order, and it likewise desires to see the end of the continued occupation of its territories in spite of the Armistice. This occupation has in fact resulted at Smyrna in the most deplorable excesses which have been committed to the hurt of the defenceless Moslem population.

It desires with equal earnestness the maintenance, on the basis of the *status quo ante bellum*, of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which, during the last forty years, has been reduced to the least possible limits. It lastly wishes to be granted in Thrace,

*Status quo  
demanded*

to the north and west of Adrianople, where the Mohammedan population is in an overwhelming majority, a frontier line which will render possible the defence of Adrianople and Constantinople.

What we ask for thus is, moreover, completely in conformity with President Wilson's principles, which we invoked when requesting an Armistice, being convinced that they would be evenly applied in the interests of the peace of the world. On the other hand, a fresh parcelling-out of the Ottoman Empire would entirely upset the balance in the East.

The ranges of the Taurus are, moreover, nothing more than a geological line of demarcation. The regions situated beyond those mountains, from the Mediterranean up to the Arabian Sea, are, although a language different from the Turkish language is spoken there, indissolubly linked with Constantinople by feelings which are deeper than the principle of nationality; on either side of the Taurus the same ideals, the same thoughts, the same moral and material interests bind the inhabitants. These form a compact block and its disintegration would be detrimental to the peace and tranquillity of the East. Even a plebiscite would not solve the question, for the supreme interests of more than 300,000,000 Moslems are involved, and they form an important fraction of the whole of the human race.

The conscience of the world could only approve conditions of peace which are compatible with right, with the aspirations of peoples and with imminent justice."

To this remarkable statement Mr. Balfour wrote a reply which is one of the most arresting and incisive documents that ever emanated from his

*Mr. Balfour's pen:—*  
*rejoinder*

“The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers have read with the most careful attention the Memorandum presented to them by Your Excellency on June the 17th, and, in accordance with the promise then made, desire now to offer the following observations upon it.

In your recital of the political intrigues which accompanied Turkey's entry into the War, and of the tragedies which followed it, Your Excellency makes no attempt to excuse or qualify the crimes of which the Turkish Government was then guilty.

It is admitted directly, or by implication, that Turkey had no cause of quarrel with the Entente Powers; that she acted as the subservient tool of Germany; that the war, begun without excuse, and conducted without mercy, was accompanied by massacres whose calculated atrocity equals or exceeds anything in record of history. But it is argued that these crimes were committed by a Turkish Government for whose misdeeds the Turkish people are not responsible; that there was in them no element of religious fanaticism; that Moslems suffered from them not less than Christians; that they were entirely out of harmony with the Turkish tradition, as historically exhibited in the treatment by Turkey of subject races; that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is necessary for the religious equilibrium of the world; so that policy, not less than justice, requires that its

St 2

## 1010 THE TRUTH ABOUT PEACE TREATIES

territories should be restored undiminished, as they existed before the war broke out.

The Council can neither accept this conclusion nor the arguments by which it is supported. They do not indeed doubt that the present Government of Turkey profoundly disapproves of the policy pursued by its predecessors.

Even if considerations of morality did not weigh with it (as doubtless they do), considerations of expediency would be conclusive. As individuals its members have every motive as well as every right to repudiate the actions which have proved so disastrous to their country.

But, speaking generally, every nation must be judged by the Government which rules it, which directs its foreign policy, which controls its armies; nor can Turkey claim any relief from the legitimate consequences of this doctrine merely because her affairs at a most critical moment in her history had fallen into the hands of men who, utterly devoid of principle or pity, could not even command success.

It seems, however, that the claim for complete territorial restoration put forward in the Memorandum is not based merely on the plea that Turkey should not be required to suffer for the sins of her Ministers. It has a deeper ground.

It appeals to the history of Ottoman rule in the past, and to the condition of affairs in the Moslem world.

Now the Council is anxious not to enter into unnecessary controversy, or to inflict needless pain on Your Excellency and the Delegates who accompany you.

It wishes well to the Turkish people, and admires their excellent qualities. But they cannot admit that among those qualities are to be counted capacity to rule over alien races. The experiment has been tried too long and too often for there to be the least doubt as to its result. History tells us of many Ottoman successes and many Ottoman defeats:—of nations conquered and nations freed. The Memorandum itself refers to the reductions that have taken place in the territories recently under Ottoman sovereignty.

Yet in all these changes there is no case to be found, either in Europe or Asia or Africa, in which the establishment of Ottoman rule in any country has not been followed by the diminution of its material prosperity, and a fall in its level of culture; nor is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Ottoman rule has not been followed by a growth in material prosperity and a rise in the level of culture. Neither among the Christians of Europe, nor among the Moslems of Syria, Arabia and Africa has the Ottoman Turk done other than destroy what he has conquered; never has he shown himself able to develop in peace what he has won by war. Not in this direction do his talents lie.

The obvious conclusion from these facts would seem to be that, since Turkey has, without the least excuse or provocation, deliberately attacked the Entente Powers and been defeated, she has thrown upon the victors the heavy duty of determining the destiny of the various populations in her heterogeneous Empire. This duty the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers

desire to carry out as far as may be in accordance with their wishes and permanent interests.

But the Council observe with regret that the Memorandum introduces in this connection a wholly different order of considerations based on supposed religious rivalries.

The Turkish Empire is, it seems, to be preserved unchanged, not so much because this would be to the advantage either of the Moslems or of the Christians within its borders, but because its maintenance is demanded by the religious sentiment of men who never felt the Ottoman yoke, or have forgotten how heavily it weighs on those who are compelled to bear it.

But surely there never was a sentiment less justified by facts. The whole course of the War exposes its hollowness.

What religious issue can be raised by a war in which Protestant Germany, Roman Catholic Austria, Orthodox Bulgaria and Moslem Turkey, banded themselves together to plunder their neighbours?

*Religious  
plea for  
consideration  
unwarranted*

The only flavour of deliberate fanaticism perceptible in these transactions was the massacre of Christian Armenians by order of the Turkish Government.

But Your Excellency has pointed out that, at the very same time, and by the very same authority, unoffending Moslems were being slaughtered in circumstances sufficiently horrible, and in numbers sufficiently large to mitigate, if not wholly to remove, any suspicion of religious partiality.

During the War, then, there was little evidence of sectarian animosity on the part of any of the Governments, and no evidence whatever so far as

the Entente Powers were concerned. Nor has anything since occurred to modify this judgment. Every man's conscience has been respected; places of sacred memory have been carefully guarded; the States and peoples who were Mohammedan before the War are Mohammedan still. Nothing touching religion has been altered, except the security with which it may be practised; and this wherever Allied control exists has certainly been altered for the better.

If it be replied that the diminution in the territories of an historic Moslem State must injure the Moslem cause in all lands, we respectfully suggest that in our opinion this is an error. To thinking Moslems throughout the world the modern history of the Government enthroned at Constantinople can be no source of pleasure or pride.

For reasons we have already indicated, the Ottoman Turk was there attempting a task for which he had little aptitude, and in which he has consequently failed. Set him to work in a territory peopled by men of his own blood and faith, under new conditions less complicated and difficult, with an evil tradition of corruption and intrigue severed, perhaps forgotten, why should he not add lustre to his country, and thus indirectly to his religion, by other qualities than that courage and discipline which he has always so conspicuously displayed.

Unless we are mistaken, Your Excellency should understand our hopes. In one impressive passage of your Memorandum, you declare it is to be your country's mission to devote itself to 'an intensive economic and intellectual culture.'

No change could be more startling or impressive; none could be more beneficial. If Your

*Turks should  
rule only  
over Turks*



Excellency is able to initiate this great process of development in men of Turkish race, you will deserve, and will constantly receive, all the assistance we are able to give you.

A.J.B."

What adds force and a poignant interest to Mr. Balfour's indictment is the fact that he was present, as Lord Salisbury's secretary, at the Berlin Congress of 1878, when the British Government insisted upon placing the emancipated Armenians once more under Turkish rule, after they had been liberated by the Russian arms.

If further corroboration were needed of our case for the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, it is furnished by Lord Curzon in the argument he advanced to the Eastern Committee in December, 1918, for driving the Turk out of Constantinople.

*Curzon's  
denunciation  
of Turkey*

" . . . The second axiomatic proposition is that the presence of the Turks in Europe has been a source of unmitigated evil to everybody concerned. I am not aware of a single interest, Turkish or otherwise, that during nearly 500 years has benefited by that presence. They have introduced a most distracting and demoralising influence into European politics. Their presence has, I think, been equally injurious to Islamism because of the pretensions and aspirations it has encouraged. It has been absolutely disastrous to the various subject races, both in Europe and in Asia, with whom they have had to deal. Indeed, the record is one of misrule, oppression, intrigue, and massacre, almost

unparalleled in the history of the Eastern world.

. . . There seems to be presented to us, accordingly, if the Powers decide to take it, one of the great opportunities that have arisen in the history of the world. Assuming what I have said about the pernicious influence which has been exercised by the Turkish presence in Constantinople to be true, here at last is an occasion when it might be possible—I do not argue for the moment whether it is desirable—to cut out this canker which has poisoned the life of Europe. I expect that if we could look to the opinion of the civilised countries through the world they would be bitterly disappointed if, for reasons of political expediency or otherwise, the opportunity was not taken at any rate to consider most seriously the question of getting rid of this running sore for ever.

. . . Another point that the advocates of the expulsion of the Turk lay great stress upon—and it appeals to me very strongly—is this.

*Stambul  
a hotbed  
of vice*

Just as Byzantium in the old days of the Eastern Roman Empire was a sink of corruption and iniquity unparalleled in the ancient world, so undoubtedly is Constantinople to-day. Stambul in the hands of the Turks has been not only the hotbed of every sort of Eastern vice, but it has been the source from which the poison of corruption and intrigue has spread far and wide into Europe itself. The presence of the Turks at Constantinople has been an ulcer in the side of Europe. If we could get rid of them, if we could agree on the 'bag and baggage' policy of Mr. Gladstone and remove them to the other side, we should all feel that a kind of miasma had disappeared from the atmosphere of Europe."

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE TURKISH TREATY (*continued*)

#### SYRIA

THE Arab problem at first sight seemed quite simple. But on closer examination it presented complications of its own. The countries between the *Tribal divisions of the Arabs* Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf were preponderantly Arab by race and religion, but they completely lacked cohesion. Their only bond was a common pride in their great traditions and a deep hatred and fear of the Turk. In Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine the Turks were no more numerous than were the Normans in Saxon England. But they exercised the same sway. They made it equally clear that they were the governing race, and they held the natives in the same contempt. Nevertheless, there was no unity amongst the Arabs as a people. In Arabia they were split up into separate tribes, each under its own hereditary chieftain. These chiefs had no sense of national unity and they were for the most part jealous and suspicious of each other. Their jealousies often resulted in petty wars which the Turks with difficulty suppressed. There was hardly any contact, and no co-operation, between the Arabs of Mesopotamia, Arabia and Syria.

Soon after the War with Britain began, there was a movement amongst certain Syrian Arabs for liberation from the Turkish yoke. Whilst the Turks

were concentrating their main forces on the defence of the Dardanelles and on resistance to the Russian attack on the Armenian frontier, the Syrian movement for independence spread to Northern Mesopotamia and there was considerable unrest in the Arabian Peninsula. The Syrian Committee appealed to the Emir Hussein, the hereditary guardian of the sacred cities of Mecca and Medina, to head an Arab insurrection against Turkish rule. He responded to this appeal, and with the aid of his gallant sons, Feisal and Abdullah, gathered together considerable forces for a revolt against Turkish government in Arabia.

Hussein became the centre of an Arab uprising which made a definite impression upon the result of the campaign in Palestine.

*The rise of  
Hussein*

Before committing himself finally to the leadership of the struggle, he entered into negotiations with the British Government as to the objectives which the Arabs could hope to obtain if they pledged themselves to such an undertaking. Before the war began, the Emir Abdullah, one of Hussein's sons, had been in contact with Lord Kitchener. The conversations were renewed, at Lord Kitchener's request, after the commencement of the war with Turkey, and the Sirdar, Sir Reginald Wingate, got into touch with the Emir Hussein, with a view to stimulating an Arab insurrection against the Turks. Finally an elaborate interchange of letters took place between Sir Henry MacMahon, the High Commissioner at Cairo, and Hussein. Hussein made quite clear what were his aims and those of his friends. They were seeking to achieve Arab independence and unity in all the regions where the Arab people preponderated: Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia,

Palestine, and the desert lands in between, over which the Bedouins roamed. As far as Syria was concerned, Sir Henry uttered precautionary words about the French traditional interest in that country. This was violently resented by Hussein, who declared unequivocally that the Arabs both disliked and distrusted the French. Sir Henry MacMahon, however, stated quite definitely that we could not throw over the French, who were our Allies in the War.

As far as boundaries were concerned, the Arab claims were ambitious:—

“England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to 37° of latitude, on which degree falls Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Amadia Island, up to the border of Persia; on the east, by the borders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basrah; on the south, by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west, by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina.”

*Grandiose  
Arabian  
claims*

Sir Henry MacMahon was very reluctant at this stage to discuss the question of boundaries, saying that the Allied forces had made no perceptible impression in their concerted attack upon the Turkish Empire, and he therefore regarded a discussion of boundaries as “premature.” The Sherif of Mecca, however, in a letter which he wrote on the 30th of August, 1915, was very insistent:—

“ . . . as the limits and boundaries demanded are not those of one person whom we should satisfy,

and with whom we should discuss them after the War is over, but our peoples have seen that the life of their new proposal is bound at least by these limits and their word is united on this:

Therefore they have found it necessary to discuss this point first with a power in whom they now have their confidence and trust as a final appeal, namely, the illustrious British Empire."

Sir Henry MacMahon referred the matter to the British Government, which immediately got in touch with M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, and as a result of the instructions he received from the Foreign Office, Sir H. MacMahon wrote to the Sherif on October the 24th, 1915:—

*Britain's  
offer in  
1915*

"The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. With the above modifications, and without prejudice to our existing treaties with Arab Chiefs, we accept these limits and boundaries; and in regard to those portions of the territories therein, in which Great Britain is free to act without detriment to her Ally, France, I am empowered in the name of the Government of Great Britain to give the following assurances, and make the following reply to your letter:—

'Subject to the above modifications, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support

the independence of the Arabs within the territories included in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.'"

On the 5th of November the Sherif agreed to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but formally reiterated his claim to the rest.

It may be remarked that in none of these letters does he mention either the Vilayet of Lebanon or the Sanjak of Jerusalem.

In his final reply on January 1st, 1916, the Sherif answered by declaring that he would not press his claims against France until after the war:—

*Negotiations  
with France  
postponed*

"We find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that, at the first opportunity after this war is finished, we shall ask you (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beirout and its coast. It is impossible to allow any derogation that gives France or any other power a span of land in those regions."

Sir Henry MacMahon's only reply was to take note of the Sherif's "desire to avoid anything which might possibly injure the alliance between England and France," and warning him that the friendship between the two countries would endure after the war. The Sherif, on his part, never referred to the boundary question again during the negotiations, but he never withdrew his claims. On the contrary, in a letter written by his son Sherif Ali, on May the 26th, 1916, on the eve of the revolt, and mostly occupied with military details, he concludes:—

“Our Lord will not, we hope, forget Alexandretta, Beirout and those regions.”

But a conversation which Hussein had in July, 1917, with the famous Lawrence of Arabia, shows that the reason why he dropped reference to these regions was because he had much larger ambitions; when he said:—

*Hussein  
dreams of  
vast Empire*

“If advisable, we will pursue the Turks to Constantinople and Erzerum, so why talk about Beirout, Aleppo, and Hail.”

Here, indeed, is a flash of the old Arab spirit that carried the banner of Islam from Mecca through Northern Africa, over the Spanish Peninsula, across the Pyrenees, and fought a battle for the faith of the Prophet in the Valley of the Loire.

The French were notified of our negotiations with the Sherif of Mecca. They always claimed a traditional interest in Syria, more particularly in the Lebanon. Here the bulk of the mountaineers belong to the Maronites, a Christian community in communion with Rome. There was also a kind of Unitarian sect called the Druses: the former were hostile to the Moslems of the plains, but friendly to the French upon whose protection they had relied for centuries. The Druses hated both the Maronites and the French. The Syrian Moslems also disliked the French. But the historical interest of France—and especially of the French Catholics—in the Lebanon, made her very sensitive to any outside interference in Syria. The British Government were anxious not to offend French susceptibilities in their dealings with the

*French  
claims in  
Syria*



Arabs. As Sir Edward Grey said in one of his letters to the Commissioner, our principal interest in these negotiations was to enlist the active assistance of the Arabs in our struggle with the Turk. The French, however, were not confident that we had not ulterior designs. They knew that, like all Imperial races, the British always began their armed interventions in desirable territory by professions of disinterestedness, which gradually settled down into an unselfish acquisition—for the benefit, of course, of the conquered province and its people. Having regard to the tremendous task upon which Britain and France were jointly engaged, the British Government were anxious to avoid any friction or suspicion which might interfere with the cordiality of our co-operation. It was therefore deemed desirable that a definite arrangement should be reached, and committed to writing, as to the kind of peace settlement which was contemplated in the Arab regions in the event of a complete victory over the Turk.


Formal negotiations between the two governments were entered upon early in 1916. As Russia was interested in this settlement, both directly because of its concern in the future of Armenia and indirectly because of its interest as Protector of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Christian shrines of Palestine, the discussion took place at Petrograd. Sir Mark Sykes represented the British and M. Picot the French Government. The terms agreed upon were embodied in the famous document known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement which was signed in May, 1916. It was a Treaty that caused as much disagreement and unpleasantness amongst the Allies as even the 1915 Pact of London with the Italians. The Arabs were not

informed of the transaction. Why the British Government did not notify them of this important Agreement is incomprehensible. They were directly concerned, for it disposed of their future government in wide areas of great renown. When it became known to the Arab leaders, it naturally gave offence to them. Fortunately, it did not damp their zeal for the overthrow of Turkish rule. Hussein confined his action to a formal repudiation of the Pact. The Italians were also very angry because the Agreement was negotiated without any consultation with them and without their knowledge. That, too, was an inexcusable blunder. Italian opposition had to be bought off with the promise of territorial concessions in Anatolia, which created fresh trouble. As the time came for putting the Pact into operation, it was generally acknowledged to be utterly impracticable. After the victory was achieved, its terms almost provoked an open rupture between the British and French Governments.

What were the main features of this egregious document?

“It is understood between the French and British Governments—

*Terms of the document*      1. That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisers or foreign



THE SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT 1916  
(Arab State A was to be in the French, and B in the British sphere of influence)

functionaries at the request of the Arab State, or Confederation of Arab States.

2. That in the blue area France, and in the red area Great Britain, shall be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.

3. That in the brown area there shall be established an international administration, the form of which is to be decided upon after consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Shereef of Mecca.

4. That Great Britain be accorded (1) the ports of Haifa and Acre, (2) guarantee of a given supply of water from the Tigris and Euphrates in area (a) for area (b). His Majesty's Government, on their part, undertake that they will at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third Power without the previous consent of the French Government."

It was a foolish document. To quote words used by Lord Curzon:—

"When the Sykes-Picot Agreement was drawn up it was, no doubt, intended by its authors . . . as a sort of fancy sketch to suit a situation that had not then arisen, and which it was thought extremely unlikely would ever arise; that, I suppose must be the principal explanation of the gross ignorance with which the boundary lines in that agreement were drawn."

Tr 2

It is inexplicable that a man of Sir Mark Sykes' fine intelligence should ever have appended his signature to such an arrangement. He was always ashamed of it, and he defended his action in agreeing to its terms by explaining that he was acting upon definite instructions received from the Foreign Office. For that reason he hotly resented the constant and indelible reminder that his name was and always would be associated with a pact with which he had only a nominal personal responsibility and of which he thoroughly disapproved. His excuse was that he carried out instructions which did not commend themselves to his judgment. He is not the only soldier who faced disaster in the Great War under the same conditions of professional subservience of judgment to discipline. It is, however, noteworthy that bad as the arrangement was from any other point of view, it did incorporate the great Arab towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo in the area of Arab independence. But the guarantee that these famous cities should be within the sphere of the Arab State did not depend entirely on the Sykes-Picot Agreement. A definite pledge to that effect had already been given by the British Government after consultation with the French.

The Arab uprising led by the Sherif of Mecca and his sons took place in the summer of 1916. It was financed and equipped by Britain.

*Limits of Arab rising* Warriors from oasis and desert flocked to the standard of Arab independence raised by Hussein. No help came from Syria. The Turks, having been made aware of the conspiracy in that province, had taken stern measures to suppress it. The Arabs of Palestine, who might have been helpful in many ways, were quiescent and

cowering. Right through the War and up to the end there were masses of Arab soldiers from Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine in the Turkish Armies fighting against the liberation of their own race. Some of the best fighting men in Hussein's army came from Upper Mesopotamia, well behind the Turkish lines. But the Arabs in that part of Lower Mesopotamia which had already been cleared of Turkish troops made no contribution. For them the battle of Arab liberation had already been won by the British Army. Their indifference to the general cause of Arab freedom was symptomatic of the lack of national cohesion in the race.

Even in Arabia some of the tribes were apathetic owing to local and personal jealousies. To quote from a Memorandum written in 1917 by Sir Arthur Hirtzel:—

“Arabia is not a State in any effective sense, but a fortuitous concourse of tribes . . . under chiefs, the limits of whose sway are determined not by frontiers, but by tribes which they for the time being control.”

*Disunity of  
the Arabs*

An effort was made at the outset of the revolt to secure unity amongst these jealous tribes by choosing a leader whom they would all follow and obey. An Assembly of Arab notables was summoned at Mecca when the Emir Hussein was raised to the dignity of King of the Arabs. This was a false move, for it alienated the sympathies and cooled the ardour of the most powerful amongst the Arab chieftains—Ibn Saud.

It is a proof of the strength of the appeal which the cause of Arab independence made to the Arab

community—and also to the influence and leadership of Hussein and his sons—that despite these unfortunate dissensions and rivalries, from the beginning of the rebellion to the end of the War, a force aggregating 100,000 men was gathered together from far and near to fight for the overthrow of the dreaded and detested dominion of the Turk.

British officers gave valuable aid in the organisation of this force into an Army which would be effective for the purpose of conducting guerilla operations on the Turkish flank. Amongst these officers the most notable was that strange man of genius who will always be remembered as  
*Lawrence of Arabia*      Lawrence of Arabia. He was a man who possessed military flair and daring to an exceptional degree. How much of the success of the Arab raids was due to Lawrence, and how much to Feisal, it is difficult to ascertain. As one who saw a great deal of Lawrence during the Peace Conference, I felt he was a most elusive and unassessable personality. The mystery that has always surrounded him has added cubits to his stature as a guerilla chief. No two observers agreed about his real height in that capacity, but that he rendered effective service, both as a fighter and as a counsellor, cannot be questioned. His literary productions still remain and there can be no doubt about their rare quality. Whatever his feats as a military leader may have been, his descriptions of them and their environments have brought immortality to his name.

In the military operations on the Palestine front, the Arab cavalry and camelry rendered invaluable service. They took part in no great battles, but they harassed the Turks, constantly cut their lines of communication, and absorbed a considerable number

of enemy troops in protecting these lines. Lawrence took part in cutting the railway upon which the Turks relied for their supplies at over 80 different points. In the final advance, after the British had broken through the Turkish defences, the Arab cavalry swept round the retreating Turks and occupied Damascus. The Arabs were entitled to claim that they rendered undoubted aid to the British armies that defeated the Turks and finally drove them out of the Arab regions of the Turkish Empire.

When I asked the Emir Feisal at the Peace Conference to give a short account of the service rendered by the Arab forces in the defeat of the Turkish armies, he replied:—

*Feisal's  
account of  
Arab  
operations*

“When his father rebelled against the Turks he was hereditary Governor of Mecca—a position held by the family for 800 years. He had no arms, machine-guns, guns, ammunition, nor supplies and only took Mecca with difficulty. He was unable to take Medina. The Turks then sent 35,000 men to retake Mecca. God helped the Arabs and the English also sent them material assistance. Officers and volunteers from the old Turkish army joined them and formed the nucleus of a regular force. In 14 months the Arab forces advanced 800 miles to the north and cut the Hedjaz railway south of Maan. This was an important military achievement, as the Turkish army at Medina threatened the rear of the Arab forces. He then delivered a frontal attack against Maan without any hope of success, in order to cover General Allenby's preparations and to prevent a Turkish concentration. He had placed his army voluntarily under General Allenby's command, in



order the better to co-operate with him. General Allenby then asked the Arab forces to attack the three railways at Deraa. The Arab army did its duty and cut these lines two days before General Allenby's attack which eventually led him to Damascus. The Arab army entered Damascus together with General Allenby's forces. From that point the Arab revolt spread like a flame and in one bound reached Latakia, which was entered by the Arabs the day before the French entered Beirut. The Arab forces were the first to enter Aleppo. Throughout these operations the Arab plan had been subordinated to General Allenby's. They had abandoned all ambition to shine by themselves or to do anything spectacular. They took 40,000 prisoners, who were delivered to the Allies. He need add nothing to the praise bestowed on the Arab troops in General Allenby's despatches.

M. PICHON asked whether the French had taken any part in the Arab operations on this front, and asked Emir Feisal to describe it if they had.

EMIR FEISAL said that with him there had been a French contingent with four 65 mm. guns and two 85 mm. guns. This contingent had done wonderful work, and the help rendered by the French detachment placed upon the Arabs a debt of perpetual gratitude. There had also been with him a British detachment to whom he was equally grateful. He did not wish to praise them, as their actions were beyond praise, as were those of his own troops whom he had also abstained from praising.

Besides the military effort made by the Arabs, he wished to draw attention to the civil losses incurred. The Allied officers who had seen the

destroyed villages of Tafaz and Ahwali could testify to the extent of the massacres perpetrated on the Arab population."

What the Arabs were apt to overlook is the fact that their contribution in the conquest of Palestine and Syria was almost insignificant compared with that of the British Empire. *Relatively minor part played by Arabs* The Arabs only claimed that their army mustered in all a force of 100,000 light cavalry. Eastern arithmetic is proverbially romantic. The authenticity and inspiration of the sacred books are fortunately not dependent on the accuracy of their figures. The number of troops which Britain put into the Turkish campaign varied from time to time, but the aggregate British forces which attacked Turkey on all fronts and which finally overwhelmed its resistance numbered 1,400,000 men. These numbers had been on the British pay-roll, which we know to our cost to this day is not compiled from any imaginary list of warriors. In addition to this immense army there was the indispensable action of the British Navy, which alone enabled these masses with their tremendous equipment to be transported to otherwise inaccessible battle areas.

The discussions between King Hussein and the British Government, with a view to clearing up the doubts that lingered in his mind and that of the shrewd chieftains who followed his banner as to the character of the settlement which the Allies proposed to make in the event of victory, continued whilst the struggle with the Turk was still going on.

*Their distrust of France and Britain* The Arab chiefs had a pervading suspicion, not altogether without justification in the history of the Western Powers, that when

the Allies talked liberation, in their hearts they meant annexation. In particular, they had a profound distrust of the French who had already annexed three great Arab countries in North Africa. But our military occupation of Egypt was also present in their minds. We solemnly promised to quit that country after restoring order. Order had been established, but we still remained and ruled. The Arabs—not unnaturally—were anxious to be reassured that if they ran the risks of rebellion and helped us to win, they would not be accorded by the British and the French the same treatment as had been meted out to their African brethren. If the Central Powers won in the end and the Turks were to be once more on top, they knew too well the retribution that would follow. Hence the prolonged correspondence with Sir Henry MacMahon before they struck a blow, and the searching questions put through him to the British Government. Whilst the Arabs realised that a certain period of control by foreign administrators and of military occupation by foreign troops was inevitable and perhaps even helpful, they wanted to make it clear that it must only be for a short period. Any British or French civilians or officers who remained afterwards must have no executive authority. Their functions would be purely advisory.

The Arabs' special concern was for Irak and Syria. They knew that no one contemplated that foreign troops should occupy any part of Arabia. It was too arid a country to make it worth the while of any ravenous Power to occupy as a permanent pasture. Palestine did not seem to give them much anxiety. For reasons which were quite obvious to them, they realised that there were genuine international interests in Palestine which placed it in a totally different category.

Moreover the Palestinian Arabs were not in the same class as the men of their race who dwelt in Irak, Syria and Arabia. The Irak case was put very clearly and forcibly by the Emir Hussein in his third letter to Sir Henry MacMahon:—

*The case of Irak* “As the provinces of Irak are parts of the pure Arab Kingdom, and were, in fact, the seat of its government in the time of Ali, and in the time of all the Khalifs who succeeded him; and as in them began the civilisation of the Arabs, and as their towns in those provinces were the first towns built in Islam, where the Arab power became so great; therefore these provinces are greatly valued by all Arabs, far and near, and their traditions cannot be forgotten by them. Consequently we cannot satisfy the Arab Nation or make them give up such a title to nobility. But in order to render an accord easy, and taking into consideration the assurances mentioned in the fifth article of your letter, to keep and guard our mutual interests in that country as they are one and the same, for all these reasons we might agree to leave under the British administration for a short time those districts that are now occupied by British troops, without the rights of either side being prejudiced thereby (especially those of the Arab Nation, which interests are economic and vital to it),”

and then follows a very characteristic specimen of Arab regard for backsheesh:—

“and against a sum paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of the occupation,

in order to meet the expense which every new Kingdom is bound to support; at the same time respecting your agreements with the sheiks of those districts, and especially those which are essential."

The British Government had through the whole of the negotiations emphasised the fact that the French had a traditional interest in Syria and that Hussein must deal direct with them where that province was concerned. It was therefore arranged between the British and French Governments that Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot should proceed to Arabia to discuss matters with Hussein.

Accordingly in the month of May, 1917, Sir Mark Sykes and M. Picot paid a visit to King Hussein and had two interviews with him. In the course of the conversations the King "admitted the necessity for European advisers to heads of departments and referred to Syria and Irak." But he objected to the suggestion that these advisers should have executive authority. In an interview on the second day, a declaration by the King, in answer to a message from the French Government which had been delivered to him by M. Picot, was read aloud, to the following effect:—

"H.M. the King of the Hedjaz learned with satisfaction that the French Government approved of Arab national aspirations; and that, as he had confidence in Great Britain, he would be content if the French Government pursued the same policy towards Arab aspirations on the Moslem-Syrian littoral as the British did in Baghdad."

M. Picot seems to have accepted this declaration as a fair statement of the conclusion at which they had arrived. Colonel (then Captain) Lawrence reported an illuminating conversation which he had with the King of the Hedjaz on July the 29th, 1917, saying that the King was extremely pleased that he had secured from M. Picot the admission "that France would be satisfied in Syria with the position that Great Britain desires in Irak." He remarked that

"the only change in the situation caused by the meeting was the French renunciation of the ideas of annexation, permanent occupation, or suzerainty of any part of Syria."

The next modification of the situation was the issue of the famous Balfour Declaration of November 2nd, 1917, as to the National Home for the Jews in Palestine. I shall deal with this fully in my chapter on Palestine.

*The Balfour Declaration*

Sir Edmund Allenby on October the 23rd issued instructions for the military administration of that part of enemy territory of Syria and Palestine, which was either already in his hands or likely to be occupied in the near future. The lines corresponding with the spheres known as A and B, which the Sykes-Picot Agreement acknowledged to be part of the Arab independent State set up by the Peace settlement, were to be occupied and administered by General Ali Pasha El Rikabi, with Arab troops.

The Armistice with Turkey was signed on October the 30th. In order to allay Arab susceptibilities, a

*Armistice Declaration* joint declaration was agreed upon on November 7th, 1918, between the Governments of France and Great Britain and was telegraphed in French by the Foreign Office to Sir Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner in Egypt, as follows:—

“The goal aimed at by France and Great Britain in their conduct in the East of a war unchained by German ambition is the complete and definite freedom of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native population.

In order to fulfil these intentions, France and Great Britain are agreed in the desire to encourage and assist in the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, at this moment freed by the Allies, and in the territories of which they are attempting the liberation, and on the recognition of these as soon as they are effectively established. Far from wishing to impose on the populations of these regions such or such institutions, they have no other care than to assure by their support and practical aid the normal working of the governments and institutions which these populations have freely set up. To ensure equal and impartial justice for all, to aid the economic development of the country by inspiring and encouraging local initiative, to facilitate the spread of education, to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the role which the two Governments proclaim in the liberated territories.”

In order to reassure the Arabs, amongst whom there was a growing and dangerous excitement owing to their hostility to the French, whom they suspected of an intention to annex the great Syrian city of Damascus and the towns of Aleppo, Homs and Hama, it was decided to publish this declaration immediately in the native Arab press. Meantime as the campaign had proceeded and the facts of the position in Syria, Irak and Palestine became better known, the feeling against the Sykes-Picot arrangement had grown. It was realised that it could not work and that it was essential for its provisions to be reconsidered. The Arabs had never accepted it. They clung to the pledges given them by both the British and French Governments, who had never communicated to them the actual terms of the Picot document with which they had only become acquainted by indirect and roundabout means. Such methods always lead to exaggeration and distortion. Rumours are generally worse than facts. The Russian Bolsheviks in the autumn of 1917 published the agreements entered into at Petrograd in 1916 about the partition of the Turkish Empire. These included the Sykes-Picot agreement. The Bolshevik revelations were given in a highly coloured statement to the Arab world in a speech delivered at Beirout by Jemal Pasha on the 20th November, 1917—nearly a year and a half after the Sykes-Picot Treaty had been signed. The news roused much indignation in Arab circles. Fresh assurances had to be given to avoid a rupture.

But for many other practical reasons the Sykes-Picot Pact was discredited, and the British authorities were convinced that in at least two respects amendment



was essential. The first was in regard to the severance of Mosul from Mesopotamia. Deprived of the grain and oil supplies of this region, Irak would have been seriously crippled financially and economically. The second was the partition of Palestine into three separate areas under three different administrations.

When Clemenceau came to London after the War I drove with him to the French Embassy through cheering crowds who acclaimed him with enthusiasm. After we reached the Embassy he asked me what it was I specially wanted from the French. I instantly replied that I wanted Mosul attached to Irak, and Palestine from Dan to Beersheba under British control. Without any hesitation he agreed. Although that agreement was not reduced into writing, he adhered to it honourably in subsequent negotiations.

*My agreement with Clemenceau* The Emir Feisal presented his case to the Peace Congress at the Quai d'Orsay on the 6th February, 1919. He was accompanied by Colonel Lawrence. These two remarkable men were arrayed in the flowing robes of dazzling white in which they were apparelled when they led their mounted warriors to battle against the Turks. Feisal, whose intellectual countenance and shining eyes would have made an impression in any assembly, added to the distinction of his appearance by the picturesqueness of his oriental costume. He stated his case with clarity, conciseness and dignity. He spoke in quiet, restrained tones. He only fired up once. A clumsy observation made quite unintentionally by one of the delegates seemed to treat the Arabs as if they were an uncultured or semi-civilised people. He immediately flashed out in stern and ringing tones: "I belong to a people who were civilised when



THE EMIR FEISAL



every other country represented in this room was populated by barbarians." Signor Orlando, as a representative of Ancient Rome, bridled at this attack. Feisal sharply retorted: "Yes, even before Rome came into existence." No summary can fairly or adequately do justice to the statement he made of the Arab case. I therefore give it as it was recorded at the time:—

"EMIR FEISAL said that in his memorandum of the 29th January, to the Peace Conference, he had asked for the independence of all the Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia, from the line Alexandretta-Diarbekir southward.

*Feisal states  
the Arab  
claims*

He based his request on the following grounds:—

(i) This area was once the home of important civilisations, and its people still have the capacity to play their part in the world.

(ii) All its inhabitants speak one language—Arabic.

(iii) The area has natural frontiers which ensure its unity and its future.

(iv) Its inhabitants are of one stock—the Semitic—and foreigners do not number 1 per cent. among them.

(v) Socially and economically it forms a unit. With each improvement of the means of communication its unity becomes more evident. There are few nations in the world as homogeneous as this.

(vi) The Arabic-speaking peoples fought on the side of the Allies in their time of greatest stress and fulfilled their promises.

(vii) At the end of the War the Allies promised them independence. The Allies had now won the War, and the Arabic-speaking peoples thought themselves entitled to independence and worthy of it. It was in accord with the principles laid down by President Wilson, and accepted by all the Allies.

(viii) The Arab army had fought to win its freedom. It lost heavily, some 20,000 men having been killed. General Allenby acknowledged its services in his despatches. The army was representative of Arab ideals and was composed of young Syrians, Lebanese, Hedjazis, Mesopotamians, Palestinians and Yemenis.

(ix) The blood of Arab soldiers, the massacres among the civil populations and the economic ruin of the country in the War deserved a recompense.

(x) In Damascus, Beirut, Tripoli, Aleppo, Latakia, and other districts of Syria, the civil population had declared its independence and hoisted the Arab flag before the Allied troops arrived. The Allied Commander-in-Chief afterwards insisted that the flag be lowered to instal temporary Military Governors. This, he explained to the Arabs, was provisional, till the Peace Conference settled the future of the country. Had the Arabs known it was in compliance with a secret treaty they would not have permitted it.

(xi) The Syrians who joined the Northern Army were recognised by the Allies as belligerents. They demand through this Delegation their independence.

His father did not risk his life and his kingdom by joining in the War at its most critical time to further any personal ambitions. He was not seeking an empire. He rose up to free all the Arab provinces from their Turkish masters. He did not wish to extend the boundaries of the Hedjaz Kingdom a single inch.

His ideal was the ideal of all Arab patriots. He could not believe that the Allies would run counter to their wishes. If they did so the consequences would be grave. The Arabs were most grateful to England and France for the help given them to free their country. The Arabs now asked them to fulfil their promises of November, 1918. It was a momentous decision which the Conference had to take, since on it depended the life of a nation inhabiting a country of great strategic importance between Europe and Asia.

The greatest difficulty would be over Syria. Syria had claimed her unity and her independence, and the other liberated areas of Arabia wished Syria to take her natural place in the future Confederation of liberated Arabic-speaking Asia, the object of all Arab hopes and fears.

*Problem of  
Syria*

Some of the people of the present Province of Lebanon were asking for French protection and guarantees. Some of them did not wish to sever their connection with Syria. He was willing to admit their independence, but thought it essential to maintain some form of economic union in the interest of mutual development. He hoped nothing would be done now to render the admission of the Lebanon to the future Confederation impossible, if it desired admission. For the moment, the

inhabitants of the rest of Syria also hoped that the Lebanon people would of their own accord decide on federal union with Syria.

The Arabs realised how much their country lacked development. They wanted it to be the link between the East and West and to hand on Western civilisation to Asia. They did not wish to close their doors to civilised people; on the contrary, as rulers of their own country, in their zeal for their country's betterment, they wanted to seek help from everyone who wished them well; but they could not sacrifice for this help any of the independence for which they had fought, since they regarded it as a necessary basis of future prosperity. They must also guard their economic interests, as part of their duty as governors. He hoped no Power imagined that it had the right to limit the independence of a people because it had material interests in their country.

Arab religious differences were being exploited. These had been triumphed over in the Hedjaz army, in which all creeds co-operated to free their country. The first efforts of the Arab Government would be to maintain this welding of the faiths in their common service of the principle of nationality."

When he came to deal with Palestine, he admitted that it was on a different footing to the countries that were traditionally Arab.

*Palestine a  
special case*

"Palestine, in consequence of its universal character, he left on one side for the consideration of all parties interested. With this exception, he asked for the independence of the Arab areas enumerated in his memorandum.

When this principle was admitted, he asked that the various Provinces, on the principle of self-determination, should be allowed to indicate to the League of Nations the nature of the assistance they required. If the indications before the Conference in any one case were not conclusive as to their wishes regarding their complete independence or regarding the Power which they chose as their mandatory Power, he suggested that an international enquiry, made in the area concerned, might be a quick, easy, sure, and just way of determining their wishes.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked the Emir whether, seeing that the plan of mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations had been adopted, he would prefer for his people a single mandatory, or several.

EMIR FEISAL said that he would not like to assume towards his people the responsibility of giving an answer to this question. It must be for the Arab people to declare their wishes in respect to a mandatory authority. Neither he, nor his father, nor, he thought, any person now living, would be ready to assume the responsibility of deciding this question on behalf of the people. He was here to ask for the independence of his people, and for their right to choose their own mandatory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that he understood this perfectly, but would like to know the Emir's personal opinion.

EMIR FEISAL said that personally he was afraid of partition. His principle was Arab unity. It was for this that the Arabs had fought. Any other solution would be regarded by the Arabs in the



light of a division of spoils after a battle. The Arabs had fought a hard fight to achieve unity. He hoped the Conference would regard them as an oppressed nation which had risen against its masters. The Arabs asked for freedom only, and would take nothing less. He thought the Conference would be of the opinion that the Arab revolt had been as well conducted as any rebellion of an oppressed people in recent memory. The Arabs were an ancient people, civilised and organised at a time when the nations represented in this room were unformed. They had suffered centuries of slavery and had now seized the chance of emancipation. He hoped that the Conference would not thrust them back into the condition from which they had now emerged. The Arabs had tasted slavery: none of the nations gathered in the room knew what that meant. For 400 years the Arabs had suffered under a violent military oppression, and as long as life remained in them, they meant never to return to it."

Further evidence was given by Dr. Howard Bliss, a distinguished missionary of Syrian birth and American ancestry, and the Principal of the American University at Beirut. He put in an earnest plea for the appointment of a Commission to proceed immediately to Syria to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants.

It was reported to us by Lord Allenby that there was considerable excitement and some disturbance in Syria created by the apprehension that France intended to annex the country and incorporate it in its Empire, like Tunis and Algeria. The Commander-in-Chief advised the British Government that he had

*Allenby  
reports  
unrest in  
Syria*

received reports from every district in Syria that the people were bitterly hostile to the French and that their occupation of the country would lead to bloodshed. Dr. Bliss in his evidence gave one or two examples of the high-handed methods adopted by the French in the district of Beirut (which was partly in French military occupation) to suppress all manifestations of a desire for Syrian independence.

As the situation in developing led to most bitter recriminations and to the nearest approach to a rupture between ourselves and the French, it will be necessary at this stage to enter rather fully into the details of the controversy. I shall tell the story in a series of contemporary documents. The military and bureaucracy in all countries are by nature suspicious of all foreigners. The French are no exception to this rule. They believed in their hearts that our officers had stirred up Syrian antipathy to the French in order to save Syria for Britain. It is true that they (our officers) were convinced that the Syrians were irradicably hostile to the idea of French rule and that it could not be permanently held without a large garrison. But neither Allenby nor any one of his informants had any idea of converting it into a British possession. The bitter sequel of many years of disaffection and rebellion proved the genuineness and reliability of Allenby's report.

As I was fully absorbed at the time in the building up of the German Treaty and also in the anxious internal situation at home, I was unable to find time to give full attention to the difficulties that had arisen in Syria. I therefore left the matter entirely in the hands of Lord Milner, who had resigned the War Office and become Colonial Secretary. In a letter

*Milner's  
view of  
Syrian  
question*

he wrote to me on the 8th of March, 1919, he expressed himself very frankly about the attitude and activities of the French in Syria:—

“What passed between me and Monsieur Clemenceau with respect to Syria was this:

I told him quite frankly that, while we were dissatisfied with the Sykes-Picot scheme which he had himself recognised the necessity of radically altering, we had no desire to play the French out of Syria or to try to get Syria for ourselves. Our interest was confined to an extended Mesopotamia, to Palestine, and to a good connection between them. The Syrian difficulty was not our doing, but was due to the fact that the French had unfortunately fallen foul of the Arabs. This put us in a very awkward position, as we were friends with the French, but also friends with the Arabs who had fought gallantly on our side against the Turks and contributed materially to our victory. It was therefore entirely in our interest that the French and the Arabs should get on better terms with one another.

There was at the same time an equal necessity for the French, for if Feisal were to stick his toes into the ground and refuse to have anything to do with them, I did not see how, in view of their and our explicit declarations about ‘complete enfranchisement’ for the people of Syria and their right to choose their own rulers, the Peace Conference could possibly impose France upon Syria as a mandatory power. The only way out seemed to be, that the French should stop continually bullying and irritating Feisal and try to make up to him. I thought that it was not yet too late,

and that if Clemenceau, who took a much more liberal view on this question than the bureaucrats behind him, would see Feisal himself, it might be a beginning of negotiations which would lead to an understanding. Clemenceau said that it was no use his seeing Feisal alone with us standing aside and possibly advising Feisal against him. If I, or some other responsible British representative were present, he would be willing to talk to Feisal.

I was just then leaving for a few days in London and said that I would try and arrange such a meeting on my return. On the day I returned, Clemenceau was shot, and I have not liked to trouble him again in the matter since. Moreover, I did not wish to go any deeper into it, until I was quite sure that I was pursuing a policy in accordance with your views.

My own opinion on the subject is very clear, although I am aware that I have almost every other Government authority military and diplomatic against me. I am totally opposed to the idea of trying to diddle the French out of Syria. I know that it will be very difficult to get any agreement between them and Feisal, but I do not think it impossible, if we put our weight into the scale in favour of agreement and bring pressure upon both parties to compromise.

You asked me last night what kind of compromise I thought was possible. I therefore suggest a scheme; it is entirely my own; it is open to numerous objections and I myself can knock half a dozen holes in it. But I defy any human being to get out of this Syrian tangle by any scheme which is not open to many objections, and I want to get out of it somehow without a row.

The position is this. At present both parties, the French and Feisal, are in a hopeless impasse.

*Mitner's  
proposition  
for settlement*

The French can probably, in any case, substantiate their claim to the Lebanon district and perhaps to the whole of the Syrian coast including Alexandria. But they certainly cannot get hold of the hinterland, including the more important places, Damascus, Homs and Aleppo, which were left, even under the Sykes-Picot scheme, in the 'Arab territory' ('A' area) *id est*, in an area which France was to supply 'advisers or foreign functionaries *at the request of the Arab state*' if Feisal continues to resist and repudiate them.

On the other hand, Feisal in that case remains cut off from the sea so that his valuable hinterland is of comparatively little use to him. Moreover, if Feisal is to develop his territory, he urgently needs money and he needs technical skill and European guidance. Seeing that we, by our repeated promises and also by the fact that we want all our money for Mesopotamia, are precluded from helping him, I do not see where he can get things except from France. Therefore as neither party can get all that he wants and their failure to agree involves an intolerable situation for both of them, the only thing is to find a compromise.

The compromise I suggest is this. Let the French give up the idea of 'bossing' Feisal in the sense of full administrative control such as they exercise in Tunis and Morocco, and let them give him access to the sea at Tripoli and the line of the Tripoli-Homs railway, which is bound to be the Mediterranean end of a most important route linking up Syria with Mesopotamia and the Further East.

This releases Feisal from his present tied-up condition and immensely increases the economic value of his whole territory.

On the other hand, let Feisal on his side accept the French as the mandatory power for the whole of his territory not falling within the sphere of British influence, but as a mandatory power with the mildest form of mandate, something like what was contemplated in the Sykes-Picot agreement for the 'A' and 'B' areas, namely, 'priority of right of enterprise of local loans' for the mandatory power, and the appointment only of such functionaries as Feisal may ask for. These functionaries would probably be confined to Public Works and Finance. What this means is that the material development of the country would be undertaken by the French. The railways, ports and other public works would be run by them, while the administration otherwise would be substantially native.

The French would, of course, hate this, for what they have been looking for, despite their own Sykes-Picot agreement, is the virtual ownership of Syria. But in the awkward position in which they are, threatened with being cut off from all participation in the development of the best parts of Syria, I think that they would accept the compromise, especially if the pill were sweetened in some way. To do this I suggest that they should be allowed to keep the Lebanon and the rest of the coast strip (except the bit allotted to Feisal), including the important port of Alexandretta as an area under their full control with a mandate which will give them complete powers of administration.

. . . . .

There is only one thing more that I have to add in this connection. If we are to play the honest broker between France and Feisal, and especially to get France out of her present difficulty by persuading Feisal to come to terms with her, we must take care that in return the French fulfil their promise to us about Mosul and Palestine, and give it a liberal interpretation."

In fairness to the French I must give their view of the position as it was presented immediately after Dr. Bliss' evidence to the Peace Conference by the Chairman of the National Syrian Committee. This body claimed to be composed of Syrians of all religions and sects and to be "duly authorised to represent the Syrian and Syrio-Lebanese Committees and Associations in the United States of America, Europe, Australia and Africa (Egypt)" whose membership he estimated at over a million. The opinions of the spokesman of this body were expressed in an extremely able and powerful presentation. He was strongly opposed to the inclusion of Syria in an Arab state constituted on the basis of racial and religious unity, and fiercely contemptuous of the idea of a "highly civilised people" like the Syrians being governed from the Hedjaz. Here are a few extracts from this striking and occasionally brilliant pronouncement:—

"Unity of language—unity of religion! If the former were to determine nationality, that, Gentlemen, would carry us much too far. The new and old worlds would have to be redivided, and one-third of Switzerland and half of Belgium joined

to France. And if unity of belief had to be taken into consideration, you would have to undertake a new distribution of nations and create religious States with popes in place of kings and councils, in place of republican and democratic Governments. No; neither unity of language nor unity of religion constitutes nationality, especially where a triple barrier, such as that existing between Arabia and Syria, separates two countries and two nations. A desert which places Damascus at least 1,500 kilometres from Mecca forms the geographical barrier; the social barrier consists of different traditions, habits and customs; whilst education, teaching and culture form the moral barrier.

What affinities exist between the natives of the Hedjaz and the Syrian, the nomad, and the settler on the soil? And, apart from the similarity of language (more apparent than real) imposed by the first conquests, what reasons can be adduced for annexing, even by ties of nominal suzerainty, an educated people to a race less advanced, if one may say so, in the ways of civilisation; or a people of enlightened progress, open to every conception of liberty, to a race rooted to its primitive organisation; or even for giving the latter supremacy by installing emirs in Syria—at Damascus and Aleppo—who would be feudatories of the King of the Hedjaz, Sherif of Mecca?

Is there any such preponderance of Arab elements in Syria as might explain or justify this idea? If there are, or ever have been, any Arab infiltrations, these racial elements have been quickly absorbed. They have become so

*Cultural gulf  
between Syria  
and Arabia*



completely Syrianised that the only Arab domination since the conquest in 635 A.D. hardly lasted as such 22 years—that is to say, one generation. . . .

To annex Syria to Arabia would be to do violence to the very soil from which the race and its history have sprung. To annex Damascus to Arabia, with or without Aleppo, would, if we may say so, be a grave political error, involving (and this would be for us a direct and mortal wound) the mutilation of our country, the unity of which has never been denied in spite of all the vicissitudes of its sad history. . . .

It is for the Powers to say whether they wish, by pursuing in our country and that of the Arabs, the clerical policy which they prohibit in their own, and which is feared by the great mass of our people, to create afresh that old division between members of the same nation and inaugurate in the East, and perhaps elsewhere, an era of agitation, unrest and irredentism which sooner or later will force them again to intervene.

Syria having once been constituted a State with integrity of territory and national unity, will it be possible to leave it to itself from the outset, or will it require the support of a highly civilised foreign Power?

Gentlemen, there is not a single sincere and educated Syrian, in Syria itself or abroad, who has not already replied to the second part of this question in the affirmative. The contrary has only been maintained by a few reactionaries or by some mistaken youths, under the somewhat Bolshevist formula improvised by the secretary of a foreign

*Need for  
guidance  
by a  
Mandatory*

delegation (whose august chief and prince already calls us his people) of:—

‘Let us massacre one another, so long as we are free. It is only by killing each other that we shall attain total independence.’

We ourselves consider that there are other and less extreme means of educating a nation, and that the massacres and anarchy which one might almost say are hoped for would only result in the ruin of our country, and, finally, in the subjection of the weakest, or our seizure by a watchful and enterprising neighbour.

Our apprenticeship has been hard—who denies it? The number of various religions that we profess, in each of which the disintegrating action of our oppressors has led its adherents to band together by nationalities, still engenders among the people mistrust, rivalries and dissension, all of which hinder our political unity. Even our national unity would have no chance of existing for any length of time except under a most tactful Government which respected local autonomies. . . .

For, having broken our bonds, would you refuse us the support we need for our first steps? You would not raise us up only to leave us to stumble in the wreck of our fetters? . . .

Is there any need to remind you, Gentlemen, that the Hedjaz was but yesterday a Turkish province, whose deputy to the Parliament at Constantinople was this very Emir Feisal, and that it has already found in its independence the reward for its efforts in the War? What right, then, can he

*Feisal's rule  
a usurpation*

claim to play the part of master in our country? In fact, he dismisses and appoints officials, chosen with a view to make people believe that he is acting under high and powerful inspiration. (He even tried at first to nominate the very Governor of the Lebanon.) His soldiers attack and plunder villages and carry away hostages as at Kaoubaba. He hoists the Hedjaz flag everywhere, counting upon its effect on the ignorant classes of the people. And he, the representative of the Hedjaz, presents himself everywhere as the mouthpiece of all those who speak Arabic, in Asia and perhaps elsewhere. He says, in the name of Syria: 'We are ready to pay for European support in cash. We cannot sacrifice in exchange for it any part of the liberty we have just gained for ourselves by force of arms.'

Gentlemen, by sanctioning this state of affairs, by giving the little Arab contingent which entered Damascus the rights of the conquerors of old, by giving his flag an exaggerated importance (which might increase his prestige among the uneducated, but would rank him with the brigand bands; and we would state roundly that in our eyes he deserves better than that),—by doing this will you have solved this question in accordance with your principles? . . .

Valuable aid may be obtained in arriving at this choice:—

1. By considering that if the people had been consulted before the War, the name of one of the Powers now assembled would have received the immense majority, if not all, of the votes

2. By referring to the documents which we have just had the honour to lay before you.

Even if the opinion of my colleagues and myself had differed from that of our mandators, we should still have considered it our duty to  
*Demand for French control* carry out our precise mission, which is to request your Excellencies, in the terms of the documents submitted, that France may be charged with the reconstitution of an integral, independent, federated Syria.

We concur in the addition made by many groups (those of the Syrians in Egypt, for instance), namely: a Syria completely separated from Arabia proper, and provided with a national Syrian constitutional and democratic Government, the constitutional head of which should have no religious character.

Is there any need to give the reasons for our choice and to state the claims of France to our confidence and our friendship?

It seems to us that this would be superfluous. The century-old traditions that unite our two nations, the affinities of temperament and culture which find eloquent testimony in that diffusion of the French language which has made it our second mother-tongue—these are matters of common knowledge.

Apart from the American University of Beirut, to which we owe a great number of our *élite* and which is entitled to very special gratitude on our part (of which we beg to assure it, and which we will prove should we become our own masters), it is the French schools from which we have received

our education and which have brought us to consciousness. . . .

Yes, without doubt, if we invoke her (French) traditions and when we recall not only her ancient declarations and promises, but those made more recently by M. Raymond Poincaré in 1912, when, as Prime Minister, he declared:—‘I need not say that in Syria and the Lebanon we have traditional interests which we intend shall be respected. The English Government has formally declared to us that it has no intentions or designs or political aspirations of any kind in those regions. We shall abandon none of our traditions, we shall reject none of the sympathies which we have acquired there.’

A few days later, Sir Edward Grey, then British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that he recognised the special interests of France in Syria. . . .

But our swordless hand will point you to our dead who, though not fallen in battle, are none the less victims of this War and of your enemies.

We have not had a hundred thousand combatants but we can number nearly four hundred thousand dead. We have not occupied towns nor cut railways, but many among us, unknown heroes, simple and retiring like their comrades in the Legion, have fallen for the same cause as your soldiers in the Dardanelles, in Macedonia and on the Western Front. In all the Allied countries, our compatriots have enlisted in the American, Australian, Canadian, English or French ranks, thus asserting their nationality. In certain countries like Brazil

they have even formed small Legions, which have fought under your banners. . . .

Palestine is incontestably the Southern portion of our country. The Zionists claim it. We have endured too many sufferings like theirs not to throw open wide to them the doors of Palestine. All those among them who are oppressed in certain retrograde countries are welcome. Let them settle in Palestine, but in an autonomous Palestine connected with Syria by the sole bond of federation. Will not a Palestine enjoying wide internal autonomy be for them a sufficient guarantee?"

At the meeting of the Peace Conference on March the 20th, 1919, the French Foreign Minister presented the case of France. He began with a  
*M. Pichon's statement* summary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, a recital of the modifications which had been made in it since its signature, up to the joint British and French Declaration of November the 5th, 1918. At this stage I interpolated that

"this announcement, which was the latest expression of policy by the two Governments, was more important than all the old agreements."

M. Pichon then recapitulated the terms of the verbal arrangement made between M. Clemenceau and myself during his visit to London in December, 1918. He then summarised a letter which M. Clemenceau had written me on February the 5th, 1919, which, whilst it confirmed the London arrangement,

"had asked for a recognition of the historic and traditional case for including the regions claimed in the French zone. It had pointed out that there

was no Government in the world which had such a position as France in the regions claimed. It had given an exposition of the historic rights of France dating from the time of Louis XIV. M. Pichon continued by pointing out that French intervention in Syria had been frequent, the last instance being the case of the expedition organised in Syria and Lebanon in 1860, which had resulted in the establishment of the status of the Lebanon. France, he pointed out, had a great number of hospitals in Syria. There were a great number of schools in many villages, and some 50,000 children were educated in French primary schools. There were also a number of secondary schools and one great university in Beyrout. Moreover, the Railway system of Syria was French, and included the Beyrout to Damascus line, and the Tripoli-Homs line, which latter it was proposed to prolong to the Euphrates and to unite with the Bagdad system. Altogether it was contemplated to have a system of 1,233 kilometres, of which 683 kilometres had already been constructed. Beyrout was entirely a French port. The gas and electricity works were French, and the same applied to the lighting along the coast. This was not the limit of French enterprise, for France had perfected the agriculture and the viticulture of Syria and had established many factories. No other country had anything like so complete a development in these regions. Hence, France could not abandon her rights. Moreover, France strongly protested against any idea of dividing Syria. Syria had geographical and historic unity. The French Government frankly avowed that they did not want the responsibility of administering Palestine, though they would prefer to see

it under an international administration. What they asked was:—

(1) That the whole Syrian region should be treated as a unit; and

(2) That France should become the mandatory of the League of Nations of this region.

On January 30 of this year Mr. Lloyd George had urged the Conference to reconsider the distribution of troops in Turkey and the Caucasus with the object of lightening the heavy burden which fell on Great Britain. As a result, the Military Representatives had been asked to prepare a plan. The scheme of the Military Representatives provided for:—

The occupation by France of Syria and Cilicia, with 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Great Britain of Mesopotamia, including Mosul, by 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade:

The occupation by Italy of the Caucasus and Konia.

The economy which Great Britain would achieve by this plan would have amounted to 10 divisions of infantry and 4 divisions of cavalry. The plan of the Military Representatives had been placed on the Agenda Paper of the Conference, but at Lord Milner's request the subject had been adjourned and had never been discussed."

M. Pichon then recalled the negotiations between the French Government and Lord Milner on the



subject of the area to be occupied by the French troops. He ended:—

“French opinion would not admit that France could be even partly excluded after the sacrifices she had made in the War, even if she had not been able to play a great part in the Syrian campaign. In consequence, the minimum that France could accept was what had been put forward in the French Government’s Note to Mr. Lloyd George, the object of which had been to give satisfaction to his desire for the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Pichon had opened as though the question of the mandate for Syria was one between Great Britain and France. There was, in fact, no such question so far as Great Britain was concerned. He wished to say at once that just as we had disinterested ourselves in 1912, so we now disinterested ourselves in 1919. If the Conference asked us to take Syria, we should reply in the negative. The British Government had definitely decided this because otherwise it would be said afterwards in France that they had created disturbances in order to keep the French out. Hence, the British Government definitely intended to have nothing to do with Syria. The question of the extent to which Great Britain and France were concerned was cleared up in the interview he had had with M. Clemenceau in London, and at which he had said that he wanted Mosul with the adjacent regions and Palestine.

As there was no question between France and Great Britain in regard to Syria, we could examine

the question in as disinterested a spirit as we could a Carpathian boundary to be decided in accordance with the general principles accepted by the Conference. He wished to make this clear before General Allenby said what he had to say. In regard to Mosul, he wished to acknowledge the cordial spirit in which M. Pichon had met our desires.

But if there was a French public opinion there was also a British public opinion, and it must be remembered that the whole burden of the Syrian campaign had fallen upon Great Britain. The number of French troops taking part in the campaign had been so small as to make no difference. Sometimes they had been helpful, but not on all occasions. The British Empire and India had maintained from 900,000 to 1,000,000 troops in Turkey and the Caucasus. Their casualties had amounted to 125,000, the campaign had cost hundreds of millions of pounds. He himself had done his best to induce M. Clemenceau's predecessors to take part in the campaign. He had also pressed Marshal Foch on the subject, and to this day he had in his possession a rough plan drawn up by Marshal Foch during an air raid at Boulogne. He had begged the French Government to co-operate, and had pointed out to them that it would enable them to occupy Syria, although, at the time, the British troops had not yet occupied Gaza. This had occurred in 1917 and 1918, at a time when the heaviest casualties in France also were being incurred by British troops. From that time onwards most of the heavy and continuous fighting in France had been done by British troops, although

*British  
military  
efforts against  
Turkey*

Marshall Petain had made a number of valuable smaller attacks. This was one of the reasons why he had felt justified in asking Marshal Foch for troops. He had referred to this in order to show that the reason we had fought so hard in Palestine was not because we had not been fighting in France. M. Pichon seemed to think that we were departing from the 1916 agreement in other respects, as well as in respect to Mosul and Palestine. In fact, we were not. M. Pichon had omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the blue area in which France was 'allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they may desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States' did not include Damascus, Homs, Hama, or Aleppo.

*Limits imposed by Sykes-Picot Agreement* In area A, France was 'prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. . . . under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief.' Also in area A, France would 'have priority of right of enterprise and local loans' . . . and . . . 'shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States.' Was France prepared to accept that? This, however, was not a question between Great Britain and France. It was a question between France and an agreement which we had signed with King Hussein.

M. PICHON said he wished to say one word. In the new arrangements which were contemplated no direct administration whatsoever was claimed by France. Since the Agreement of 1916, the whole mandatory system had been adopted. If a mandate were granted by the League of Nations over these

territories, all that he asked was that France should have that part put aside for her.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that we could not do that. The League of Nations could not be used for setting aside our bargain with King Hussein. He asked if M. Pichon intended to occupy Damascus with French troops? If he did, it would clearly be a violation of the Treaty with the Arabs.

M. PICHON said that France had no convention with King Hussein.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the whole of the agreement of 1916 (Sykes-Picot) was based on a letter from Sir Henry MacMahon to King Hussein."

I then quoted a passage from that letter which made it clear that the French had agreed that the district Damascus Hama-Homs-Aleppo should be excluded from the territory over which France was to have control. M. Pichon interposed that this was an arrangement entered into between "Angleterre" and King Hussein and that France had not been informed. [Later on I shall demonstrate that France was fully aware of the transaction.] I replied that had it not been for "Angleterre" there would have been no question of Syria. I quoted the numbers of men that had been put into the field against Turkey, and I added:—

"But Arab help had been essential; that was a point on which General Allenby could speak."

General Allenby, who was present, said it was invaluable. Then I proceeded:—

“ . . . that it was on the basis of the above quoted letter that King Hussein had put all his resources into the field which had helped us most materially to win the victory. France had for practical purposes accepted our undertaking to King Hussein in signing the 1916 agreement. This had not been M. Pichon, but his predecessors. He was bound to say that if the British Government now agreed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo should be included in the sphere of direct French influence, they would be breaking faith with the Arabs, and they could not face this. He was particularly anxious for M. Clemenceau to follow this. The agreement of 1916 had been signed subsequent to the letter of King Hussein. In the following extract from the agreement of 1916, France recognised Arab independence:—

*France bound  
by agreement  
with Hussein*

‘It is accordingly understood between the French and British Governments:—

(1) That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States in the areas A and B marked on the annexed map under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief.’

Hence, France, by this act, practically recognised our agreement with King Hussein by excluding Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo from the blue zone of direct administration, for the map attached to the agreement showed that Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo were included, not in

the zone of direct administration, but in the independent Arab State.

M. PICHON said that this had never been contested, but how could France be bound by an agreement the very existence of which was unknown to her at the time when the 1916 agreement was signed? In the 1916 agreement France had not in any way recognised the Hedjaz. She had undertaken to uphold 'an independent Arab State or Confederation of Arab States,' but not the King of the Hedjaz. If France was promised a mandate for Syria she would undertake to do nothing except in agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of States. This is the role which France demanded in Syria. If Great Britain would only promise her good offices, he believed that France could reach an understanding with Feisal."

President Wilson, who had listened with intent interest to the discussion which had taken place between M. Pichon and myself, then intervened and said that

" . . . he would now seek to establish his place in the Conference. Up to the present he had had none. He could only be here, like his colleague M. Orlando, as one of the representatives assembled to establish the peace of the world. This was his only interest, although, of course, he was a friend of both parties to the controversy. He was not indifferent to the understanding which had been reached between the British and French Governments, and was interested to know about the undertakings to King Hussein and the 1916 agreement,

*Wilson  
insists on  
self-  
determination*

but it was not permissible for him to express an opinion thereon. He would, however, like to point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one of the parties had gone out. This seemed to him to alter the basis of the agreement. The point of view of the United States of America was, however, indifferent to the claims both of Great Britain and France over peoples unless those peoples wanted them. One of the fundamental principles to which the United States of America adhered was the consent of the governed. This was ingrained in the United States of America thought. Hence the only idea from the United States of America point of view was as to whether France would be agreeable to the Syrians. The same applied as to whether Great Britain would be agreeable to the inhabitants of Mesopotamia. It might not be his business, but if the question was made his business, owing to the fact that it was brought before the Conference, the only way to deal with it was to discover the desires of the population of these regions. He recalled that, in the Council of Ten, Resolutions had been adopted in regard to mandatories, and they contained a very carefully thought out graduation of different stages of mandate according to the civilisation of the people's concerned. One of the elements in those mandates was the desire of the people over whom the mandate was to be exercised. The present controversy broadened out into very important questions. Cilicia, for example, from its geographical position, cut Armenia off from the Mediterranean. If there was one mandatory in the south,

and another in the north of Armenia, there would be a great danger of friction, since the troublesome population lived in the south. Hence, the controversy broadened into a case affecting the peace of the whole world in this region. He hoped, therefore, that the question would be discussed from this point of view. If this were agreed to, he hoped that he might ask General Allenby certain questions. If the participation of M. Orlando and himself were recognised as a matter of right and not of courtesy, the question he wanted to know was whether the undertaking to King Hussein, and the 1916 agreement, provided an arrangement which would work. If not, and you asked his opinion, he would reply that we ought to ask what is the opinion of the people in the part of the world concerned. He was told that,

*Danger of  
war in  
Syria*

if France insisted on occupying Damascus and Aleppo, there would be instant war. Feisal had said that he could not say how many men he had had in the field at one time, as it had been a fluctuating figure, but from first to last he had probably had 100,000 men.

GENERAL ALLENBY said that he had never had so many at one time.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that, nevertheless, from first to last France would have to count on having 100,000 troops against her. This would mean that France must send a large number of troops. He was greatly concerned in a fight between friends, since he was the friend of France and the friend of Feisal. He was very concerned to know if a 'scrap' was developing. Hence he asked that it might be taken for granted that this question was on the



Council table, since it was one of interest to the peace of the world, and not merely a question of agreement between France and Great Britain. The Turkish Empire at the present time was as much in solution as though it were made of quicksilver. Austria, at any rate, had been broken into pieces, and the pieces remained, but the Turkish Empire was in complete solution. The Councils of the world would have to take care of it. For his part, he was quite disinterested, since the United States of America did not want anything in Turkey. They would be only too delighted if France and Great Britain would undertake the responsibility. Lately, however, it had been put to him that he must approach his own people on this matter, and he intended to try, although it would mean some very good talking on his part. He admitted that the United States of America must take the responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, there was great antipathy in the United States of America to the assumption of these responsibilities. Even the Philippines were regarded as something hot in the hand that they would like to drop. If we said to the French Government 'Occupy this region.' What would happen? He had a method to propose of finding out, which he would develop later.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that General Allenby should be questioned at this point.

PRESIDENT WILSON asked the following question:—

If before we arrive at a permanent settlement under the League of Nations we invite France to occupy the region of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the result be?

GENERAL ALLENBY said there would be the strongest possible opposition by the whole of the Moslems, and especially by the Arabs.

*Allenby's  
evidence*

Shortly after the capture of Damascus, Feisal had been allowed to occupy and administer the city. He had said that he would like to be helped in the administration. A little later, after the setting up of the military administration in these regions, General Allenby had put French administrators in the blue area. When they arrived Emir Feisal had said that he could not retain the command of the Arab Army if France occupied the ports. He had said that it meant that he was occupying a house without a door, and it would be said that he had broken faith with the Arab nation. Feisal had originally asked if he could occupy Beyrout and the ports. General Allenby had replied in the affirmative, but had told him that he must withdraw when the Allied Armies came along, and he had done so. To Feisal's protest against the occupation by the French of places in the blue zone, General Allenby had replied that he himself was in charge of the administration, as Commander-in-Chief; and that the French officers appointed as administrators must be regarded not as French officers, but as Allied military officers. Feisal had then said that he would admit it for the present, but would it last for ever? General Allenby had replied that the League of Nations intended to give the small

*Arab  
opposition  
to the  
French*

nations the right of self-determination. Feisal had insisted that 'if put under French control' he would oppose to the uttermost. General Allenby had replied that at present there was no French control,

but only the control of the Allies, and that eventually Feisal's rights would be considered. Soon afterwards he had visited Beyrout and there, and in other places, deputations had come to protest against the French administration. These had included various Christians, Orthodox and Protestants, as well as Mussulmans. General Allenby had again replied that it was not a French administration, but merely officers put in by himself as Allied Commander-in-Chief. Every time he had been in that country he had found the greatest opposition to French administration. He had done his utmost to make a *rapprochement* among the Arabs and the French, but without success. The French liaison officers did not get on well with the Arabs. M. Picot had been with him to Damascus and Aleppo and was perfectly conversant with the situation. M. Picot would say that General Allenby had done his best to create good feelings. Lately, Sir Mark Sykes had been in Beyrout, Aleppo, and Damascus with M. Picot and had done his best. Nevertheless, the misunderstanding continued. If the French were given a mandate in Syria there would be serious trouble and probably war. If Feisal undertook the direction of operations there might be a huge war covering the whole area, and the Arabs of the Hedjaz would join. This would necessitate the employment of a very large force. This would probably involve Great Britain also if they were in Palestine. It might even involve them in Egypt, and the consequences would be incalculable.

He had gone with M. Picot to Damascus and had seen there Ali Riza el Rikaby Pasha, the Governor of the territory to the east of Damascus.

*Budgetary  
troubles in  
Syria*

The administration had not been doing well. There was practically no Budget, and it had been necessary to give him advisers. General Allenby had given him two British advisers, Majors Cornwallis and Stirling. M. Picot had subsequently sent a very good man named Captain Cousse, to replace a liaison officer, Captain Mercier, who had been there before and who had not got on with the Arabs because he had stood too much on his dignity. Even Captain Cousse, however, had not been able to get on well. Afterwards, General Allenby had sent a British financial expert, and had invited M. Picot to send a French financial expert. The British adviser, Colonel Graves, had co-operated with M. Moulin, the French adviser. They reported very badly on the finance. There had practically been no Budget. Then General Allenby had withdrawn Colonel Graves. M. Moulin was still there, but was meeting great difficulties owing to Ali Riza el Rikaby's dislike of the French administration. General Allenby had visited Damascus with M. Picot and had there interviewed Riza el Rikaby Pasha. General Allenby produced at the Conference a document containing the gist of the communication made by him to Riza el Rikaby Pasha. A copy of this document in Arabic and English had been left with Riza el Rikaby Pasha.

In reply to Mr. Lloyd George, he said that at Damascus there was a brigade of infantry and two regiments of cavalry. The Sherifian troops were only used for police purposes, since the Sherifian Army was still in process of formation.

PRESIDENT WILSON suggested that the fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form

*Wilson suggests Inter-Allied Commission* an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria, extending their inquiries, if they led them beyond the confines of Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. They should be asked to come back and tell the Conference what they found with regard to these matters. He made this suggestion, not because he lacked confidence in the experts whose views he had heard, such as Dr. Howard Bliss and General Allenby. These, however, had been involved in some way with the population, with special objects either educational or military. If we were to send a Commission of men with no previous contact with Syria, it would, at any rate, convince the world that the Conference had tried to do all it could to find the most scientific basis possible for a settlement. The Commission should be composed of an equal number of French, British, Italian and American representatives. He would send it with *carte blanche* to tell the facts as they found them.

*Clemenceau wants wide terms of reference* M. CLEMENCEAU said he adhered in principle to an inquiry, but it was necessary to have certain guarantees. The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were not isolated. They were all connected by historical and religious and other links, including mutual feuds, and old quarrels existed between all of them. Without contesting what General Allenby had said, he wished it to be recorded, if there were a *procès-verbal*, that many

Syrians were not Arab, and that if the Syrians were put under the Arabs they would revolt. He knew quite well the great share taken by Feisal in the Syrian campaign, and he thought that the British were also a little afraid of it. The whole inquiry would be an extremely delicate one. Orientals were very timid and afraid to say what was at the back of their minds. It was very difficult to get the real feelings of the people. It was very important, therefore, that the inquiry should not be merely superficial. Hence, he would ask for twenty-four hours of reflection before setting up the Commission. He might like to send some French Arabs there, as Feisal only represented one side of the Arab race. Moreover, Feisal was practically a soldier of England. That was a fact that all the world knew. He said he would revolt if the French were at Damascus, but, as a matter of fact, French artillery had recently been sent there and had been received quite well. He had made every effort to bring himself to agree with the principles propounded by President Wilson, but something must be said for the historical claims and for the efforts that nations had made in different regions. For example, insistence on an Arab outlet to the sea would destroy the claim of one nation in that part of the world. The Members of the Commission must be very carefully selected, and they must inquire into every Turkish mandate. Subject to these provisions he was prepared to accept President Wilson's proposal in principle.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said he had no objection to an inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the regions in which the British Empire were principally concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry

*I accept  
the proposal*

into Armenia, in which they were not so closely concerned.

PRESIDENT WILSON said he saw advantages in a unified inquiry into Turkish mandates.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said if this extension was to be given to the Commission it was essential that it should get to work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey fell mainly on the British.

MR. BALFOUR said that he felt these proposals might postpone the making of peace.

PRESIDENT WILSON said this was not so. For the purposes of peace all that was necessary to tell Turkey was that she would have nothing.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that Turkey was entitled to know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory.

PRESIDENT WILSON said it was rather that they ought to know how much was to remain Turkish.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the question of who was to be the mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference for the arrangements for Turkey.

PRESIDENT WILSON said that Turkey was entitled to know if she was to have territory of her own, and that other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who would be her next-door neighbour.

MR. BALFOUR asked whether it would be wise to include Western Anatolia in the purview of the Commission. Constantinople was mainly a military question—(President Wilson said a strategic question)—but south of the region which went with Constantinople came regions to which the Greeks laid claim.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said there was no suggestion that the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia. At Mr. Lloyd George's request

President Wilson undertook to draft a Terms of Reference to the Commission."

The situation in Syria between the French and the Arabs became gradually worse. There was delay in delimiting the spheres of military occupation. For this Clemenceau blamed Milner, whom he accused of failing to keep his promise to deal with the matter promptly. For this charge there was a certain amount of justification. Ever since the spring of 1918—since Lord Milner went to the War Office—his energy seemed to have sagged. Mentally he was as clear-headed and sound as ever when he exerted himself, but there was a nervous lassitude which appeared to have descended upon him and affected his fine faculties with the supineness of fatigue. He was in charge of some of the most important sections of the Peace Treaties—the German Colonies in Africa and the Pacific, Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia. I experienced great difficulty in inducing him to come over to Paris to negotiate with the various interests affected by these problems. When he came he would never settle down to business. He had the restlessness of nervous exhaustion. No sooner had he arrived in Paris than he felt an irresistible impulse to return to London, leaving his task unfinished—hardly begun. I urged him to remain and finish his job. He always pleaded urgent colonial business at his Office. He never explained what it was. To my mind there could be nothing comparable in importance or urgency with

*Milner's  
lassitude  
delays  
arrangements*



the questions that had been delegated to him at the Peace Conference. A man in that condition, however, cannot respond to persuasion. He cannot keep his restlessness under control.

It was of no avail to point out to him that putting off decisions was exasperating the French and fostering their suspicions—and not without cause. M. Clemenceau was not annexationist by inclination or political training. He had resisted vigorously Colonial ventures in the Far East. He did not belong to that section of political or religious French opinion which took a fanatical interest in Syria. He never joined in the chorus of *Partant pour la Syrie*. His attitude was apprehended in France, and the papers of the Right—especially the Catholic papers—suspected him of indifference to French interests in that region. They were disposed to attribute the delays in arranging for a French military occupation to Clemenceau's lack of zeal in the matter. This imputation irritated the old French Premier, for he had left the question of Syria in charge of M. Tardieu, who had done his best to get a decision, but in the absence of Lord

*Clemenceau's  
attack on  
Milner* Milner found it difficult to achieve any result. M. Clemenceau delivered an angry speech at a meeting of the Peace Conference on the 21st of May. He said that “early in the year the proposal had been made for the evacuation of Syria by British troops, and the substitution of French troops. Lord Milner had asked him to put this aside for the moment, and had undertaken to discuss it with him. He had never done so. Lord Milner had promised to help him with the Emir Feisal. He had never carried out his promise.” For some unknown reason he also blamed Lord Curzon for obstructing a settlement:—

“He knew the cause of this. It was the arrival of Lord Curzon. He had heard all about this from London where Lord Curzon had spoken very freely. Lord Curzon was the fiercest friend France had in England.”

I pointed out that early in the year I had not only agreed to a redistribution of forces in Syria, but had actually urged it, in order to relieve the British Army which had a large force there, thus multiplying the already too troublesome difficulties of demobilisation. I had gone away to London, and for some reason which I had never quite understood, the scheme had fallen through. I then pointed out that President Wilson had now proposed a Commission to Syria. The United States, Great Britain and Italy had their delegates already, but it was France who had never appointed their delegates. The agreement to send the Commission had been put into a formal document which had been signed by all of them. The French Government had not carried out their part of the bargain. I did not accuse M. Clemenceau of not keeping faith, but I said that he certainly had not carried out the bargain.

The French finally refused to take any part in the Commission. I felt that they regarded our officers as the stimulators of the anti-French feeling. It might provoke further unpleasantness if we were to send out our representatives. President Wilson, however, felt that, being in a more impartial position, he would appoint a purely American delegation to go to Syria to institute an enquiry as to the wishes of the inhabitants. I told the Peace Conference that the British Government were quite willing to agree to a similar

*French with-  
draw from  
Commission:  
Americans  
only appointed*

investigation into the wishes of the people of Mesopotamia and Palestine. I formally declared at the Conference that "I was quite willing to abide by the decision of the inhabitants as interpreted by the Commission." President Wilson thereupon commented: "that was necessarily his own point of view. He had no other means on which to form judgment. He did not think that these peoples could be left entirely to themselves. They required guidance and some intimate superintendence, but this should be conducted in their interests and not in the interests of the Mandatory."

By the time the Commission had reported at the end of July, the Treaty of Versailles had been signed and President Wilson had returned to America. The Report was so hostile to the French claims in Syria that the President decided not to send it in to the Peace Conference on Turkey. It has however since then been published. Here are the conclusions at which the Commission arrived:—

*Anti-French  
findings of  
unpublished  
Report*

"Arab feeling toward the French—While the Commission was prepared beforehand for some disinclination towards France in Syria, the strength, universality, and persistence of anti-French feeling among practically all Moslems and non-Catholic Christians (except a division of the Greek Orthodox), came as a distinct surprise. Friends of the French affirmed that it is due to German and Turkish, succeeded by Arab and British propaganda, and that it is not deep-seated. The Commission went to great pains in testing these affirmations by questioning. . . .

The anti-French feeling does seem to be deep-rooted in large proportions of the Syrian

population. This appears in an examination of the principal reasons given by the Syrians for their opposition to all French interference in their affairs. They say:—

I. The French are enemies of religion, having none at home, and supporting Roman Catholics abroad for purely political motives.

III. The French education is superficial, and inferior in character-building to the Anglo-Saxon. It leads to familiarity with that kind of French literature which is irreligious and immoral. The Moslems recognise that the time has come for the education of their women, and they say that those who receive French education tend to become uncontrollable.

IV. The French have not treated the natives as equals in Algeria and Tunisia, but have imposed differences in office holding and in various civil rights. This argument was presented very often and developed in some detail.

VII. The French are inclined to a policy of colonisation, by which they wish to substitute the use of the French language for native tongues, and make the people into Frenchmen. The Syrians wish to preserve the use of the Arabic language, and to retain their separateness. Furthermore, it is inherent in this policy that the French would never leave Syria."

Their recommendation was that the United States should be asked to undertake the single mandate for

*Request for  
American  
mandate*

all Syria (including Palestine) but that, if America could not take it, it should be given to Great Britain.

This document was never communicated to us officially, although we ascertained that the Report was definitely adverse to the French. Neither the Americans nor ourselves were prepared to accept a mandate for Syria. We had made it clear repeatedly, not merely to the French Government, but to General Allenby and to the Emir Feisal, that we would under no conditions entertain the idea. The latter urged us to do so, at the request, as he alleged, of the Syrian Arabs, but nothing would have induced us to reconsider our decision. Even Feisal admitted that it was essential in the interest of Syria itself that there should be temporary control by one of the Great Powers. We were bound, by the agreements entered into by Sir Edward Grey in 1916, to the allocation of that measure of control to the French; but we were equally bound, in an agreement entered into with the French and ourselves, to see that the cities of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo should be within the Arab sphere. We could not indefinitely keep a large body of troops in a country for which we were not going to undertake any responsibility as a mandatory.

I therefore strove to negotiate an understanding between M. Clemenceau and the Emir Feisal which would enable us to evacuate Syria, and to hand over the military occupation to the French, whilst at the same time leaving the Arab garrisons in the cities I have mentioned.

*Arrangement  
to withdraw  
British troops*

It is clear from the quotations I have already given from the speeches of M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon, that the French disliked Feisal, and their detestation was cordially reciprocated by the great Arab Chief. But

ultimately an agreement was concluded on September 13th, 1919, by which the evacuation of the British Army in Syria was to be concluded by November 1st, 1919, and the French garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo were to be replaced by an Arab force. Feisal protested against this arrangement, as it left the Arabs "at the mercy of greedy imperialistic ideas."

It was clear from the substance, and still more from the tone of Feisal's protests, that things were not going smoothly in the matter of the substitution of French for British troops in Syria. The French, who were in an extremely suspicious frame of mind on the whole of the Syrian question, were convinced that British officers were encouraging the obduracy of the Arab chiefs, and creating difficulties for them. It was quite true that the British military authorities in that area, from Lord Allenby downwards, were convinced that the French occupation would create trouble throughout the whole of the Arab world. The French had managed to impress upon the Arabs and the British that they had no intention of quitting Syria once they were in control, and that their real purpose was to annex the country and constitute it an integral part of their Empire. All the same I had no evidence that British officers had not carried out faithfully and honourably the instructions given them by the Government that the British Army should withdraw and that the French should come in. But once more

*Clemenceau's  
angry  
protest* Clemenceau was angry—extremely angry. He not unnaturally believed the tittle-tattle that poured in from French officers, eager to occupy and garrison this fair province. I received from M. Clemenceau a strongly worded telegram written in a temper of acrid

resentment, and full of insinuations against British good faith. Smarting under the stings of the hornets and gnats of the Chauvinist and clerical Press, and of Parliamentarians who accused him of betraying the historical interests of France in Syria, the Tiger lashed his tail furiously and bit his best friends. Knowing that on the whole and in the end he was amenable to the conviction of fact and reason, I deemed it desirable to set forth the actual position in some detail.

I therefore prepared a careful statement setting forth the whole of the facts bearing on developments in Syria, and demonstrating by documentary evidence in the possession of the French Government that the conduct of the British Government and its military representatives had been straightforward and had conformed in every particular with the agreements entered into between the two Governments.

“18th October, 1919.

Monsieur le Président du Conseil,

1. I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of October 14th in reply to my telegram of the preceding day, and also of the memorandum you have submitted in reply to

*My reply* my *aide-mémoire* of the 13th September which has just reached me. I must

state at the outset that the tone of your telegram took me entirely by surprise. It represents, so far as I can judge, a complete change from the friendly spirit you displayed in our discussions on this subject in Paris. I must in particular resent your statement that you

‘ . . . thoroughly understand the difficulty in which English negotiators find themselves

after being driven by political necessities to enter into engagements both with the King of the Hedjaz and with France which, if not in opposition the one to the other, are at any rate difficult to adjust.'

I can hardly conceive of a more offensive imputation made by one Ally to another, after five years of comradeship in arms, considering that the engagements were entered into with the King of the Hedjaz with the sole object of making possible the revolt of the Arabs against the Turks at a critical stage of the War. These engagements, and the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 which included them, were not concluded by the present Government but by its predecessor, and were entered into by Sir Edward Grey, whose scrupulous integrity is recognised by the whole world. Your statement implies a charge of duplicity against the man who carried the British Empire into the war against Germany by the side of France, and remained in office the steadfast friend of France during those critical years before America entered the War. He is the last man against whom a French Prime Minister should bring such a charge. It is all the more singular that you should have made this imputation in view of the fact that, so far from the engagements entered into by the British Government to the Arabs and the French Government being contradictory, the French Government is itself explicitly bound by the terms of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 to accord to the Arabs the very rights guaranteed by the British Government to King Hussein.

*Defence of  
Sir Edward  
Grey*



2. As the French Government appears to be under a complete misapprehension both as to the facts and as to the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter, I propose to record the history of the Syrian question. In order that that history

*History of  
the Syrian  
question*

may be complete, I append the correspondence in full which passed between the British High Commission in Egypt and King Hussein in 1915 and 1916. From this correspondence you will see, that while the authority of the Turks over their whole Empire was still intact, the British Government scrupulously protected the interests of its French Ally in Syria. It was of the utmost importance to encourage the Arab movement of revolt in order to help break down the Turkish wall which prevented effective communication between the Allies of the West and the Russian armies. The condition upon which alone the Arabs would agree to throw in their lot with the Allies was an agreement that there should be an independent Arab State or confederation of States including the whole Arab population. As you will see the Arabs pressed for the inclusion within the area of the independent Arab State of the whole of Syria and Cilicia. His Majesty's Government, however, refused to consider this proposal. They stated, on October 25th, 1915, that they did not consider that that portion of Syria lying west of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, could be said to be purely Arab, and that the interests of France were there involved. This area, therefore, had to be excluded from the zone within which they were prepared to recognise the existence of an independent Arab State. Thus, they stated in a letter to King Hussein of the 14th December, 1915, that,

‘ . . . with regard to the vilayets of Aleppo and Beyrut the Government of Great Britain have taken careful notice of your observations, but as the interests of our Ally, France, are involved the question will require careful consideration and a further communication on the subject will be addressed to you in due course.’

I would call your attention, however, to the reply which the Sherif Hussein made on the 1st January, 1916.

‘As regards the Northern parts and their coasts, we have already stated in our previous letter, what were the utmost possible modifications and all this was only done so as to fulfil those aspirations whose attainment was desired by the will of the blessed and supreme God. It was this same feeling and desire which impelled us to avoid what might possibly injure the Alliance between Great Britain and France and the Agreement made between them during the present war and calamities; yet, we find it our duty that the eminent Minister should be sure that at the first opportunity after this war is finished we should ask (what we avert our eyes from to-day) for what we now leave to France in Beyrut and its coast.’

*Hussein's  
original  
reservations*

His Highness went on to say:—

‘The people of Beyrut would decidedly never accept such isolations and they may oblige us to undertake new measures which might exercise

Great Britain certainly not less than our present troubles, because of our belief and uncertainty in the reciprocity of our interests which was the only cause that caused us never to negotiate with any other power but you. Consequently it is impossible to allow any derogation which gives France or any other power a span of land in those regions.'

In the end King Hussein, yielding to the insistence of His Majesty's Government and subject to the reservation quoted above, entered the War on the Allied side.

3. I turn now to the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916. The negotiations between the British and the Arabs and the British and the French were carried on simultaneously during the autumn of 1915. On October 21st Sir Edward Grey had a discussion with M. Cambon on the subject and asked that the French Government should appoint a representative to discuss the frontiers of Syria with a representative of the British Government. On the 23rd November, M. Picot, who was the representative appointed by the French Government, met Sir Arthur Nicolson, who pointed out to him our attitude towards the Arabs and our dealings with the Sherif. No agreement was arrived at at that meeting, but at a later meeting on the 21st December, M. Picot informed Sir Arthur Nicolson that

*M. Picot's statement of French agreement* after great difficulties he had obtained permission from his Government to agree to the towns of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, being included in the Arab Dominions to be administered by the Arabs under French influence. He said, further,

that his Government realised the importance of the Arab movement and wished to make any sacrifices possible in order to separate the Arabs from the Turks. You will observe that these negotiations with France were completed some months before the Arabs revolted, and before the correspondence between His Majesty's Government and King Hussein on the subject of the Arab boundaries was concluded. These records, a summary of which I handed you before, but which I attach for convenience of reference, are purely British records. But that the French Government was aware at that time of the undertakings of Great Britain to King Hussein in regard to the boundaries of the area within which the British Government was prepared to recognise the independence of the Arabs, is clear, not merely from these records, but still more from the fact that the limits laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, within which there was to be an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States, are identical with those laid down in the correspondence with King Hussein, and include the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.

4. I come now to the text of the Agreement itself. Article I reads as follows:—

“France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State or confederation of Arab States in the areas (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab Chief. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and

*Terms of  
Anglo-French  
Agreement*

local loans. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain shall alone supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or confederation of Arab States.'

I observe that both in your telegram and in your memorandum you state that under the Anglo-French Agreement, France and Great Britain were to protect (*protéger*) an independent Arab State. This is not correct. The word used in the Agreement is '*soutenir*' (uphold) which bears an entirely different significance. I would further remind you that the alteration of the word '*protéger*' to '*soutenir*' was deliberately made in August, 1916. The proposal of alteration was set forth in a letter from M. Cambon to Viscount Grey on the 25th August, in which he says:—

'il me semble que les mots "*soutenir*" et "*uphold*" rendraient plus exactement notre pensée',

and was agreed to in a reply of Lord Crewe's of August 30th, 1916. According to the correct text, therefore, the French Government is bound by its undertakings to Great Britain to uphold (*soutenir*) an independent Arab State in the area which includes the above-mentioned four towns, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, and within that area to 'supply advisers and foreign functionaries *at the request of* the Arab State or confederation of States.' Under the mandatory system, of course, the provisions of the 1916 Agreement about priority of exploitation would be superseded by the system of the open door.

5. I would further direct your attention to the previous paragraph of Sir Edward Grey's letter of May 16, 1916, to M. Cambon, in which on behalf of the British Government he accepted the Agreement:—

*British  
acceptance  
of terms*

‘I have the honour to inform Your Excellency in reply that the acceptance of the whole project, as it now stands, will involve the abdication of considerable British interests, but, since His Majesty's Government recognises the advantage to the general cause of the Allies entailed in producing a more favourable internal political situation in Turkey, they are ready to accept the arrangement now arrived at, *provided that the co-operation of the Arabs is secured, and that the Arabs fulfil the conditions and obtain the towns of Homs, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo.*’

You will observe that the acceptance of the Agreement by Great Britain was made conditional upon the Arabs obtaining the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. If that condition is not fulfilled the whole Agreement clearly falls to the ground. There was also the further condition that the Arabs should fulfil their part. In view of the fact that the Arabs remained in the War until the end and played an indispensable part in the overthrow of Turkey, there can be no question that this condition has been fulfilled.

6. Two other declarations or engagements which have bearing on this question are the Anglo-French declaration of 1918 and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The text of the Anglo-French declaration of November 8th, 1918, runs as follows:—”

(This declaration I have already quoted on p. 1036. It will be recalled that it was solemnly affirmed that the aim of France and Great Britain was to ensure the complete and final emancipation of all those peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and to establish National Governments and Administrations which shall derive their authority from the initiative and free will of the peoples themselves.)

“The Clauses relating to the Turkish Empire in the Covenant of the League of Nations read as follows:—

*Provisions of  
League  
Covenant*

‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory.’

7. The only other historical data which I think necessary to record as affecting the problem under discussion, are the understandings arrived at between yourself and myself in December last year in regard to Palestine and Mesopotamia, and the Declaration made by the British Government in March of this year in regard to the mandate for Syria. The understanding of last December was that the French Government would agree to the inclusion of the Mosul area in Mesopotamia, would also agree to relinquishing the idea of an

international state in Palestine, and that so far as they were concerned, would agree to a British mandate over both. The reasons for this arrangement, as I understand them, were threefold: (a) that Mosul was geographically and economically part of Mesopotamia; (b) that international Government had proverbially proved a failure, and that the sentiments of the inhabitants of Palestine, whether Arab or Zionist, appeared to favour a British mandate; (c) that in view of the fact that the British Empire had practically alone overthrown Turkey, and had employed a total of 1,400,000 troops and incurred an expenditure of £750,000,000 in a campaign which led to the conquest of Syria, the French Government which, owing to the concentration of its forces on the Western front, had been unable to participate in the Turkish campaign in more than a small degree and had even opposed its prosecution, was prepared to make these modifications in the 1916 Agreement, to meet British desires without attaching, as has since been alleged, any conditions thereto.

8. The Declaration of Great Britain's disinterestedness in Syria was made to the Council of Four at a meeting held in March last. Lord Allenby, the Commander-in-Chief in these parts, was present at the meeting and went back to Egypt and Syria immediately afterwards to inform his subordinates. Instructions were further sent to him at later dates from Paris and London instructing him to make it clear that under no circumstances could Great Britain accept the mandate for Syria. Similar statements were made to the Emir Feisal at the time of the Paris meeting and later. To these

*British  
declarations*



declarations the British Government unreservedly adheres.

9. It was in the light of these facts, declarations, and undertakings, that I brought forward the proposals as set forth in the *aide-mémoire* of September 13th. The British Government had hoped that the Peace Conference would be able to deal quickly with the Turkish problem and in the earlier half of the year they had thought the best road to a peaceful settlement would be the continuance of the military occupation of Syria by British troops, assisted by French and Arab troops under the supreme command of Lord Allenby until the Turkish peace was made. In the summer a proposal for substituting French for British troops in Western Syria broke down partly through disagreement about boundaries and partly because of doubt as to the consequences on local peace and order.

*Efforts to  
promote  
understanding*

Despite their strong desire to promote a Franco-Arab understanding it has been brought home to the British Government at every turn that there was strong opposition among the population of Syria to the exercise by France of a mandate over that country—opposition which His Majesty's Government did their best to discourage. The long-standing existence of this opposition is clearly indicated in the correspondence with King Hussein in 1915. The report of the American Commissioners, who have recently traversed the country taking evidence, proved that it is still formidable. It has throughout, however, been the desire of the British Government that an amicable working arrangement should be arrived at between the French, British and the Arabs, the three peoples concerned, and they did all in their

power, as you will remember, to promote that understanding as long as the Emir Feisal was in Paris. Unfortunately, though they had entirely disinterested themselves in Syria, and therefore had no interests of their own to serve, their efforts came to nought. In the early autumn, however, of this year it became clear that the decision of the United States as to whether she would assume a mandate for any part of Turkey would be long delayed, and it became necessary for Great Britain, which had borne almost the whole brunt of the war against Turkey, to cease to make herself responsible for the occupation of Syria. It was essential that she should demobilise her troops and limit her responsibilities. Pressure, both of public opinion and of financial necessity, left no other

*British withdrawal of troops unavoidable* course open to the British Government. Accordingly it brought forward its proposals for the replacement of British troops in Syria by French and Arab troops in the following terms:—

*‘Extract from Aide-Mémoire of September 13th, 1919.*

3. In deciding to whom to hand over responsibility for garrisoning the various districts in the evacuated area, regard will be had to the engagements and declarations of the British and French Governments, not only as between themselves, but as between them and the Arabs.

4. In pursuance of this policy the garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force, and the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force.’

The British Government further declared its willingness to accept the arbitration of the President of the United States on the question of the boundaries between Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine. This last, and certain other proposals in the *aide-mémoire*, I agreed at your request to adjourn until the Peace Conference could take up the whole question of the future of the Turkish territories. The proposals, however, in so far as they related to the occupation of Syria during the interim period, were reported to the Conference on September 13th and no objections were raised. These proposals were in all respects in complete accord with the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916 as modified by the Prime Ministers in 1918. They accord to France full control of the so-called blue area until such time as the Peace Conference determines the future of these territories. They accord to the Arabs the control in the area in which they were promised an independent Arab State both by British engagements and by the French Government under the 1916 Agreement. Further in area (A) (excluding Mosul) France will alone have the right of supplying advisers at the request of the Arab State.

10. As these proposals vitally affected the Emir Feisal and the Arabs, and could not be carried into effect without his co-operation, I telegraphed as soon as they were formulated inviting him to come to Paris at once to discuss them with the British and French Governments. At the same time I notified you and the other members of the Conference that I had done so. In reply you stated that you did not see the purpose of the Emir Feisal's journey at

*Consultation  
with Feisal*

that time and when he arrived you stated that you did not wish to see him. Accordingly, with your consent, I invited him to come straight to London with the object of inducing him to accept the proposal about occupation as assented to in Paris. To these proposals the Emir Feisal raised the strongest objection, partly on the ground that the Arabs objected to the exercise by France of any mandate over Syria, and that these objections had already been made clear by the people themselves to the American Commissioners, who had been sent to ascertain the wishes of the people, and partly on the ground that the Arab people, as represented by him, were bitterly opposed to the partition of Syria and the Arab territory in any shape or form. Despite very great difficulties the British Government put the strongest pressure on the Emir Feisal to accept the arrangement and to come to terms with the French Government. How strong were the Emir's objections and how loyally the British Government carried out its understandings with the French Government will be apparent from the correspondence which passed between the Emir and the British Government during the last few weeks, copies of which I append hereto. That the British Government was not forgetful of France's rights and claims is shown from the following extract:—

*Our efforts  
on behalf  
of France*

‘In so far as the occupation by France of the rest of Syria is concerned, they would ask Your Highness to remember that the Arabs owe their freedom in a large measure to the supreme sacrifices made by the French people in the late

War. It is true that the French contribution in Syria itself was not great for France was deeply pre-occupied in the War on other fronts. But on these greater and vital battlefields of Europe they lost 1,400,000 in dead, and incurred a debt not far short of that incurred by Great Britain in overthrowing the power which sustained the Turkish tyranny and without whose support the Turkish military power could not have continued the war more than a few weeks.'

11. As a result of our representations, I reached the conclusion that if a round-table Conference of military representatives were held to discuss, not the policy but the method of carrying out the military arrangements for the replacement of British troops by French and Arab troops in their respective areas, the change in the occupying authority could probably be carried through by friendly agreement between the three parties concerned, and with the consent of all. I therefore telegraphed to you asking you to send General Gouraud to London immediately to discuss the military arrangements with the Emir Feisal and Field-Marshal Lord Allenby. You can now understand how surprised I was to receive your refusal and still more the statement of the reasons which led you to adopt this course. After labouring incessantly to bring about a friendly settlement which would secure to France the whole of her rights, which would re-establish friendly relations between herself and her Arab neighbours, and leave her completely free to deal with them under the Agreement of 1916, I found my efforts met with an attitude of

*Clemenceau's  
refusal to  
discuss military  
arrangements*

suspicion and opposition wholly unwarranted by the facts, as the documents attached to this letter will show. I earnestly trust that the destruction of this attempt at settlement by consent will not prejudice the conclusion of an amicable agreement between Arabs and the French.

12. The British Government are so impressed with the importance of bringing about an understanding between the Arabs and the French that they did not communicate your message to the Emir Feisal in the somewhat insulting form in which it reached them. Had they done so, there would, in their opinion have been but little chance for a peaceable settlement of the Syrian question. They informed him that you had invited him to Paris and pressed upon him in the strongest manner that he should accept your invitation and come to terms with the French Government direct. He has, I am glad to say, decided to act upon this advice.

13. The British Government knows that when the Emir Feisal does come to Paris, you will, notwithstanding the tone of your message, treat him with the courtesy and consideration which one of the Allies deserves. They would remind you that

*Request for  
courtesy to  
Feisal*

he initiated a revolt against Turkish rule at a time when the Allied fortunes were at a very low ebb, that he was loyal to the Alliance to the end, and that he and his followers played an indispensable part in overthrowing Turkey which was the prelude to the collapse of the German combination. The Emir Feisal is the representative of a proud and historic race with whom it is essential that both the British and the French should live in relations of cordial amity. He is further a member of the

Peace Conference of which you are yourself the distinguished president. The British Government is bound to him by solemn engagements and the area he controls lies opposite both to the French and British spheres. His father is also a great Mohammedan leader. His Majesty's Government cannot conceal the anxiety they have felt at the apparent determination of the French press to deal with the Emir Feisal and the Arab problem with a high hand. If this were indeed the policy of the French Government the British Government are afraid that it would inevitably lead to serious and long continued disturbances throughout the Arab territories which might easily spread to the whole Mohammedan world. The Emir Feisal is now anxious to co-operate with the Allies. They earnestly hope that during the course of the negotiations in Paris nothing will occur to drive the Emir Feisal into hostility or induce him to enter into relations with those hostile elements which exist in the Middle East and are the enemies alike of France and Britain.

14. His Majesty's Government would further state that the Emir Feisal regards himself as entitled by solemn agreement to set up an independent State within the zone laid down in the Anglo-French Agreement of 1916, and including the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. The French Government is no less bound than the British Government, as the documents I have quoted in this letter will show, to uphold (soutenir) this Arab State in these districts, though they alone have the right to supply it with advisers *at its request*.

*Britain  
pledged  
to secure  
fair play*

15. They must further state that inasmuch as the Emir Feisal is one of Britain's Allies they cannot disinterest themselves in the question of whether or not the obligations which they have undertaken towards him and which the French Government have also undertaken in the 1916 Anglo-French Agreement are carried out or not. The British Government is under solemn obligation both to the Arabs and to the French Government. As I have pointed out in this letter, its obligations do not conflict with one another, but are complementary. It is clearly their right as it is their duty to concern themselves with the fulfilment of the Treaties by which they are bound."

I then summed up the arguments already advanced. I replied to charges brought against Lord Allenby and his officers of stirring up feeling against the French in Syria and arming the Arabs to resist the French occupation, and I concluded:—

"The British Government would earnestly plead that interested propaganda should not be allowed to estrange Anglo-French relations, and that a hearing should not be given to these unfounded accusations against the British Government and its agents.

*Britain's  
good faith  
with France*

There is a point at which such accusations, and still more their appearance in the French press, will inevitably provoke a demand for publicity. His Majesty's Government do not think it would conduce to the good relations between Great Britain and France if they were forced to publish the whole series of accusations made against them by the French Government in no very friendly or



conciliatory language, during the past six months, together with the replies which show these accusations to have been unfounded. Certainly nothing would be more calculated to encourage the enemies of that Anglo-French Alliance which was the principal cause of the Allied victory in the War. But they will not shrink from the duty if it is thrust upon them.

I have the honour to be, etc.,  
D. LLOYD GEORGE.

M. Clemenceau was not able to refute any of the statements contained in this letter. I deemed it advisable, however, not to leave the matter there but to do my utmost to promote a better understanding between the Emir Feisal and the French Government. I persuaded the French Premier to receive Feisal if I could induce him to come to Paris. This was arranged. As a result the French came to an understanding with the Arabs, the terms of which they did not communicate to us. I had conversations with Clemenceau on the general lines of our settlement with Turkey which ended in a satisfactory agreement. A note received by me from M. Clemenceau, dated December 12th, 1919, gives some of its main points. In it the French raised a new issue on the concession of Mosul to the British mandate:—

*Terms  
arranged :  
French ask for  
oil concessions*

“The Mosul concession in so far as France is concerned entails, as an essential compensation demanded alike by industry and by the French Parliament, strict equality in the exploitation of petroleum in Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. This point carries great importance, by reason of the

absolute lack of petroleum in France and her needs. Like iron and coal, petroleum has assumed a vital part in the independence and 'self-defence' of all the nations of the world. The willingness of France and England to arrive at an agreement, in order to ensure peace, must be clearly manifested in the industrial as well as in other spheres. The principle once admitted, the conditions regarding the passage and freedom of the pipe-lines will be easy to regulate. . . .

This first sketch of the essential lines of settlement as regards the Turkish Empire (an international neutral State of Constantinople and the Straits, a Turkish State relegated to Asia Minor and Anatolia, the recognition of the independence of Armenia, within the limits imposed by history, justice and reason, a definite understanding on the question of the independence of the Arabs and Syrians under a French and British mandate respectively) will be completed by an exchange of views regarding the Caucasus, Kurdistan and Persia, on which it appears that no dissension need arise. They will only come in question so far as they are affected by the present settlement."

Had M. Clemenceau remained in office another twelve months I am convinced all would have gone well. Unfortunately he resigned immediately after his shabby defeat for the  
*Disaster of  
Clemenceau's  
fall*      *Presidentship of the Republic in succession*  
to M. Poincaré. A combination of the malcontent elements who thought that he had given in all along the line to the United States of America and Great Britain not only in Germany, but also in Turkey, defeated his candidature. I have already

pointed out how factions resented his abandonment of the Allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and his acceptance of a modified demand for Reparations. On top of this came the anger of the financial interests at his surrender of Mosul, and that of the Catholic Right for his arrangement with me over Palestine and his consent to a temporary mandate over Syria, instead of a virtual annexation of that province. All these disgruntled elements united in humiliating him. The election that followed his retirement returned a majority which represented the war spirit and was extremist in its views of the peace settlement. The policy of French Ministries for the future consequently became more irreconcilable.

We are witnessing today a similar change of policy on the part of French Governments in the Western Mediterranean. That also has taken place under pressure exerted by a combination of the same influences. The same unholy alliance of religious and financial vested interests that defeated liberty in the East, is labouring to achieve a similar result in the West.

M. Veniselos, who was a shrewd political observer, warned me in a letter he wrote me on the 27th October, 1919, of the change in policy which would ensue on the retirement of M. Clemenceau:

"It is, in fact, extremely distressing to witness the systematic efforts displayed on the part of certain financial circles in France with a view to throwing again into oblivion the lessons of History and letting Turkey or, to be more precise, the Young Turks, who owing to their organisation constitute the only real power in Turkey, to resume freely their

*Influence  
of financial  
circles in  
France*

work of extermination of the Christian populations in that country.

The presence of M. Clemenceau at the head of the French Government constitutes a precious safeguard against the influence of these circles. M. Clemenceau, however, has already declared that he would retire from power after the elections and if his retirement takes place before the settlement of the Turkish question, it is impossible to foresee the difficulties which will arise from Paris with regard to the proper settlement of this question."

Clemenceau was succeeded as Premier by M. Millerand, but henceforth the narrow and vindictive Poincaré became the real leader of France instead of the more sagacious and far-sighted Clemenceau. Behind the Poincarist policy were the reactionary elements, the military, the Church and the bureaucracy. The troubles that ensued in Europe and in the East are largely attributable to this lamentable change. The policy of the enthroned factionists ultimately overthrew all that was best in the Peace settlement of 1919 and 1920. Our first experience of this change of attitude was in the framing of the Turkish Treaty.

The discussions on the Turkish Treaty were resumed at a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Allies held in London on February 17th, 1920. The French Government was represented on this occasion by M. Berthelot. He was much the ablest official in the Quai d'Orsay: well informed on every aspect of foreign affairs, exceptionally intelligent, possessed of a suppleness and subtlety which made him distrusted by the

*Ability of  
M. Berthelot*

blunter and more rigid British bureaucrat. Our Foreign Office stigmatised him as anti-British. When he heard of this his answer was: "I am not anti-British; I am pro-French." He was a good man to do business with because he understood that agreement meant a comprehension of what the other side were after and a readiness to concede to their point of view details which did not give away the substance of one's own objective. He was a great personal friend of M. Briand, who trusted him implicitly and was guided by his advice. As Briand never read any papers—either official papers or newspapers—Berthelot was indispensable to him. Berthelot knew all about the business in hand to the last detail.

In Clemenceau's suspicious eyes Berthelot's attachment to Briand was a fatal flaw in his qualifications.

*Shift of  
French  
policy* He was therefore pushed into the background—far out of sight—during the whole of the peace negotiations with Germany and Austria. From that obscurity he emerged as soon as Clemenceau disappeared from the scene. He was left in charge of the French case at the London Conference. The new President of the Council, M. Millerand, did not put in an appearance. Having regard to the contrast between his attitude and that of his predecessor, he probably thought it advisable to send the astute Berthelot to take soundings and also to accustom the Allies gradually to the change in the navigational course of the French Government in the Eastern Mediterranean.

When the Syrian question was reached on the agenda, I bluntly asked M. Berthelot what was the nature of the agreement entered into between the French and the Emir Feisal

M. Berthelot said this agreement was based on a draft drawn up by Colonel House in connection with the "A" Mandate. He had shown the Emir Feisal this draft, and had pointed out that the French terms were really more favourable to the Arabs than those proposed by the Americans.

*Terms of  
Agreement  
with Feisal*

The next day, February 18, 1920,

"LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot had mentioned certain steps taken by the French Government with the Emir Feisal and he had promised to give the meeting a résumé of the draft agreement between them. He had further said that it was based on the form of mandate suggested by Colonel House. In this connection he would like to remind M. Berthelot that the provisions of the Treaty must be respected. He referred to Section 22 of the Covenant. Mandates must be drawn up either by the League of Nations or by the Conference. The latter had set up a Mandates Commission, presided over by Lord Milner. This Commission had drawn up the forms of two mandates, Mandate 'B' and Mandate 'C.' These were now operative under the Treaty. But the form of Mandate 'A,' applicable to the Near East, had never been drawn up. The draft suggested by Colonel House had not been accepted, and was not official. If the Treaty was to be followed, the Mandates Commission should be called together again to determine the form of Mandate 'A.' It was not open either to France or to Great Britain to establish themselves in Syria or Mesopotamia by means of secret agreements. He submitted that the Mandates Commission should be called together, and no doubt the French draft

AAT 2

agreement with the Emir Feisal would be of great service in helping to draft a form of Mandate 'A.'

M. BERTHELOT replied that . . . as to the remarks of Lord Curzon, the French Government had no intention of presenting their agreement with the Emir Feisal as a final and tangible document. Conversations had been undertaken with the Emir partly by reason of a number of misunderstandings which had arisen between them. Mr. Lloyd George himself had suggested that France should make an agreement with the Emir. A certain official standing had been conferred on him, and this standing had been accepted by France—wrongly, in M. Berthelot's private opinion. Nevertheless, as the Conference had chosen to regard him as the qualified representative of the Arabs, France had treated with him accordingly. Great concessions had been made to him, and M. Berthelot himself had been blamed for them. He had quoted the Mandate proposed by Colonel House inasmuch as it was an American document, and as the Americans were supposed to be of stricter doctrine on this subject than others; but in any case he assured the Council that there was nothing rigid in what had been done, or in its consequences.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE observed that the discussion was dealing with abstractions, and he would like to know the terms of the draft agreement between the French and the Emir Feisal.

M. BERTHELOT said he would now proceed to give a résumé of the terms of the provisional agreement concluded with the Emir Feisal.

The preamble of the provisional agreement referred to the Franco-British Agreement of November

9th, 1918. It contained no reference to a mandate, neither did it refer to the Peace Conference, for the reason that the Emir Feisal had throughout the negotiations resolutely refused to accept a mandate or to accept any reference to, or interference by, the Peace Conference.

The first Article of the provisional agreement proclaimed the rights of the Arab-speaking people, settled in Syria, to unite with the object of governing themselves as an independent nation. It recognised, however, that this people would require the advice and guidance of a Great Power in the management of its affairs; and it appealed to the French Government to undertake that duty.

*Substance  
of the  
Articles*

The second Article authorised the French Government to help and defend the State of Syria with the object of ensuring its continued independence.

Furthermore, it laid down that the Syrian Government would ask the French Government to appoint a number of councillors, administrators, and advisers to control certain branches of the administration; such as the Departments of Finance and Public Works; the Gendarmerie; the Army; etc.

Finally, the Article prescribed that the manner of choosing the French councillors, and the duration and the conditions of service would form the subject of a special agreement between the two Governments.

By Article 3, France was granted priority in all matters connected with the raising of loans; and generally in regard to financing the Government of Syria.

The 4th Article dealt with foreign affairs. It laid down that the Syrian Government should



be represented abroad, but only through the intermediary of French representatives, except at Paris where a Syrian representative would reside.

The 5th Article recognised the Arab language as the official language in Syria.

Finally, the 6th Article proclaimed Damascus to be the capital of Arab Syria; the French representative to reside at Aleppo.

It would be seen that two important questions, which had been discussed with the Emir Feisal, still remained unsettled for the reason that no satisfactory agreement could be reached. The first question dealt with the creation of various autonomous States within Syria, such as the Druses, Liban, etc., together with the eventual federation of these various autonomous States into a confederation. The second point dealt with the setting up of a Syrian Parliament. In that connection France considered that such a system of government would, for the present, prove to be unsatisfactory on account of the variety of racial and religious antagonisms, and the mentality of the peoples inhabiting the country.

He would add that the Emir left Paris perfectly satisfied with the agreement which had been reached and his loyalty to the French Government, as an Oriental, appeared to be irreproachable. He, personally, placed the greatest confidence in his good faith. He fully realised that the Emir possessed a weak character and that his position would be a difficult one, on account of his being surrounded in Damascus by a group of enemies, who entertained anti-French sentiments. But, should the Emir Feisal lose authority owing to his weakness,

it was understood that all agreements entered into with him would, *ipso facto*, lapse."

Since the end of January 1920 France had been in complete military occupation of Cilicia and the parts of Syria not reserved for the Arab State. The Nationalist Turks had commenced hostilities and had forced the French to retire from the Sanjak of Marash with heavy losses.

*French  
difficulties  
in Cilicia  
and Syria*

On the 20th March, 1920, an Arab assembly representing Syria and the Arabs of Damascus assembled at Damascus, proclaimed the independence of Syria and chose the Emir Feisal as their King. The Provisional Mandate over the area assigned by the Powers to France was not repudiated, as their temporary control was not regarded as inconsistent with a recognition of the final independence of the whole country.

From the time that the French took over from the British, there was trouble and increasing disorder in Syria. King Feisal accused the French of fomenting trouble in order to justify the use of force in establishing themselves; while General Gouraud accused the Damascus Government of engaging upon a policy hostile to the one of collaboration to which it had pledged itself. He quotes, in his ultimatum of July 14th, a command which he alleged had been formally issued. He does not explain by whom or by whose authority it was issued, but he suggests that the proclamation had Feisal's acquiescence, if not his assent:—

"Since we cannot openly declare war on the French, we must overrun the country with bands which will destroy it little by little. They will be

commanded by our officers, and if any of them are killed, the State will be responsible for their families."

King Feisal appears to have been genuinely distressed by the growing hostility between his people and the French, and he took steps to attempt to persuade the native population to adopt a more friendly attitude towards the mandatory Power, even exposing himself to the criticism of betraying his people to the French. There is no doubt, however, that even in his mind there was resentment at the large force the French had thought it necessary to bring in in order to enforce their conception of the Mandate—as he put it, "enforcing the Mandate by means of 80,000 men, armed with all the latest weapons of destruction. . . ."

*Feisal's  
difficult  
position*

" . . . No one," he said, "is under any illusions regarding the aim of French policy, which is to create trouble throughout the country, make my task in the Eastern Zone impossible, and then intervene with their Army and impose their will by force of arms upon the entire nation. . . . It is clear that the French were pursuing a purely colonial imperialist policy."

Things went from bad to worse. Incident after incident occurred. After each one the French became more high-handed. They took over the customs at Beirut: they introduced a new currency on the basis of the French franc. The Arab population were worked up to a dangerous state of excitement. General Gouraud accused Feisal of fomenting the disorders. Feisal accused the French of bribing his enemies to fight the Arabs. On July 14th Gouraud sent an ultimatum

to Feisal. He began by referring to the Mandate which France had received for Syria "to bring to the Syrian population a régime of independence, order, tolerance and wealth. . . ."

*Gouraud's ultimatum* "France had affirmed the right of the Arab population on Syrian soil to self-government." And Feisal, according to Gouraud, had himself "gratefully recognised that it was in the interest of the Syrian population to seek the counsel and help of a great power in order to realise their unity," and had "appealed to France for this purpose."

General Gouraud recapitulated the events since the taking over of the Mandate by the French. He enumerated the "incidents," and said: "The state of anarchy into which the country has been plunged as a result of these disorders is such that we have been obliged to bring in considerable forces, considerably more than should have been necessitated simply by the withdrawal of the British troops from a peaceful region." He went on to accuse Feisal of introducing into his Government men who were known to be hostile to France. "Their programme is an insult both to France, whose help has been rejected, and to the Supreme Council, who conferred the Mandate upon her." The demands made by the General were briefly:—

1. The right of the French authorities to use the Bayak-Aleppo railway for their transport. French military Commissions to have control of the stations at Bayak, Baalbek, Homs, Hama and Aleppo; and the town of Aleppo to be occupied, since it is an important junction of communications, and must not fall into the hands of the Turk.

2. Conscription for the Sherifian army to be stopped, and the army reduced to the numbers it possessed when the French took over.
3. Acceptance of the Mandate. The General reaffirms that the French will "respect the independence of the Syrian peoples, and that it will be entirely compatible with the principle of government by Syrian authorities whose power is conferred upon them by the will of the people. The Mandatory Power only requires in return a concurrence in the form of help and collaboration, but in no case will it assume the colonial nature of annexation or direct administration."
4. Acceptance of the national currency.
5. Punishment of offenders—those who had committed hostile acts against France.

Failure to agree to these demands *en bloc* within four days would give the French the right to take what action they considered necessary, "and," Gouraud ends, "it is the Government of Damascus which will bear the whole weight of responsibility for the extreme measures which I envisage with regret, but which I am prepared to enforce with the most resolute firmness."

Feisal secured an extension of the time limit in order to enable him to make the necessary arrangements for the execution of the French demands. He said that his reply was given 6½ hours before the expiration of the ultimatum, but that General Gouraud pretended only to have received it on the morning of July 21st, after the time limit had expired the previous evening. Before it was received Gouraud

*French  
march on  
Damascus*

had already given orders for his troops to march on Damascus, which they eventually occupied—"as cynical an instance of aggression," says Feisal, "as modern history records."

Gouraud's violent action was prompted no doubt by the encouragement received from those in Paris whose aim at that time was undoubtedly to convert Syria into a French province, like Algeria, Tunis, or Morocco. In the end this high-handed French move only antagonised Syrian opinion to such a degree that disturbances ending in open revolt followed one after another. These necessitated military expeditions which were costly and only temporarily successful in achieving a sullen and delusive quiescence. The feeling created by the disregard of solemn treaties with the Arabs spread throughout the Arab world and left the impression that the only straight word spoken by the Western nations was the one that was bellowed from the cannon's mouth. It made the Arabs hostile in Mesopotamia and Palestine and accentuated inevitable difficulties in both countries. The story and its sequel were very fairly stated by Mr. Winston Churchill when, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, he explained the situation to the Imperial Conference in 1921. He said:—

"A disagreement broke out between Emir Feisal and the French, with many fierce protests and

*Churchill's  
account of  
the situation* complaints urged by the French against him; accordingly at a certain stage, the French being involved in Cilicia and in fighting with the Turks, General Gouraud marched an army against Damascus, routed the Arabs, seized the city, and is now in occupation of the four towns I have mentioned (Damascus,

Aleppo, Homs and Hama), as well as the whole of Syria. The operations had been conducted very largely by black African troops, and it was extremely painful to British opinion, and to British officers particularly who had served with the Arabs, to see those who had been our comrades such a little time before and our Allies, and who looked to us for protection and to see their wrongs righted, to look on while they were thrashed and trampled down and their cities taken against the spirit of the treaties, if not against the letter, by the French; and that has been a deep source of pain to politicians and to the military men who have been concerned. However, we have these strong ties with the French and they have to prevail, and we were not able to do anything to help the Arabs in the matter, but it has unsettled the whole of the Arab world, and for a time they mingled us in their resentment with the French."

We know to-day how completely Lord Allenby's judgment as to the position in Syria has been vindicated by the event. Three distinguished soldiers—Gouraud, Sarrail and Weygand—supported by large armies, failed to reconcile the inhabitants of Syria to French rule. It was a costly lesson for French statesmen, but they learnt it at last.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### THE TURKISH TREATY (*continued*)

#### PALESTINE

THE intention of the Allied Powers regarding the future of Palestine up to the end of 1916 are practically embodied in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The country was to be mutilated and torn into sections. There would be no more Palestine. Canaan was to

*Dawning  
interest  
in future of  
Palestine*

be drawn and quartered. But 1917 saw a complete change in the attitude of the nations towards this historic land. It was no longer the end of a pipe-line here, the terminus of a railway there, a huddled collection of shrines over which Christian and Moslem sects wrangled under the protection of three great powers in every quarter. It was an historic and a sacred land, throbbing from Dan to Beersheba with immortal traditions, the homeland of a spiritual outlook and faith professed by hundreds of millions of the human race and fashioning more and more the destinies of mankind. The carving knife of the Sykes-Picot Agreement was a crude hacking of a Holy Land. At the beginning of the War, Palestine was not in the picture. The mind of the Great Powers was on Belgium, Poland and Istria. The destiny of Palestine was left to the haggling of experts in the various Foreign Offices of the Allies.

In 1915 and 1916, Britain massed huge armies to check the menace of the Turk on the Suez Canal.



At first they crawled drearily and without purpose across the desert towards the land of the Philistines. But in 1917, the attention of her warriors was drawn to the mountains of Judea beyond. The zeal of the Crusaders was relumed in their soul. The redemption of Palestine from the withering aggression of the Turk became like a pillar of flame to lead them on. The Sykes-Picot Agreement perished in its fire. It was not worth fighting for Canaan in order to condemn it to the fate of Agag and hew it in pieces before the Lord. Palestine, if recaptured, must be one and indivisible to renew its greatness as a living entity.

The next factor which produced a momentous change was the decision to come to terms with Jewry, which was clamouring for an opportunity to make Canaan once more the homeland of their race. There are more Irishmen living outside Ireland than dwell in the old country. Still, Ireland is the homeland of the Irish people. No one imagined that the 14,000,000 of Jews scattered over the globe could find room and a living in Palestine. Nevertheless this race of wanderers sought a national hearth and a refuge for the hunted children of Israel in the country which the splendour of their spiritual genius has made for ever glorious.

It seems strange to say that the Germans were the first to realise the War value of the Jews of the dispersal. In Poland it was they who helped the German Army to conquer the Czarist oppressor who had so cruelly persecuted their race. They had their influence in other lands—notably in America, where some of their most powerful leaders exerted a retarding influence on President Wilson's impulses in the direction of

the Allies. The German General Staff in 1916 urged the Turks to concede the demands of the Zionists in respect of Palestine. Fortunately the Turk was too stupid to understand or too sluggish to move. The fact that Britain at last opened her eyes to the opportunity afforded to the Allies to rally this powerful people to their side was attributable to the initiative, the assiduity and the fervour of one of the greatest Hebrews of all time: Dr. Chaim Weizmann. He found his opportunity in this War of Nations to advance the cause to which he had consecrated his life. Dr. Weizmann enlisted my adhesion to his ideals at a time when, at my request, he was successfully applying his scientific skill and imagination to save Britain from a real disaster over the failure of wood alcohol for the manufacture of cordite. In addition to the gratitude I felt for him for this service, he appealed to my deep reverence for the great men of his race who were the authors of the sublime literature upon which I was brought up. I introduced him to Mr. Balfour, who was won over completely by his charm, his persuasiveness and his intellectual power. Dr. Weizmann then brought to his aid the eager and active influence of Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, and General Smuts.

During the summer of 1917, Mr. Balfour, with my zealous assent as Prime Minister, entered into negotiations with Lord Rothschild on the subject of the Zionist aims. Ultimately it is recorded that the War Cabinet on September 3rd, 1917, "had under consideration correspondence which had passed between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord Rothschild on the question of the policy to be adopted towards the Zionist movement." That

policy was after prolonged enquiry and reflection decided by the Cabinet on merits, and I have no doubt in my mind that some such provision would by common consent of all the Allied Powers have been inserted in the Peace Treaty even had there been no previous pledge or promise. But the actual

*Propaganda value of Balfour declaration* time of the declaration was determined by considerations of War policy. It was part of our propagandist strategy for mobilizing every opinion and force throughout the world which would weaken the enemy and improve the Allied chances. Propaganda on both sides probably played a greater part in the last War than in any other. As an illustration I might take the public declarations we made of the Allied intention to liberate and confer self-government on nationalities inside the enemy Empires,—Turkey, Germany, and Austria. These announcements were intended to have a propagandist effect, not only at home, but also in neutral countries and perhaps most of all in enemy countries.

On principle, the democratic Powers of Europe and America had always advocated emancipation of the subject races held down by the great Empires. But we were also aware that the proclamation of liberation as part of our War aims would help to disintegrate the solidarity of the enemy countries, and so it did. It would have the effect of detaching from the governing races in those countries Poles, Alsace-Lorrainers, Czechoslovakians, Croatians, Roumans and Arabs dwelling within the boundaries of the Central Empires.

The Allies redeemed the promises made in these declarations to the full. No race has done better out of the fidelity with which the Allies redeemed their promises to the oppressed races than the Arabs.

Owing to the tremendous sacrifices of the Allied nations, and more particularly of Britain and her Empire, the Arabs have already won independence in Iraq, Arabia, Syria, and Trans-Jordania, although most of the Arab races fought throughout the War for their Turkish oppressors. Arabia was the only exception in that respect. The Palestinian Arabs fought for Turkish rule.

The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propagandist reasons. I should like once more to remind the British public, who may be hesitating about the burdens of our Zionist Declaration to-day, of the actual War position at the time of that Declaration. We are now looking at the War through the dazzling glow of a triumphant end, but in 1917 the issue of the War was still very much in doubt. We were convinced—but not all of us—that we would pull through victoriously, but the Germans were equally persuaded that victory would rest on their banners, and they had much reason for coming to that conclusion. They had smashed the Roumanians. The Russian Army was completely demoralised by its numerous defeats. The French Army was exhausted and temporarily unequal to striking a great blow. The Italians had sustained a shattering defeat at Caporetto. The unlimited submarine campaign had sunk millions of tons of our shipping. There were no American divisions at the front, and when I say at the front, I mean available in the trenches. For the Allies there were two paramount problems at that time. The first was that the Central Powers should be broken by the blockade before our supplies of food and

*Jewish  
influence  
in Russia*

essential raw material were cut off by sinkings of our own ships. The other was that the War preparations in the United States should be speeded up to such an extent as to enable the Allies to be adequately reinforced in the critical campaign of 1918 by American troops. In the solution of these two problems, public opinion in Russia and America played a great part, and we had every reason at that time to believe that in both countries the friendliness or hostility of the Jewish race might make a considerable difference.

The solution of Germany's food and raw material difficulties depended on the attitude of Russia and the goodwill of its people. We realised, and so did the Germans, that Russia could take no further part in the War with her army, but the question was: when would she conclude peace with Germany and what manner of peace would it be? Time counted for both sides, and the conditions and the temper of the peace between Germany and Russia counted even more. Would the peace be of a kind which would afford facilities for the Germans to secure supplies of grain, oil, and copper from the immeasurable natural resources of that vast and rich country, or would it be a sulky pact which would always stand in the way of Germany's attempt to replenish her stores from Russian resources? In the former case, we could not hope for a better issue of the War than a stalemate after another year or two of carnage. In the latter case, the stranglehold of our Fleet would be effective, and the Central Powers would be deprived of essential food and material and their will and power of resistance would be weakened to a breaking-point. The Germans were equally alive to the fact that the Jews of Russia

wielded considerable influence in Bolshevik circles. The Zionist Movement was exceptionally strong in Russia and America. The Germans were, therefore, engaged actively in courting favour with that Movement all over the world. A friendly Russia would mean not only more food and raw material for Germany and Austria, but fewer German and Austrian troops on the Eastern front and, therefore, more available for the West. These considerations were brought to our notice by the Foreign Office, and reported to the War Cabinet.

The support of the Zionists for the cause of the Entente, would mean a great deal as a war measure. Quite naturally Jewish sympathies were to a great extent anti-Russian, and therefore in favour of the Central Powers. No ally of Russia, in fact, could escape sharing that immediate and inevitable penalty for the long and savage Russian persecution of the Jewish race. In addition to this, the German General Staff, with their wide outlook on possibilities, urged, early in 1916, the advantages of promising Jewish restoration to Palestine under

*Germans considering similar more* an arrangement to be made between Zionists and Turkey, backed by a German guarantee. The practical difficulties were considerable; the subject was perhaps dangerous to German relations with Turkey; and the German Government acted cautiously. But the scheme was by no means rejected or even shelved, and at any moment the Allies might have been forestalled in offering this supreme bid. In fact in September, 1917, the German Government were making very serious efforts to capture the Zionist Movement.

Another most cogent reason for the adoption by the Allies of the policy of the Declaration lay in

the state of Russia herself. Russian Jews had been secretly active on behalf of the Central Powers from the first; they had become the chief agents of German pacifist propaganda in Russia; by 1917 they had done much in preparing for that general disintegration of Russian society, later recognised as the Revolution. It was believed that if Great Britain declared for the fulfilment of Zionist aspirations in Palestine under her own pledge, one effect would be to bring Russian Jewry to the cause of the Entente.

It was believed, also, that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in this respect would have a special value when the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases. Such were the chief considerations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.

Men like Mr. Balfour, Lord Milner, Lord Robert Cecil, and myself were in whole-hearted sympathy with the Zionist ideal. The same thing applied to all the leaders of public opinion in our country and in the Dominions, Conservative, Liberal, and Labour. There were only one or two who were not so favourably inclined to the policy. One, in particular, doubted the wisdom from the Jewish point of view; that was Mr. Edwin Montagu. Lord Curzon, whilst professing a certain measure of interest in Zionist dreams, was anxious not to excite unattainable hopes in the breasts of Jewish zealots. He doubted the feasibility of any substantial achievement because of the barrenness of the Palestinian soil. He prepared a careful statement of his opinion, which can be read with interest to-day

*British  
sympathy  
with  
Zionism*

in view of developments in Palestine since the War. It is written in Lord Curzon's best and most characteristic style. There is a great fund of detailed knowledge of his subject, acquired by a study of the authorities *on the matter, stimulated by a flying visit through the country in his youthful days.* But he had, by instinct and inheritance, profound distrust of the success of any bold experiment designed to change existing conditions. The writing has much distinction of phrasing. It is also lightened by some amusing passages.

#### "THE FUTURE OF PALESTINE

I am not concerned to discuss the question in dispute between the Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews, viz., whether it is possible to reconcile the reconstitution of a national home for the Jewish race in Palestine with the contented assimilation of many millions of Jews in other countries where they have acquired nationality and made a home.

*Curzon's  
cautious  
Memorandum*

I am only interested in the more immediately practical questions:—

(a) What is the meaning of the phrase 'a National Home for the Jewish Race in Palestine,' and what is the nature of the obligation that we shall assume if we accept this as a principle of British policy?

(b) If such a policy be pursued what are the chances of its successful realisation?

For important as may be the political reasons (and they seem to me almost exclusively political) for adopting such a line of action, we ought at



least to consider whether we are encouraging a practicable ideal, or preparing the way for disappointment and failure.

If I seek guidance from the latest collection of circulated papers (*The Zionist Movement*, G.—164) I find a fundamental disagreement among the authorities quoted there as to the scope and nature of their aim. A 'National Home for the Jewish race or people' would seem, if the words are to bear their ordinary meaning, to imply a place where the Jews can be reassembled as a nation, and where they will enjoy the privileges of an independent national existence. Such is clearly the conception of those who, like Sir A. Mond, speak of the creation in Palestine of 'an autonomous Jewish State,' words which appear to contemplate a State, i.e. a political entity, composed of Jews, governed by Jews, and administered mainly in the interests of Jews. Such a State might naturally be expected to have a capital, a form of government, and institutions of its own. It would possess the soil or the greater part of the soil of the country. It would take its place among the smaller nations of the earth.

The same conception appears to underlie several other of the phrases employed in these papers, e.g., when we are told that Palestine is to become 'a home for the Jewish nation,' 'a national home for the Jewish race,' 'a Jewish Palestine,' and when we read of 'the resettlement of Palestine as a national centre,' and 'the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people.' All these phrases are variants of the same idea, viz., the recreation of Palestine as it was before the days of the dispersion.

On the other hand, Lord Rothschild, when he speaks of Palestine as 'a home where the Jews could speak their own language, have their own education, their own civilisation, and religious institutions under the protection of Allied Governments,' seems to postulate a much less definite form of political existence, one, indeed, which is quite compatible with the existence, of an alien (so long as it is not a Turkish) Government.

*Alternative  
meanings of  
Jewish  
National  
Home*

At the other extreme the late Lord Cromer, who favoured the Zionist cause, explains that the resuscitated Palestine is only to be 'the spiritual centre of the Jews' and a reservoir of Jewish culture—aspirations which are wholly different from those which I have just recorded, and which appear to be incompatible with the evolution of a comparatively small and for the most part agricultural or pastoral community.

I call attention to these contradictions because they suggest some hesitancy in espousing a cause whose advocates have such very different ideas of what they mean.

But I must proceed further to point out that, whichever interpretation we adopt, Palestine would appear to be incapacitated by physical and other conditions from ever becoming in any real sense the national home of the Jewish people.

That people number, we are told, about 12 millions, scattered in all parts of the world. Of this total, 9½ millions are in Europe (including 6 millions in Russia) and 2 millions in North America. The number in the United Kingdom is 245,000; the number already in Palestine was, before the war, 125,000.

Now what is the capacity as regards population of Palestine within any reasonable period of time?

*Palestine's  
population  
capacity*

Under the Turks there is no such place or country as Palestine, because it is divided up between the *sanjak* of Jerusalem and the vilayets of Syria and Beirut. But let us assume that in speaking of Palestine in the present context we mean the old Scriptural Palestine, extending from Dan to Beer-sheba, i.e., from Banias to Bir Saba. This is a country of less than 10,000 square miles, including 4,000 to the east of the Jordan, i.e., it is a country which, excluding desert lands, is not much bigger than Wales. Now Wales, in spite of having one city of nearly 200,000 people, and two others of 200,000 between them, only supports a population of 2,000,000 persons.

Palestine, on the other hand, before the war contained a population the highest estimate of which was between 600,000 and 700,000 persons, of which less than one-quarter were Jews and the remainder (except for small Christian communities or settlements) Moslems. The Jews were to a large extent congregated in the few towns, e.g., in Jerusalem, where, out of a total population of 80,000, 55,000 were Jews—for the most part living on alms or charity, or old men come to end their days in the Holy City. The Jewish colonies, about which so much has been said, contained a population of only 11,000. The remainder of the Jews were in the other towns and parts of the country.

Since the War the Turks have reduced the country to a condition of abject debasement. The Jewish colonies have either been dislocated or

broken up, the various missionary establishments, except the German and Spanish, have disappeared, the local inhabitants have been conscripted and to a large extent destroyed on the front, the urban populations have been reduced to beggary, and colonies of Turkomans, Circassians, Kurds, and other savage races have been planted about to hold the country in subjection.

Before the War it was calculated by competent authorities who had lived for years in the country that for many years it could not support an increased population. After the devastation wrought by the War it will be many decades before we can contemplate a population that will even remotely approximate to that of Wales. This is a position due not merely to the ravages of war, but to the present physical conditions of the country, brought about by centuries of neglect and misrule. Before any considerable revival can be expected there must be a colossal expenditure on afforestation, on irrigation, on the rebuilding of the broken-down terraces which formerly supported the cultivation. The Scriptural phrase, a land 'flowing with milk and honey', which suggests an abounding fertility, must be read in relation to the desert features of Sinai, to which it stood in glowing contrast, and loses somewhat of its picturesque charm when we realise that the milk was that of the flocks of goats that roamed, and still roam, the hills, while the honey was the juice of the small grape that was used as a substitute for sugar and still makes a palatable wine.

Further, let it be borne in mind, when we speak of this devastated country as a national home for a great people, that in the steamy Jordan valley no

Europeans can live or rear children, that only the higher parts of the country are suited for settlers who come from more northerly climes, that malaria, fever, ophthalmia, and other ailments abound, not to be eradicated save by great outlay and after a long time.

Palestine is, in fact, a poor land, containing no mineral wealth, no coal, no iron ore, no copper, gold or silver. It depends entirely on live stock (i.e. mainly, goats, which crop the bare hills) and agriculture. In parts, but in parts only, where there is sufficient water and a good climate, excellent crops of wheat and barley are produced. Olive oil, sesame, and oranges are the chief exports.

Such is the country—a country calling for prolonged and patient toil from a people inured to agriculture—and even so only admitting after generations of a relatively small population—that we are invited (if we can get hold of it, which we have not yet done) to convert into the national home of a people, numbering many millions, brought from other and different climates, and to a large extent trained in other industries and professions.

There arises the further question, what is to become of the people of this country, assuming the Turk to be expelled, and the inhabitants not to have been exterminated by the War? There are over half a million of these, Syrian Arabs—a mixed community with Arab, Hebrew, Canaanite, Greek, Egyptian, and possibly Crusaders' blood. They and their forefathers have occupied the country for the best part of 1,500 years. They own the soil, which belongs either to individual

*Its present  
occupants*

landowners or to village communities. They profess the Mohammedan faith. They will not be content either to be expropriated for Jewish immigrants, or to act merely as hewers of wood and drawers of water to the latter.

Further, there are other settlers who will have to be reckoned with. There are 100,000 Christians, who will not wish to be disturbed; east of the Jordan are large colonies of Circassian Mahomedans, firmly established; there are also settlements of Druses and Moslems from Algeria, Bulgaria, and Egypt.

No doubt a prodigal expenditure of wealth will secure the expropriation of some of these. But when we reflect that the existing Jewish colonies, in the most favoured spots, after a prodigious outlay, extending over many years, have only in a few cases as yet become self-supporting, it is clear that a long vista of anxiety, vicissitude, and expense lies before those who desire to rebuild the national home.

I spoke earlier of the dreams of those who foresee a Jewish State, with possibly a Jewish capital at Jerusalem. Such a dream is rendered wholly incapable of realisation by the conditions of Jerusalem itself. It is a city in which too many peoples and too many religions have a passionate and permanent interest to render any such solution even dimly possible. The Protestant communities are vitally interested in the churches and in the country as the scenes of the most sacred events in history. The Roman Catholics collect annually large sums and maintain extensive establishments at Jerusalem and Bethlehem. The Greek Orthodox Church regards

*Jerusalem an  
international  
religious  
centre*

the Holy Places with an almost frenzied reverence. Great pilgrimages come annually from the Slav countries and Russia. I recall a flourishing Russian monastery on Mount Tabor. The Hellenic clergy have large properties in the country.

Finally, next to Mecca and Medina, Jerusalem is the most sacred city of the Mohammedan faith. The Mosque of Omar, on the site of the Temple of Solomon, is one of the most hallowed of the shrines of Islam. It contains the great rock or stone, from which Mohammed ascended on the back of his miraculous steed to Heaven, and which is regarded with so much awe in the Moslem world that when, a few years ago, an Englishman was alleged to have been digging under it, the uproar spread throughout the Moslem world. It is impossible to contemplate any future in which the Mohammedans should be excluded from Jerusalem. Hebron is a site scarcely less sacred to Islam. It is no doubt from a full consciousness of these facts that the wisest of the Zionists forgo any claim to the recovery of Jerusalem as the centre and capital of a revived Jewish State, and hope only that it may remain as a sort of enclave in international, if not in British, hands.

But is it not obvious that a country which cannot within any approximate period contain anything but a small population, which has already an indigenous population of its own of a different race and creed, which can possess no urban centre or capital, and which is suited only to certain forms of agricultural and pastoral development, cannot, save by a very elastic use of the term, be designated as the national home of the Jewish people? It may become the home of a considerably larger number

of Jewish settlers than now, mainly brought from the eastern parts of Europe (though the chance of their coming in large numbers or being sent for political reasons from Austria and Germany is by no means to be ignored); this colonisation may be supported by the expenditure of large sums of money; the productiveness and health of the country may be slowly improved by the application of enterprise and science; a Jewish community, freed from the misrule of the Turks and enjoying equal rights with other sections of the population, may become prosperous and even powerful. But again I ask, is this what we contemplate when we say in our proposal formula that 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish race'? If we contemplate no more, is it wise to use language which suggests so much more?

In reality is not the maximum policy that we can possibly hope to realise one which, if the Turks are defeated and turned out of Palestine, will

*Curzon's  
proposals*

(a) Set up some form of European administration (it cannot be Jewish administration) in that country.

(b) Devise a machinery for safeguarding and securing order both in the Christian and in the Jewish Holy Places.

(c) Similarly guarantee the integrity of the Mosque of Omar and vest it in some Moslem body.

(d) Secure to the Jews (but not to the Jews alone) equal civil and religious rights with the other elements in the population.



(e) Arrange as far as possible for land purchase and settlement of returning Jews.

If this is Zionism there is no reason why we should not all be Zionists, and I would gladly give my adhesion to such a policy, all the more that it appears to be recommended by considerations of the highest expediency, and to be urgently demanded as a check or counterblast to the scarcely concealed and sinister political designs of the Germans. But in my judgment it is a policy very widely removed from the romantic and idealistic aspirations of many of the Zionist leaders whose literature I have studied, and, whatever it does, it will not in my judgment provide either a national, a material, or even a spiritual home for any more than a very small section of the Jewish people.

C. of K.

October 26, 1917."

His objection, it will be seen, is not so much to a systematic settlement of Jewish emigrants in Palestine, but rather to the extravagant expectations formed by extreme Zionists as to the possibilities of Jewish settlement in so small and arid a land. He was clearly of opinion that the population of Palestine had already reached its possible limits of expansion, certainly on anything like a big scale. The evidence given by the Zionists at the Peace Conference completely destroyed his arguments in this respect, and the success of Jewish colonisation since then, despite the timidities of successive governors, has neutralised his anticipations.

Mr. Montagu's objections were of a different

order. He belonged to a small and dwindling minority of Jews—mostly wealthy—who had no desire that Israel should be regarded as a separate race and a distinct nationality. Such of them as still professed their adhesion to Judah regarded it as a definite religion and not as a peculiar people. Mr. Montagu had not even these religious predilections. As he himself once mournfully said to the late Lord Morley, "I have been striving all my life to escape from the Ghetto." He was therefore a convinced and a bitter anti-Zionist. This was his statement:—

*Montagu's  
objections  
to Zionism*

"It was suggested that a question raising such important issues as to the future of Palestine ought, in the first instance, to be discussed with our Allies, and more particularly with the United States.

On the question of submitting Lord Milner's draft for the consideration of the United States Government, Mr. Montagu urged that the use of the phrase 'the home of the Jewish people' would vitally prejudice the position of every Jew elsewhere and expand the argument contained in his Memorandum. Against this it was urged that the existence of a Jewish State or autonomous community in Palestine would strengthen rather than weaken the situation of Jews in countries where they were not yet in possession of equal rights, and that in countries like England, where they possessed such rights, and were identified with the nation of which they were citizens, their position would be unaffected by the existence of a national Jewish community elsewhere. The view was expressed that, while a small influential section

of English Jews were opposed to the idea, large numbers were sympathetic to it, but in the interests of Jews who wished to go from countries where they were less favourably situated, rather than from any idea of wishing to go to Palestine themselves.

. Mr. Montagu urged strong objections to any declaration in which it was stated that Palestine was the 'national home' of the Jewish people. He regarded the Jews as a religious community and himself as a Jewish Englishman. He based his argument on the prejudicial effect on the status of Jewish Britons of a statement that His Majesty's Government regarded Palestine as the national home of Jewish people. Whatever safeguarding words might be used in the formula, the civil rights of Jews as nationals in the country in which they were born might be endangered. How would he negotiate with the peoples of India on behalf of His Majesty's Government if the world had just been told that His Majesty's Government regarded his national home as being in Turkish territory?"

But urgent diplomatic and military reasons at last ensured complete unanimity on the subject. Even Mr. Montagu surrendered his opposition, and accepted the declaration as a military expedient.

Mr. Balfour had been in communication with Lord Rothschild, who was the head of the Zionist Movement in this country, and who was pressing on behalf of his fellow Zionists for a Declaration which could be issued to the Jews throughout the world, guaranteeing that the Allies would make it one of the conditions of the Peace settlement with

Turkey that there should be a National Home for the Jews in the land from which they had been driven as a people, but with which their name would always be associated. When the matter was brought to the attention of the Cabinet on the 3rd of September, 1917, it was decided to communicate with President Wilson informing him that the Government were being pressed to make a Declaration in sympathy with the Zionist Movement, and seeking his views as to the advisability of such a Declaration being made. It took some weeks to obtain his personal opinion on the subject, but, when it arrived, Mr. Balfour reported that "President Wilson was extremely favourable to the Movement." He also informed the Cabinet that "the German Government were making great efforts to capture the sympathy of the Zionist Movement." He and Lord Milner urged the Cabinet to issue a Declaration in favour of the Zionist demand. Mr. Balfour, in support of it, said:—

*Wilson  
agrees to  
Balfour  
policy*

"This movement, though opposed by a number of wealthy Jews in this country, had behind it the support of a majority of Jews, at all events in Russia and America, and possibly in other countries. He saw nothing inconsistent between the establishment of a Jewish national focus in Palestine and the complete assimilation and absorption of Jews into the nationality of other countries. Just as English emigrants to the United States became, either in the first or subsequent generations, American nationals, so, in future, should a Jewish citizenship be established in Palestine, would Jews become either Englishmen, Americans, Germans, or Palestinians. What was at the back of the Zionist

Movement was the intense national consciousness held by certain members of the Jewish race. They regarded themselves as one of the great historic races of the world, whose original home was Palestine, and these Jews had a passionate longing to regain once more this ancient national home. Other Jews had become absorbed into the nations among whom they and their forefathers had dwelt for many generations. Mr. Balfour then read a very sympathetic declaration by the French Government which had been conveyed to the Zionists, and he stated that he knew that President Wilson was extremely favourable to the Movement."

The question came up for final decision before the War Cabinet. By that time Lord Curzon had withdrawn his objection. Mr. Balfour then proposed the now famous Declaration of sympathy with the Zionist aspirations:

"His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

*Balfour  
submits a  
declaration*

In support of it he stated:

"that he gathered that everyone was now agreed that, from a purely diplomatic and political point

of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and America, as, indeed, all over the world, now appeared to be favourable to Zionism. If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America. He gathered that the main arguments still put forward against Zionism were twofold:—

- (a) That Palestine was inadequate to form a home for either the Jewish or any other people.
- (b) The difficulty felt with regard to the future position of Jews in Western countries.

As to the meaning of the words 'national home,' to which the Zionists attach so much importance, he understood it to mean some form of British, American, or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to work out their own salvation and to build up, by means of education, agriculture, and industry, a real centre of national culture and focus of national life. It did not necessarily involve the early establishment of an independent Jewish State, which was a matter for gradual development in accordance with the ordinary laws of political evolution.

LORD CURZON stated that he admitted the force of the diplomatic arguments in favour of expressing sympathy, and agreed that the bulk of the Jews held Zionist rather than anti-Zionist opinions. He added that he did not agree with the attitude taken up by Mr. Montagu. On the other hand, he could not share the optimistic views held.

CCt 6

regarding the future of Palestine. These views were not merely the result of his own personal experiences of travel in that country, but of careful investigations from persons who had lived for many years in the country. He feared that by the suggested declaration we should be raising false expectations which could never be realised. He attached great importance to the necessity of retaining the Christian and Moslem Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and, if this were to be effectively done, he did not see how the Jewish people could have a political capital in Palestine. However, he recognised that some expression of sympathy with Jewish aspirations would be a valuable adjunct to our propaganda, though he thought that we should be guarded in the language used in giving expression to such sympathy."

All the representatives of the Dominions, and the leaders of public opinion in our country of every party, welcomed the Declaration and pronounced themselves wholeheartedly in favour of the policy. The French Government gave their ready and cordial assent before the Declaration was issued, and the same thing applied to the Italian Government.

*Jewish State  
ultimately  
envisaged*

There has been a good deal of discussion as to the meaning of the words "Jewish National Home" and whether it involved the setting up of a Jewish National State in Palestine. I have already quoted the words actually used by Mr. Balfour when he submitted the Declaration to the Cabinet for its approval. They were not challenged at the time by any member present, and there could be no doubt as to what the Cabinet then had in their minds.

It was not their idea that a Jewish State should be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants. On the other hand, it was contemplated that when the time arrived for according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them by the idea of a National Home and had become a definite majority of the inhabitants, then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Commonwealth. The notion that Jewish immigration would have to be artificially restricted in order to ensure that the Jews should be a permanent minority never entered into the heads of anyone engaged in framing the policy. That would have been regarded as unjust and as a fraud on the people to whom we were appealing.

President Wilson thus interpreted the Declaration in his explanation to the American public:—

“I am persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and *Wilson's* our people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a *clear* Jewish Commonwealth.”  
*statement*

The Zionist leaders gave us a definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves to giving facilities for the establishment of a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally to the Allied cause Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world. They kept their word in the letter and the spirit, and the only question that remains now is whether we mean to honour ours. Immediately the Declaration was agreed to,



millions of leaflets were circulated in every town and area throughout the world where there were known to be Jewish communities. They were dropped from the air in German and Austrian towns, and they were scattered throughout Russia and Poland. I could point out substantial and in one case decisive advantages derived from this propaganda amongst the Jews. In Russia the Bolsheviks baffled all the efforts of the Germans to benefit by the harvests of the Ukraine and the Don, and hundreds of thousands of German and Austrian troops had to be maintained to the end of the War on Russian soil, whilst the Germans were short of men to replace casualties on the Western front. I do not suggest that this was due entirely, or even mainly, to Jewish activities. But we have good reason to believe that Jewish propaganda in Russia had a great deal to do with the difficulties created for the Germans in Southern Russia after the peace of Brest-Litovsk. The Germans themselves know that to be the case, and the Jews in Germany are suffering to-day for the fidelity with which their brethren in Russia and in America discharged their obligations under the Zionist pledge to the Allies.

*Effects in  
Russia*

Through Sir Mark Sykes and Colonel Lawrence we informed the Arab leaders, King Hussein and his son, Feisal, of our proposals. We could not get in touch with the Palestinian Arabs as they were fighting against us.

There is no better proof of the value of the Balfour Declaration as a military move than the fact that Germany entered into negotiations with Turkey in an endeavour to provide an alternative scheme which would appeal to Zionists. A German-Jewish Society,

the V.J.O.D.\*, was formed, and in January, 1918, Talaat, the Grand Vizier, at the instigation of the Germans, gave vague promises of legislation by means of which "all justifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to find their fulfilment."

In January, 1916, the British Government's policy in regard to Palestinian Holy Places and Zionist colonisation was officially communicated in the following message to Hussein:—

"That so far as Palestine is concerned, we are determined that no people shall be subjected to another, but in view of the fact:

*Statement  
of British  
policy*

(a) That there are in Palestine, Shrines, Wakfs, and Holy Places, sacred in some cases to Moslems alone, to Jews alone, to Christians alone, and in others to two or all three, and inasmuch as these places are of interest to vast masses of people outside Palestine and Arabia, there must be a special régime to deal with these places approved of by the world.

(b) That as regards the Mosque of Omar, it shall be considered as a Moslem concern alone, and shall not be subjected directly or indirectly to any non-Moslem authority.

That since the Jewish opinion of the world is in favour of a return of Jews to Palestine, and inasmuch as this opinion must remain a constant factor, and further, as His Majesty's Government view with favour the realisation of this aspiration,

\*Vereinigung Jüdischer Organisation Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte des Osten. (Alliance of the Jewish Organisations of Germany for the Safeguarding of the Rights of the Orient.)

His Majesty's Government are determined that in so far as is compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle should be put in the way of the realisation of this ideal."

The Arab leaders did not offer any objections to the declaration, so long as the rights of the Arabs in Palestine were respected. Pledges were given to the non-Jewish population of Palestine who constituted the great majority of its inhabitants, as well as to the Jews.

*Arab attitude* These were the result of conversations which we had with such Arab leaders as we could get in touch with. There was a twofold undertaking given to them, that the establishment of a Jewish National Home would not in any way, firstly, affect the civil or religious rights of the general population of Palestine; secondly, would not diminish the general prosperity of that population. Those were the only pledges we gave to the Arabs.

After the Armistice, the position of Palestine in reference to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Balfour Declaration, and the Mandate and Mandatory for Palestine was very thoroughly discussed at meetings of the War Cabinet Eastern Committee. At a meeting of that Committee, held in December, 1918, Lord Curzon stated the position very fully.

"The Zionist declaration by our Government has been followed by a very considerable immigration of Jews. One of the difficulties of the situation arises from the fact that the Zionists have taken full advantage—and are disposed to take even fuller

*Curzon describes conditions in Dec., 1918*



*[By Courtesy of Albert Parker Service]*  
**LORD CURZON AND SIR MAURICE HANKEY ON THEIR WAY TO SAN REMO**



advantage—of the opportunity which was then offered to them.

The Zionist programme, and the energy with which it is being carried out, have not unnaturally had the consequence of arousing the keen suspicions of the Arabs. By 'the Arabs' I do not merely mean Feisal and his followers at Damascus, but the so-called Arabs who inhabit the country. There seems, from the telegrams we receive, to be growing up an increasing friction between the two communities, a feeling by the Arabs that we are really behind the Zionists and not behind the Arabs, and altogether a situation which is becoming rather critical. In one of the telegrams that reported the views of Feisal we were told that he is strongly of opinion that if a Great Power remains in the background of Palestine it should be ourselves; and if he is assured it will be Britain, he would be prepared to support what I think he describes as the infiltration of the Zionists on a reasonable scale; but otherwise, if we are to go out of the matter and some other protecting Power is to come in, he will back the Arabs by all means in his power. We can imagine, therefore, a difficult situation arising in Palestine itself out of these circumstances. If we were supposed to have identified ourselves with the Jews, and the whole Arab force backed by Feisal on the other side were thrown into the scale against us, that would produce complication. We have difficulties with our European Allies as it is, and we do not want to have complications in Palestine itself. Upon both these parties beginning to feel these suspicions there falls the bombshell of the Anglo-French declaration. You can understand at once how the suspicions

and, indeed, the activities of both parties are fomented by that, because once you appeal to the principle of self-determination, both Arabs and Zionists are prepared to make every use of it they can. No doubt we shall hear a good deal of that in the future, and, indeed, in it we may find a solution of our difficulties.

Now, as regards the future of Palestine: I said just now that one of the blemishes of the Sykes-

*Suggested boundaries :*  
*Dan to Beersheba*

Picot Agreement was the imperfect and unscientific manner in which the boundaries had been drawn. I imagine that, whatever arrangements we make about Syria in the future, we must put right and define upon some scientific basis the boundaries of Palestine itself. If you look at the Sykes-Picot map you will see a purely arbitrary line is drawn in the north which runs from a place on the coast southwards through the Sea of Galilee to the Jordan frontier. I imagine we shall all agree that we must recover for Palestine its old boundaries. The old phrase 'Dan to Beersheba' still prevails. Whatever the administrative sub-divisions, we must recover for Palestine, be it Hebrew, or Arab, or both, the boundaries up to the Litani on the coast, and across to Banias, the old Dan, or Huleh in the interior. So much for the northern boundary. Then we must have some definition of 'eastern boundary.' The Zionists are naturally looking eastwards to the trans-Jordan territories, where there is good cultivation and great possibilities in the future. Everybody wants to get out of the steaming Jordan Valley and on to the uplands beyond, and we are undoubtedly face to face with a movement which is growing on the part of the Zionists,

that Palestine is now to include what certainly it has not included for many centuries, if it ever did, and what would be regarded by the Arabs as part of their domain. Finally, there is the southern boundary of Palestine. Here a number of different considerations come in. On the one hand there are those who will say that the cultivable areas south of Gaza ought to be part of Palestine because they are necessary to the subsistence of the people. On the other hand there are those who say: 'Do not complicate the Palestine question by bringing in the Bedouins of the desert, whose face looks readily towards Sinai, and who ought not to be associated with Palestine at all.' I therefore suggest, in passing, when we are dealing with Palestine and when we go to the Peace Conference, that we shall have to make up our minds as to what is the kind of policy we propose for the northern, eastern, and the southern boundaries of Palestine.

Now comes the question of the future administration. I quoted just now the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, under which the scheme then in contemplation was international administration to be agreed upon between the Allies and the Arabs. I do not suppose you will find a single person in any country now in favour of that solution. Not only is international administration wherever it has been tried in Oriental countries a failure, but it is singularly unsuited to the conditions of Palestine. I doubt if at the Peace Conference a single voice will be raised in its favour. If I am right in that, and if a tutelar Power is to be appointed, either by a League of Nations under

*International  
administration  
unworkable*



General Smuts' scheme, or by the Peace Conference itself, or by the self-determination of the people, there then arises the question who that Power should be. Only three are really deserving of consideration: France, America, and ourselves. I do not think I need seriously discuss the case of France, because, whatever may be her own feelings, nobody else wants her there. Her presence there would be quite intolerable to ourselves, and it is clear it would be equally unwelcome to the people. There remain the United States and Great Britain. When the matter was brought before the Imperial War Cabinet, a good many of us, anxious to curtail our responsibility in that part of the world as much as we could, and filled with a desire, strongly recommended by Sir Robert Borden, to interest America in responsibilities in other parts of the world than the American Continent, felt disposed to urge that America should be made the custodian of Palestine. I believe I myself expressed a view in its favour. The more I think of it the more doubtful I am whether that is really a wise solution. I ask the Committee to contemplate the position of the Americans placed, as they would be if the French ambitions as regards Syria are fulfilled, midway between the French and ourselves. It would be a position that would almost certainly result in friction with both parties. Look at it again from the point of view of Palestine itself. I imagine that we have not conquered this country merely in order to recover it from the Crescent; we have conquered it in order that it may prosper and flourish under the Cross."

Discussing the idea of an American Mandate, he said:—

“Remember the Americans have no experience of this sort of work or this kind of people. Their standards of administration, their methods of work, are entirely different from our own. Their method of handling Eastern people would be different from ours, and I suggest that the Americans in Palestine might be a source not of assistance but very much the reverse to ourselves in Egypt.

Has not the whole history of the War shown us—I hesitate to speak upon it because it is a strategical point—that Palestine is really the strategical buffer of Egypt, and that the Canal, which is the weak side of Egypt, if it has to be defended in the future, will have to be defended—as it has been in this war—from the Palestine side? We were tempted into Palestine by our position upon the Canal and by the threat of a Turkish invasion that inevitably drew us forward upon the Canal, drew us across the Sinai Peninsula, and involved us in Palestine itself. Therefore, from the strategical point of view there is a close community of interest between Palestine and Egypt. Another consideration is this. Ought we not to try and keep the Arabs of Palestine in close touch with the Arabs of the country both to the east and to the north? If you, so to speak, segregate them under the charge of a separate Power which has no interest in those regions, you will really sterilise them and arrest their growth. On the other hand, our position and influence in the surrounding Arab areas must be always so great that the Arabs of Palestine

*Strategic  
importance  
of Palestine*

would have, I think, a much better chance in our hands than in those of any others.

The final consideration is this, that, from all the evidence we have so far, the Arabs and Zionists in Palestine want us. The evidence on that point seems to be conclusive. Our most recent telegrams include two, in one of which the Zionists propose to General Clayton that Great Britain should assume a permanent tutelage over Palestine until both the Jews and the Arabs decide otherwise by decisive majorities. General Clayton, in his telegram of the 21st November, proposed a form of declaration as follows: 'That it is desirable at an early date to issue a declaration to the effect that the tutelage of Palestine shall continue until both Jews and Arabs in Palestine agree mutually that it should cease. Agreement would necessitate a majority of both Jews and Arabs respectively in favour of complete autonomy, and tutelage would continue if either party refused to agree.' General Allenby agrees that a declaration in the above sense would have a good effect, provided it came from the *Entente* Powers. Obviously it is impossible that any such declaration should come from us. It might come at a later date from the Conference. The point I wish to put before the Committee is this, that when we go into the Conference we should for our part drop altogether the idea of international management of Palestine in the future, that we should make the best arrangement we can for its boundaries, and then, if it becomes a question of America and ourselves, believing in our own mind that it is best for the interests of the people of both parties that we and not America should be the Power, we should give

every encouragement to this view I have put forward, namely, that under the principle of self-determination both the Zionists and the Arabs should be left to speak for themselves."

At the same meeting of the War Cabinet Eastern Committee, at which Lord Curzon made the above statement, Lord Robert Cecil dealt with the question of the Mandatory Power:—

"The French are entirely out of the question, for the reasons given by Lord Curzon, and also because the Italians would really burst if you suggested it—and the Greeks too. Therefore there is no question at all of the French, and it is entirely a question of the Americans or the British. I should be glad to see the British there.

*Cecil's  
views on  
Mandate*

At the same time I should not like to rule out the Americans. There are advantages in having the Americans there. Upon the strategical aspect I do not express an opinion, but I am not much impressed by the argument that in order to defend Egypt we had to go to Palestine, because in order to defend Palestine we should have to go to Aleppo or some such place. You always have to go forward; at least, I gather so. You could not stand still in Palestine any more than you could anywhere else. As to that, I think our policy ought to be to say that, as far as we can do so decently, we think we are the best people to do it for the League of Nations, but that if they will not let us do it we would rather the Americans did it than anybody else. I do not believe the French will allow us to do it

LORD CURZON: I do not feel at all clear that the Americans would be willing to do it.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: That is a different matter. They may wish us to do it under the pressure of the Arabs and the Jews.

*An unprofitable task* GENERAL WILSON: If we do think that we would be the best people there, I think we had better go there. It lies between us and the Americans.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: There is not going to be any great catch about it.

GENERAL WILSON: No.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Because we shall simply keep the peace between the Arabs and the Jews. We are not going to get anything out of it. Whoever goes there will have a poor time.

GENERAL SMUTS: It would affect Jewish national opinion, and nationally they are a great people.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: They are likely to quarrel with the protecting Powers.

GENERAL WILSON: If well handled I do not think so.

GENERAL MACDONOGH: I suggest the most important thing in the consideration of the position of Palestine is not its topographical relation to Syria or anything else, but its being, as Mr. Balfour says, the home of the Jewish people, and therefore interesting the whole of the Jews all over the world. I see a good many of the Zionists, and one suggested to me the day before yesterday that if the Jewish people did not get what they were asking for in Palestine, we should have the whole of Jewry turning Bolsheviks and supporting Bolshevism in all the other countries as they have done in Russia.

LORD ROBERT CECIL: Yes. I can conceive the Rothschilds leading a Bolshevist mob."

The official Memorandum supplied to the Cabinet by the Foreign Office Department dealing with the East, outlines the suggested British proposals:—

*Foreign Office  
Memorandum*

"The problem of Palestine cannot be exclusively solved on the principles of self-determination, because there is one element in the population—the Jews—which, for historical and religious reasons, is entitled to a greater influence than would be given to it if numbers were the sole test. It is necessary, therefore, to devise some scheme of Government which will at once protect Arab interests, and give effect to the national aspirations of the Jewish race.

Under the agreement with France an international administration is to be established. But this does not mean that any form of condominium need be set up. Such a method of Government, wherever it has been tried in Oriental countries, has proved a failure; and it is singularly unsuited to the conditions of Palestine. The provisions of the agreement will be sufficiently satisfied if a tutelary Power be appointed by the Treaty of Peace, charged with the duty of developing the country in the interests of the inhabitants, and of giving effect to the admitted purpose of providing there a national home for the Jewish people.

The actual form of the Government to be set up is to be decided, according to the agreement, in consultation with Russia, and subsequently in consultation with the other Allies, and the representatives of the Sherif of Mecca; Russia is

no longer in question, and the details may, perhaps, be better left to the protecting Power, subject to the control or veto of the League of Nations. The difficulty will be to devise some form of constitution which will give sufficient opportunity for Jewish national aspirations without unduly encroaching on the rights of the Arab majority. In the Zionist talk of a Jewish State, the Arab portion of the population is well-nigh forgotten. Their programme, and the energy with which it is being carried out, have not unnaturally had the consequence of arousing the keen suspicion of the Arabs who inhabit the country, and the position is becoming rather critical.

It is clear that there must be a tutelary Power, and this conflict between the Jews and the Arabs makes it all the more necessary. The question is as to the Power who is to be entrusted with these duties. Only three are really deserving of consideration,—France, America, and Great Britain. France may be put on one side, if for no other reason, because the inhabitants of Palestine would decline to accept her. Further, her presence would be a source of certain friction, with this country, and would arouse fierce opposition in Italy and in Greece.

The proposal that the United States should undertake these duties has met with a sympathetic reception in some quarters. But it is at least doubtful whether they would be willing to accept the responsibilities. Their difficulties would be great, situated as they would be between France on the north, and Egypt on the south, and administering a country which must depend for its commercial

*Choice of a  
Mandatory  
Power*

development on connection with the Arab countries of the interior and with Egypt. Further, it may be doubted whether the Americans possess either the experience or the aptitude that would qualify them for handling an Oriental problem of such exceptional complexity. The only other alternative appears to be that Great Britain should herself be invited to undertake the duties. The Foreign Office are doubtful of the advantages of adopting this course, and think it might be wise to keep an open mind on the question until it is seen how the general discussion of the Middle Eastern settlement goes, and to take the general situation into account in eventually coming to a decision.

There are considerations of weight which seem to point to the conclusion that Great Britain ought to be the tutelary Power. In the first place, as has been pointed out, the commercial development of Palestine will, in the main, depend on the Egyptian factors in the case; nothing considerable can be made out of the ports of Palestine, and trade will come from the direction of the Suez Canal and probably from Kantara, the new port which has developed there.

Again, there are reasons of strategy which point to the same conclusion. The War has shown that Palestine is really the strategical buffer of Egypt, and the presence of a foreign Power in Palestine might seriously affect the position of Great Britain both on the Suez Canal and in the adjacent Arab areas. And there is the final—and probably, at the Conference, the conclusive—consideration, that from all the evidence we have so far, the Arabs and Zionists in Palestine are united in desiring the

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protection of this country. If self-determination be the test, each of these two communities would, it is confidently believed, unhesitatingly vote for Great Britain.

In one of the telegrams that report the views of Feisal, we are told that, so strongly is he of opinion that if a Great Power remains in the background of Palestine, it should be ourselves, that, if he is assured it will be Great Britain, he will be prepared to support the infiltration of the Zionists on a reasonable scale; but, otherwise, if we are to go out of the matter and some other protecting Power is to come in, he will back the Arabs by all the means at his disposal.

The conclusions of the Eastern Committee are summed up in the following resolutions. They are generally of opinion that in no circumstances should any claim by Turkey to share the sovereignty, real or nominal, of Palestine be admitted; and

*Conclusion  
of Eastern  
Committee*

1. The Committee is opposed to the institution of an international administration in Palestine.

2. The Committee favours the nomination of a single Great Power, either by the League of Nations, or otherwise, to act as representative of the nations in Palestine.

3. Such Power should not be France or Italy, but should be either the United States of America or Great Britain.

4. While we would not object to the selection of the United States of America, yet if the offer were made to Great Britain we ought not to decline.

5. The choice, whatever form it may take, should be, as far as possible, in accordance with the expressed desires (a) of the Arab population, (b) of the Zionist community in Palestine.

6. Every effort should be made at the Peace Conference to secure an equitable readjustment of the boundaries of Palestine, both on the north and east and south.

7. In any case the pledges as to the care of the Holy Places must be effectively fulfilled."

These discussions will explain why, when I met Clemenceau in London, I placed a united Palestine in the forefront of the requests I made to him. Clemenceau's ready assent saved a severe conflict on the subject with his successors. They would have preferred the Sykes-Picot partition which would, now that Russia had retired from the Alliance, have given France an equal voice with Britain in the control of the whole of Palestine except an enclave around Haifa. The Millerand Government would not have agreed to surrender the French share in this joint administration. This was clearly seen, when we came to the drafting of the Turkish Treaty. They then put up a persistent fight to recover a measure of that condominium in Palestine.

The Americans, when sounded on the subject of the Mandate for Palestine, were not inclined to accept the responsibility. France was mainly anxious to secure the Syrian mandate for herself. Italy put in no claim. It was therefore assumed that Britain would be the Mandatory.

When the Emir Feisal appeared before the Supreme Council on February 6, 1919, he said:—

"Palestine, in consequence of its universal character, he left on one side for the consideration of all parties interested. With this exception, he asked for the independence of the Arab areas enumerated in his memorandum."

The Zionist Mission, representing "The Zionist Organisation and the Jewish population of Palestine," was received by the Supreme Council on February 27th, 1919. M. Sokolow read the following extract from a memorandum which he had circulated:—

*Zionist  
Memorandum  
to Peace  
Council*

"The Zionist Organisation respectfully submits the following draft resolutions for the consideration of the Peace Conference:—

1. The High Contracting Parties recognise the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.

2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the Schedule annexed hereto.

3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.

4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)

5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:—

(1) Palestine shall be placed under such political administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there

of the Jewish National Home, and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

Dr. Weizmann, in the course of his speech, said:—

"The Zionist Association demanded, in the name of the people who had suffered martyrdom for eighteen centuries, that they should be able, immediately peace was signed, to tell their co-religionists in the Ukraine, in Poland, and in other parts of Eastern Europe, that some of them would be taken to Palestine to be established on the land, and that there was therefore a hopeful prospect for Jewry. That was the essence of what the Zionists required, and with that object in view they had taken the liberty of drawing up the following resolution:—

To this end the Mandatory Power shall *inter alia*:—

(a) Promote Jewish immigration  
*Weizmann's* and close settlement on the land, the  
*proposals* established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equitably safeguarded.

(b) Accept the co-operation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews of Palestine and of the world, that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and entrust the organisation of Jewish education to such Council.

(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant."

Later:—

"MR. LANSING asked Dr. Weizmann to clear up some confusion which existed in his mind as to the 'Home.' Did that mean an autonomous Jewish correct meaning of the words 'Jewish National Government?'

DR. WEIZMANN replied in the negative. The Zionist Organisation did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a Mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Organisation would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and to develop institutions of every kind. Thus it would build up gradually a nationality, and so make Palestine as Jewish as America is American or England English. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals."

The evidence which was given on behalf of the Zionists completely disposed of what I will call the "Curzon objection" as to the extremely limited possibilities of development in Palestine. When Lord Curzon visited the country the total population of Palestine was only about 600,000. Out of these half

*Evidence of  
capacity for  
larger  
population*

a million were Arabs and 100,000 Jews and Christians. These numbers were reduced by the end of the War. But, as the Zionist Declaration pointed out:—

“The population of Palestine in the days of Christ, before the present scientific methods of cultivation were thought of, and when the external trade was not comparable to that now enjoyed by Palestine, amounted to four millions. Evidence was given at the Peace Conference that the population of Lebanon, which resembled Palestine in many respects, had a density of 160 per square kilometre. The population of Palestine to-day is only about 50 per square kilometre. On that basis, there is room in Palestine for an increase of three millions without encroaching on the legitimate interests of the people who are there. Hungary has a population of more than double that of Palestine to-day. Italy, where the conditions are not unlike those of Palestine, in that it is a very mountainous country with no minerals, has a population per square mile three times that of Palestine. On the Italian basis, Palestine ought to provide accommodation for a population of four millions.”

In order to show that the Peace Conference had every point of view presented to it, I would quote a passage from a Report of an American Commission which was sent there to investigate the conditions:—

“There is a further consideration that cannot justly be ignored, if the world is to look forward to Palestine becoming a definitely Jewish State, however gradually that may take place. That consideration grows out of

*An  
American  
view*

the fact that Palestine is 'the Holy Land' for Jews, Christians, and Moslems alike. Millions of Christians and Moslems all over the world are quite as much concerned as the Jews with conditions in Palestine, especially with those conditions which touch upon religious feeling and rights. The relations in these matters in Palestine are most delicate and difficult. With the best possible intentions, it may be doubted whether the Jews could possibly seem to either Christians or Moslems proper guardians of the Holy Places, or custodians of the Holy Land as a whole. The reason is this: the places which are most sacred to Christians—those having to do with Jesus—and which are also sacred to Moslems, are not only not sacred to Jews, but abhorrent to them. It is simply impossible, under those circumstances, for Moslems and Christians to feel satisfied to have these places in Jewish hands, or under the custody of Jews. There are still other places about which Moslems must have the same feeling. In fact, from this point of view, the Moslems, just because the sacred places of all three religions are sacred to them, have made very naturally much more satisfactory custodians of the Holy Places than the Jews could be. It must be believed that the precise meaning, in this respect, of the complete Jewish occupation of Palestine has not been fully sensed by those who urge the extreme Zionist programme. For it would intensify, with a certainty like fate, the anti-Jewish feeling both in Palestine, and in all other portions of the world which look to Palestine as 'the Holy Land.'

In view of all these considerations, and with a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause, the

Commissioners feel bound to recommend that only a greatly reduced Zionist programme be attempted by the Peace Conference, and even that, only very gradually initiated. This would have to mean that Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up.

There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country, the Holy Places being cared for by an International and Inter-religious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatory and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have representation upon this Commission."

The Commissioners stated that "From the point of view of the 'people concerned,' the Mandate should clearly go to America." The Mandate for "all Syria" was to include Palestine.

But, in conclusion, they were not certain "that the American people would be willing to take the Mandate: that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large and influential Jewish population. . . ."

They recommended that if America could not take the Mandate for all Syria, it should be given to Great Britain.

The voting, such as it was, gave over 60 per cent. first choice for America, out of the 1,152 petitions



presented; of this number there were 1,073 petitions for Great Britain as Mandatory, if America did not take the Mandate.

Inasmuch as President Wilson made it clear that America had no desire to undertake the Palestinian Mandate, it is interesting to note that the American plebiscite indicated that, failing America as a Mandatory, there was an overwhelming demand for Great Britain.

When M. Clemenceau retired from the Premiership early in 1920, there was, as I have pointed out, a perceptible change in the outlook of the French Government, which was reflected in their attitude towards the idea of a British Mandate for Palestine. There was an attempt to treat the Sykes-Picot Agreement as if it had never been scrapped. The French, moreover, claimed an especial position in reference to the protection of the Holy Places, and their attitude towards the establishment of a National Home was definitely critical and even hostile.

The fight on the question of the abrogation of the Sykes-Picot arrangement was left, as were the Syrian negotiations, to M. Berthelot. He contended for the Sykes-Picot line and said that he was quite sure that M. Clemenceau had not been prepared to yield on that point. He was very scornful of the idea of a Jewish National Home. When Lord Curzon firmly adhered to the Clemenceau arrangement, the French ultimately accepted the British Mandate, but stated that they "would ask that the British would respect the traditional rights of the French and pay regard to the interests of those inhabitants who were of the Catholic religion, and especially to the Catholic Missions." The raising of this last question subsequently

*France  
shifts her  
attitudes*

led to a very prolonged discussion, at which M. Millerand was present. Signor Nitti intervened very emphatically on behalf of Italy:—

“He fully recognised that the question involved was one of a spiritual nature; but in his opinion the Holy Places should be so administered as to ensure complete equality to all the nations concerned. He had no particular definite proposals to put forward, but he maintained that each form of worship should be respected, and that each country should enjoy equal rights.

M. BERTHELOT said that he was not specially qualified to deal with the religious question, and that he must leave it to be dealt with by M. Jules Cambon.

M. CAMBON expressed the view that the question of the protectorate of the Holy Places was one

<i>Demand for Protectorate of Holy Places</i>	which merely concerned the Allied Powers, and it should find no place in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.
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The Holy Places had been in the hands of the French since the fifteenth century. The Vatican had always recognised that fact, and every French Government, even those who had broken with Rome, had accepted that responsibility. Even during the War, the Vatican had acknowledged the right of France to a protectorate over the Holy Places. The question was one of the greatest importance to French Catholics. Consequently, should a mandate in Palestine be granted to Great Britain, France would be bound to make certain reservations in regard to the Holy Places. Otherwise it would be difficult to induce the French Senate to accept the arrangement.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE requested Signor Nitti to state the views held by Italian Catholics on that point.

M. NITTI maintained that no useful object would be served by studying or by laying stress on existing rights. The existing rights had been created by the necessities of a Mohammedan occupation. The Mohammedan occupation was about to cease, and he agreed that equal rights should be granted to all Christian faiths, and that no difference could be made between the rights of the various Catholic countries. Italy had never recognised the French protectorate over the Holy Places, and on this account special agreements had been entered into from time to time. In his opinion, in the future no material protection would be required, since Great Britain would accept the mandate. Italy also attached great importance to that question because the Catholic Party in the Italian Parliament had since the last election greatly increased, and it now took a great interest in all religious matters. For these reasons he maintained that Italy should be granted the same rights as those granted to any other Catholic country.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether the Council would accept Signor Nitti's proposal that complete equality should exist and that each country should protect its own Catholics and its own religions.

M. CAMBON did not object that each Government should protect its own nationalists. Indeed, France had always objected to protect any but French citizens in a civil capacity; but it was essential that France should preserve her traditions in respect of the protectorate of the Holy Places.

Should Mr. Lloyd George agree, he proposed that the French representatives should discuss the question with the Italian representatives, and endeavour to arrive at a mutually satisfactory agreement.

M. NITTI said that he had no objections to offer M. Cambon's proposal that they should discuss the question together. On the other hand, it should be

*Nitti wants  
equal rights  
for all  
nations*

realised that a new system of government was about to be introduced into Palestine which, up to the present, had been in the hands of Mohammedans. He thought, therefore, it would be necessary to consider how the new situation would affect the question under reference. In his opinion, each Christian nation should receive the same treatment. It was not a question of civil protection by one or another nation. Each religious order, of whatever nationality, would receive full protection. Thus the Italian Capucines settled in Palestine would be permitted to refer their grievances to their own representatives. Up to the present, owing to the Mohammedan occupation of Palestine, political and religious questions had been mixed up, but in the future it was obvious that the nationals of each country would, if necessary, have to turn to their own representative for such religious protection as they might require. For these reasons a special position is to be guaranteed to the Holy Places. No country should have any special privilege in regard to them as well as to religious communities. Each country must protect its own nationals quite independently from their religious status. It is moreover necessary to take into consideration the vindications of the Latins following the usurpations undergone in past centuries.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE pointed out that Great Britain also possessed certain interests in the matter. There were some millions of Catholics in Great Britain whose interests could not be overlooked. In the past, when Palestine had been under Mohammedan sovereignty the protection of the Holy Places by France might have been necessary. But could it now be suggested that Great Britain would in the future require to be watched by creating a special protectorate of the Holy Places? Did her Allies wish to imply that they no longer trusted Great Britain to treat their nationals fairly in that matter? He failed to see what advantage there could be in an Alliance if Great Britain was considered to be incompetent to protect French and Italian citizens on a visit to the Holy Shrines. Was it suggested that Great Britain should merely sweep the streets of Jerusalem, patrol the highways, and see that no one robbed either an Italian or a Frenchman travelling to Jerusalem on a spiritual mission, whilst she was not considered fit to protect the Shrines? Apparently Great Britain was expected to supply funds to govern the country; but she was not fit to protect the sacred shrines of Jerusalem. Obviously, Great Britain could not accept any such suggestions. Should any special religious order wish to place itself under the protection either of France or Italy, Great Britain would deal with either of those Governments in respect of any grievances entertained by those communities. But it would be impossible to create an empire within an empire. When the whole responsibility for the administration of the country fell on Great Britain, she could not agree to be left outside in questions pertaining to the Holy Places. He, personally, would be quite

willing to consider the request of any other of the Allies to take over the administration of Palestine. But in that event Great Britain would not ask that country to give up her special rights in regard to any British nationals who might visit the Holy Places. He would be prepared to accept M. Nitti's original proposal, but he thought the discussion had better be adjourned to the next morning."

Signor Nitti submitted the following addition to the British text of the Mandates:—

"All privileges and all prerogatives in regard to religious communities will terminate. The Mandatory Power undertakes to appoint, *Nitti's proposed rider to Mandate* in as short a time as possible, a special commission to study and determine all questions and claims, concerning the different religious communities. Account will be taken, in the composition of this Commission, of the religious interests involved. The Chairman of the Commission will be appointed by the Council of the League of Nations.

He was quite sure that all the members of the Supreme Council present shared the full confidence that he himself felt in the British Government in regard to the safeguarding of the rights and privileges of non-Jewish communities. He himself would like to see the President of the Commission, which was proposed by the Italian Delegation, to be appointed by the League of Nations, in order to ensure complete impartiality.

M. MILLERAND said that, as regards Palestine, there were really three questions. The first was that there should be a National Home for the

Jews. Upon that they were all agreed. The second point was the safeguarding of the rights of non-Jewish communities. That, again, he thought, offered no insuperable difficulties. The third was the question of existing traditional rights of non-Jewish bodies, and on that he would like to offer certain observations. He was not precisely informed as to what had transpired during the discussions which Mr. Lloyd George had held with M. Clemenceau on this subject, and no doubt Mr. Lloyd George would give precise information to the Supreme Council. He himself had no objection to the Mandate which he understood Great Britain desired to exercise in Palestine. He was quite sure that England would faithfully discharge that duty, and he was equally sure that M. Clemenceau had not contemplated that this mandate should carry with it the renunciation of the traditional rights of the inhabitants of Palestine. What was the question before the Supreme Council that afternoon? He understood that in undertaking a mandate for Palestine Great Britain undertook, first, to establish a National Home for the Jews in that country, and also not to neglect the traditional rights of the inhabitants generally.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that as regards Mr. Balfour's declaration he doubted very much if the question of religion sprang to M. Clemenceau's mind when this matter was first discussed with him; at any rate, nothing on the subject was ever said. It was probably an afterthought. Both he and M. Clemenceau had agreed that any régime of an international character would almost certainly

*I refuse to  
tolerate  
interference*

lead to trouble, and that therefore it was preferable that the mandate for Palestine should be committed to a single Power, and that that Power should appropriately be Great Britain, as the conqueror of Palestine. He quite agreed with Signor Nitti that so long as Palestine was in the hands of Turkey it was desirable to have some European Power acting as the protector of those who professed the Roman Catholic faith. He wished to point out, however, that Great Britain was not Turkey, and that England had, he thought, the reputation generally of exercising a scrupulous impartiality in regard to the religions of all peoples who came under her rule. It was, therefore, impossible for Great Britain to accept conditions which had been imposed upon the Turks by force after a series of bloody wars. But to continue those conditions when Great Britain was in charge of the administration of Palestine, and to say that it must be left to France to ensure that her Catholics received fair play under British rule, was quite impossible. It would simply lead to a dual administration by two great European Powers. It would not only be insulting and humiliating to Great Britain, but it would also be unfair to other countries. Consequently he hoped the French Government would accept Signor Nitti's suggestion that the whole subject of privileges and rights of various religious communities should be carefully examined by the Council of the League of Nations, with a President appointed by that Council. Great Britain would greatly prefer not to have to decide this question herself. These delicate matters had led to grave controversies in the past as between Catholics, Protestants, the Greek Church,



and others. Great Britain would infinitely sooner have these questions referred to an authoritative and impartial body whose decisions Great Britain would scrupulously carry out. He begged M. Millerand not to put this humiliation upon Great Britain, and to insist on special arrangements being made for the protection of Catholics under a British mandate.

M. MILLERAND said that Mr. Lloyd George had wittily suggested that in all probability neither he nor M. Clemenceau, when they had first discussed this question, had particularly considered the interests of religious bodies. He could say at once that it was never in the minds of the Supreme Council to treat their English colleagues like the Turks. He himself had not the slightest doubt that Great Britain would display her well-known liberal spirit in dealing with this question. He would simply ask his British and Italian friends to consider what was the moral situation in France created by centuries of sacrifice, and to beg them to have regard to that situation. He was convinced himself that when Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau had discussed the question, supposing M. Clemenceau had raised these points, they would have met with the most favourable consideration from Mr. Lloyd George. . . . He ventured to suggest, therefore, a slight variant of the Italian proposal, to the effect that 'The Mandatory Power agrees to submit all questions of claims of various religious communities to an Inter-Allied Commission to be appointed by the League of Nations and to be composed of representatives of the interests of the several religious bodies concerned.'

SIGNOR NITTI said that he would like to ask M. Millerand to consider again the proposal submitted by the Italian Delegation. There were two fundamental questions before the Supreme Council. The first was political, and the second religious in its nature. Both of these were met by the Italian proposal, he thought. The Turkish Government was now being superseded by a civilised Government. Religious bodies in Palestine, therefore, need be under no apprehension as to the safeguarding of their rights; nor would there be any necessity to have the *Te Deum* sung in the Churches! The historical necessity in the past of protecting Christian bodies under the Turkish régime had now come to an end, as the European religious communities were now represented by a civilised nation which would guarantee to the whole world the safeguarding of the interests of those communities. As regards the religious question, he had nothing to oppose to M. Millerand's draft so long as the President of the French Chamber was willing to accept a small modification. He himself would prefer that the President of the projected Commission should be nominated by the League of Nations, as this would secure entire impartiality.

M. MILLERAND said that there remained then only the question of form. He himself hoped that Signor Nitti would not insist upon his proposal, as it would be impossible for the French Delegation to accept it. In regard to this question, for historical reasons extending over a great number of years, there was a keen sensibility on the part of the French nation, and he deprecated any difficulties being raised. He urged the Supreme Council not

to ask the French Delegation to state that they agreed to surrender long-existing rights and privileges. He hoped that it might be possible to find a formula which would meet the case.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said if it was only a question of form, the British Delegation would do their best to meet M. Millerand's point of view and to enable him to satisfy those in his country who were deeply concerned about the question. He quite understood the political difficulties that confronted M. Millerand. The present trouble, however, was a practical one. It was most undesirable to have two mandatories in Palestine; one of the mandatories would incur all the trouble and expense and cost, and yet would have no power at all in regard to religious bodies. The other mandatory would, it was suggested, have full authority in regard to religious matters. This latter proposition was quite consistent with the position of Great Britain as a mandatory Power, and as such it was impossible for him to accept this position. He reminded the Supreme Council that under the Turkish régime the inhabitants of Palestine were quite accustomed to change their religion in the course of 24 hours whenever they thought that anything was to be gained thereby. To have two mandatory Powers in Palestine would make it quite impossible for Great Britain to administer the country, and it might even easily raise difficulties in regard to her relations with France. In any case, the task of governing Palestine would not be an easy one, and it would not be rendered less difficult by the fact that it was to be the national home of the Jews, who were an

*Impossibility  
of a double  
Mandatories*

extraordinarily intelligent race but not easy to govern. M. Berthelot would remember that the French Government were not especially anxious to accept a French mandate. In any case, to undertake the administration of Palestine would be a costly and a difficult operation. He himself did not like the idea of a Commission, as proposed by M. Millerand, who wished it to be composed of leaders of all religious bodies of the various Powers. He himself could not conceive anything less likely to work in harmony and achieve its object than a body composed as suggested by the French Delegation. Further, the Supreme Council must always bear in mind the fact that the Orthodox Church also had considerable interests in Palestine. Russia might to-day be in low water, but she would revive in the near future. He thought that disastrous consequences might ensue if the Orthodox Church were left entirely out of consideration, in view of that revival. He would very much prefer that M. Millerand would see his way to accepting Signor Nitti's draft, at any rate as a basis of agreement. What he desired himself was the establishment of a Commission which would be most likely to promote harmony. That Commission should undertake that the interests not only of French Catholics but also of other Catholics and of the Orthodox Church, and all other religious bodies, should be taken fully into consideration.

M. MILLERAND, on behalf of the French Delegation, was prepared to accept Signor Nitti's proposition as a basis of agreement, provided that the first sentence was suppressed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said so long as France would not press for special privileges he was quite

satisfied with the Italian draft, and he had no objection to the first sentence being left out. If, however, the British Delegation agreed to this, he trusted that M. Millerand would, on his part, agree to inserting in the declaration the words referring to the National Home of the Jews.

M. MILLERAND said that he would ask formally, with a view to having it recorded in the *procès-verbal*, that it should be understood that provision should be made for the safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

*Curzon queries French phraseology* LORD CURZON said that he did not yet quite understand the precise significance of 'political rights' according to French law. In the British language all ordinary rights were included in 'civil rights.' He was anxious to avoid introducing in the Treaty a word which might have a different meaning for the French and for the British, and might revive the 'religious' rights which had just been disposed of.

M. MILLERAND said that the reason why the French Delegation wished to insert the word 'political' was that they were anxious that non-Jewish communities should not be deprived of existing political rights; that is to say, the right to vote and take part in elections.

Signor NITTI thought that the apparent difference of opinion between the French and British Delegations was one of form and not of substance.

M. MILLERAND said that he was prepared to accept the Italian addition to the Article, provided that the opening sentence with regard to the



*[By Courtesy of Alfieri Picture Service]*

M. MILLERAND, MR. LLOYD GEORGE AND SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN  
AT THE CONFERENCE



abandonment of the French religious privileges was not formally included in the Treaty, but was regarded as a binding pledge. As regards the political rights of the inhabitants of Palestine for which the Treaty Delegation had pressed, he would be satisfied to record the French claim in the *procès-verbal*."

It was finally agreed:—

(a) To accept the terms of the Mandates Article with reference to Palestine, (see p. 1195) on the understanding that there was inserted in the *procès-verbal* an understanding by the Mandatory Power that this would not involve the surrender of the rights hitherto enjoyed by the non-Jewish communities in Palestine; this undertaking not to refer to the question of the religious protectorate of France, which had been settled earlier in the previous afternoon by the undertaking given by the French Government that they recognised this protectorate as being at an end.

(b) The Mandatories chosen by the principal Allied Powers are: France for Syria and Great Britain for Mesopotamia and Palestine.

In reference to the above decision the Supreme Council took note of the following reservation of the Italian Delegation:—

"In view of the extensive economic interests which Italy as an exclusively Mediterranean Power enjoys in Asia Minor, the Italian Delegation reserves its approval of this resolution until the regulation of Italian interests in Turkey-in-Asia."



The question of the boundaries of the British Mandate occupied a good deal of the time of the Conference. There were two difficulties: one was the northern boundary of Palestine, the second was the guarantees that were to be given by the French as Syrian Mandatories, that the head waters of the Jordan should not in any way be diverted so as to deprive Palestine of the water supply which was essential to its existence. After prolonged discussion, in which both Lord Curzon and myself took part, I made a suggestion which ultimately led to a friendly settlement of the question of boundaries.

*Boundaries  
settlement  
by Scottish  
theologian*

“MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like to recognise the very conciliatory and helpful spirit in which M. Berthelot had approached the subject, and he begged to assure him that the British Government would respond in a like spirit. These questions were to be settled as between Allies and friends, and not as between competitors. However, he thought the present Conference was not one in which details of frontiers could be determined. A book written by a Scottish theological professor, Professor Adam Smith, had been brought to his notice. This book had been written before the War, and, although the work of a theologian, was so accurate in matters of geography that it had been used by Lord Allenby during his campaign. In the book were maps showing the frontiers of Palestine, and various towns. It was hardly possible to go into these intricacies at present, and he would therefore suggest that Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot should have another

meeting and examine the subject together. He would only make two provisos.

M. BERTHELOT said that he would be delighted to read the book on Palestine, as he was partial both to the Scottish and to theologians."

On the question of water supply, I said:—

"It would be realised that the acceptance of a Mandate by Great Britain over that country involved the assumption of a very heavy and constant burden. Palestine was not a productive country; it possessed no trade which would requite Great Britain for such expenditure as she might incur in its development. For these reasons Great Britain would only accept a Mandate for a real Palestine, the Palestine of ancient history; which should not merely include the barren rocks of Judea, that might at any moment be rendered a desert through the cutting off of the waters flowing through the same.

In agreement with M. Clemenceau, it had been decided that Great Britain should hold Palestine.

*Problem of the watersheds* It had, however, been recognised that the exact limits of the territories to be included in Palestine might be open to discussion, and on that account it had been proposed that any points in dispute should be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by the President of the United States of America. He (Mr. Lloyd George) felt sure that the French representatives would agree that the President would be very impartial in regard to any difference as between France and Great Britain. The waters of Palestine were essential to its existence. Without

those waters, Palestine would be a wilderness; and all Jews were unanimously agreed that the sources of Hermon, and the head-waters of the Jordan were vital to the existence of the country. On the other hand, those same waters were of no use to anyone holding Syria. They could in effect only be used for the purpose of bargaining or for the purpose of obtaining concessions from Palestine. Consequently, he would ask the French representatives to take a liberal view of their obligations in regard to the settlement of the future boundaries of Palestine.

M. BERTHELOT, in reply, said: Palestine would obviously constitute a heavy load for Great Britain to bear; but Great Britain had herself claimed to shoulder that burden. In regard to the watersheds, undoubtedly the rivers of Southern Syria possessed a certain degree of utility for the areas north of the Jordan, but that was all. On the other hand, the snows of Hermon dominated the town of Damascus and could not be excluded from Syria. Again, the waters of the Litany irrigated the most fertile regions of Syria. On the other hand, the British claim to the waters of the Jordan might appear to be more admissible. Consequently, though unable to agree to the extension of Palestine into Syria in order to include all the water-sheds of the waters of Palestine, he felt sure some arrangement could be made in order to protect the waters of Palestine. The historical frontiers of Palestine were unknown. But he thought the latitude of Lake Tiberias indicated roughly the limits of Palestine in that direction.

In regard to the proposal that President Wilson

should be asked to arbitrate, should differences of opinion arise as to the territorial limits of Palestine, the French were unable to accept any such proposal, since President Wilson was entirely guided by Mr. Brandeis, who held very decided views."

Whilst the discussions were proceeding, a telegram arrived from Judge Brandeis, of the Supreme Court of Justice in Washington. It had been addressed to Dr. Weizmann and read as follows:—

*Cable from  
Judge  
Brandeis*

'16th February. Please convey Prime Minister Lloyd George following message from myself and all those associated with me in the Zionist Organisation of America quote My associates of the Zionist Organisation of America cable me from Paris that in Conference in Turkish Treaty France now insists upon terms of Sykes Picot agreement stop If this contention of French should prevail it would defeat full realisation of promise of Jewish Home for Sykes Picot agreement divides country in complete disregard historic boundaries and actual necessity rational northern and eastern boundaries indispensable to self-sustaining community and economic development of country on North Palestine must include Litany river watersheds of Hermon on East must include Plain of Jaulan Hauran if Balfour Declaration subscribed to by France as well as other Allied and Associated Powers is to be made effective these boundaries must be conceded to Palestine. Less than this

would produce mutilation promised Home stop Balfour Declaration was public promise proclaimed by your Government and subscribed to by Allied Powers I venture to suggest that in your assuring just settlement boundaries Palestine Statesmen Christian Nations keep this solemn promise to Israel.'

"M. BERTHELOT, after commenting on the fact that the contents of the telegram seemed to indicate that Judge Brandeis had a much exaggerated sense of his own importance, said that he had carefully studied an authoritative work on Palestine which Mr. Lloyd George had been good enough to lend him. This work clearly showed that the historic boundaries of Palestine had never extended beyond Dan and Beersheba and he was quite prepared to recommend to his Government that these should be recognised as the correct boundaries. Judge Brandeis's idea that the Jewish Home should include the Litany River, the watersheds of Hermon, the Plain of Jaulan and Hauran was, in his opinion, too extravagant to be considered for a single moment. What was a legitimate demand was that the Palestinians should have the use of the waters to the south of Dan. The Litany River, however, had never been included in the Jewish State.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the book which he had asked M. Berthelot to read constituted the greatest authority in the British language on the question of Palestine. In the days of Agrippa the boundaries had stretched slightly beyond Dan and Beersheba but these latter had always remained

*Dan to  
Beersheba  
agreed*

Palestine's historic limits. After consultation with Lord Allenby and other authorities, the British Government had decided to accept these as the boundaries for the future and they had further been accepted by M. Clemenceau whose acceptance had since been loyally upheld by the present French Government. He proposed therefore to reply to Judge Brandeis in the sense that the Judge's geography was at fault and that it might be as well if he studied more authoritative and accurate maps than were apparently at present at his disposal.

M. BERTHELOT asked that Mr. Lloyd George in his reply would add that while France too could not for a moment admit the extravagant claims put forward by Judge Brandeis, she had no intention of adopting a hostile attitude, but was quite prepared to make liberal arrangements for the supply of water to the Zionist population.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE suggested that the exact boundaries should be settled by the British Foreign Office with M. Berthelot."

The French would not agree to any extension of the boundaries of Palestine beyond the old limits of Dan, but were prepared to meet the case of Palestine by giving a guarantee that the water supply of the country would not be interfered with by the Syrian Mandatory. One of Dr. George Adam Smith's maps was accepted by M. Berthelot as a fair delimitation of the boundaries of Palestine, and we accepted M. Berthelot's guarantee with regard to the arrangements for the supply of water to the Zionist population.

In his attitude towards the question of the National Home, M. Berthelot was definitely hostile throughout the whole of our conferences. The discussion was opened by Lord Curzon, who said:—

*French  
hostility  
to Jewish  
National  
Home*

“ . . . As regards Palestine, His Britannic Majesty's Government has, two years previously, promulgated a formal declaration which had been accepted by the Allied Powers, that Palestine was in future to be the National Home of the Jews throughout the world. His information was to the effect that the Jews themselves attached a passionate importance to the terms of this declaration, and that they would not only be disappointed but deeply incensed if the pledge given in Mr. Balfour's declaration were not renewed in the terms of the Treaty. The Supreme Council had now to consider what should be the exact form that the repetition of this pledge should take. He thought that the only safe plan was to repeat the pledge in the precise form in which it had been originally given. The British Foreign Office had been pressed very closely by the Zionists in order to have the terms of that pledge expanded and improved. He himself, as Head of the British Foreign Office, had absolutely refused to go beyond the original declaration, and had said that the fairest thing was to adhere strictly to the original terms. Beyond this the British Government were not prepared to go. He sincerely hoped that the French Delegation would not refuse to adhere to the terms as originally drafted. He understood the French Delegation had an alternative draft of the Article relating to Mandates

which they proposed to submit to the Council, but he sincerely trusted they would not press its acceptance.

M. BERTHELOT said that he confessed that he was not in entire agreement with all that Lord Curzon had said. It seemed to him the safest plan to adopt was to accept the proposal to submit the question to the League of Nations. In regard to the Zionists he was not again in entire agreement with Lord Curzon, but he thought it was especially important that the Council should not go beyond the present proposals. Were they to grant to the Jews all facilities to settle in Palestine and to organise there a theoretical Jewish home? He thought that the whole world was sympathetic to the aspiration of the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine, and they would be prepared to do their utmost to satisfy their legitimate desires. Nor did the French Government desire at all to stand in the way of Great Britain's wish to give the Jews due opportunity to achieve those passionate aspirations. So far as these were concerned, the French Delegation had no objection to offer, and they were prepared to recognise the responsibilities of the country accepting the Mandate. It was essential, however, that there should be no misunderstanding on this question. Was this new projected State, however, to have an entirely different administration from other States? If so, a great difficulty would be created both with the Mussulman and the Christian world. He could not think that this was intended by His Majesty's Government. As regards Mr. Balfour's declaration on behalf of the Zionists, had it been generally accepted by the Allied Powers? He had not the



text in front of him, but so far as his recollection went it was framed in general terms. But he could not recall that general acceptance had ever been given to Mr. Balfour's declaration by the Allied Powers. He had no desire at all to embarrass the British Government, but he must state that, so far as his recollection went, there had never been any official acceptance of Mr. Balfour's declaration by the Allies of the British Government.

LORD CURZON thought that M. Berthelot was possibly not fully acquainted with the history of the question. In November, 1917, Mr. Balfour had made a declaration on behalf of the Zionists. The terms of this declaration had been communicated by M. Sokoloff in February, 1918, to M. Pichon, who at that time was Head of the French Foreign Office. He had before him a copy of a letter from M. Pichon which had been published in the French Press, which he would ask the Interpreter presently to read out to the Supreme Council. Further, the Italian Government had also expressed its approval of the terms of the declaration, which had, further, been accepted by the President of the United States and also by Greece, China, Serbia, and Siam. He thought, therefore, he was quite justified in saying that Mr. Balfour's declaration had been accepted by a large number of the Allied Powers. Secondly, M. Berthelot had laid stress upon the fact that it was desirable that there should be no misunderstanding at all upon the subject. He quite agreed, but he did not see how any such misunderstanding could arise. He thought it was impossible for the Supreme Council to determine that day exactly what form the future

*Curzon gives  
history of  
the Pledge*

administration of Palestine would take. All they could do was to repeat the declaration which had been made in November, 1917. That declaration contemplated, first, the creation of a national home for the Jews, whose privileges and rights were to be safeguarded under a military Power. Secondly, it was of the highest importance to safeguard the rights of minorities; first the rights of the Arabs, and then of the Christian communities. Provision was made for this in the second part of the declaration. He submitted, therefore, that, in the interests of those communities to which M. Berthelot had alluded, it was unwise to suppress the second part of the declaration. The position of the British Government is this, that they simply could not exclude it, and they sincerely hoped that, in view of the explanation which it had submitted to the Supreme Council, the French Government would not press their objections.

M. BERTHELOT, referring to Mr. Balfour's original declaration, quoted the words 'The Mandatory Power will assume the responsibility of establishing a home for the Jews on the understanding that the rights of other communities will be safeguarded.' This, he said, guaranteed the two points referred to by Lord Curzon. He suggested that it might be as well to have Mr. Balfour's statement in its original form translated for the benefit of the Supreme Council. As he had already pointed out, the French Government had never taken official cognizance of Mr. Balfour's declaration, and M. Pichon's connection with that declaration was, he submitted, somewhat vague.

LORD CURZON said that M. Berthelot could

hardly say that M. Pichon was unaware of the significance of the declaration. M. Pichon, in his reply to M. Sokoloff, had not only endorsed, on behalf of his own Government, Mr. Balfour's declaration, but had added in his letter: 'besides, I am happy to affirm that the understanding between the French and British Government on this question is complete.' With regard to M. Berthelot's second point, where he had suggested words beginning 'Sous réserve des droits politiques. . . ' the question of political and existing traditional rights raised an infinite field of discussion. He quite agreed that it was desirable to raise this point, but he thought it was most unwise and, indeed, quite unnecessary, to raise the question now. It has been agreed by the Supreme Council that the Mandate should be submitted to the League of Nations, and he thought that the Council should be content at present with merely repeating the terms of Mr. Balfour's original declaration, which had been accepted by the French Government at the time of its promulgation.

M. BERTHELOT said that, as he understood the matter, it appeared that hitherto all M. Pichon had agreed to was to establish the traditional home of the Jews, and it was not in any way evident that M. Pichon had accepted the whole declaration in its entirety.

SIGNOR NITTI said that they were all agreed on the question of establishing a Jewish Home there.

M. BERTHELOT said he accepted this, but he disputed the necessity of referring to Mr. Balfour's declaration, which had long been a dead letter.

LORD CURZON indicated his dissent.

SIGNOR NITTI said that Great Britain had taken over the administration of the country, and she would certainly respect the traditional rights of the inhabitants. The Catholic Church generally, however, was not satisfied with this solution of the question, and a letter from Cardinal Gaspari had been published in the Press some time before to the effect that, should Turkish domination in that region end, the French were its natural successors. The idea of the Church was that France, and not Great Britain, should be the protector of Roman Catholic interests in Palestine. From the international point of view he urged that it was better that the formula which had been suggested by the Italian Delegation should be accepted. As M. Millerand was well aware, the Roman Catholic Church was not a signatory to the Treaty.

M. BERTHELOT said that all the Jews in France were anti-Zionists, and had no desire at all to go to Palestine.

LORD CURZON replied that he found it difficult to discover exactly what it was to which the French Delegation took exception. Was it to establishing a National Home for the Jews in Palestine, or to the protection of the rights and privileges of the various religious communities there? What he understood was that all they objected to was that the declaration in its original form had been issued by the British Government and that it had afterwards been accepted by the other Governments. It had been suggested that the following words should be omitted:—

'putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 8, 1917, by the British

Government and adopted by the other Allied Powers in favour of.'

He enquired why it was desired to omit this sentence, and what injury was done by its inclusion? The Jews regarded the declaration of Mr. Balfour in its entirety as the charter of their rights, and they attached great importance to reference being made to the original declaration in the Treaty of Peace.

M. BERTHELOT said the declaration of Mr. Balfour of the 8th November, 1917, was undoubtedly a very important pronouncement, and he quite understood that the English Jews and Zionists generally attached great importance to it. The declaration, however, had never been officially accepted by the French Government, and it had never been admitted as a basis for the future administration of Palestine. All that France and Japan had accepted in substance was that in Palestine there should be established a National Home for the Jews. Further, he submitted that it was not customary, in official documents such as the present Treaty, to refer to what really were semi-official communications. The French Government were quite prepared to accept the terms of the declaration in substance, but that was all, and he did not think that the Jews could expect more. The French had no intention of contesting the British right to refer to the projected national home for Jews. But, as he had said, to refer in the Treaty to something which had never been officially accepted by other Powers, would mark a new departure, and he himself could perceive no reason for any special reference to the declaration.

LORD CURZON thought that the Jews themselves were really the best judges of what they wanted. M. Berthelot was apparently of the view that they had no reason to attach capital importance to the reference in the Treaty to Mr. Balfour's declaration. The fact remained, however, that they did attach such importance, and, after all, they were the best judges of their own interests. M. Berthelot, it seemed, objected to any reference being made in the Treaty to any one Power as being responsible for endeavouring to set up in Palestine a National Home for the Jews. He was most anxious to meet M. Berthelot's views, and he suggested that this might be done by substituting the word 'principle' for the word 'declaration' in the British draft on Mandates: that is to say, that the second paragraph of the draft should read as follows:—

'The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the principle. . . .'

M. BERTHELOT said that what the French objected to was any reference in an official instrument, such as the Turkish Treaty, to an unofficial declaration made by one Power, which had never been formally accepted by the Allies generally. The substitution, as suggested by Lord Curzon, of the word 'principle' for the word 'declaration' would not remove the difficulty.

LORD CURZON submitted that M. Berthelot had now apparently changed his ground. He had understood that both M. Millerand and M. Berthelot had agreed to insert Mr. Balfour's

declaration in the Treaty, and that all they objected to was any reference to the fact that the original declaration had been made by the British Government on a certain date. He had endeavoured to meet their objections, but, unfortunately, without result. It now appeared that M. Berthelot objected to the insertion of the declaration in the Treaty, even in a modified form, and he desired instead to adopt the French draft, which Great Britain could not possibly accept. After all, the Mandate for Palestine was to be given to Great Britain. He might here observe that Great Britain was in no way anxious to accept this charge. He was at a loss to understand what objection there could be to repeating in the Treaty the exact terms under which Great Britain had accepted the Mandate, and to include a reference to the circumstances which were set forth in Mr. Balfour's declaration. Was it necessary to continue an argument on a matter in regard to which the British Government had taken up a position from which it was practically impossible for them to recede?"

Ultimately the French Delegation dropped their objection to the Balfour Declaration. The whole position was very fairly given in a statement made by Mr. Winston Churchill to the Imperial Cabinet on 22nd June, 1921, indicating the position with regard to the Jews in Palestine at that date:—

*Churchill  
summarises  
the position*

"Palestine is complicated by the pledge which was given by the late Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, in the name of the Government, in a most critical period of the War, that a Jewish

National Home would be favoured by Great Britain in Palestine. There are 550,000 Arabs, 60,000 Jews and 60,000 Christians in Palestine. The Zionist ideal is a very great ideal, and I confess, for myself, it is one that claims my keen personal sympathy, but quite apart from whatever you may feel for the idea, there is no doubt that during the War we hoped to gain influence and support, among other things, for our cause, and to enlist the aid of Jews all over the world, and that we got, in consequence, support, and we have to be very careful and punctilious to discharge our obligations, if we honestly and legitimately can, without sacrificing other considerations. And therefore, I am in a very difficult position there, because it is not that the Jews in Palestine were unpopular—they were not; it is not that the numbers that are now coming in—7,000 or 8,000 a year—are really introducing a serious or imminent change in the character of the country—they do not; but the Zionists, in order to work up enthusiasm for their cause, have to go all over the world preaching the return of hundreds of thousands of oppressed peoples from the persecuted countries of Europe, Russia, the Ukraine, Poland and so forth, to the Promised Land. This terrifies the Arabs who, although they would not be in the least alarmed if it were a moderate immigration of carefully selected colonists of the kind that have already established themselves there, and done such wonderful work under the care and munificence of, for instance, the Rothschild family during the last twenty or thirty years. They would not mind that at all, but the idea they have in their minds is that they are going to be swamped



and overwhelmed by hundreds of thousands of Bolsheviks from Central Europe. That is what they believe and it has raised a most dangerous state of excitement from one end of the country to another. We had a very nasty outbreak at Jaffa the other day (May, 1921), at which forty or fifty Jews were murdered, and it was not suppressed until a large number of casualties of one kind or another had been inflicted.

We must insist on the door to immigration being kept open, insist that immigrants are not brought in beyond the numbers which the new wealth of the country, which was created by public works and better agriculture, can sustain.

*Selection of immigrants* MR. MASSEY: The character of the immigrants?

MR. CHURCHILL: Above all, as Mr. Massey so justly interjects, by looking strictly to the character of the immigrants, both at the port from which they start for the Holy Land and when they arrive in the country. The stories of Bolshevism have been much exaggerated among them, the numbers of those who are infected with this horrible form of mental and moral disease are not at all great, but I have given to Sir Herbert Samuel, himself a keen Zionist and a Jew, directions which he is carrying out with vigour, to search the camps for men of Bolshevik tendencies and to send them out of the country with the least possible delay, and this is being done. It is not a question of making war upon opinion, but of not allowing a great experiment which deserves a fair chance, to be prejudiced by persons who are guilty of a breach of hospitality.

MR. MEIGHEN: How do you define our responsibilities in relation to Palestine under Mr. Balfour's pledge?

MR. CHURCHILL: To do our best to make an honest effort to give the Jews a chance to make a National Home there for themselves.

MR. MEIGHEN: And to give them control of the Government?

MR. CHURCHILL: If, in the course of many years, they become a majority in the country, they naturally would take it over.

MR. MEIGHEN: *Pro rata* with the Arab?

MR. CHURCHILL: *Pro rata* with the Arab. We made an equal pledge that  
*Arab rights maintained* we would not turn the Arab off his land or invade his political and social rights.

MR. MONTAGU: Mr. Balfour's speech guaranteed the rights of both.

MR. CHURCHILL: . . . The United States has lately been coming forward from its long sleep and demanding that none of the mandates shall be ratified by the League of Nations until they have been fully consulted, but if they are under the delusion that we are making a great profit out of these, we might invite them to share our burden with us or relieve us of them altogether. Anyway, I think we ought to have from the Imperial Conference, who represent States, many of which sent troops to take part in this cause, the necessary liberty to make an offer if, and when the time arrives; but I object very much to the accusation that we have got off with a very valuable booty, when, as a matter of fact, we are discharging with great pain and labour a thankless obligation."

The form of the British Mandate in Palestine was finally settled in these words:—

#### “THE MANDATE

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a  
*Text of* Mandatory selected by the said Powers  
*the Mandate* the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstructing their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the aforementioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:—

*Article 1*

The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

*Article 2*

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

*Article 3*

The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

*Article 4*

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. . . .

The Zionist organization, so long as its organisation and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

*Article 6*

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

*Article 7*

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

*Article 9*

The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

*Article 11*

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such

agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

*Article 13*

All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

*Article 15*

The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

*Article 16*

The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

*Article 18*

The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose



such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

*Article 22*

English, Arabic, and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine, shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

*Article 23*

The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

*Article 25*

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provisions for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

*Article 27*

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

*Article 28*

In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities."

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE TURKISH TREATY (*continued*)

#### GREECE

EVERY tragedy is a compound of errors and accidents. There never was a more complete illustration of this than the story of the Greek failure in the Great War.

*Greece's lost  
opportunity  
in the  
Great War*

When Turkey decided to join with the Central Powers, the opportunity that opened out to Greece for adding to her realm the millions of Greeks who lived a menaced and anxious existence under the shadow of Turkish despotism was such as had not been afforded since the fall of the Greek Empire. Her oppressors had committed the fatal blunder of challenging mighty Empires who were in an appreciably better military and naval position to attack the Turkish Empire than were the Allies of that Empire to come to its aid.

It was a great and, as it turned out, an irreparable misfortune for Greece that when the War broke out she had a King whose personal sympathies were with the Central Powers. He would have liked to throw in his lot with Germany. He had married the Kaiser's sister, and thus his wife was German and his children half-German. It would have been too much to expect of human nature—which is none the less human because it is royal—that Constantine and his whole family should not have a constant pride in their association with the mightiest potentate

on the Continent of Europe. Moreover the Kaiser was a good family man and kindly and genial in his personal relations. Constantine's vanity was none the less potent because it had legitimate grounds. Added to that, he could not be unmoved by the fact that he had received his military training in that Imperial grand army which was then beyond question the finest in the world. After the Balkan War he was given the baton of a field-marshal in the German army. So that family attachment and military pride conspired to make of him a pro-German. As he himself put it in his personal telegram to the Emperor on the 25th of July, 1914:—

"The Emperor knows that My personal sympathies and My political opinions impel Me to His side. . . . After full reflection it is, however, impossible for Me to discern how I could be of use to Him if I mobilised My army at once. The Mediterranean is at the mercy of the combined English and French fleets. They would destroy our war and merchant fleets, deprive us of our islands and above all prevent the concentration of My army which can only be achieved by sea, since there is no railway yet in existence. Unable to render Him any service, we should be wiped off the map. I am compelled to think that neutrality, which might be in His interests, is obligatory for us."

The King, however, gave an assurance that he would not interfere with "His friends among My neighbours." That of course meant Bulgaria and Turkey. On the other hand, the King's Chief Minister, Veniselos, was by political conviction and political sympathy entirely

*Veniselos  
opposes  
Constantine*

with the Liberal democracies of the West. He was the greatest statesman Greece had thrown up since the days of Pericles. His influence in Greece at that time was paramount. His achievements in the Cretan rebellion against the Turk, his brilliant oratorical gifts, his achievements as a reformer, and his magnetic personality, gave him a greater hold upon the Greek people than that possessed by any other politician, or even by the monarch himself. The King was personally popular. The Greek victories and acquisitions in the Balkan Wars were ascribed to his leadership. He was the nominal head of the Army that drove out of Southern Macedonia the remnant of the Turkish forces that had not been broken by the Bulgars and the Serbs. But Veniselos was the real author of the combination that defeated the Turk, and his hold on the Greek people was deeper than that of his sovereign.

When war broke out, Veniselos was convinced that the interests of his country demanded that Greece should unite her fortune with those of the Entente. Once Britain declared war against Germany, he had no doubt that, whatever the vicissitudes of the conflict, victory would ultimately rest on the banners of the Entente. When the King taunted him with the defeats sustained by Britain at the Dardanelles and in France, his answer was: "That generally happens in every war in which the English take part; but they always win the last battle." Apart therefore altogether from his judgment as a democratic leader on the merits of the conflict, he was convinced that the interests of Greece would be advanced by entering into the struggle on the side of Britain. He therefore exerted the whole of his influence and authority to persuade the King to abandon every notion of

neutrality, and throw in the whole strength of Greece in support of the Entente. Unfortunately for the Allies, there were statesmen in charge of their destinies who had a fatal propensity for delaying decision until it was too late to act.

A fortnight after Britain entered the War, the following message was despatched from our Minister at Athens to Sir Edward Grey:—

“Athens, August 19th, 1914.

M. Veniselos came to see me last night, and, with full approval of the King and Cabinet, formally placed at disposal of Entente Powers, all the naval and military resources of Greece from the moment when they might be required. His Excellency said he had just made a similar declaration to my French colleague and my Russian colleague, as those countries were our allies, but that offer was made in a special sense to His Majesty's Government, with whose interests those of Greece were indissolubly bound up. He knew resources of Greece were small, but 250,000 troops she could dispose of, her navy and ports might be of some use, and he suggested that, in case of necessity, 50,000 Greek troops could be sent to Egypt to keep order. The offer would remain open, and until it were accepted it must, of course, remain a profound secret.

I thanked him most cordially for this tangible proof of Greek sympathy, and said I felt sure His Majesty's Government would deeply appreciate his generous offer, but that I believed you would prefer that, if the other Balkan States remained neutral, Greece should do so too.

Having this morning received your telegram No. 133, after consulting my French and Russian colleagues, I communicated its substance to M. Veniselos, explaining that, though sent off before his offer had been made, it was in effect a reply.

He thanked you for message, but pointed out that it contained no reference to the possibility of Bulgarian intervention against Serbia, in which eventuality Greece was bound by her treaty to assist the latter, and intended to do so.

I suggested that it might be more difficult for us to give assistance against Bulgaria than against Turkey. His Excellency quite understood this, but said that moral support derived from being recognised as our ally would be of supreme advantage to Greece. In view of unconditional offer now made by Greece, would it not be possible to give him the assurance he requires regarding Bulgaria? Failure to do so might be regarded as a rebuff, and create reaction.

I venture strongly to urge that I should be authorised to convey personal message of thanks from the King to the King of Greece, and M. Veniselos besides one from you to the Greek Government. My Russian colleague is pressing for similar messages from the Emperor of Russia.

This step on the part of the Greek Government was quite unexpected, and I can only attribute it to M. Veniselos' impulsiveness and his eloquence in carrying his colleagues and the King with him."

The British Foreign Minister sent a truncated summary of this important communication to the

*Grey's chilly  
reception  
of offer*

French and Russian Governments. For some inexplicable reason he omitted to mention to our Allies the vital offer of 250,000 men and the tender of 50,000 for Egypt. He intimated to them that he proposed to send the following reply, which was a virtual rejection of the valuable help tendered by Greece:—

“Should Turkey depart from neutrality and come out on the side of Germany and Austria, we should at once welcome and support Greece as an ally, and should regard the use of Greek ports and co-operation of Greek navy as being most valuable.

As to Bulgaria, a point on which M. Veniselos is very particular, far the most desirable object, in our opinion, would be a confederation of the Balkan States, including Roumania, as suggested by M. Veniselos the other day. We wish to help that by every means in our power, and M. Veniselos will understand that His Majesty's Government are anxious not to be involved in any inter-Balkan conflicts.

We are not possessed of information that would lead us to believe that the contingency of Bulgarian intervention against Serbia is probable, but if Bulgaria were to join Germany and Austria in attacking Serbia, and Greece were thereby drawn in by treaty obligations to Serbia's assistance, His Majesty's Government would be ready to give Greece such support as is in their power.

You should ask view of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and what reply French (Russian) Government intends to send to M. Veniselos.”



The tender of a quarter of a million Greek troops was contemptuously ignored.

At that time we could not spare more than 100,000 men to help France to save her capital from an impending attack by the most formidable army any country ever put in the field. Our trained reserves were barely sufficient to make up casualties, and we had nothing further to fall back upon except a small volunteer force which could not be sufficiently trained, officered or equipped for the battle front for some months. The Greeks were not only trained, but a considerable proportion of their officers and men had been fighting victorious battles against an army which was traditionally reputed to contain soldiers of a high fighting quality.

Had the unconditional offer of Greece to throw in her lot with the Allies been promptly accepted and announced, it is more than doubtful whether Turkey would have risked an attack from Britain in Mesopotamia and Palestine, from Russia in Armenia and at the same time from a Greek army on her Western frontier. At that time neither Austria nor Germany could have given the Turks any assistance in men or material. There were no means of transporting any substantial aid to the Turks either by sea or land until Serbia had been crushed and Bulgaria had joined the Central Powers and thus opened up communication between the Danube and Constantinople. Bulgaria would have hesitated to join our adversaries had the King known that the Greeks would have come to the aid of the Serbs. Before Serbia was ultimately attacked, however, Constantine had assured the Germans that the Greek Army would not intervene. Had the Greek offer in August, 1914, been

*Acceptance  
would have  
kept Turkey  
out of War*

accepted, and had Turkey nevertheless declared war on the Allies, a Greek Army could easily have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Dardanelles disaster would have been averted, and Constantinople would have been at the mercy of the British fleet. The practical refusal of this proffer of an effective Greek alliance was therefore a stupendous error of judgment. It turned out to be a calamitous error, not only for both Britain and Greece, but also for the world, for it prolonged this devastating War for two years.

The tender of Greek assistance to the Entente was not renewed for nearly three years, and then only after King Constantine's attitude had become so hostile that he had to be driven from his throne by an Allied Army. When Veniselos made his offer on the 19th of August, 1914, to place at the disposal of the Entente Powers all the naval and military resources of Greece, he had succeeded in persuading the King that the Entente—now that Britain was in that Alliance—was bound to win in the end. Meanwhile the great Navy of Britain had the Greek ports and islands at its mercy. That prospect overrode Constantine's predilection for Germany. But when the German Army drove the French and British armies headlong towards Paris and smashed a great Russian force at Tannenberg; when also Turkey joined the Central Powers, the King came to the conclusion that his Prime Minister had been at least premature in his anticipation of an Entente victory. As the campaign developed and the immense Russian Army was being rolled back from the German frontier, the Turks were holding up the British Armies in Mesopotamia, the Suez Canal and Gallipoli, and the Allied attempts to break through the German lines in France

were repulsed with unparalleled carnage, King Constantine's sympathy with Germany became less concealed and more operative. He completely thwarted the pro-Ally plans of Veniselos.

The history of Greece for the next two years was one of a desperate struggle between Veniselos, who was still anxious to come to the aid of the Allies, and the King, 'whose pro-German proclivities became more and more pronounced as German victories in France and in Russia multiplied, and the British attacks in Mesopotamia and the Dardanelles were defeated by the Turkish armies. When it became clear in 1915 that Austria and Germany were preparing a serious offensive against Serbia and that King Ferdinand was intriguing with the Central Powers to join in the attack, Sir Edward Grey approached the Greek Government with a view to inducing it to redeem its pledges to Serbia to come to her aid if she were attacked. In order to purchase its adhesion he wired on January 23rd, 1915, that:—

*Grey's vain approach to Greece in 1915*

"If Greece comes out as the ally of Serbia and participates in the war, I know both France and Russia will readily admit most important territorial compensations for Greece on coast of Asia Minor, and if M. Veniselos wishes for a definite promise, I believe there will be no difficulty in obtaining it. If, therefore, M. Veniselos wishes for a definite understanding on these terms, he should at once let France and Russia and H.M. Government know, and I am sure any proposals he has to make will be most favourably considered. The matter is urgent. . . . You should urge all this unofficially upon M. Veniselos. Inform your French and Russian

colleagues and be ready in addition to co-operate with them in any offers to Greece that they may be instructed to make. You should not, however, offer to Greece, Rhodes or any island in Italian occupation."

This is the first occasion on which any offer was made to Greece of any territory in Asia Minor. It is significant that it came not in response to any request from M. Veniselos, but as a proposal from Sir Edward Grey with the assent of France and Russia. Veniselos advised his sovereign to accept the offer, but the King effectively put an end to any negotiations by dismissing M. Veniselos from office and substituting a Government of his own adherents. At the head of this Government he placed M. Gounaris, who throughout his career was a complete courtier and an enemy of M. Veniselos.

As the menace to Serbia became more imminent, Sir Edward Grey did not await any definite acceptance from Greece of his proposal but, after consultation with the French and with the Russians, on the 7th of April, 1915, presented to the Greek Government the following definite proposal. He wired to our Minister at Athens:—

"The three Powers have decided that it is desirable to take action at Athens. You should therefore, when your French and Russian colleagues are similarly instructed, make a communication to M. Gounaris in the following terms:—

*A further offer*

'The three Allied Powers have taken note with satisfaction of the declaration made to them

by the new Greek Government to the effect that they will continue the foreign policy of their predecessors. The Allied Powers for their part remain, as hitherto, prepared to assure to Greece in return for her co-operation in the war against Turkey, the territorial acquisitions already promised in the Aidin Vilayet.'

You should add, in the manner which you think most suitable, that the offer of the acquisition will, however, only hold good if Greece without delay co-operates with the Allies; in the contrary event the Powers will consider themselves free from any engagement."

On the 9th of April, 1915, Sir Edward Grey sent a further telegram:—

"The phrase 'against Turkey' was intentionally so worded. We are prepared to promise Smyrna and a substantial portion of the Hinterland to be hereafter defined."

Whilst these telegrams were being sent to Greece, negotiations were simultaneously being conducted by the Entente with Bulgaria, with a view to inducing her either to join their Alliance, or at least to preserve neutrality. In return for such a promise, the British Government undertook to use their influence with Greece to secure the cession of Drama as well as Kavalla to Bulgaria.

The Constantine Government took full advantage of this undertaking given to Bulgaria to prejudice Greek opinion against the Allies. They worked it for all it was worth to rouse Greek patriotic sentiment

against co-operation with the Powers that were negotiating a surrender of Greek territory behind the backs of the King and his Ministers. Here is one report we received on this aspect of Constantine's sinister activity:—

“The effect of your communication on public opinion is increasing. At various entertainments, where a short time ago mention of name of German Emperor would have been hissed, he is now applauded. From the Provinces I have received to-day telegrams of resolutions of public meetings protesting against cessions of territory. These are encouraged, and perhaps organised, by the Government, but feeling against cessions to Bulgaria is practically unanimous.”

There was a desultory and clumsy correspondence going on simultaneously between the Allies and Greece and the Allies and Bulgaria and the Allies and Serbia, with a view to securing some understanding which would save Serbia from a combined attack of German, Austrian and Bulgarian forces. The Bulgarians refused to consider any proposal which was not clear and definite. The Allies promised nothing which was not subject to the consent of Greece, and the Greek King, who did not want an understanding between Bulgaria and Britain, refused to give that consent.

An able and promising Bulgarian diplomat, whose friendliness towards Britain was never in doubt, told one of our Ambassadors abroad in July, 1915:—

“ . . . The general sympathies (in Bulgaria) were on the Allied side; but it was necessary to show

that they were really in earnest, and that they would make it worth Bulgaria's while. . . .

While anxious to see his country join us, he admitted that he would not as a Bulgarian politician recommend the great venture, unless somewhat more precise assurances were given than those which had been included in the first message of the Powers."

Greece on her part would not assent under any conditions to the surrender of Kavalla and Drama.

*Ferdinand and Constantine back Germany to win* Both Ferdinand and Constantine were playing a very foxy game. Ferdinand had undoubtedly made up his mind to join forces with the Central Powers whenever they were ready to strike the blow, feeling confident that he would thus secure far larger territorial concessions at the expense of both Serbia, Greece and Roumania, than anything the Allies were offering him in their despatches. On the other hand Constantine by this time had become avowedly pro-German in his attitude and conversation. Both the Bulgarian and the Greek monarchs were convinced that Germany was winning on every front and that her legions were irresistible. The military situation at the time seemed to justify their estimate of the ultimate outcome of the war. They were impressed by the overwhelming German victories in Russia and by the failure of the Russian armies to put up any effective fight against the hammerstrokes of the terrible artillery of the Teuton.

The failure of one effort after another to break through the German lines in France, and still more the Dardanelles fiasco, were also having a great effect on the Balkan mentality.

We had in Bulgaria powerful friends who were completely out of sympathy with King Ferdinand's desire to join the Central Powers. They were definitely pro-Ally. They all urged us to convert our hints at concessions of territory to Bulgaria in the event of her becoming an ally into unequivocal and unconditional pledges, but Grey would not go beyond a statement that "cession of Kavalla will not become a question of practical discussion with Greek Government till after Bulgaria becomes an ally. . . . If Bulgaria is willing to become an ally we should then make a proposal to Greek Government and discuss with them compensation and conditions on which cession of Kavalla might be arranged." With such a lame and conjectural offer, our supporters in Bulgaria were completely disarmed in their struggle with the King, and Ferdinand had his way.

Constantine it is true still pretended to adhere to his pledge that he would come to the aid of Serbia if she were attacked by Bulgaria, but when the blow fell on his Serbian allies, he dishonoured his promise on the ground that it would involve him in a war against Germany and that his undertaking applied to a Bulgarian attack alone, and Serbia was left in the lurch.

If instead of these futile negotiations, which fostered and at any rate justified misunderstandings on all sides, Sir Edward Grey had agreed to the proposal which I urged upon him in February, 1915, to arrange a conference of Foreign Ministers of Britain, France, Russia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Roumania and Greece at some convenient port in the Aegean, a clear and definite arrangement, with a liberal promise of financial aid from Britain and France, might have been effected, which would have had the result of



organising a formidable Allied front against the Central Powers on the Danube.

The worst that could have happened would have been that King Ferdinand would have been compelled to expose his designs in time for the Allies to take the necessary measures to thwart them.

On August 23rd, 1915, Veniselos was recalled to office. He had behind him the support of the vast majority of the Greek people, and that made it difficult for the King to carry out openly his pro-German policy. There can be no doubt that Constantine was in touch secretly with both Germany and the Bulgarian Minister, and knew well what was going on, and had assured them privately that despite all the public protestations of his Ministers, he would not allow any military measures to be undertaken by Greece against the Central Powers or their Bulgarian confederates, provided Greece was not attacked. So that although Veniselos had the popular sentiment behind him, he had, to quote an able historian,\*

*Veniselos  
thwarted by  
Constantine*

“to face a strong opposition, composed of jealous party leaders, great provincial families, party bosses, mayors and lawyers, the whole network of party jobbery whose power had been endangered by the reforms of 1910-11.”

That was the combination which finally thwarted his statesmanlike schemes for a greater and a more glorious Greece. He was essentially a liberal and a democrat, and all the reactionary elements hated and feared his ideals, his legislation and his personality. He succeeded in obtaining from the King a promise

\*Mr. John Mavrogordato, “Modern Greece.”

that if Serbia were attacked by Bulgaria, even if Germany were involved, the Greek Army would march to the aid of their Allies. That promise was worthless, for the King never intended to redeem it. It was only given to bridge over a temporary political menace to his throne. When that had passed away, Veniselos was once more flung out of office.

After the dismissal of Veniselos, the actions of the Greek King were almost openly hostile to the Allies and friendly to the Central Powers.

Our Balkan diplomacy had not been a success. We rejected the proffer of Greek assistance on land

*Our bungle  
in the  
Balkans*

and sea when made to us unconditionally at the outset of hostilities. We got nothing out of our promise to give Smyrna to Greece, because at the same time we offered Drama and Kavalla to Bulgaria; and we lost Bulgarian support by our equivocations and hesitations. So we faced our gravest crisis in South-Eastern Europe with a semi-hostile Greece and an actively hostile Bulgaria. After the Greek King's decision not to go to the aid of Serbia, Sir Edward Grey endeavoured to bribe him into changing his mind by promising that "if Greece is prepared to give support as an ally to Serbia, now that she has been attacked by Bulgaria, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to give Cyprus to Greece. Should Greece join the Allies for all purposes, she would naturally have a share with them in advantages secured at end of war, but the offer of Cyprus is made by H.M. Government independently on condition that Greece gives immediate and full support with her army to Serbia."

Grey attached so much importance to this proposal that he sent a second telegram the same day to our

Minister at Athens, urging him to make the communication about Cyprus at once.

This telegram was not even shown by the Greek Prime Minister, M. Zaimis, to the King for two days. A reply was only received after a delay of four days. M. Zaimis said that in view of military opinion that it would only be courting disaster to go to the help of Serbia, it had been decided not to take action, but to maintain a neutrality benevolent towards the Allies.

He added that no offers whatever would move the Government from that attitude.

It was reported to the British Government that the King had said to a friend that "when he was ready he would sweep the Allies into the sea," so convinced was he of the certainty of a German victory. That being his frame of mind, no promises of additional territory to be redeemed on the assumption that the Allies achieved a victory could make the slightest impression on him.

At the request of the German Minister, Fort Roupel, a key position of great importance in the passes entering Eastern Macedonia, was *Greek territory surrendered to German forces* surrendered with its Greek garrison to German and Bulgarian troops without a shot being fired. A few weeks later the Bulgarians advanced and occupied almost the whole of Eastern Macedonia up to the sea. This occupation included the port of Kavalla, the proposed cession of which to Bulgaria was the reason assigned by Constantine's Ministers for their refusal to honour their promise of support to Serbia. The Greek garrison of 8,000 men was instructed by Constantine's Ministers to surrender to the invaders, and they were subsequently interned in Germany until the end of the war. The feeling aroused in Greece by this

act of perfidy was intense. Veniselos left Athens for Crete and proclaimed a revolutionary movement. The Greek islands and Macedonian Greece favoured the Revolution. He set up a Committee of National Defence, raised a Greek Army and declared war against Germany and Bulgaria. With the help of loans and equipment from the Allies he soon raised a force of four divisions, 60,000 men in all, and joined up with the Allied Army which was confronting the Central Powers on the Balkan front.

The defiance which Veniselos hurled at his King, so far from moderating the latter's hostility to the Allies, embittered and accentuated it. At this stage an eloquent and impressive appeal was addressed by M. Coromilas, the Greek Minister at Rome, to King Constantine to restore Greek unity and espouse the cause of the Entente:—

“Reading the ingenuous dispatches of the Government which affirm its intention of preserving the best relations with the Entente Powers, I observe that it does not realise either the appalling gravity of the situation or the ultimate catastrophes towards which official Greece is heading. The obscure and ambiguous policy which Your Governments have pursued for over a year has led us to hostilities with our natural friends, the Powers of the Entente, whom we have so frequently assured of our good friendship, whilst—the most amazing thing—this same policy has driven us to non-resistance against the Bulgarians, our hereditary enemies, when they came and captured our forts, our Macedonian towns, half our war supplies and our soldiers. Now that blood has

*Coromilas’  
appeal to  
Constantine*

been shed, France and England, to whom we owe the restoration of our liberties and who have so often aided us, have become the implacable enemies of Your Majesty and of that Greece which remains your Kingdom.

One part of Greece has repudiated the other: it has separated itself by violence; it has seceded from the Athens Government in order to go to Salonica to defend our land which we have abandoned to our enemies. I am well aware how people tell You, Sire, that nevertheless the bulk of the people are with You; but You were King not of the majority, Sire; You had absolute sovereignty over all the Greeks, whether over those who dwell in the Kingdom, or those who dwelt outside; and they who speak to You thus, intending to console You, belittle Your Majesty and even shake Your throne which they claim to uphold, for majorities crumble away with the advent of adversity. And the throne cannot be a political party.

Never, Sire, has the Nation been in more terrible circumstances. It is unthinkable that pity should not have conquered all hearts and impressed on them the ruin of their native land and that the unity of all its citizens alone can save it. . . .

Whatever the issue of this vast conflict—and it will probably be doubtful as You Yourself feel—Greece should remain the true and sincere friend of the Entente Powers. M. Veniselos and his Salonica colleagues have perceived this truth. Do not refuse, Sire, to realise it too. Since you are the King, not of the majority of the people, but of all the Hellenes, forget the past, forget the resentments which You may feel, call upon the

co-operation of M. Veniselos and his friends; I am firmly of the hope that they will willingly give it to You. Set up a strong Government, capable of assuming responsibilities, capable ultimately of relieving You thereof. Make this gesture, Sire; You who have made glorious the national arms, save the soul of Greece from the passions which rend it; save the nation and our race; Greece, united by You, will succeed in weathering the storm and avoiding the disasters which are in the air, no matter what unexpected blows the War may hold in store for us. If you do not undertake it at once, the future of our Country, of Hellenism, will be lamentable, will be horrible.

I beg Your Majesty to forgive the freedom of my language. The affection I feel for You forces me to speak to You thus, as my heart bleeds to see what You have been in the past and what the future holds. It is my duty to speak to You plainly, without reserve; it is my duty to tell Your Majesty that the policy which has led us inevitably alas! to our present plight is fatal and I profoundly disapprove of it. Only this advice which I venture to give, only your Royal gesture, which will mean national unity, can still save what remains.

COROMILAS."

This fervent appeal made no impression on the King. His attitude and action became more and more hostile to the Entente. He entered into secret negotiations with the German military leaders to arrange a joint attack on the left flank of the Allied forces on the Salonica front. The actual correspondence with the Germans was conducted by the Queen, who

*Constantine  
plots with  
the Germans*

transmitted her despatches to the Greek Minister at Berlin. They were sent to the Greek Minister at Rome, who forwarded them to Berne with instructions that they were to be sent on to M. Theotoky at Berlin. The proposition was that if the Germans sent a strong force from the north the Greeks would advance to meet them from the south, and together they would fall on the Entente army and roll it out of the way so as to enable the Germans to occupy Greece.

The first suggestion of this plan appears in a telegram from the Kaiser to his sister Queen Sophie on the 3rd December, 1916, commiserating with her "on the dangers through which you and Tino have passed. I admire the courage with which you have resisted during these difficult times." He counsels "a revolt by Tino against his executioners. The intervention of Tino with his principal forces against the western flank of Sarraill will lead to a decision in Macedonia." He announces the capture of Bucharest: "Up till now God has helped us." The Kaiser at that time had no doubt that the Germans were winning. Constantine shared his confidence. On the 19th December he and the Queen wired to the Emperor:—

"We reciprocate your very warm wishes for the New Year; may God give us fresh victories and peace.

The situation is very serious; there is only bread enough for a fortnight. . . . They want to make us die of hunger and by continuing the blockade impose their demands. Without provisions the situation is hopeless.

We congratulate you on the splendid victories in Roumania and kiss you.

TINO SOPHIE."

The plan never came off. Britain and France anticipated the blow by an ultimatum which compelled the King either to retire his forces to the Peloponnesus or to fight immediately. He and the Queen sent messages urging an immediate advance by the Germans. The Queen wired to Berlin: "I consider the game is lost if the attack does not take place at once." But Hindenburg was not ready. He had become the Kaiser's principal military adviser on all fronts—East and West—and the deadly lure of the Western Front had caught him and Ludendorff. He then missed his chance of delivering a blow at the Allies on a vulnerable front, with the aid of a new Ally who could have brought at least ten divisions of fully trained and seasoned troops to his aid. Constantine wired the Field Marshal with a full appreciation of the military situation in Greece and ended his message:—

*Allies  
anticipate  
the stroke*

"It is desirable for us to be urgently informed whether a German attack on the Macedonian front is anticipated and when it is likely to start."

Three days later the Queen wired to the Kaiser:—

"I thank you heartily for your telegram, but, lacking adequate provisions for the duration of such an enterprise, as well as the lack of munitions and a number of other things, we are unfortunately compelled to abstain from such an offensive. You can picture my state of feelings. How I suffer! Thank you from my heart for your most tender words, for the . . . (words illegible) of the abominable circumstances. May the vile swine get the



punishment they deserve! I kiss you very affectionately—your sister grieving and alone, in the hope of better times.”

In December, 1916, King Constantine and his Queen sent another message to Berlin that they were “holding out in hourly expectation of a German offensive in Macedonia.” This also was the anticipation of the Allies, as I pointed out in my “War Memoirs.”\*

By January Constantine was reduced to considering whether and how he could carry out Hindenburg’s injunctions to destroy the War material of the Greek Army lest it should fall into the hands of the Entente. The blockade had driven him back to his former condition of sulky neutrality until the anticipated German victory should enable him once more to defy his real enemies. The retinue of politicians and courtiers who surrounded and encouraged him, more from hatred of Veniselos than from affection for the Germans, were reluctant to give in. Their hostility culminated in a murderous attack on British sailors at the Piraeus. Nothing prevented Constantine from throwing in the whole of his forces on the side of the Central Powers except the fear of the Allied Fleets. Hence the unbridled hatred of his followers for the British Navy and those who manned it. Had the Central Powers broken through the Allied lines at Salonika and marched into Greece, they would have been welcomed with open arms by Constantine and his consort, and probably by the whole rabble of financiers, social parasites and vested interests who supported the throne in its efforts to thwart the Western democracies whose principles

\* *War Memoirs*, Vol. III, pp. 1383 *et. seq.*

and purposes their King so utterly detested, but with which Veniselos was in complete sympathy. The situation had become intolerable. We never knew from day to day whether Constantine would not order his army to attack our forces at Salonika from behind, whilst the Germans assailed them in front.

The peremptory action of France and Britain in June, 1917, put an end to this menace. The French Government proposed that action should be taken for the deposition of Constantine. The

French Prime Minister, M. Painlevé,  
*Decision* came over to London to discuss the pro-  
*to depose* ject for armed intervention to overthrow  
*Constantine*

Constantine's dictatorship, which was evidently out of touch with Greek opinion as a whole. One or two Ministers in the Cabinet interposed objections to the course proposed by the French. Unfortunately the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Balfour, was in America at the time. The Foreign Office was in the charge of Lord Robert Cecil. The idea of dethroning a King by force was antipathetic to his political traditions and, though he recognised the strength of the French case, he was hesitant and vacillating in his opinions when it came to drastic action. One moment he was prepared to agree to the plan; then, on reflection, he withdrew his assent and asked for more time to consider. The French Prime Minister could not stay indefinitely in London in order to secure complete unanimity in the War Cabinet. I therefore suggested, after a prolonged conference in Downing Street which came to no positive decision, that M. Painlevé should accompany Lord Milner, General Smuts and myself to my cottage at Walton Heath to come to a final decision one way or another. We sat out under a

tree in the garden for hours on a beautiful summer night to thrash out the whole problem, and we came to the unanimous conclusion that as the French had troops on the spot they should land them at the Piraeus, occupy Athens, dethrone the King and set up either the heir—Prince George—or his second son, Prince Alexander.

Action was immediately taken on this line. The British fleet was at hand ready to give its support to the French landing force, and Constantine was banished. Prince George refused the throne, Prince Alexander accepted it. Veniselos was recalled, much to the delight of the preponderant majority of the Greek people. The Greek Army was equipped

*Greece joins  
the Allies*

to take part in the campaign on the Salonika front. By the autumn campaign of 1918 there were ten excellent Greek divisions in the line held by the Serbians, the French and the British.

These military incidents are more appropriate to the history of the War, but I am bound to relate them here as they have a direct bearing on the attitude of the Powers towards the Greek demands at the Peace Conference. Sir Edward Grey's offer of Smyrna and its hinterland lapsed when Constantine refused to join the Allies in resisting the attack on Serbia. Veniselos unreservedly acknowledged that fact, but by the effective action which he took in organising a powerful reinforcement to the Allies on the Salonika front, when their man-power was at the point of exhaustion, he undoubtedly established a new claim for liberal recognition of the Greek peace aims.

The Greek Army on the Salonika front ultimately numbered 250,000 men. The French General Guillaumat bore high testimony to their value, and thought



Monseigneur J. L. Lefebvre,  
organisateur de la victoire.

Novembre 1918 E. H. Vaniselo,



that in an offensive they were quite equal to any soldiers in the line. They justified this eulogy by the triumphant way in which they attacked and broke through the Bulgarian trenches. Their adhesion gave the Allies the necessary numerical and moral superiority on that front, and made the difference between victory and stalemate in a sector of the great battlefield which exercised a perceptible influence on the fortunes of the war as a whole. The break-up of the Balkan front turned the flank of the Austrians, laying them open to an attack on their most vulnerable frontier, where the Slavonic population were not too friendly to their German masters. It completed the demoralisation which had already begun, notably in the Austrian Army. It contributed materially not merely to the Austrian surrender, but to the conclusion arrived at by Hindenburg and Ludendorff that the game was up. The effective contribution thus made by Greece to victory was a substantial one, and certainly entitled them to as much consideration at the hands of the victors as the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, and the Croats, of whom large numbers up to the end of the War were fighting in the ranks of our enemies.

But though Veniselos did his best to retrieve the situation by organising Greek support for the Allies during the last year of the War, Greece never recaptured the enthusiasm of the French or British people for its cause. The King's machinations left an indelible impression of treachery. The support he won from a large section of his people—so large as at one time to constitute a majority on the mainland—implicated the nation as a whole and poisoned the traditional sympathy felt by the Western democracies for the country which they had helped so

much to liberate from the Turkish yoke. It is true that the Treaty of Sèvres accorded to Greece large concessions of territory. But when trouble arose in the enforcement of that Treaty, France and Italy readily sacrificed Greece, and the British people felt no zeal for a nation that appeared to them to have been fickle and unreliable in the great struggle by which they sought to profit.

Veniseelos realised that Greece, owing to the tergiversations of her King, had forfeited all claim to the territorial concessions promised by Sir Edward Grey in return for Greek support. The Greek leader put the Greek case in a letter he wrote to me on November

*Veniseelos  
pleads the  
Greek cause*

2nd, 1918:—

“November 2, 1918.

My dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to send you herewith the Memorandum which you were good enough to ask for, concerning the best manner of settling the questions relating to the Ottoman Empire.

In the Memorandum the question is regarded from an absolutely objective point of view. Permit me, as the leader of the Greek Government, to lay before you in this letter the more particularly Greek point of view.

It would be neither just nor politic that the Powers should concern themselves with the Arabs, the Syrians and the Armenians, and neglect the future of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenians deserve the sympathy of the whole civilised world, and we could not contemplate any settlement of the Eastern Question which did not ensure their future. But the Greeks are also worthy of the same sympathy.

They are as numerous as the Armenians, and have been the victims of the same kind of maltreatment, while an enormous number of them have been exterminated. Further, tens of thousands of Greek volunteers took part in the war in Macedonia, and formed a very important part of the Army of National Defence which I organised as the head of the Salonica Government.

The settlement of the future of the Greek portion of the Western part of Asia Minor by its annexation to Greece is the sole method by which Greece would be able appreciably to extend her territories, at this moment when Serbia and Roumania are respectively completing their national unity. If Greece is unable to develop in the direction of Asia Minor, she will have to look for an extension of her frontiers in the direction of Thrace, which would carry her as far as the Black Sea. I fear that this solution, however, would raise still greater obstacles than those involved in an extension of Greece towards Western Asia Minor.

The principal obstacle to the extension of Greece into Asia Minor lies in the objections of Italy. By the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy received a promise that she should be able to establish herself on the southern coast of Asia Minor, in the Adalia region. Two years later, at the conference at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, when the question came up, in consequence of the letter from the Austrian Emperor to Prince Sixte de Bourbon, of the possibility of a separate peace with Austria, which did not give satisfaction to the Italian aspirations in the Adriatic, Italy was promised a sphere of influence at Smyrna.



The claims of the Italians to Smyrna were based upon the arrangements between England, France and Russia concerning Asia Minor which were concluded in 1916. *Italy's claim to Smyrna now invalid* These arrangements, however, in view of the Russian revolution, have now ceased to hold good. Even the agreement under which, before Italy entered the War, the Western Powers consented to the cession of Constantinople to Russia is no longer in force. It is then impossible, in view of the radical changes that have already occurred in regard to the future of Asia Minor, to continue to regard as valid the promise that was made with regard to Smyrna. Moreover, the establishment of Italy at Smyrna would result in a contradiction of the very principles in whose name the Allies are conducting the War. Greece would be placed in the same situation with regard to Italy that Serbia was with regard to Austria, before the War began, and her peaceful development would from this fact become impossible.

The opposition of Italy to the extension of Greece into Western Asia Minor, however, ought not to prevent this extension.

It is to the interest of Europe at large, in the fullest sense of the phrase, to consolidate the smaller States to the utmost possible extent and to render them more and more independent. Speaking more particularly, the strengthening of Greece as a Mediterranean Power would aim simply at assuring equilibrium in the Mediterranean and would in no way hamper the legitimate interests of Italy.

I fully understand that the promise of the Entente Powers in regard to the concessions to Greece in Asia Minor is not now binding on

those Powers, as the promise was made under conditions that Greece has not carried out. But the Entente Powers know well that I have left no stone unturned during the War to ensure that Greece should ally her future with theirs. They are also aware that the Greek people have faithfully followed my lead. When the General Elections took place, after my first disagreement with King Constantine in February, 1915, the electors who were able to vote again gave me a great majority, notwithstanding that the choice before them was between the policy of Veniselos, who wanted war, and that of the King, who wanted peace. When, in September, 1915, the ex-King, betraying his country, again entered into conflict with me, Greece did not hesitate to make a revolution, in order by this means to take part in the War.

I think I may be permitted to say there are few peoples who, in similar circumstances, would have acted in such a praiseworthy manner.

Independently of the action of the Greek people, however, the cession to Greece of the western part of Asia Minor is called for in the name of the principles for which the Allies are now fighting, as they have on many occasions declared. Why should these principles not be applied to Greece?

Permit me to hope, my dear Prime Minister, that in the spirit of fairness and equity which presides over the decisions of the British Empire, I shall receive firm support for the defence of the legitimate interests of my country.

I have the honour to remain,

My dear Prime Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

E. K. VENISELOS."

This letter interpreted faithfully not only the Veniselist attitude towards Greek claims, but also that which was adopted by President Wilson, Clemenceau and myself. The *The Big Three favours Greece's claim* Italian attitude throughout was one of jealous antagonism. In the south-western corner of Anatolia, Italy had ambitions which conflicted with those of Greece. In support of these claims Sonnino put forward the Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne. The conditions under which the Allies had promised Smyrna and its vicinity to the Greeks had not been fulfilled owing to Constantine's betrayal. It was equally true that the conditional agreement subsequently entered into by Britain and France to concede that region to Italy had also lapsed, because the consent of Russia, which was an essential part of that arrangement, had not been obtained. The question of standing by a bargain entered into between Allies did not therefore apply in either case. The problem had to be reconsidered on the merits of the respective claims placed before the Peace Congress. The delegates at the Conference had to take into account ethnical and historical considerations, and they had also to pay some heed to the contribution made by the two claimants in that final defeat of the Turkish Empire, which liberated these territories from the dominion of the Turks, and alone made it possible for the question of their disposal to be raised in the peace settlement.

As to the ethnical aspect of the rival claims, the Greeks constituted a definite majority of the population of the extreme south-western vilayets of Asia Minor. The number of Italian residents in those areas was negligible. On the ground of military contribution, the Greeks could urge the important

part they played in the battles which opened up the road to Constantinople.

Veniseelos presented in full detail the whole of the Greek territorial claims in Thrace, Asia Minor and the Islands in a memorandum he submitted to the Peace Conference and subsequently in the personal statement he made to it. On the 2nd January the Foreign Office provided the British delegations with the expert view on the territorial settlement in Thrace and the Straits. In this memorandum it was assumed that the Turk would be excluded from Europe. The territory to be partitioned in Thrace between Greek and Bulgar depended on the settlement effected about the Straits. In the opinion of the Foreign Office experts:—

“The best solution, however, if attainable, would be that the zone of the Straits should be separated entirely from Turkey and formed into an independent State, and that the League should then appoint a Mandatory, who here, as in Palestine, would have the double duty (*a*) of supervising the local administration and keeping the peace between the different elements in the population, and (*b*) of guarding a great international interest—in this case, the passage of the Straits.”

*Advice of  
Foreign Office  
experts*

As to what was left of Eastern Thrace outside the international zone, the experts advised that:—

“The international record of Bulgaria, and the fact that the population of Eastern Thrace is almost entirely Greek, Turkish, Jewish, and Armenian, with no more than a few Bulgar villages

close to the northern frontier, rules out Bulgaria as a claimant.

The only other possible claimant is Greece, and it may perhaps be considered that Eastern Thrace as a whole, up to the Bulair and Chatalja lines (as contrasted with the enclave between the Enos-Midia line and the present Turco-Bulgarian frontier), is a possible geographical and administrative unit, and might be assigned to Greece as it stands. From the Greek point of view it would constitute an island like Crete, accessible through the ports of Enos, Rodosto, Silivri, Midia, Iniada, etc. (the freedom of the Straits being ex-hypothesi secured by international control). In return for obtaining Eastern Thrace, Greece should be induced to renounce her claims to Smyrna, and an interchange might be effected between Turkish inhabitants of Eastern Thrace and Greek inhabitants of Western Anatolia.

. . . The claim to Western Thrace should be resisted strongly, since there are few Greeks in Western Thrace (the bulk of the population being Turkish or Bulgar-speaking Moslems), while (what is still more serious) the assignment of this corridor to Greece would cut off Bulgaria territorially from the Aegean."

The suggestion of an interchange of Turkish and Greek inhabitants so as to promote racial homogeneity in the partitioned territories appeared for the first time in this Foreign Office paper. The expedient was subsequently adopted and put into practical operation with great success in the Treaty of Peace effected between Veniselos and Mustapha Kemal.

*First proposal  
to exchange  
inhabitants*

On the 16th January, 1919, the War Office General Staff also prepared some "Notes on Greek War Aims" for the instruction of the delegates to the Conference. The document is somewhat vague and inconclusive on the question of Thrace. It leans, however, to the Bulgarian claims on the question of access to the Aegean in Western Thrace. As to Greek claims in Anatolia, it is content with stating the case without making any recommendations:—

"Historically, the Greek occupation of Western Asia Minor has been continuous for over 2,600 years, and has survived the numerous

*Views of the  
War Office*

conquests of the peninsula. At the outbreak of the War there were between  $1\frac{1}{2}$  and 2 million Greeks in Asia Minor, of whom over 600,000 were in the Smyrna (or Aidin) vilayet. Smyrna itself and its neighbourhood were indubitably Greek in 1912. The Greek predominance extended along the coast as far north as Aivali and southwards to beyond the mouth of the Menderez Chai, but inland not beyond the line Bergama—Manisa—Baindir, and Aidin is Turkish. Owing to the traditional Greek tendency to settle on the coast, in towns, and along trade routes, thereby penetrating inland into districts where the surrounding population is Turkish, it is difficult to draw a correct ethnographical boundary. North of this region there were Greek majorities in several kazas along the south shore of the Sea of Marmora, and strong Greek minorities at Kemer and Edremid. Further south there were Greek communities at Mugla, Budrum, Milassa and Makri. There were also large Greek settlements in 1912 along the south-eastern coast

of the Black Sea, particularly at Samsun, Kerassun and Trebizond. Since 1914 the numbers and cohesion of the Greeks in Asia Minor have been seriously diminished by the deliberate policy of the Turco-German authorities. Some 300,000 Greeks were expelled from the littoral in June, 1914, and about 450,000 more from March, 1915, onwards. However, the return of Greek inhabitants to these traditional homes of Hellenism is certain, and the Greek birth-rate is considerably higher than the Turkish."

It then deals with the offer made more than once by the Entente of territorial concessions in Asia Minor, and how they fell through owing to the refusal of the Greek Government to accept the terms. As to the Treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne it says:—

"This agreement is understood to be no longer considered by the British Government as binding, but there is no doubt that the Sonnino Party in Italy still covets the Smyrna district. More moderate Italian feeling would apparently be content with the Adalia and other districts in southern Asia Minor. The essence of Italy's policy is the desire not to be treated less favourably than the other Powers in the Mediterranean settlement. The handing over of nearly a million Greeks in western Asia Minor to Italian rule would be a gross violation of the principles of nationality and self-determination, and would perpetuate hatred between Italy and Greece, with the certainty of more irredentist agitations, suppressed or open rebellion, and finally war. Since their national

regeneration at the beginning of last century, Greeks have never rested quiet under foreign domination, and in a struggle against Italy they could count on British, French and Russian sympathy."

On the merits of the Greek claim to territory in South-Western Anatolia, it says:—

"As against Turkey, the allocation to Greece of the whole area claimed by Greek extremists, or even of that offered her in 1915, is ethnologically indefensible. On the other hand, the Turks have proved themselves unfit to govern Europeans. Their policy, carried out since 1914, of deporting the Greek population of the seaboard into the interior, was deliberately intended to destroy the Greek civilisation with which they know they cannot compete. They are totally incapable of commerce, or of the economic development of the rich western coastland of Asia Minor. If this region is to be developed at all, it must be developed by Europeans. It is at present inhabited by Greeks, whose intense political feeling will continue to manifest itself in irredentist agitation, so long as large Greek populations remain under Turkish domination, whereas the satisfaction of the historic claims of Hellenism would divert it into calmer channels."

The Greeks will at least demand that, whatever territorial adjustment of Turkish possessions in Asia Minor may be made, the Greek districts shall as far as possible enjoy some kind of autonomy under international guarantee, and that the civil rights of Greek minorities in Turkish districts shall



be protected. It is assumed that in any case the Turkish state of the future will be subject to a large measure of international supervision and control."

As to the Dodecanese, the War Office Notes simply state that "the population is overwhelmingly Greek." As to Cyprus, although the War Office Staff admit that the majority of the inhabitants of the island have a strong desire for unity with Greece, they advance strategical considerations for not parting with it.

"The potential strategic importance of Cyprus is great, both from a naval and from an air point of view, its shores lying within 44 miles of the Anatolian, and 69 of the Syrian coast, while Larnaka is only 262 miles distant from Port Said. Though the island possesses no adequate harbour at present, the Admiralty state that an excellent base for submarines and destroyers could be made at Famagusta. Facilities also exist for aerodromes and a flying-boat base. With the increasing range of aircraft, Cyprus will be within easy striking distance of the main lines of communication through Asia Minor and Syria, and, by sea, to Alexandria and the Suez Canal. Its actual importance will greatly increase should a naval base be established in the Levant by a Great Power. While the possession of the island by Greece could hardly be considered a menace to the British Empire, the danger of its falling into the hands of a stronger Power cannot be wholly disregarded."

I quote lengthy extracts from these documents in order to refute the suggestion often made that the Greek claims, more particularly in Anatolia, had no foundation in justice and were merely the pillaging schemes of ambitious and greedy politicians seeking to found a Greek Empire by grabbing territory which legitimately belonged to people of another race and tradition. The first suggestion that South-Western Anatolia should be added to Greece came not from Veniselos, but from the British Foreign Office in 1915. The case made for this claim in the War Office document is particularly remarkable inasmuch as British officers have always been supposed to have a strong pro-Turkish bias.

In his statement before the Conference in February, M. Veniselos submitted statistical evidence in support of the Greek claims. He asserted that the Greek population in Northern Epirus included 120,000 to 80,000 Albanians. He fully admitted that numbers spoke nothing but the Albanian language, but he said that he would not accept language as a sole test of nationality:—

*Veniselos  
statement  
to the  
Conference*

“After the experience gained in this War, neither race, nor language, nor skill, could be taken by itself as determining nationality. National conscience alone must decide.”

He mentioned the striking fact that over two-thirds of the Greek fleet was manned by men of Albanian origin.

In Thrace, there was the practical difficulty that whilst the majority in Eastern Thrace, especially on the shores of the Black Sea, was Greek, Western

Thrace contained a Turkish majority. Taking Thrace as a whole, including that part which had already been incorporated in Greece, the population was very mixed, but the Greeks predominated over any other race.

As to the Straits, he advocated an international zone which should include the vilayet of Constantinople (although he stated that Constantinople was "in reality a Greek town"), the sanjaks of Ismid, Gallipoli and Biza, and part of the vilayet of Brusa. Thus the shores on both sides, from the Black Sea to the Aegean, would be under international control.

Anatolia should be partitioned on the principle laid down in Article 12 of President Wilson's Fourteen Points:—

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."

M. Veniselos went on "The Turks were good workers, honest in their relations and a good people as subjects. But as rulers they were insupportable and a disgrace to civilisation, as was proved by the extermination by them of 1,000,000 Armenians and 300,000 Greeks during the last four years in Asia Minor. He could not discern any other method of protecting those who remained except to grant them freedom from Turkish rule.

. . . He did not know whether his views were shared by the Conference, but he would explicitly

*Claim to  
Western  
Asia Minor* state that the claims of Greece to Western Asia Minor were based on the principle that no territory previously belonging to Turkey could remain a part of the future Ottoman State unless it contained an absolute majority of Turks.

Now, applying this test, it would be evident that on the basis of population, the western part of Asia Minor, west of a line running between Kastelorizo and the sea of Marmora could not form part of the Turkish State and must be allotted to Greece. From that territory, however, he would exclude a portion of the Dardenelles sandjak, which would form part of the internationalised area. The western territory of Asia Minor claimed by Greece could be separated from the rest of Asia Minor not only for ethnic reasons, but also because geographically and historically it formed a specially distinct and separate region."

He supported his geographical argument by a striking quotation from an eminent German geographer, Philipson, who dwelt on the contrast between the Central and the South-Western regions of Anatolia:—

"Thus a great natural barrier divides Asia Minor—on one side a secluded plateau of a practically Asiatic nature, and on the other an Aegean country with all the features of Greece proper and reciprocal relations both in history and in nature with the sea and overseas with Greece. Therefore, we meet in the centre Asiatic civilisation and Greek civilisation on the western coast both in the past and in present time."

He produced elaborate statistics to demonstrate the fact that the Greeks preponderated in this region, and that when the whole of the non-Turkish population—mostly Armenian Jews—was taken into the reckoning, the preponderance was still more decisive. The figures he quoted “had been derived originally from official Turkish statistics.”

Then comes the proposal incorporating the bold and interesting suggestion from the British Foreign Office, which has already been cited, as to an interchange of population between Greeks and Turks:—

*Population  
exchange*

“Outside the area of Western Asia Minor, claimed by Greece, some 922,000 Greeks, perfectly organised and maintaining 1,400 schools with 100,000 scholars, would still remain under the Turkish Government of Central Asia Minor. For this evil there was only one possible remedy. Under the Peace Treaty, the Turkish Government should undertake to purchase the real estate and house property belonging to such of the Greeks inhabiting Turkish Territory as might desire to emigrate into Greek Asia Minor. The Greek Government should adopt the same policy in regard to property and real estate belonging to Turks in Greek Asia Minor. There would thus be set up a current of mutual and voluntary migrations, thanks to which it might be hoped that in the course of a few years the people remaining in the Turkish State would be composed exclusively of Moham-medans, whilst the Greek element in the Greek portion would become overwhelming in the Greek area.”

Five years later hundreds of thousands of Greeks emigrated under this arrangement from Asia Minor and settled on Greek territory. It was an amazing feat of organisation, carried through successfully by the dynamic will of Veniselos. He gave us his conception of the scattered Greek confederation which would be created by the realisation of the territorial claims he put forward:—

“A reference to the map would show that new Greece would have the singular appearance of a State formed around a sea instead of round a plain or river basin, as was the case with many States. That certainly was an inconvenience, but for thirty centuries Greeks had lived under those conditions and had been able to survive great catastrophes, to prosper and to increase.”

In concluding his speech, he defended the Greek people against the accusation that they had failed to support the Entente throughout the War:—

“He said that he realised that Greece did not appear before the Peace Conference with the full titles which she would have possessed but for the treason of a king. Still, he had a right to ask that a people should not be held responsible for the acts of their sovereign. The people had not supported the king’s action, but had striven to bring about a reaction by electoral strikes and revolutions and, in spite of German propaganda which had been carried on for many years, the country had succeeded at a critical moment in righting itself. It had been faced with a sort of Bolshevism,

*Constantine  
blamed for  
Greek war  
record*

but it had been able to recover. At the beginning of the War he had offered to side with the Great Powers. He had proposed intervention when the Allies had appeared in the Dardanelles. He had never asked for any reward. Indeed, when he had first suggested an alliance with the Great Powers neither Turkey nor Bulgaria had entered the War, so that it would have been impossible for Greece to obtain compensations. At the time when he himself had gone to Salonika and ordered mobilisation the situation was such that Greece could not possibly hope for any benefit. At that time he had suggested to Mr. Lloyd George that Turkey should be allowed to retain Asia Minor as well as her European possessions as an inducement for her to negotiate a separate peace."

The questions raised by M. Veniselos were referred to an Expert Committee on which the British Empire was represented by the Canadian Premier, Sir Robert Borden, and Sir Eyre Crowe. Mr. Harold Nicholson was also present throughout the proceedings of the Committee. No abler, more influential or more impartial combination could have been chosen to examine the case made by the Greek leader. During the proceedings there was a pleasant interchange of courtesies between Signor Orlando and M. Veniselos:—

"M. VENISELOS said . . . he would first deal with Epirus and the Isles, partly because one of the Great Powers was greatly interested in the settlement of these questions. Con-  
*Veniselos*                   versations had actually taken place  
*and Orlando*           between Italy and Greece with a view  
to arriving at an agreement and to prepare the way

to a settlement without binding the Conference. He need hardly point out that it was to Greece's interest to maintain good relations with Italy and with all the Mediterranean Powers, in the same way as it had always been to her interest to maintain good relations with the other Western Powers. Greece was a small Power, whereas Italy was a Great Power, but it was in the common interest of both to reach an amicable agreement.

M. ORLANDO asked permission to say that Italy was animated by the same spirit and desire to come to a sound and friendly agreement with Greece on territorial questions. He only disagreed with M. Veniselos when he referred to Greece as a small Power. It was a noble country, entitled to maintain an honoured place in the world.

M. VENISELOS expressed his gratification at the words spoken by M. Orlando.

At the end of the proceedings Signor Orlando went out of his way to demonstrate his anxiety for good relations with Greece:—

“M. Orlando said he wished to repeat his expression of sympathy for M. Veniselos and for Greece. He sincerely hoped that the small differences existing between Italy and Greece would be adjusted to the satisfaction of both countries.”

No one who knows Signor Orlando would cast any doubt on the sincerity of his expression of sympathy and goodwill towards Greece. But this was only one of the occasions on which delegates at the Conference discovered that they were by no means



masters in their own Ministry. Baron Sonnino regarded Greece as a troublesome rival in the Eastern Mediterranean and treated her as such.

In March, M. Veniselos sent in to the Conference the following Memorandum:—

“ . . . In reality Italian policy has remained hostile to Greece and has systematically taken advantage of every occasion to injure her interests.

*Veniselos  
denounces  
Italian  
hostility*

The Italian delegates on the committee of Greek affairs have openly pronounced themselves against all the territorial claims of the Hellenic Government, and have even gone so far as to constitute themselves the champions of Bulgarian interests against Greece.

In Roumania, owing to Italian intrigues the Koutzovalaque question has again been raised. A Koutzovalaque delegation has arrived in Paris to support the Albanians who are also in Paris supported by the Italian Government.

In Bulgaria, the Italians were the first to send a civilian Representative who poses as the protector of the Bulgarians. There has already been formed at Sofia an Italo-Bulgarian league which under a commercial form pursues political aims.

In the Dodecanese the strictest blockade continues, the inhabitants are still forbidden to correspond with their relatives abroad and the Metropolitan of Rhodes, as also the Council of Notables, are closely watched. The police force has been doubled.

In Northern Epirus, Albanian bands have been formed with the co-operation of Italian officers and soldiers, among them some Albanians from the north, with whom is being prepared an armed

resistance against an eventual Greek occupation. Armed bands terrorise the Greek populations and endeavour to extort from them their signature to petitions in favour of Albania and Italy. The scene has been cleverly set for the Americans; the United States Consul at Turin, and some American journalists were invited to visit Northern Epirus where they were only shown Albanians. At the same time Italian emissaries go about in Greek Epirus making the Mussulmans sign petitions in favour of Albania and Italy.

At Smyrna the Italians encourage the Turks to prepare to oppose Greek occupation by force of arms. For this purpose bands have been formed with the participation of Italian agents and the Italian Representative is working in close collaboration with the Vali General Nouri.

In spite of these numerous anti-Greek activities the Greeks have not thought fit to depart from the correct attitude they have imposed upon themselves, in the hope that in the end they will find in the Italians a little more justice and conciliation. But the future is in danger of being definitely compromised if matters are allowed to continue for long in their present way."

Later on we received the following confidential report:—

"ON URGENT MEASURES REQUIRED  
AT SMYRNA.

. . . The situation in the interior is very serious, because the Turks threaten to proceed to massacres at the first opportunity. Italian agents are taking part in this movement; these were formerly Austrian subjects who quite recently acquired Italian

nationality. The Italians are doing their best to incite the Turks to rise in opposition to the annexation of these provinces to Greece, and, with this aim, are subsidising the Turkish press. The Italian representative is collaborating with the Vali. . . ."

This hostility developed gradually into active moral and material encouragement by Italy to Mustapha Kemal's resistance of Greek aspirations. Italian statesmen were resolved that there should be no rival to the Italian naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean. A larger Greece, with ports on the Coast of Asia Minor and with a maritime population, would always be a constant menace, when allied to more formidable naval powers, to the control of the Mediterranean, which has been Italy's historical aim. The struggle over Smyrna, Thrace and the islands was the first manifestation of the policy which is now threatening the peace of the world: the policy of making the Mediterranean an Italian lake.

The Report of the Committee of Experts revealed a measure of disagreement which made even a majority Report impossible. The British, French and American representatives reported in favour of territorial concessions in Epirus, but they were not in agreement as to the frontier. The Italians desired to maintain the 1913 frontier. On Thrace there was an approach to unanimity on the Greek claims. The Italians agreed in principle, but formulated certain reservations. In formulating their recommendation as to Thrace "the Committee proceeded on the assumption that the City of Constantinople, the Sea of Marmora and the Straits will be constituted by the Superior Conference into a separate zone and that it will be

*Committee  
of Experts  
disagree*

for the Conference itself to establish the northern frontier of that zone."

On Asia Minor, France and Britain alone endorsed the general aims of the Greek Government. The line of demarcation did not follow that claimed by Veniselos. Areas where it was acknowledged that the Turks were in a majority were excluded from the Greek region. Italy was not prepared to make any concession to Greece in this quarter. Her delegates stood by the Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne, which had been rendered nugatory by the absence of Russia's signature, or even of any informal approval from Petrograd. The United States Commissioners rejected the Greek claims in Asia Minor on other grounds. The islands (with the exception of the Dodecanese, which were considered to be outside the reference of the Commission) were unanimously conceded to Greece.

President Wilson, after an independent examination of the case, which he conducted with the help of his advisers, overruled the recommendations of his representatives on the Commission, and fell in with the proposals of the British and French experts as to the best settlement of the Greek demands. He was through the whole of our discussions a stout advocate of the Greek claim to Smyrna. These proposals were finally incorporated in the draft Treaty.

The question of Smyrna had been settled before President Wilson departed for America. But the boundaries and the future position of Syria and Palestine had not yet been determined, and no progress could be made with the vital questions of Constantinople, the Straits, Thrace and Armenia until the Senate of the United States had given its final decision on the subject of the Mandate for these regions. I

*The race for  
Smyrna*

deal with the reasons for this delay and its disastrous effect on the whole Turkish settlement in the following chapter. Meanwhile, Greek troops had been put in occupation of Smyrna and the vicinity. There was a race between the Italians and the Greeks as to which of them should be the first to land a garrison in Smyrna. Prompt action taken by Wilson, Clemenceau and myself enabled Veniselos to get a Greek force into the town whilst the Italians were hesitating. Some difficulties arose from time to time as to the limits of Greek occupation, but these were adjusted without any serious trouble.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE TURKISH TREATY (*Continued*)

#### ASIA MINOR, ARMENIA AND EUROPEAN TURKEY

THE case of Turkey presented complications which postponed even a provisional settlement until 1920.

*Why Turkish settlement was postponed* The withdrawal of Russia from the War left open the settlement of Constantinople, the Straits and the province of Armenia.

With regard to the former, the War had demonstrated the danger of entrusting the impregnable sea gates of vast regions like Southern Russia and Roumania to the complete control of so unreliable a country as Turkey had proved to be. The richest provinces of Russia, productive of material essential to the life and industries of other countries, could be cut off by the caprice or corruption of a Turkish Government. Russia herself, fighting for her life in a terrible struggle with powerful adversaries, could be and was for several months of the year completely subjected to a process of strangulation by the thumb of the Turk pressed on this narrow gullet, through which alone she could be fed with the essentials for a vigorous resistance to her foes. Russia and Roumania were not defeated by the German and Austrian armies, but by the Dardanelles. The Hellespont was responsible for the Allied failure to come to the aid of Russia and Roumania at the crucial moment in the campaign. It was

also responsible for the most humiliating defeat inflicted on the British Army and Navy in the whole course of the War. These narrow Straits imperilled the chances of Allied victory. They certainly postponed that victory for probably two years. By this means millions of casualties and thousands of millions of expenditure were added to the terrible losses sustained by the belligerents on both sides.

It was impossible for the Allies to contemplate any peace settlement which would leave so vital an international waterway to be dominated by the guns of a country that had taken so disastrous an advantage of its command of an indispensable way of communication between great nations. A peace which would not secure the world against this menace would not be a peace to which any responsible or even sane statesman could append his signature. The Allies, therefore, soon after the War commenced, came to the conclusion that the freedom of the Narrows from the Bosphorus to the Dardanelles must be secured, not by paper guarantees above a Turkish signature, but by entrusting the keys of this channel to hands that could be relied upon to maintain free access along its waters to all nations that kept the rules of the Covenant of Peace.

As free passage from the Mediterranean to the ports of the Black Sea primarily concerned Russia, England and France, the two latter Powers had agreed to a suggestion that emanated from the Czar's Government that the command of the Straits should be given to Russia. By the secret Constantinople Agreement which was negotiated between Russia, Great Britain and France, and to which Italy, when she entered into the

*Constantinople  
Agreement  
cedes Straits  
to Russia*

Alliance, subsequently adhered, Russia was to be given:—

“the town of Constantinople, the western coast of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora, and the Dardanelles; Southern Thrace as far as the Enos-Midia line, the Coast of Asia Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria, and a point on the Gulf of Ismid, to be defined later; the islands in the Sea of Marmora, and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of England and France in the above territories to remain inviolate.”

As will be seen by reference to the map, this agreement contemplated that complete control of the Straits should be vested in Russia, and that such territorial concessions should be made to her as would enable her effectively to exercise that control.

The collapse of Russia and her consequent withdrawal from the alliance, and the repudiation by the Bolsheviks of the Constantinople Agreement, entirely altered the situation. But it did not in the least modify the essential fact that the command of the Straits could no longer be left in the hands of a weak and venal Power like Turkey, which had no special interest in securing freedom of access to any ports beyond her own. The new situation was reviewed by the War Cabinet, and further discussions took place with France, Italy and America. The decision unanimously reached by the Allies was publicly announced by me in the speech I delivered on January the 5th, 1918, in which I defined the War Aims of the Alliance. Having said that “new circumstances like the Russian collapse and the separate



Russian negotiations" had brought about changed conditions, I proceeded:—

"Nor are we fighting to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race . . . Whilst we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race, with its capital at Constantinople—the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being internationalised and neutralised—Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred."

For the control of the Straits by Russia, therefore, it was necessary to find a substitute. The form which that substitute might take we had not had an opportunity during the War of fully discussing amongst ourselves. America was obviously directly interested, and until the arrival of President Wilson in Europe, there was no opportunity for entering into any detailed consideration with him of the future control of the Straits.

When we met him in Paris, we had several conversations with him as to the future disposition of the territories of the Turkish Empire. We also had conversations with Colonel House, before and after the President's arrival,

*American  
Mandate  
considered*

on the subject. And when the principle of Mandates was accepted by the Allies, the application of that plan to the German Colonies and the Turkish Empire was the subject of frequent interchange of views. The President refused to consider a suggestion made to him that America should undertake a mandate for any of the African Colonies of the German Empire. The Democrats in particular had always been opposed to the Philippine venture. As President Wilson said in one of his speeches at the Peace Conference, "the Philippines are still burning our hands." America was therefore not prepared to extend the experiment to the government of negro populations in Africa. They had already as many negroes under their flag at home as they could well manage. But when the question of a mandate over Armenia and the Straits was concerned, the President took a much more sympathetic view of that project. It was obvious that we could not agree to any settlement which would leave the remnant of the persecuted population of Armenia to the cruel mercies of the race which had massacred, outraged and pillaged it for a generation and continued it through and right up to the end of the War. But Armenia, with its depopulated and dispirited remnants, could not stand alone against the Turks on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks on the other. It was essential therefore that we should find a mandatory Power which would undertake as a humane duty the protection of this harried Christian community in the mountains of Armenia.

It was obvious that neither France, Britain nor Italy could undertake that task. They were already *Heavy task of mandates in Near East* overburdened with the weight of the mandates they had accepted in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Anatolia, Syria, Africa and the Southern Seas. So heavy were these burdens.

that ultimately Italy shrank from undertaking her share in Anatolia. Britain has disembarrassed herself of her task in Mesopotamia; France renounced the mandate for Cilicia in 1920 and she has recently followed the British example in Mesopotamia as far as Syria is concerned. Public opinion in France and in Britain is now maturing towards a restoration to Germany of mandates over extensive tropical territories in Africa. The German Führer however seems to be in no hurry to urge his demands in that direction. He has unfulfilled ambitions in other directions which interest him more than the wellbeing of tens of millions of dusky non-Aryans in the tropical jungles of Africa. The task in Palestine is a heavy one and becoming increasingly so, but there a supreme sense of duty, without any counterbalancing material interests, is constraining Britain to adhere to the trust she has undertaken on behalf of the civilised nations of the world.

Russia would have been the most fitting choice for a mandatory in Armenia and the Straits. Up to the Revolution her religious sympathies were engaged in a crusade for the protection of the Christian communities in Turkey. It was her military intervention that had emancipated the Christians of the Balkans and a portion of the Christians in the Armenian valleys. Had it not been for our sinister intervention, the great majority of the Armenians would have been placed, by the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878, under the protection of the Russian flag.

The Treaty of San Stefano provided that Russian troops should remain in occupation of the Armenian provinces until satisfactory reforms were carried out. By the Treaty of Berlin (1878) —which was entirely due to our minatory pressure and which was acclaimed by us as a

*Our sacrifice  
of Armenia*

great British triumph which brought "Peace with honour"—that article was superseded. Armenia was sacrificed on the triumphal altar we had erected. The Russians were forced to withdraw; the wretched Armenians were once more placed under the heel of their old masters, subject to a pledge to "introduce ameliorations and reforms into the provinces inhabited by Armenians." We all know how these pledges were broken for forty years, in spite of repeated protests from the country that was primarily responsible for restoring Armenia to Turkish rule. The action of the British Government led inevitably to the terrible massacres of 1895-7, 1909 and worst of all to the holocausts of 1915. By these atrocities, almost unparalleled in the black record of Turkish misrule, the Armenian population was reduced in numbers by well over a million.

Having regard to the part we had taken in making these outrages possible, we were morally bound to take the first opportunity that came our way to redress the wrong we had perpetrated, and in so far as it was in our power, to make it impossible to repeat the horrors for which history will always hold us culpable.

When therefore in the Great War the Turks forced us into this quarrel, and deliberately challenged the British Empire to a life and death struggle, *Armenia's new hope lost in Russian Revolution* we realised that at last an opportunity had been given us to rectify the cruel wrong for which we were responsible. From the moment war was declared, there was not a British statesman of any party who did not have it in mind that if we succeeded in defeating this inhuman Empire, one essential condition of the peace we should impose was the redemption of the Armenian

valleys for ever from the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the infamies of the Turk.

When the Sykes-Picot conversations were transferred to Petrograd, the fate of Armenia was one of the subjects of negotiation. It was there decided that the Northern half of Armenia should be placed under Russian control, and the southern half under the French.

But the Russian Revolution, and the advent into power of a Government with different enthusiasms and with a totally different view of its aims and responsibilities, had put Russia out of the question as a mandatory even had she been prepared to accept the trust. The Revolutionaries of all sections were united in one resolve, that Russia should not be asked to fight for any territory except that of Holy Russia itself. The parrot cry of the streets and of the camps alike was "no annexations or indemnities." The secret treaties, by which Constantinople and the Straits and half the province of Armenia were to be placed under the dominion of the Czars, were promptly repudiated. The minds of the peasants, workers, and bourgeoisie alike were concentrated not on reforms in Armenia, or the redress of Armenian wrongs, but on the overthrow of oppression and misgovernment in Russia itself and the reconstruction of a system which had been responsible for reducing the majority of the people of so rich a country to poverty, misery and slavery.

The Straits might have been handed over to Greece with much historical and ethnical justification.

*Alternatives  
for  
Constantinople*

Constantinople was once the capital of a renowned and resplendent Greek Empire; and the shores of the Straits with the adjacent islands were populated by

millions of Greeks. That might have been a solution, but no one realised better than Veniselos that such a proposal would have encountered the open hostility of Italy, and the more formidable clandestine opposition of France. The other alternative, the internationalisation of the Straits, was one of the plans suggested and canvassed amongst Allied statesmen and bureaucrats. It implied the setting up of an international Commission of Control, on which Britain, France, America and Italy would certainly have been represented. But everyone realised the dangers of this kind of condominium. Wherever it had been tried it had provoked disagreements ripening into quarrels which imperilled goodwill even amongst the friendliest powers. We all shrank from applying so dangerous an experiment to a territory charged with elements—racial, religious, commercial and financial—which were highly inflammable.

It was therefore obvious to our minds that the best solution would be the choice of a mandatory

<i>Advantages of an American Mandate</i>	Power not involved in the jealousies and rivalries of European states; one whose remoteness from these age-long contentions would have been a guarantee of impartiality, and whose power and position in the world would have given authority to its decisions. The same principle applied to the Armenian problem. Here again international control was impracticable. Neither Britain nor Italy was prepared to step into the abandoned shoes of Russia, and although France was ready and even eager at that time to secure dominion over the southern part of Armenia, she was by no means prepared to extend her control to the northern part of the province. French, British and Italians alike were driven to the conclusion that
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America alone was capable of discharging adequately the responsibilities of a mandatory. When the delegates of the Great Powers assembled at the Conference examined the difficulties, it became clear that America was the only mandatory who would have been acceptable to all alike.

Had the President displayed any reluctance to entertain the idea, we should have been forced to contemplate the next best arrangement. In my judgment that would have been the placing of the Greeks in control of the Straits. As far as the maritime Powers were concerned, it would have been an ideal arrangement for us and for France. Greece was so much at the mercy of any naval Power that she would not have dared to slam the gates of the Dardanelles against their ships. Had the President peremptorily refused to consider the idea, we could at that date have imposed the Greek alternative upon Turkey, and secured the assent of France and Italy, especially as America would have been friendly to that arrangement.

As to the views of the Armenians themselves on the subject, they realised that it was essential that there should be a power strong enough to protect them until a state had been built up that would be able to hold its own against an angry neighbour bereft of its prey. Hundreds of thousands of the Armenian race had been driven by persecution for shelter in other lands. The sense of restored security given by a powerful mandatory would have brought most of them back to their homes. All that would have been expected of a mandatory was to occupy these populated valleys for perhaps a generation at the outside.

*The  
Armenian  
problem*

The idea of the annexation of Armenia by a foreign country vanished with the disappearance of Russia from the scene. Since the Sykes-Picot negotiations of 1916, the idea of self-determination had grown considerably in strength, and it now dominated the whole peace policy of the Alliance. The Armenians, who had been before and during the War quite happy at the opening prospect of becoming a province in a Christian Empire, had set their minds now on restoring Armenia to its pristine glory as an independent country. Their new attitude may be gathered from the communication which they had recently addressed to the French and the British Governments through their delegation in Paris. They claimed the right:—

“to set up an independent Armenian State under the protection of the Allied great powers, one of whom is to be asked to act as a mand-  
*Claim to*            datory, for the organisation and  
*Independence*    administration of the new State for a term of years. An organic statute, drawn up by the protectory powers, would lay down the main lines of the administration of the new State during the period of transition, sanctioning the convocation of a constituent assembly at a date approximately defined, which would determine the form of Government to be adopted permanently, subject to the approval of the protecting powers. The provisional administration to last long enough, but only so long, as would be necessary to enable the survivors of the deported Armenians, and Armenians from other parts, to return to their ‘National Home.’”



The prospect of a Mandate for Armenia and Constantinople appealed to President Wilson's idealism. There was no need for persuasion. The trust would have been an entirely unselfish one as far as America was concerned. No one could have imputed to her any sordid design to grab territory belonging to other countries merely for her own profits and advantages. It would have been a permanent contribution made by the American people to the cause of humanity and of permanent peace. It would have been a legitimate source of pride to the great people of the West that the American flag should be saluted by the ships of every nation, on soil where it represented nothing but the maintenance of exalted ideals and the discharge of a noble duty. All that prospect appealed to what was best in the President's complex character. American power would not have been used to govern a foreign people against their will. It would only have been exerted to protect and to defend them. The people on the borders of the Straits were the most mixed population in the world—outside America. And American experience in promoting co-operation amongst and welding together an infinite variety of races would have enabled the Americans to render a service to mankind which they were better equipped to contribute than any other State.

After consultation with President Wilson and M. Clemenceau, and with their full consent, I proposed at a meeting of the Council of Four on May the 14th, 1919, that:—

“(1) A mandate over the province of Armenia as constituted within frontiers to be agreed upon

*Recision  
of Council  
of Four* between the U.S.A., British, French,  
and Italian delegations, with recom-  
mendations, if unanimous, shall be  
accepted without further reference to  
the Council.

(2) A mandate over the city of Constantinople, the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the sea of Marmora and a small contiguous territory, the frontiers of which would be determined by agreement between the U.S.A., the British, French and Italian delegations whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without reference to the Council."

The Italian Prime Minister was not present at the meeting when this decision was arrived at. He had gone to Rome over the Fiume question. But on his return the project received his full and cordial concurrence.

President Wilson accepted the proposal "on behalf of the United States of America and subject to the consent of the Senate thereof." The President made it quite clear to M. Clemenceau and myself that he was not in a position to state definitely that the United States would assent to this proposal. It was a novel idea. There was considerable public sentiment in America against accepting any obligations which might involve the States in foreign entanglements, particularly in Europe, and Wilson emphasised the fact that he had no command over the majority in Congress, and that men like Lodge would probably oppose any plan that emanated from him. Nevertheless he was hopeful, in view of the fact that the trials and troubles of Armenia had always made a special appeal to public sentiment in the United States.

The President had already sounded his leading supporters and found them favourable to the idea.

*Wilson's  
refusal to  
consult  
opposition*

Unfortunately he took no measures to approach the leading Republican statesmen, not even those who genuinely sympathised with his policy on the League of Nations. Had they been frankly consulted before he committed himself at the Peace Council, there is every reason to believe that they would have pledged themselves to support the proposed Mandate. Here again his narrow and jealous party bias thwarted his most cherished plans and wrecked schemes which would have contributed materially to the permanent beneficence of the Peace settlement that he laboured so hard to achieve.

Even if he had failed after consultation to secure the adhesion of the Republican leaders, he would have known where he stood and been in a better position to decide his course of action. With an adverse Republican majority in the Senate, he would have known that there was no prospect of his being able to carry through the plan, and he could have advised his colleagues at the Conference to seek without loss of valuable time other means of securing the freedom of the Straits and of protecting the Armenians. When he finally left Paris, his Allied colleagues in the Conference were under the impression that a personal appeal from him to the American people might override any possible opposition, and their subsequent discussions on the Turkish Treaty were based on this assurance. The Turkish settlement had necessarily to be postponed until the German Treaty had been considered by the Senate. That put off the final decision on the terms of the Treaty with Turkey for another year. By that time the situation

had become more difficult, as I shall point out later on in my narration of events.

President Wilson, after his arrival in America, lost no time in testing opinion on the proposed Mandates for Constantinople and Armenia. The idea was so novel and so alien to all American traditions that the proposal was received at first with a chill shiver. He was unable to concentrate on a propagandist campaign to educate the American public on the subject of the duty it owed to humanity to take its fair and full share in the tasks of civilisation in respect of the backward races that the War had left in the hands of the Allies. The fight over the Covenant of the League was absorbing all his exhausted energies. It was a great struggle, and the President fought it with a valour and a consecrated fervour worthy of the great cause he championed. He had three redoubtable difficulties to overcome. One was the fact that the Senate had a Republican majority, alienated and embittered by his unfair electoral blunder in 1918. The second was his own tactical rigidity. The third was physical debility. The first obstacle he might have circumnavigated. Were it not for the second, he might have triumphed over the first, and the second might not have been fatal to success, had it not been for the unforeseen irruption of the third. That proved fatal to the chance of victory over his powerful and pertinacious opponents. He was stricken in September whilst conducting in the West what seemed to be a triumphant campaign for the Covenant. In October he had a stroke of paralysis which put him finally out of action as the fighting leader of a great crusade.

There was at that time no other leader comparable in influence and ability amongst the Democrats of

America. Wilson could not delegate his duties to the Vice-President without an acknowledgment of permanent or at least prolonged disablement. Even if he had, the Vice-President was not strong enough to carry the struggle through to a victorious end. Lansing Wilson had always treated more as a negligible clerk than as a responsible Foreign Secretary. Colonel House, to whom Allied statesmen had always resorted in the President's absence for an authentic interpretation of his Chief's views, had been summarily dismissed without any explanation and had been forbidden access to the stricken leader.

The only faculty that remained unimpaired to the end—which was delayed for four years—was his abnormal stubbornness. Wilson still remained

*He clings to  
office after  
breakdown*

President for another two years and would not abdicate or even delegate his functions to any of his subordinates. He was

not deprived of his gifts of speech and comprehension, but his nervous system and the vigour and balance of his mind were shattered. For some time the illusion was preserved of a temporary nervous breakdown from which a short rest would ensure complete restoration. This placed the Allies in an impossible position. I shall not deal here with the effect of sick-room decrees on the fortunes of the League. I am concerned now only with their effect on the negotiations of the Turkish Treaty. We knew only too well that without Wilson's powerful advocacy there was no hope of persuading the United States to undertake the onerous responsibilities of a Mandate for the Straits and for Armenia. But we could not rush to assume the President's practical demise in the face of official medical assurances of his probable restoration to health after a period of complete rest. After waiting

patiently for some weeks for a sign or symptom of his reappearance, tentative efforts were made by Britain and France to approach him to secure a decision which would enable us to proceed with the drafting of the Treaty on one assumption or another. We pressed Lord Grey to go to America to seek a personal interview with the President. But all in vain. Grey he refused to see on purely personal grounds which were quite irrelevant to his mission.

The only messages that came from the convalescing chamber were negative to any suggestion of accommodating changes in the terms of the Treaty, as settled by him in Paris. We were in despair as to what action we could take without risking a breach with America. American politicians were ready enough to censure and calumniate their President, but they would not have tolerated any ignoring of Presidential authority by foreign Powers, and they might have combined in resenting what could have been construed as an insult to their Chief Magistrate, had it emanated from European Governments.

At last reliable information reached us from America that the President was never likely to regain his mental or physical powers to such an extent as to enable him to exert any influence on American opinion on doubtful issues like the Mandates. We therefore decided in our consultations to consider alternatives if the American Senate threw over the President and placed him in a position where he could not accept a Mandate for any part of Turkey.

The first suggestion that we should not wait any longer for an American decision on the Mandate

*I suggest  
making  
new plans*

question was made by me at the Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, on February 12th, 1920. By this time, as I have already pointed out, M. Clemenceau had resigned and M. Millerand had succeeded him as President of the Council. M. Millerand and M. Berthelot represented France; Signor Nitti, the Italian Premier, represented Italy. The substitution of Nitti and Tittoni for Orlando and Sonnino meant a fundamental transformation in Italian foreign policy. America was represented by an observer who took no part in the proceedings.

In opening the Conference I said:—

“As regards the Turkish Treaty, I felt that the Conference had waited perilously long before taking this up. It was not the fault of the Conference. The difficulty was due to the fact that President Wilson had led the Conference to expect that when he returned to the United States of America he would be in a position very shortly to give a decision as to whether the United States of America would accept a mandate. He had hoped to do so at the latest by August or September. The difficulties, however, had proved to be greater than he had anticipated. The result was that, instead of giving a reply in September, he was not able to give a reply to-day, nor was he likely to do so three months hence. Hence, it was right for the other Powers concerned to bring the matter to a conclusion. There were also our own difficulties to be considered. I believed that the British as well as the French Press, and even the Italian Press, had said that the only thing to be done was for the Heads of Governments to talk quite frankly

to one another. This was about the only good advice that the Press had ever given to the Peace Conference. The first difficulty was the physical difficulty of the Heads of Governments meeting and continuing together in the same place for their deliberations. This applied not only to the Turkish Treaty, but to the other questions also. The meetings must either take place at Paris, Rome or London; that is to say, in either case two-thirds of the Council had to be in some country that was not their own. I understood that M. Millerand found it difficult to remain in London on this visit. This would give some idea of what my own difficulties had been in staying for 7 months in Paris last year. It was not only I myself that had stayed, however. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had remained for 9 months and other Ministers had remained for weeks in the aggregate."

I invited Lord Curzon, who had succeeded Mr. Balfour as Foreign Secretary, to make a statement on the position. He opened by stating that:

*Lord Curzon  
states the  
position*

"The delay in negotiating the Treaty was exclusively due to the Powers having to await the decision of the United States. They would have been glad to have welcomed any disposition on the part of the United States to bear her share of the burden, but we had reluctantly come to the conclusion that it was useless now to expect this. America had clearly shown her determination not to accept any mandate. No European Power would, he thought, be wise to accept a Mandate for an independent Turkey."



The subtle but unmistakable change in the atmosphere to which I have already referred in describing the Conferences on Syria and Palestine, was apparent also, as soon as the Conference came to business on the subject of the Turkish settlement, notably in that part of the room occupied by the French and Italian delegates. The feeling was entirely different from that with which all the Allied representatives assembled at Paris in June, 1919, had hailed Mr. Balfour's brilliant arraignment of Turkish rule. The Ministers present on this occasion were different in mentality and political attitude.

The first question on which the change of front towards Turkey on the part of France and Italy became evident, was over Constantinople. The Allies, in the days of Clemenceau, Wilson and Orlando, were unanimously of opinion that the Turk should be confined to Asia. At the London Conference it became obvious that Millerand and Nitti had already agreed to reverse the decision without awaiting the American answer as to the Mandate. On this issue Britain found herself in a minority of one in the Conference, France and Italy being emphatically of the opinion that Constantinople should still remain the Turkish capital, and that the Sultan should have his headquarters in that city. I have already quoted Lord Curzon's trenchant sentences when he urged the Gladstonian policy of "bag and baggage" out of Europe for the Turk. We could not hold out for that in the face of the invincible opposition of our Allies. I therefore felt bound to accept the decision of the majority. In announcing the decision of the British Government, I expressed my doubts as to the wisdom of the

conclusions which the majority of the Conference had reached:—

“MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the conclusion at which His Majesty’s Government had arrived in regard to the retention of the Sultan at Constantinople was one which had been reached after the most careful consideration, and with reluctance, hesitation and apprehension, as to the wisdom of the course which finally commended itself to the Conference. He himself thought that the objections to turning the Sultan out of Constantinople were theoretical. The Turk had been in Europe for hundreds of years, and was always a curse, an oppressor and a source of trouble. He had never become a European, he had never assimilated European civilisation, and he had been a perpetual cause of war. He would be a sanguine man who would expect the nature of the Turk to change. Again, Constantinople differed from any other capital; e.g., Paris was conspicuously French, London was British; Rome was Italian; but Constantinople was not Turk, and the majority of the population was not Turkish. Further, if the seat of Government were removed from there, the Turkish population at Constantinople would be to a very considerable extent reduced. The population immediately round the town was Greek. Therefore, by retaining the Sultan at Constantinople we were departing from principles by which the Allies had settled most of their problems, and we were retaining an alien monarch ruling over an alien population. At Constantinople the Sultan would be a perpetual source of disputes, jealousies and intrigues between the Western Powers. It was said that his presence

there would give us a hold over Asia Minor. He himself did not believe this. The Turks would know that any edicts issued by him were dictated by foreign domination and would consequently ignore them. He feared that to leave the Turk at Constantinople would not mean a settlement of the problem but only the beginning of fresh trouble."

On the question of the control of the Straits there was still complete unanimity. In the probable event of America not accepting the mandate for Constantinople and the Straits, it was decided to set up an international state for that purpose under the control of a body chosen by France, Italy, Britain and the United States, if the latter decided to exercise her right. The subject was raised as to the number of troops which would be required to secure that control, and the contribution to be made to this international force by each of the Allies. This matter was referred to a military Committee to be presided over by Marshal Foch.

*International  
control of  
Straits  
agreed*

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE said: It was only with great reluctance that the British Government had decided to support the view which was urged by their Allies; but that if they gave way on the matter they must insist that the sway of the Sultan in Constantinople and Europe must be as strictly limited as possible. He suggested that the Council might now pass to the consideration of the nature of control over the Straits.

M. CAMBON thought that this depended on the Council's decision as to the control to be exercised

*Cambon's analysis of the problem* over the Sultan at Constantinople. If the latter control was very strict, then the control of the Straits would not be a difficult matter. The fortifications had been destroyed, and care must be taken to see that they were not re-erected. The Straits must be neutralised, and as regards the forces to guarantee the freedom of passage he thought the simplest plan would be to have a mixed Naval Division at Constantinople, with various Allied Fleets represented, just to exercise a general supervision. There should then be a Special Commission to supervise the arrangements for according always a free passage of the Straits. Any extension of the machinery was, in his opinion, unnecessary. The important thing was to defer to the sensibilities of the Turks, who were a most sensitive people and whose prejudices it was desirable to respect. Control should be exercised as unostentatiously as possible. The Turk, he thought, could be easily guided and controlled so long as this was done in a delicate manner."

These last few sentences led up to a startling proposal which showed how completely France, after the disappearance of Clemenceau, had shifted the emphasis of its policy. France had larger financial interests in Turkey than any other country. French bondholders, according to M. Berthelot, held 80 per cent. of the Ottoman debt of £144,000,000 and there was a good deal of French money invested in various enterprises in Turkey. The French investor had lost all the immense sums he had lent to Russia under the Czarist regime. He wanted a fight to be put up for

*French investments in Turkey*

his loans to the Turks. M. Millerand represented that desire and sentiment. As long as Clemenceau was in charge of affairs, this aspect of the Turkish question was kept in the background. But the Millerand Ministry was more in touch with the powerful financial interests that sway Governments of the Right Wing in all countries. For the first time these investments played a conspicuous part in our discussions. They ultimately had a pernicious influence on the French attitude towards the Turkish Nationalist revolt against the Treaty.

So determined was M. Millerand not to yield one millimetre of ground on the question, that after he had returned to Paris he sent peremptory instructions to his representatives at the Conference in London not to discuss it. Ultimately the deadlock created was so menacing to the continuance of the Conference that the French delegates returned to Paris to confer with their Chief, with a view to obtaining some authority to put forward definite counter proposals. The character of these proposals was the best proof of the disproportionate importance attached by the new régime in France to the question of French loans and concessions. It was no less than the appointment of an Interallied Commission, which should have complete control over the finances of Turkey.

The discussion on this extraordinary plan reveals the change which had taken place in the French attitude towards the Turkish problem. M. Millerand

<i>Proposal</i>	was by no means as well disposed as
<i>to control</i>	M. Clemenceau to Greek and Armenian
<i>Turkish</i>	claims. The French Government had no
<i>finances</i>	real interest any longer in the liberation of

the subject races. M. Cambon, with the adroitness

and subtlety of one of the most accomplished diplomats in the world, introduced his new scheme of financial control as if it were a substitute for the employment of force, and therefore a concession to Turkish susceptibilities.

“The best formula, he thought, would be to say that the Commission was one to control the Turkish finances, although really its powers would be of a much more extended character. The Commission would frame a Budget, would see that the money raised was properly expended, and would supervise the administration of the Customs. The Power controlling the purse would really mean control of the whole Government. A few years ago the Powers had established a financial control over Macedonia and had raised sufficient money to pay for the administration, the balance being remitted to the Turkish Government. Under this administration Macedonia had been absolutely quiet, and the system had worked very well until the revolution. This, he thought, furnished an object-lesson. He agreed with Signor Nitti that the Sultan was to remain at Constantinople both as a spiritual and as a temporal sovereign. All Christian history showed that where these two sovereignties were combined in one person a perpetual struggle went on, as there had been in Europe until the Pope had relinquished his temporal aspirations. In the Moslem world, however, it was different. There it was important that the reigning sovereign should have both temporal and spiritual authority or his power declined. To sum up, the best system, in his opinion, would be a Financial Commission which in reality would exercise full powers of

administration. If the Sultan were sent to Asia Minor he would become the leader of the Nationalist Party, would place himself at the head of the Nationalist Army, and would cause endless trouble. M. Cambon thought that the Council should not have difficulty in arriving at a practical solution of the problem, even if it were not a perfect solution."

Signor Nitti was disposed to fall in with M. Cambon's ideas. I took a different view:—

"MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he would like the Council to consider very closely the degree of control to be exercised over Turkey in Asia, a question which had been raised early in the day by M. Cambon, and it was a very important problem. *I challenge the proposal* Was the control to be purely financial or was it to have an administrative character? In other words, was the Turk to be controlled politically or was he to be absolutely independent, that is to say, was Turkey to be like any other country, free to work out its own salvation?

M. CAMBON said that before the War the Powers had exercised a certain system of financial control, that is, they administered the Turkish debt. That was a special administration which was designed to guarantee to foreign creditors the payment of their dues. He thought that this system might now be extended with a view to obtaining complete control. Due regard must be paid to Turkish *amour-propre*, but subject to this condition he saw no reason why an administrative colour should not be given to our financial control. We might

establish a financial Commission with full powers and with instructions to work towards complete control of administration. As he had stated that morning, the Turk attached great importance to appearances, and if he were careful not to offend their susceptibilities, we might establish an effective universal control which the Turk would accept.

SIGNOR NITTI agreed that the control must be essentially financial in its character and it should have no political colour. Whatever happened, it was essential, in establishing the Commission, to avoid any possibility of quarrels and jealousies between the Powers setting up that Commission. Further, the Commission must administer to the advantage of the country itself. Turkey, left to herself would go to pieces; it was, therefore, necessary to establish some sort of outside control. At present he was prepared to agree generally to M. Cambon's proposals so long as it was understood that the Commission was essentially a financial and administrative body and in no sense a political body.

M. CAMBON said that he himself had seven years' experience of Turkey. Month after month he submitted various plans of reform to the Sultan, Abdul Hamid. The latter invariably agreed to his plans, but he never acted upon them. We had, therefore, never established a real control over the administration of Turkey. . . .

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said . . . He was apprehensive of antagonising the national sentiment of Turkey by interference in their internal affairs. If Turkey desired to govern herself in her own way he did not see how we could resist this demand. After all, Turkey was no more incompetent than Persia.

*Difficulty  
of enforcing  
financial  
control*



If we really proposed to administer the country, he did not think that this action on our part would conduce to peace in Turkey or to agreement among ourselves. Were the Powers to decide what taxes were to be levied? This was only one of the many difficult questions involved in M. Cambon's proposal. He himself doubted whether the Powers could possibly undertake the actual governing of Turkey. If we decided that certain taxes must be levied, and they were not collected, how were we to insist upon their being paid? Abdul Hamid knew quite well that if he did not collect the taxes suggested by the Powers, the latter had no intention of intervening in order to enforce their collection. M. Cambon's scheme meant the control of the administration of Turkey through a financial Commission; but if Turkey declined to execute the orders of that Commission, these would have to be enforced by military action. Were the Powers prepared to take such action? In his view it was no use our continuing the same old pretence which before the War had made us the laughing stock of the whole world because our control was quite ineffective. We had liberated from Turkish sovereignty the Armenians and the Arabs, and we proposed similarly to liberate the Greek subjects of Turkey. . . . Great Britain and France had already incurred many very heavy obligations; and he thought that both countries should be most reluctant to incur other obligations which they might find it impossible to enforce.

M. CAMBON said that he was still disposed to think that his proposal might work satisfactorily. No doubt the financial system as suggested by him would really mean administrative control in

disguise, but he thought that it would be a system which would be acceptable to the Turk. The Administration set up by the Powers to regulate the Turkish debt had been a complete success. Associated with it had been a number of Turkish officials who were both well trained and well disposed, and nobody in Turkey had raised any objection to this administration. So far as his experience went the results of the system had been excellent. When he had been in Turkey only one objection had been raised by the Sultan—

Abdul-Hamid—who had once asked him ‘What good is this control so far as I am concerned? All the revenue which accrues from this administration goes to pay its expenses.’ He had explained to the Sultan that the effect of this administration

*Administration  
of the country  
ultimately  
involved*

had been to establish the good name and the credit of Turkey in Europe. The Turk was a well-disciplined individual and he was quite prepared to accept foreign control; that is to say, Turkish officials were quite amenable to such control so long as they were certain of receiving their salary. Mr. Lloyd George had said that to establish the control envisaged by him (M. Cambon) really meant governing the country. That was true. But if the Powers did not govern the country, who would? He thought that a great opportunity now presented itself of administering Turkey on right lines. If the Powers did not seize this opportunity to intervene and to control the administration of Turkey, the Turks would merely relax into their old corrupt ways.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that M. Cambon in his statement clearly indicated that he wished the

Powers to be responsible for the government of Turkey. His own view was that it was impossible to administer Turkey through a Financial Commission, as this involved, in the long run, the use of force. Were the Powers prepared to accept this responsibility? It involved adding a fresh and gigantic responsibility to those which the Allies had already shouldered as the result of the late war, and it would be difficult to exaggerate its magnitude. He understood that M. Cambon proposed to go far beyond the financial control exercised prior to 1914.

M. CAMBON thought that the system advocated by himself would give the Allies indirectly the powers to check abuses in Turkish administration and to influence local authorities in the direction of sound methods. He admitted that direct control would be dangerous . . . . The Powers had very important commercial and political interests in Turkey, and it was essential that order should be established in that country. Further, the Powers desired to free non-Turkish populations from the Turkish yoke and to protect Christian minorities which were now under the sovereignty of the Sultan.

SIGNOR NITTI said that he had at first been in favour of M. Cambon's proposal to create a system of financial control, but he had been much

*Nitti draws  
back*

impressed by Mr. Lloyd George's observations. The question immediately before the Council was that of the control of Turkey proper. Should we endeavour to establish administrative control through a Financial Commission as M. Cambon had suggested? Mr. Lloyd George had very forcibly pointed out the extent of our responsibility if we accepted

this solution. It would mean that we should be compelled to administer the whole internal politics of Turkey, which was a very different matter from the administration of the Turkish debt. Supposing, for instance, a Turkish debt collector, acting under the instructions of the Inter-Allied Financial Commission, was murdered, what action could the Allies take? The Powers, as had been pointed out, had every interest in a prosperous Turkey, but they could not accept grave responsibilities unless they had corresponding means of action to enforce their decrees. . . ."

I have already alluded to the fundamental change in the French attitude. The alteration in the Italian aims, as far as Asia Minor was concerned, was equally emphatic, although the motives were different. Sonnino's idea was practically the annexation and exploitation of Southern Anatolia. The proposals of the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement were designed to include Smyrna in this new Italian Empire. Adalia would have given to Italy for colonisation a sparsely populated territory on the Eastern Mediterranean, with great possibilities for a people who had to emigrate each year in large numbers to North and South America to find a living. An industrious and resourceful people like the Italians, who were accustomed to turn hillsides into fruitful vineyards and olive groves, would have restored the prosperity of this once fertile region. The land of Anatolia once upon a time nurtured teeming populations of cultivators and fishermen. It needed irrigation and roads to restore it to its annual productiveness. The Italians were well qualified by experience and skill for such a task. Had

the idea been adhered to there would soon have been a considerable colony of prospering Italian settlers. Sonnino's scheme was the old Roman plan of founding legionary colonies in regions of strategic importance to the Empire. The surplus population of Italy could thus have settled under the Italian flag in a land which was only a few days' steaming from the motherland. It would not be necessary to displace a native population, for Turkish neglect, misgovernment and shiftlessness had depopulated these shores and reduced them almost to a waste. That was the idea of Italian statesmanship in the days of the Treaty of London. The Pact of St. Jean de Maurienne would have provided the new colony with an excellent harbour for its trade.

Much to Sonnino's disgust, the excitement over Fiume took the Italian mind entirely off this ambitious and hopeful scheme of Anatolian colonisation. When the Sonnino régime came to an end, the Nitti and Tittoni administration stood for entirely different ideals.

*New régime  
not  
imperialistic*

They did not belong to Italy's Imperialist school of thought. They were politically opposed to the ambitions of Crespi. They concentrated their thoughts more on internal development and purely commercial expansion. They were not enamoured of the idea of creating an Italian Empire by the forcible annexation of territory belonging to other races. The grab for a share of foreign soil here and there came therefore to an end, and for it was substituted a search for spheres for commercial exploitation and for securing opportunities to develop raw material. The constant recurrence of the words "primary materials" in Nitti's speeches showed the change that had taken place in the fundamental aims of Italy.

The realisation of these aims did not involve occupation of any territory. Signor Nitti urged Italy's claim for a privileged position on the ground that

“each of the Allied countries had obtained something from the War. Italy had merely obtained a few barren, unproductive hills from Austria which only represented a dead *Nitti's* loss. The value of Trieste would soon *complaint* disappear because Austria had died.

The Council knew how matters stood with regard to the Adriatic question. As to colonies, Italy, which possessed the largest number of emigrants and the smallest area of colonies, found her situation at the end of the War in no way improved. Finally, in Asia Minor, Italy had been guaranteed equitable treatment under the Treaty of London: but the net result would appear to be that she had received nothing and under these circumstances the question arose in Nitti's mind whether it would not be better to refuse to sign the Treaty, and whether it would not be better to enter into direct relations with Turkey. Though Turkey in Asia had been partitioned, though Greece would as a result double its territory, Italy would get nothing. Would it be possible under these circumstances for him to defend himself, in Italy, either from a national, economic or moral point of view?”

He had no definite proposals to make. He merely asked that the whole question should be reconsidered from a wide point of view, to which I replied that I

“could not help thinking that Signor Nitti took an unduly dismal view of the things which Italy

would obtain as a result of her entry into the War.

In the first place Italy would obtain a fine natural frontier, a great mountain rampart, instead of being absolutely at the mercy of her greatest foe. The whole of her Irredentist population were now reunited in the Kingdom of Italy, and her greatest foes had been absolutely destroyed. Further, Italy had obtained a great sphere of economic development in Southern Anatolia once upon a time one of the greatest granaries of the world, which would help in feeding Italy with corn, a benefit which she obtained without assuming any great responsibilities. In Mesopotamia, in Palestine, Great Britain had obtained territories which would demand the expenditure of vast sums of money and the employment of considerable garrisons, whilst Italy in Anatolia obtained great economic advantages with no responsibility and no great garrisons to maintain. . . .

Furthermore, Jubaland with its thousands of square miles of the best cotton growing land in Africa had been offered to Italy. In that connection he could not help saying that he had been struck by the fact that the value of this concession had never been mentioned in Italy."

The policy of mineral, industrial and financial concessions was gradually disintegrating the War ideal of racial emancipation. The final negotiations for the drafting of the Turkish Treaty witnessed the first appearance of these sinister underground forces. Even in Britain old pro-Turkish sympathies were reappearing. They were reinforced by prudential considerations

*Concession-  
hunting  
ousts  
idealism*

relating to the fact that we were the largest Moslem Empire in the world, and that the conquest of Turkey was largely attributable to Mohammedan troops recruited in India. America, which had no national Turkish sympathies, and, on the contrary, had an unmitigated abhorrence of Turkish brutalities and massacres, and moreover had no vested interests in that quarter of the globe, was not represented at these Conferences. The idealist President, who dreamed of a Turkish settlement based on liberty and the wishes of the inhabitants, was confined to his sickroom—a broken and baffled prophet unable to put up any further fight for his faith.

Whilst the Conference was discussing questions of Turkish finance, the customs of Constantinople, economic preferences in Anatolia and the boundaries of Armenia, a new portent suddenly broke in upon their deliberations in the form of Mustapha Kemal. At that time he was known—and not widely known—to the Allies as the young Turkish officer who had distinguished himself at Gallipoli. It was owing to his prompt and daring leadership that the ineffective and bungled British attack at Suvla Bay had been checked, and the last hope of forcing the Dardanelles in the Great War for ever lost. No information had been received as to his activities in Asia Minor in reorganising the shattered and depleted armies of Turkey. Our military intelligence had never been more thoroughly unintelligent. The first we heard of his having gathered together a formidable striking force was when the news reached the Council in London that he had inflicted a serious defeat upon the French at Marash with an army of 30,000 regular Turkish troops. The French, to whom Lord Allenby

*Mustapha  
Kemal  
takes the  
field*



had surrendered the garrisoning of this territory, were taken completely by surprise and were therefore utterly unprepared. The War Office and the Admiralty instituted immediate enquiries with their representatives at Constantinople to obtain further details as to the actual military position, and at the meeting of the Conference on the 28th February, Lord Curzon opened the proceedings with a statement:—

“LORD CURZON said that when, at the meeting of the Supreme Council that morning, he had spoken of the complicity of Mustapha Kemal with the Turkish Government, he was not aware that the connection between the two was as close as now appeared. He had just been informed that Mustapha Kemal had recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum, a fact which was more significant because Erzerum was to be included in the new Armenia. The nomination of such a man would entirely preclude any chance of success which the new State might otherwise have had.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the Supreme Council were faced with a very difficult situation.

*My views  
of the  
French defeat* The information of which he was in possession was necessarily incomplete, and it came from Constantinople. A telegram had been received that morning from the British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and its contents had been communicated by Lord Curzon to the Conference of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers held that morning, to the effect that, after heavy fighting in Marash, the sandjak of Marago, in Cilicia, had been evacuated by the French. Many Armenians had

been massacred both during and after this fighting. It was difficult to estimate the actual numbers, but they might amount to possibly between 15,000 and 20,000. There were not more than about 12,000 French troops in Cilicia, whereas the enemy's forces were variously estimated at between 25,000 and 30,000. The Principal Administrator of Cilicia had stated that immediate action would be taken to recover Marash, and General Gouraud seemed to be confident that he had sufficient troops to deal with the situation. . . . Apparently there was no fresh news from General Gouraud, who was in charge of this district. He suggested the first thing to do was to ask the French Government to ascertain from General Gouraud exactly what the situation was, so far as the latter's information went. In the meantime, he thought that they must proceed on the assumption that the news which the British Government had received was accurate. He himself could not conceive of anything more fatal to the prestige of all the Allies than this event. Unless strong action were taken at once their prestige would suffer irretrievably. It would mean that our Treaty was worthless except where there were overwhelming Allied forces on the spot. It was all very well to insert in the Treaty provisions about 'powers of patrolling,' 'spheres of influence,' and so on, but not the slightest attention would be paid to these by the Turks, as to the stipulations in regard to the protection of minorities. The fact was that, on the eve of making peace with Turkey, the Powers found themselves practically impotent to deal with a situation of extreme gravity. Taking this as a typical case of the application of the rights of

economic priority, he would remind the Council that when they had discussed the previous week the question of economic preference, he had stated that in his opinion no Power should undertake this obligation unless that Power at the same time accepted certain responsibilities. The British

*Order must  
be restored* were not asking for preferential rights in regard to Mosul merely in order to have the use of the oil; they were quite prepared to accept a concur-

rent obligation to defend the inhabitants from outside aggression. Similar obligations must be accepted by other Powers who undertook the responsibility of a sphere of influence. Up to September last the British had been in military occupation of Marash, and throughout that occupation perfect order had existed; British officers had even been accustomed to shoot 20 or 30 miles outside Marash in complete security. Since that time, and after the territory had been taken over by the French, the Turkish Nationalist Movement had spread and had grown more and more menacing in character. . . . It was no use the Allies proceeding with the terms of a Peace Treaty until they could once more restore order. For this, the primary responsibility rested with the French. Great Britain had discharged this duty up to last September. Although, as he had said, the French were primarily responsible, the other Powers were all interested in the question. The British Government had withdrawn its troops after pressure which had been exerted for many months by French statesmen, on the understanding that France would undertake to protect the Armenians. The Powers now wanted to know what steps the

French Government proposed to take to restore the situation, to protect the Armenians who remained, and generally to uphold the prestige of the Allies. So much for the local situation. As regards Constantinople, as Lord Curzon had stated that morning, the reason why the Supreme Council had decided to maintain the Turk there was that the Allies felt that so long as the Sultan and his Government remained at Constantinople under the Allied guns they had a certain hold over them in certain eventualities. Such an eventuality had now arisen. The Council had been informed that Mustapha Kemal, who was responsible, presumably, for the recent horrors in Cilicia, was a high official of the Government of Constantinople and had recently been appointed Governor of Erzerum. Were the Allies to do nothing? It was not enough to warn the Turks."

It turned out that at this battle the French had a force of 5,000 troops, partly Senegalese, the rest mainly Armenian recruits not of the first quality. There were very few French soldiers present. When the French representatives were pressed for information about this calamitous affair, it was clear that even General Gouraud, who was in command of the whole of the French forces in Syria and Cilicia, had only the most meagre particulars as to what had happened, and the first duty of the Conference was to discover exactly not only what had happened at Marash, but details as to the development of the Nationalist Movement in Central Turkey and its military strength.

As I felt that it was idle to proceed with the framing of a Treaty which must necessarily be

*Strength of Kemal's Army* obnoxious to the Turkish Nationalists, without ascertaining what the chances were of its enforcement, I insisted that before we proceeded with the draft provisions we should take stock of the military position. The French secured the attendance of a French officer, Colonel Chardigny, who gave us all the information which the Intelligence Department of the French Staff had gathered together about the constitution and strength of Mustapha Kemal's forces. He

"said that the Turkish Army still survived, but the strength of the various Divisions had been very considerably reduced. There were at present about fifteen Divisions of regular troops, each consisting of about 3,000 men, perhaps totalling altogether some 50,000 men. These 50,000 men were well trained and disciplined but beyond them there were probably a large number of small bands, ranging from 100 to 150 men each under one or two officers. The first *corps d'armée*, consisting of four Divisions, and numbering about 7,000 men, was at Erzerum. Mustapha had, however, great difficulty in feeding and supplying his troops, as he lacked transport and the commissariat was deficient. He had, in fact, to keep them separated, as he was unable to concentrate them owing to supply difficulties."

Signor Nitti took a more alarming view of the strength of Mustapha Kemal's army. He estimated it to be anything up to 150,000 men, but he produced no detailed information on the subject, nor did he inform the Council of the sources from which he had derived his information.

It was not clear to us whether the Marash irruption into territory occupied by the Allies, and the attack on French troops, were due to the unauthorised initiative of Mustapha Kemal or to instructions received by him from the Sultan's Government at Constantinople. Neither the Foreign Office nor the Intelligence Department of the Admiralty or the War Office could supply us with any information upon which we could base any valuable conclusions on that important point. Kemal was nominally an official of the Sultan. He had been recently appointed Governor of Erzerum by Damad Ferid, the Grand Vizier. The Turkish Government must therefore be held accountable for his actions. But further investigations by the Allied representatives on the spot showed clearly that Kemal was not only his own master but that of the Government as well. He alone counted in the situation. He did not repudiate the Ministry; he forced the Sultan to dismiss it. A new Vizier, Izzet Pasha, was substituted for the more pliable Damad Ferid. Izzet was practically the Nationalist nominee.

It was therefore no longer a question of bringing pressure at Constantinople on a Sultan and his Ministers who were surrounded by a garrison of Allied troops, and who deliberated and decided in Council Chambers dominated by Allied guns. We had to deal with a daring rebel, a good soldier and a born leader of men, who had gathered around him far away from Allied control right in the hills of Anatolia, the remnants of the Turkish Army that had held up the British Army for four years. Volunteers flocked to his standard, inspired by his determination to resist to the last the dismemberment of the country their race had governed, or rather misgoverned, for hundreds of

years. Kemal roused the pride of a governing caste whose military prowess had shattered the Arab and the Greek Empire, and had marched its triumphant armies right into the centre of Europe, conquered vast territories in three continents, and struck terror into regions far beyond the limits of its immense conquests.

It may be asked why, in the face of this formidable Nationalist movement, the Allies did not pause in their schemes for the partition of Turkey?

*The French  
still want  
Cilicia*

With the exception of Cilicia and Adalia we did not propose to deprive Turkey of any territory where the inhabitants were predominantly Turkish. In Arabia, Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia the Turkish elements were negligible. In the Smyrna region the non-Turkish elements predominated, notwithstanding the massacres and deportations of the War period. Thrace was an inextricable medley of races, but, taking it as a whole, the non-Turkish ingredients predominated. Cilicia had in recent years become Turkish owing to the extermination and enslavement of the Armenians. The French, however, clung here to their rights under the unfortunate Sykes-Picot Agreement. Their zeal for this troublesome, costly and unproductive acquisition was cooling down. Ultimately they abandoned it as a worthless possession. It would have spared endless trouble had they done so in time. Their defeat by Kemal enhanced his prestige and encouraged the Nationalists to fresh attacks on other occupied territories, and shattered all fear of the invincible might of the conquerors in the Great War. The French attached importance to Alexandretta. As for the rest, they were prepared to leave it to be exploited by French concessionaires with prior rights. No French

Government had the courage either to abandon their hold or to defend it. Cilicia was the weakest position morally and strategically in the whole of the Allied claims. And Cilicia was the beginning of the movement that ultimately destroyed the settlement of Asia Minor and Thrace on the lines of racial self-determination. But we were bound by Treaty obligations we had entered into with France in 1916.

The same observation applied to Adalia. The Italians had no ethnological title to this territory. In so far as it was inhabited, the sparse population was not Turkish by blood but it was entirely so by adoption and religion. The only defensible argument of the Italians in favour of seizing and colonising it was

*Italians  
lose interest  
in Adalia*

the fact that it was practically derelict, whilst in the days of the Roman Empire it was a thriving and industrious community of tillers and fishermen. But as I have pointed out, under the new political temper and régime in Italy the ardour for colonisation had cooled down. The peasants were tired of the rifle and wanted to get back to the mattock. They had had enough of attacking and defending hills in the Dolomites and the Istrian Alps. They were not eager to renew their experience in the hills of Anatolia: they preferred their own vineyards on the slopes of the Appenines. Nitti represented that reaction. There was everywhere in town and country a weariness of fighting and a revolt against the War spirit. No acquisition which involved more marching and trenching and ceaseless dodging of the hissing messengers of death appealed to the national sentiment in any of the great countries that had borne the heaviest sacrifices and burdens of the War. Such combative temper as was left in Italy concentrated on a wretched little seaport



town in the Adriatic. Nitti and Tittoni therefore were not eager to add Adalia to the Italian Empire. But the Treaty of London had included it in the territorial concessions to be made to Italy as the price of her defection from the Triple Alliance and her adhesion to the Entente. Sonnino had fought hard to add Smyrna to Adalia. Nitti therefore dared not sign a Treaty which altogether surrendered these gains and returned them to the nation to which they ethnologically and religiously belonged.

Armenia presented us with a totally different problem. Up to a generation ago Armenia was inhabited by a people racially and religiously distinct from their Turkish rulers. By faith they were Christian.

*Americans want to save Armenia by proxy* Abdul Hamid of infamous memory inaugurated a policy of elimination of this ancient race from the valleys in which they dwelt. As a method of converting the Armenian majority into a wretched and cowed minority this savagery succeeded in the most fertile regions of Armenia. The Allied Powers were unanimously of opinion that the Turks should not be allowed to profit by their atrocities, and that its full inheritance should be restored to the Armenian nation and an opportunity be afforded to it to rebuild its strength in the ancient home of its ancestors.

No one held this opinion more intensely and with more indignation against the oppressors than the President and the people of the United States of America. We were waiting for their practical interpretation of this holy wrath. It was becoming more and more apparent that their idea was that their righteous anger should be vindicated by, and at the expense in blood

and treasure of, the nations who had already suffered most in the War and who were exhausted by the sacrifices they had endured in the struggle.

We received intimations from Washington that the President, notwithstanding his physical debility, retained a keen interest in certain aspects of the Peace settlement. In his sickroom he followed the struggle in the Senate over the Covenant of the League with a constant and an eager concern which caused perpetual anxiety to medical advisers who warned him against the perils of mental excitement. There was a majority in the Senate in favour of the Treaty. The only question was whether it would be sufficiently large to ensure the vote required by the Constitution. That was not settled until the 19th March, 1920, when the requisite majority was not forthcoming on the first vote. The failure to carry the treaty through the American Senate was regarded as a repudiation by Congress of President Wilson's Peace policy. After the vote, America withdrew from the Supreme Council of the Allies, and we were then confronted with a grave position by the official announcement that America had withdrawn from all co-operation in the framing and creation of the Treaties.

But the dauntless spirit of Woodrow Wilson was not as broken as the poor body in which it still lingered. When the Allied Powers took in hand the drafting of the provisions of the Turkish Peace Treaty without the help of America, to our surprise a long message came to us, dictated by the palsied but still indomitable idealist at the White House, which showed that his interest in the oppressed Christian population of the Turkish Empire was undiminished. It is true that the official note was signed "Colby," but the ideas

*Wilson's  
tenacity  
of  
interest*

were those of Woodrow Wilson. Some of the phrases showed clearly that the substance of the message had come from his lips, and although the point and polish of his phrasology had considerably faded, they were undoubtedly his sentences.

The Secretary of State's note was as follows:—

“In acknowledging receipt of Your Excellency's communication, of the 12th March in respect of Conferences relating to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and the present position of negotiations proceeding between the Chief Allied Powers, I am to inform you that in the view of the President it does not seem desirable that a Plenipotentiary should represent the United States at the Conferences. As, however, this Government is profoundly interested in the future peace of the world, the President thinks that its views on the suggested solutions of the intricate problems connected with the Turkish Treaty should be frankly expressed.

The United States it is true were not at war with Turkey, but its armies and navies were fighting the principal Allies of that country and in contributing to the defeat of those Allies, they also contributed to the defeat of the Turks.

Accordingly the President holds that it is the duty of his Government to communicate its views and to press for a solution which will be at once lasting and just.

The Washington Government understands the agency of the arguments for the retention of the Turks at Constantinople but is of opinion that the arguments against it are far stronger and contain certain elements which, in their opinion, can

*Views on  
Constantinople  
settlement*

scarcely be ignored. The Allies have often expressed their intention that the anomaly of the Turks in Europe should end, and it is difficult to believe that the Mohammedan peoples who not only witnessed, without protest, the defeat of Turkish power, but even contributed materially to that defeat, will now feel so strongly on the subject as to resent the expulsion of the Turkish Government, necessitating on the part of the Great Powers a complete reversal of policy which seems neither necessary nor desirable.

It is assumed that the line given as the Southern frontier of Turkey is meant to be the ethnological frontier of the Arabs. If this is the case, certain rectifications would appear to be necessary. Supposing, however, that in choosing this line the Allied Powers were guided by other considerations, the Washington Government, without any desire to criticise, would be glad to be supplied with the arguments which led the Powers to make this choice. The Washington Government are glad to note that on the International Council which it is proposed should be established for the Government of Constantinople and the Straits, provision is made for Russian representation. They are convinced that no arrangement which is now made in respect of the Government and the control of Constantinople and the Straits can possess any element of permanency unless Russia's vital interests in these problems are protected and carefully provided for, and unless, when Russia once more has a Government which is recognised by the civilised world, it is understood that that Government may assert its just claim to be heard in respect of whatever decisions may be reached.

The United States Government are convinced that no final decision should, or can, be made in respect of the passage of men-of-war and the régime of the Straits in war time without the consent of Russia.

They accordingly note with pleasure that these questions are under consideration.

As regards Thrace, it appears to the Government of the United States only right that that portion of Eastern Thrace, which is outside the zone reserved for Constantinople, should, *with the exception of the Northern part of that province*, become part of the Kingdom of Greece.

This northern part is clearly Bulgarian in population; justice and fair dealing consequently demand that the cities of Kirk-Killisse and Adrianople and the surrounding territory should be part of Bulgaria. Both on ethnic and historical grounds Bulgaria's claim is worthy of the most serious consideration; moreover, it would appear that Bulgaria is entitled to have its claim to this territory favourably considered, having regard to the fact that it has been compelled to give up territory which is purely Bulgarian as well as many thousands of Bulgarians on its Western boundary on the rather doubtful grounds of securing for Serbia a strategical frontier.

In respect of the proposed preferential rights of three great Mediterranean Powers to furnish instructors and advisers in certain zones, the Washington Government feel that before they can express an intelligent opinion on this question, they must be furnished with more information as to the reason and purpose of such a plan.

The genuine interest of the Government of the United States in the plan for Armenia cannot be questioned, and the Government are convinced that most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country is both expected and demanded by the civilised world.

*Favourable  
terms for  
Armenia*

Armenia's boundaries therefore should be fixed in such a way as to recognise all the legitimate claims of the Armenians, and to secure for them unencumbered and easy access to the sea. The United States Government are not aware of the considerations which governed the decision arrived at by the Supreme Council, but they feel that access to the sea, which is indispensable to Armenian interests, would hardly be assured by granting special rights over Lazistan.

Taking into consideration that Trebizond has always been the termination of the trade route across Armenia, and that M. Veniselos, speaking on behalf of the Greeks of that district, has expressed their preference for connection with Armenia rather than Turkey, it is hoped that the Powers will agree to grant Trebizond to Armenia.

In respect of the question of Turkey relinquishing her rights to Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the Islands, the Washington Government suggest that the same method adopted in the case of Austria should now be resorted to, that is to say, that these provinces should be placed by Turkey in the hands of the Great Powers, for those Powers to dispose of as they may think right.

The Washington Government have too limited information as to the exact arrangement that is contemplated for Smyrna, and the reasons for deciding upon this arrangement, to be in a position to express an opinion at present on this most important question.

The Washington Government fully appreciate the many difficulties that come up for settlement in connection with the Treaty of Turkey. Owing to the conflicting interests involved the problems are complex and fruitful of misunderstandings, but the United States Government are confident that in handling these problems the Powers will be animated by a spirit of fairness and of a scrupulous regard for the interests of the vanquished, victor and neutral alike.

Before a comprehensive plan can be worked out it is obvious that much remains to be done, and this Government will be glad to receive further information in regard to the economic clauses of the Turkish Treaty.

The plan that has apparently been elaborated by the Supreme Council in connection with the continuation of concessions granted to aliens, and also giving the right to cancel or to revise concessions on payment of indemnity (vide 8th paragraph of Your Excellency's note) has, incidently, grave possibilities, and careful elucidation would seem to be necessary.

In conclusion, let me say that, whatever arrangements or territorial changes may be made in the former Ottoman Empire, the Washington Government understand that such arrangements or changes will in no way place the citizens or corporations of the United States of America or of any other country in a position less favourable than corporations or citizens of any Power which is a party to the Turkish Treaty."

It was a notable and, in many respects, a heroic document, when one recalls the conditions under

which it was prepared. But the Note did not make a favourable impression on the Allied plenipotentiaries. It was full of admonition and exhortation to high endeavour, but did not contain one sentence which would give us reason to hope that if we responded to his appeal the United States would give us any support and assistance in our efforts. It was an intimation that America meant to leave us in the lurch, dropping a tract in our collection box to meet the crushing expenses of a policy for which the American President insisted on retaining a leading share in the responsibility. He had done his best. His health had been shattered by his exertions for the cause in which he believed. He could not personally have done more. We only felt that he might have added one sentence to say so, and to express his regret that exigencies and intrigues over which he had no control had added to the gigantic burdens we had now to bear without any help from America. Had he even sent us privately a message of sympathy for the predicament in which we had been placed by the backsliding of American politicians, we should have felt grateful. But that was not in his obdurate and self-centred nature.

When the Allies met in Conference at San Remo late in April, much of their attention was occupied with the settlement of the Armenian problem. They had before them the repudiation of the Treaty by the American Senate and President Wilson's Note. The military situation in Asia Minor, had certainly not improved. The Allies therefore had to consider the problem of Armenia from the double aspect of the growing Turkish Nationalist menace, and the possibility of the Armenians raising a force which

*A heroic  
document*

*Armenia  
discussion  
at San  
Remo*



could effectively counter this threat; or alternatively, whether, now that America had deserted them, the Allies could undertake that task themselves. They had incurred heavy obligations involving the employment of considerable forces for some time—on the Rhine, in Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia and also in Constantinople and the Straits. Could they persuade their Parliaments to add to these heavy liabilities the maintenance of a strong military force in Armenia? I was doubtful. In order to enable readers to follow the argument, it is necessary to give a summary of the whole discussion on the Armenian question:—

“SIGNOR NITTI proposed that the Supreme Council should now take the questions on the Agenda, the first of which was the continuation of the discussion, adjourned from the morning meeting, in regard to the Turkish frontiers. These frontiers were two-fold in character; first, the Asiatic frontiers, that is to say, Armenia, Smyrna, and so on; and, second, the European frontiers, that is to say, Thrace. His own view was that the Allied Powers, in drawing up the Treaty, should consider the desirability of making it acceptable to the Turks, and also susceptible of application, if necessary, by force by the Allied Powers. He enquired whether any of his colleagues had any remarks to make.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that at the meeting of the Supreme Council held on the previous day he had put forward certain observations

*My statement  
about  
Erzerum*

on the suggested boundaries between Turkey and Greece. Signor Nitti had just read a telegram from the High Commissioners in Constantinople which gave certain

figures bearing on this question; but the value of the figures was open to question, as no date was given. There was no doubt that, since the War, a large majority of the Greek population had been driven out, and it was possible that the Turks had manipulated the statistics which had been submitted to the Supreme Council. It was evident that, before the War, the Greeks were certainly in a majority both in Thrace and in Smyrna. He was, however, deeply concerned about the question of Armenia. There was a Turkish majority there, although it might be slight. But there was absolutely no doubt that in Erzerum there were very few Armenians, and the population was almost exclusively composed of Turks and Mussulmans. This majority was not the result of the War or the extermination of Armenians, or of the alteration of statistics. But before the War, and before any massacres took place, the population was emphatically Mussulman. Consequently, by no principle which had been laid down by the Allied Powers could they defend surrendering the place, which had a preponderant majority of Mussulmans, to the Armenians. To insert in the Treaty a clause to the effect that Erzerum was to be ceded to Armenia would certainly add to our difficulty of persuading the Turks to sign the Treaty. He himself did not see his way to facing all the evil consequences of the Turks' refusal to sign, in view of the fact that the Allied Powers accepted the principle of self-determination. Supposing the Turk stated his willingness to sign the Treaty, what would happen? The Allied Powers wished to declare that Erzerum should be part of Armenia. Did anybody at the Council table think that the Turks

in that particular region, in that event, would take the slightest notice of the Armenians? Such a clause would, in his view, merely provoke a massacre. . . . What was the situation of Armenia? They had on one side the Azerbaijanis, who were half civilised; on another side they had the Anatolians, and on another the Kurds. It seemed to him an extraordinary proposition to ask the Armenians to conquer a vast territory when they could hardly defend the very limited sphere which they held at present. The real danger underlying this agitation for a larger Armenia was that it might induce the Allied Powers to commit follies in order to take vengeance upon the Turks. President Wilson no doubt desired a greater Armenia, but his intention was that it should extend to the South and not to the West. He himself agreed with Signor Nitti that here was a centre of Turkish nationalism in Anatolia and it would be very difficult for the Allied Powers to constitute an Armenia which would be capable of supporting and maintaining itself. To ask Armenia to undertake this burden would be to act in defiance of every principle, national, racial and strategic. He regretted that he had to take this view, as it was not in consonance with that of his own Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and of the Allied Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in London, over which Lord Curzon had presided. But he was quite prepared to defend his case in England or elsewhere.

M. BERTHELOT said that when the London Conference had examined the question of the frontiers of Armenia they had taken into special

*Berthelot  
takes the  
other side*

consideration the question of Erzerum. The United States of America had had a grand conception of a greater Armenia, which, however, had rested on no secure foundation whatever; it corresponded to no reality, and the Allied Conference had felt it necessary to face facts. A more reasonable conception was to take Russian Armenia, which contained some 400,000 or 500,000 people. This was threatened from the outside, but it was actually in existence, and it represented the Armenia of history. Reverting to the question of Erzerum, the British Prime Minister had raised certain points and had put forward his case in his usual striking manner. Although there had never been an Armenian majority in Erzerum, there had been an extensive Armenian colony, most of whom, unfortunately, had been massacred. There were, therefore, strong moral grounds for giving that city to Armenia. The city of Erzerum constituted a powerful fortress which if left in Turkish hands, would cut off Armenia from the sea. To leave the Turks at Erzerum would place them right on the backs of the Armenians. A more important factor was the line from Kars to Erzerum, which constituted the only line of through communication. To give Erzerum to the Turks would mean that that line would be entirely cut off so far as Armenia was concerned. If Armenia were entirely denied any possibility of access to the sea, what was she to do? In spite of the powerful arguments advanced by Mr. Lloyd George, he thought that it would be almost impossible to construct a new Armenian State unless Armenia were placed in possession of Erzerum. The problem was most difficult and

most embarrassing, but he thought that it was a point of honour for the Allied Powers, *vis-à-vis* the whole world, to settle it; and unless Erzerum was ceded to the Armenians their position would be practically impossible. He did not entirely agree with Mr. Lloyd George's argument that if Erzerum were ceded to Armenia it would make it more difficult for the Turks to sign the Treaty of Peace. However forcible might be the arguments urged in favour of leaving Erzerum in the hands of the Turks, he thought that the arguments against this were much more powerful. He could quite understand the standpoint of Mr. Lloyd George, that it was desirable to make some concessions in order to placate the Turks, with a view to inducing them to sign the Treaty, but he felt that the Allies were bound by their pledge of honour to constitute Erzerum a part of the new Armenian State.

LORD CURZON said that in London a special Committee had been appointed to deal with the question of frontiers, which had recommended that Erzerum should be granted to the Armenians. The Conference over which he had the honour to preside had been fully conscious of the difficulties which had been so eloquently set forth by Mr. Lloyd George. Before the War, the Turks in the Erzerum district had numbered some 360,000, and the Armenian population had numbered about 160,000. The Armenian population, however, had been greatly reduced by a series of massacres extending over a great many years. The reasons, however, which had influenced the London Conference were essentially strategical rather than moral. Erzerum occupied a dominating position

*Curzon outlines  
the history  
of this issue*

from every point of view, and to leave it to the Turks would make an independent Armenia impossible. He wished the Supreme Council to envisage the future possibilities in this connection. There might be a great Pan-Moslem or Pan-Turanian movement, and, faced with this, the London Conference had felt that it was desirable for the peace of the world in general to place a wedge between the Moslems of Turkey and of the further East in the form of a Christian community, which would be a new Armenian State. It was well known that once there had been a great and widely-extended Armenia. The London Conference had perceived the difficulties in the way of constituting a greater Armenia, but they had felt that her case, historically, was analogous to that of the Zionists. The case for the Zionists was not based upon the numbers of that people actually inhabiting Palestine. There was a further consideration. Certain assurances had been given to the Armenians which practically amounted to pledges. When the Supreme Council had asked the League of Nations to undertake the custody and protection of Armenia the Council of the League had enquired what were the proposed boundaries of the new State. The London Conference had frankly informed the Council what the provisional boundaries were, and on that hypothesis the Council of the League had made their reply to the Supreme Council. Armenians had made constant enquiries as to what the future frontiers of their State would be, and they had been informed that they would probably include Erzerum, and consequently they expected that the necessary stipulation would be made in the Treaty.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE thought that the Armenians had really no right to indulge in unjustifiable hopes.

LORD CURZON said that if this was the view of the Supreme Council it would be a bitter blow to the Armenians. The United States had been particularly anxious that Trebizond should be granted to Armenia, but Armenia would never get Trebizond if Erzerum were left in the hands of Turkey. Moreover, he did not think that Turkey would be mollified for the loss of Smyrna if she were granted Erzerum. Would it not be worth while, if the Allied Powers really wanted to build up a new Armenia, to give them something to work up to? What the London Conference had in mind was to constitute a frontier up to which Armenia could work in the future. He regretted very much that he was taking up an attitude which was not in accord with the view which had been put forward by his own Prime Minister, but he felt bound to submit the views he had put forward, not as a colleague of Mr. Lloyd George, but as Chairman of the Conference in London.

SIGNOR NITTI enquired whether the Allied Powers were wishing to give Armenia something which, *Nitti thinks* in her own interests, she had better not *Erzerum a* have? They had agreed that it was *dangerous gift* impossible for them to send troops to *for Armenia* that part of the world. He doubted whether it was possible, or desirable, to attempt to restore to Armenia what she had possessed in past history. If the Allied Powers drove the Turks to the point of exasperation they would not sign the Treaty. They had been driven out of Thrace: their frontiers were to be reduced to the Chatalja

line: they were to lose Smyrna; and if this last indignity, that is to say, the loss of Erzerum, were to be put upon them, they would almost certainly refuse to sign the Treaty. Moreover, if Erzerum were taken from Turkey the Turks would undoubtedly endeavour to recapture it, and the Allied Powers would be impotent. It had been suggested that Norway should be asked to undertake the mandate for Armenia. Was it proposed that the Norwegians should once more be invited to conquer the Mediterranean? The Allied Powers proposed to give Smyrna to Greece, and also Thrace, as the populations in those regions were preponderantly Greek. Unfortunately, the fortress of Erzerum was, so far as its population was concerned, preponderantly Turkish. He held himself no brief for the Turks. All he wanted to do was to act in the best interests of the Armenians themselves, and not to put them in an impossible situation.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that he was very sorry to disagree with the views of Lord Curzon and of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in London. He was, however, thinking of the responsibility cast upon those who had not only to make Treaties but also to enforce them. The Allied Powers had recently signed a good many Treaties, the terms of which had not yet been enforced, and their enforcement would require the most anxious consideration of the Supreme Council. It would not be easy, he thought, to enforce the terms of the German Treaty, and he did not wish the Allied Powers now to sign a Treaty which they knew they were not in a position to enforce, and, further, which they had no intention of enforcing. It was not fair to the Armenians to



give them on paper a territory which we had no intention of assisting them to secure. The Allied Powers were contemplating sending polite letters to President Wilson to enlist his sympathy and to invite the co-operation of the United States. It was possible that a certain amount of money might be raised out of the United States for the assistance of Armenia, but he saw no probability at all of the United States sending the three or four Divisions necessary to conquer Erzerum. If Erzerum were ceded to the Armenians, the only answer the Turks would make would be to massacre Armenians. What were the Allied Powers then to do? Were they to continue to hold a succession of Conferences, to twiddle their thumbs and to say that they did this in order to encourage the 'larger hope'? The only 'larger hope' that he envisaged was that of Armenian massacres. Thrace, Smyrna and Constantinople all came in a different category, as these regions were more or less within our compass and occupied by Allied troops. The Allied Powers were not in a position to send any forces to assist the Armenians. That morning the Supreme Council had been engaged on the question of Batum. With great difficulty, France had been induced to send one Battalion, and similarly Italy had reluctantly agreed to send another Battalion. It was not their desire to help that was lacking, but simply that the troops were not there to send. If Erzerum were to be ceded to Armenia it would be a question not of the Allied Powers sending forces to protect Armenia, but in order to conquer new territory. He understood that Armenia was a trackless, mountainous country. Their Military

*Fresh massacres  
of Armenians  
probable*

Experts had informed them that an enormous army would be necessary in order to conquer Mustapha Kemal, and nobody had the slightest intention of raising such a force. Yet, it was now proposed, apparently, to sign a Treaty which might involve, in honour, tremendous possibilities which none of the Allied Powers would in any circumstances be prepared to face. It was not right, he thought, for the Great Powers to negotiate Treaties which they knew they could not, and had no intention to, carry out. He strongly deprecated encouraging illusive hopes in the breasts of poor creatures who had been persecuted for centuries, when the Allied Powers were perfectly well aware that they could not justify those hopes. It was quite possible that the cession of Erzerum might not be the one thing which would prevent the Turks from signing the Treaty, but the Turks might think and say that 'The other parts of our Empire which you have taken away are regions of which you are already in possession, but we know that Erzerum is a place where you cannot touch us.' He would not, however, put his case on that ground, but he would put it to the Supreme Council that it was not honourable to the Armenians to cede Erzerum on false pretences, as the Allied Powers had no intention to do anything except to write letters to President Wilson, or to assemble Conferences, or to address appeals to the League of Nations. He could say this, that no one in Great Britain would take the responsibility of asking for even £1,000,000 in order to send troops to conquer Erzerum. The Armenians could not conquer it themselves, and its cession to Armenia would be a purely provocative

*Who would  
capture  
Erzerum for  
Armenia?*

measure. He hoped that the body of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in London, who had given this question their most careful consideration, would have regard to what heavy obligations already rested upon the Allied Powers, and that they would not insist upon carrying out what was contrary to their principle of racial determination. He wished, therefore, to support most strongly Signor Nitti in his proposal to re-cast the proposed boundaries which, historically speaking, were never Armenian except at the time when England was Welsh and Asia Minor was Greek. He adopted the line that he was taking with deep regret, as it was in opposition to that which was taken by the London Conference. He wished, however, to submit to the Supreme Council two suggestions. First, before any decision was taken he thought they should find out whether President Wilson was prepared effectually to assist the Allies to carry out the Treaty as at present drafted. If the President agreed to lend the support of the United States, then he thought that the Supreme Council might follow the line indicated by the London Conference, and he suggested that President Wilson should be told that the answer he gave to that question would have a very considerable effect on the clauses that the Supreme Council might decide to insert in the Treaty. His second suggestion was this. In order to gain time and to see whether it were possible to secure some mandatory Power, the territory might, in the interval, be placed under the aegis of the League of Nations, with power to decide in the course of the next year or two to which Power it should be allotted. This would enable the Allied Powers to determine whether, in the course of time,

Armenia would prove her capacity to constitute a State and to defend her own frontiers unassisted by outside help.

M. BERTHELOT said that Mr. Lloyd George's arguments were not confined to the question of

*Berthelot  
accepts my  
proposals*

Erzerum, but they concerned Armenia's future generally. Mr. Lloyd George had represented that it was not honest on the part of the Great Powers to create a new Armenia on paper without being prepared to consolidate that State. This, he thought, was a most important question. The Great Powers were undoubtedly not in a position to render effective support, and the argument put by Mr. Lloyd George, that it was impossible to attempt to construct a new Armenia on paper without granting Armenia adequate means of support, was, he thought, irresistible. The two suggestions made by the British Prime Minister really amounted to this. It was proposed to state to America that she had always evinced the strongest interest in Armenia; that the Allied Powers thought that Erzerum was necessary to the new Armenia, and the United States had maintained that Trebizond was equally essential to her future existence. In the circumstances, were the United States prepared to lend their assistance? If President Wilson refused this appeal, then the Allied Powers would have to fall back upon themselves. Mr. Lloyd George's second suggestion gave the Allied Powers a breathing-space, and placed the onus upon the League of Nations. Well, it was possible that Mustapha Kemal and his forces might eventually disappear, and Mr. Lloyd George's suggestion would give the Allied Powers

two years in which to await events. This might not be an ideal solution, but as the Powers had no effective means of enforcing the Treaty, and as the attitude of the United States was quite uncertain, he felt—speaking on behalf of the French Delegation—that they were compelled to accept Mr. Lloyd George's suggestions, although these did not in any way settle the question of Erzerum.

LORD CURZON pointed out that Mr. Lloyd George had made a further suggestion, and that was, to endeavour to discover what the Armenians thought that the Allied Powers intended to give in the way of assistance. He himself was of opinion that the Armenians would state that they were perfectly prepared to take all risks and to defend their State without outside support. The Supreme Council had agreed already that Armenia should be among the signatories of the Treaty. What, he asked, would be the effect on public opinion generally if Armenia refused to sign the Treaty because the Powers were unable to decide this question.

M. MILLERAND said that he had listened with great interest to the discussion on the question of Erzerum. He himself felt bound to say that nothing that he had heard seemed to controvert the necessity of giving Erzerum to Armenia, as *Millerand* recommended by Lord Curzon and *still unconvinced* M. Berthelot. Mr. Lloyd George, however, had pointed out with irresistible force that we proposed to cede Erzerum to Armenia, and yet we were not in a position to support her if she should require assistance. Was it proposed that they should endeavour to maintain a *rational* Armenia, to include Erzerum, and at the same

time ask President Wilson whether the United States would accept a mandate for the new Armenia, or were they proposing to set up an Armenia on paper only, whose existence the Allied Powers were not prepared to secure? The question was undoubtedly a most embarrassing one. Was Armenia simply in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey as a point of interrogation only? He himself thought not. Only the previous day the Supreme Council had received certain information about Thrace which tended to show that the Greeks were confronted with much greater difficulties than they at present anticipated. The same was the case in Smyrna. However that might be, the Allied Powers desired to base this Treaty on the principles of justice and reparation, which were the bases upon which they had placed their belief since the beginning of the War. Further, they trusted that the United States would eventually conform to the ideas of justice and of self-determination which had actuated the Allied Powers in formulating their various Treaties. The proposed Treaty with Turkey was weak in many respects, and Armenia was a particularly weak point in that Treaty. To suspend the fate of that country was, he thought, to compromise altogether the whole Treaty with Turkey. To ask the Turks to sign a Treaty in which there was a considerable blank—well, was this desirable? His own conclusion was this. After much hesitation, and after the most conscientious examination of all the factors in question, the Conference in London had arrived at the conclusion that the reconstituted Armenia must include Erzerum. This was not an impeccable solution as Mr. Lloyd George had pointed out, but it did present a solution, and to

create an Armenia without Erzerum was no solution at all. A solution which left the fate of Armenia in suspense until President Wilson had made up his mind was, he thought, untenable."

Lord Curzon, however, was persuaded by Boghos Nubar Pasha that the Armenians themselves would be quite equal to the task of defending their State.

Boghos was an Armenian who had stood *The fairy-tales* well with the Sultans, and through their *of Boghos* favour had accumulated considerable

riches. Nevertheless, he was faithful to his people and served them to the best of his opportunities, whilst adroitly avoiding every provocation that would add his name to the appalling array of recruits which his fellow countrymen had contributed to the noble army of Armenian martyrs for the Christian faith. The business aptitude which made his wealth seemed to have deserted him completely when he adopted the role of a patriot. When asked for detailed information which would enable the Allied leaders to estimate the possibilities of forming an independent Armenian State, he supplied us, not with reliable figures, but with coloured fantasies about the numbers and heroic qualities of the Armenian warriors that would spring to arms—provided the Allies made those arms available. Lord Curzon had implicit faith in his statements and his statistics. His reply to every question, his method of dispelling every doubt was "Boghos assures me . . . ." The Turks were in possession of the fortress of Erzerum. Its capture was essential if the Armenian independent State was to be set up. Who was to capture it? Why, the Armenians, of course. Who said that they were capable of storming such a

formidable stronghold? Boghos had assured Lord Curzon that they could do so. A considerable army was necessary to guard the frontiers and defend them against all attacks. Where was that army to come from? "Oh! Boghos was confident that as soon as the State was in existence, Armenians would rally to its flag from the end of the earth." Lord Curzon resented every doubt cast upon the facts or figures of this stout-hearted Armenian leader. For a man who knew the Orient well, he displayed the most amazing credulity.

I will give an extract from Boghos' statement before the Council. Lord Curzon invited him to attend in order to dispel the serious doubts I had expressed as to the capacity of the Armenians, without the assistance of a large Allied force, to clear Kemal's forces out of Armenia in order to make a beginning with the establishment of an independent State. I was sceptical of its possibilities from the moment America backed out of the President's promise to undertake the American mandate.

But Lord Curzon, to corroborate his proposition that the Armenians were "perfectly prepared to take all risks and to defend their State without outside support", invited Boghos Nubar Pasha to state his case:—

*Boghos  
attends the  
Council*

"SIGNOR NITTI briefly stated the points which the supreme Council desired to put before the Armenian Delegation, and said that the two principal questions which they wished to ask Boghos Nubar Pasha were:—

Was Armenia prepared to defend her new frontiers and did she desire the inclusion of Erzerum within those frontiers?



Further, did Boghos Nubar Pasha think that Armenia was in a position to reorganise her army and to provide the means to safeguard the new State?

MR. LLOYD GEORGE added a further question:—

Did the Pasha think that the Armenians were in a position to capture Erzerum, which was now in possession of the Turks, and to establish themselves in that fortress?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA said that he had no doubt at all that the Armenians could establish themselves at Erzerum and consolidate their position there. They had already, at Erivan, the elements of an army which had fought throughout the War and had proved themselves excellent soldiers. They were quite prepared to fight again and to conquer Erzerum, the inclusion of which was essential to the New Republic of Armenia. The Armenians had already in being an army of not less than 15,000 men, and they could raise without difficulty another 40,000, if the Allies were prepared to provide them with munitions and equipment. At present the Armenian soldiers were unsupplied with boots, and they had no munitions at all. No one, however, could question their military valour. They had supplied a Battalion to the French Foreign Legion which had fought in France and Palestine, and elsewhere under French leadership; they had received the highest praise from the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and also from Field-Marshal Lord Allenby. The Armenian troops had also fought with the Russian army, and had latterly, owing to the defection of the Russians, been left to bear the whole brunt of the War. He and his colleagues were convinced that, given arms and

*Fighting  
mettle of the  
Armenians*

munitions and equipment, they would render a good account of themselves. They still had a certain number of Russian officers, but it was very necessary that they should get officers from the Allies also. Only the previous day he had received a communication from America to the effect that there were 5,000 to 10,000 American volunteers ready to start at a moment's notice for Cilicia. He was quite certain that they could raise in the United States many more thousands of men to enlist in the Armenian army. As regards Erzerum, the possession of this place was absolutely essential to the security of the new Armenian State, and the fortress was really the key of her future.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE said that the difficulty of the Allied Powers was this; they had already undertaken immense obligations in regard to Germany and elsewhere. If Erzerum were ceded in the terms of the Treaty to Armenia, it must be captured from the Turks. Supposing the Turks refused to give up the place, did Armenia expect the Allied Powers to support her and to assist her to capture the fortress, or were they themselves prepared to march against the Turks and conquer it?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA said he quite realised the terrible difficulties which confronted the Allies after their awful experiences during the recent War. He fully understood that it was most difficult for them to send troops. Much as Armenia would have liked to have received military support from the Allies, they did not feel this assistance was indispensable. The great majority of the Armenian soldiers who had fought during the recent War had been demobilised, but he thought that they

*Could capture  
Erzerum  
single-handed*

could readily remobilise men up to the extent of 5,000 or 6,000. Mustapha Kemal, no doubt, disposed of a considerable number of men, but he did not think that these were equal in fighting value to, or as numerous as, the soldiers that Armenia could put into the field. He did wish to lay stress upon this fact, that he could not conceive of an Armenia without Erzerum.

SIGNOR NITTI enquired how many Armenians there were at present in Erzerum?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA pointed out that great numbers of Armenians had been killed or massacred, or deported. If, however, tomorrow Erzerum became once more Armenian, all the Armenians in Cilicia, or those who had been exiled or deported, would at once return.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE asked whether, supposing under the terms of the Treaty the Province of Erzerum was added to the new Armenian State, would Armenia expect the Great Powers to assist her to recover this province and to establish their authority there?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA said that the only answer he could give was this. The Armenians were quite aware that they could not rely upon Allied military support, much as they would like to have this assistance. In spite of that, he was quite sure that the Armenians were fully capable of capturing Erzerum and maintaining themselves there.

SIGNOR NITTI asked how, with the limited forces at the disposal of the Armenians, they could prevent future massacres?

*No Armenians  
left to  
massacre*

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA pointed out that there were really no Armenians left to massacre. In 1914 the Turks

had endeavoured to dispose of the Armenian question entirely by wiping out the Armenians altogether.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether in the Province of Erzerum, during the last 50 or 100 years, there had ever been an Armenian majority?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA replied in the affirmative. This was the case both in Erzerum and in other Vilayets.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE enquired whether Boghos Nubar Pasha had any figures to substantiate his statement?

BOGHOS NUBAR PASHA said that he would be quite prepared to supply the necessary figures, if desired."

No testimony could have revealed more pitilessly the hopelessness of the Armenian position and the casual random and lax way in which the principal champions of a highly intelligent race ascertained facts upon which the future of that race as an independent nation entirely depended.

The following day M. Aharonian, the head of the Armenian Delegation, appeared before the Supreme Council. The Chairman, Signor Nitti, addressing him, said:—

" . . . he must be aware that it was impossible for the Allied Powers to send troops to the assistance of Armenia. What he desired on behalf of the Supreme Council now to ask M. Aharonian was, supposing the Allied Powers were prepared to supply officers, munitions and equipment to the Armenian armies, would those armies be able to drive the Turks out of Erzerum and maintain

themselves in that fortress, and also secure their new frontiers? A further question he would like to ask M. Aharonian was what, having regard to Armenia's best interests, was the most suitable frontier to be laid down?"

M. Aharonian was just as confident, but also as confused and contradictory in his explanations, as Boghos Pasha. According to him, Kemal's *More blinkered optimism from Aharonian* army was a poor thing "greatly inferior to what was imagined"; not numerous, ill-trained and ill-equipped. The Armenians on the other hand had an army in being of 25,000 to 30,000 men trained by the Russians. In two or three months there would be 40,000. All they asked for was clothing, munitions, equipment, officers and the right to march under the Allied flags:—

"and if these were granted to them he had every hope that the Armenian army would be able to march in a very short time and to occupy the Province. Further, he was practically certain that the Armenians, reinforced as he had indicated above, would not only be able to take Erzerum but would also be in a position to capture other Provinces, though these might occasion them a certain amount of difficulty, more especially the Province of Van."

On the other hand, he admitted that the Turkish population constituted a majority in the Vilayet of Erzerum, but that that majority was due to the fact that they had a garrison of 40,000 in that area alone. He ended by saying that he had no figures about the size of the Turkish army.

How could we depend on such information? We called in Marshal Foch, who spoke sympathetically of the Armenians, who had been "persecuted for centuries," but he was not encouraging about the prospects of their liberation by their own efforts. He undertook to refer the question to the military experts. They reported:—

"Les Gouvernements ayant d'autre part décidé qu'aucune force alliée ne serait envoyée en Arménie, les Arméniens se trouveront réduits à leur seule force et dans ces conditions ils semblent incapables de prendre possession de l'Arménie turque et d'Erzeroum en particulier."

*Military experts' adverse verdict*

This report confirmed the conclusion at which I had already arrived as to the possibility of establishing and maintaining an independent Armenian State on a large scale. I said:—

"I could not accept the responsibility of agreeing to the Larger Armenia. I had consulted Mr. Balfour, who had been in charge of the matter in Paris, and I found that Mr. Balfour took precisely the same view as I did. I thought the British Cabinet would also take this view. Naturally, Lord Curzon, who had been President of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors in London, stood loyally by the decision of that Conference. Personally, however, I felt that the creation of a Larger Armenia would make for bad feeling among the Moslems in India and all the world over. Moreover, it was indefensible on ethnological grounds. What I would like would be,

if possible, to suspend the question until the United States of America would decide finally whether they could take a mandate. If President Wilson refused it was possible that some future President might accept. If America became the Mandatory she would see fair play in Armenia. Apart from that, I felt I could not agree to the Larger Armenia, and this prevented the Treaty from going forward. I hoped it would be possible for M. Millerand to agree with me on some plan of holding the settlement in suspense until America could finally decide. In that case it would be possible to have the Larger Armenia.

M. MILLERAND said that he thought Lloyd George attached an exaggerated importance to the question of Erzerum itself. He quite realised the British Prime Minister's reasons, and would like to meet him. He himself would like to go rather further than Mr. Lloyd George, and make the following suggestions to the United States:—

*Millerand  
accepts  
reference  
to America*

(i) As Mr. Lloyd George suggested, to ask President Wilson if America would charge herself with the Mandate for Armenia. If this were accepted, the question was settled.

(ii) If America would not accept, to ask her to arbitrate and to say whether Erzerum should be neutralised or should form part of Armenia."

We were all in agreement that it would be hard on the Armenian remnant to abandon them without giving America a chance to demonstrate what she was prepared to do to assist them to rebuild a nation strong enough to defend itself against the Grey Wolf—

as Kemal was called by his friends—and his growing pack. Russia, which had undertaken the liberation and protection of the Armenians, had retired from the field. The President's Note showed that America was still interested. We therefore decided to sound him as to his practical designs for giving effect to his sympathies.

The following Note was accordingly despatched to him:—

“In the note of this date that is being addressed to the United States Government in response to the Note of the latter dated March the 26th, a passing reference alone has  
*Our message to Wilson* been made to the subject of Armenia, and a statement is added that a separate communication will be made to the United States Government on the subject. The following are the views which it is the desire of the Supreme Council to submit for the consideration of that Government.

At an early stage in the discussions which have been proceeding with regard to the Turkish Treaty, first in London and afterwards in Paris, an enquiry was addressed by the Allied Conference to the Council of the League of Nations, who were known to be greatly interested in the future of Armenia, as to what might be the degree of assistance that they would be prepared to offer towards the realisation of the independence and security of the projected Armenian State.

It was not contemplated to invite the League of Nations itself to assume a Mandate for Armenia for the sufficient reason that that body is neither a State nor has the army nor the finances to enable it to discharge such a duty.



The Council of the League in their reply, while indicating the fullest sympathy with the object of the Allied Powers, themselves pointed out that this could best be assured if either a member of the League or some other Power could be found willing to accept the Mandate for Armenia.

The Supreme Council, in considering this reply, were at once reminded of the conviction long entertained by them that the only Great Power which is qualified alike by its sympathies and its material resources to undertake this task on behalf of humanity, is America. It has indeed been rightly described in Mr. Colby's note as 'the demand and expectation of the civilised world.' Nor could the Supreme Council forget that the inclusion of a liberated Armenia among the objects for which the Allied and Associated Powers fought and won the War nowhere received more eloquent expression than in the speeches of President Wilson.

Accordingly the Supreme Council now address a definite appeal to the United States Government

<i>U.S.A. asked</i>	to accept the mandate for Armenia.
<i>to take</i>	They do so not from the smallest desire
<i>Armenian</i>	to evade any obligations which they
<i>Mandate</i>	might be expected to undertake, but

because the responsibilities which they are already obliged to bear in connection with the dissolution of the former Ottoman Empire will strain their own capacities to the uttermost, and because they believe that the appearance on the scene of a Power emancipated from the prepossession of the old world will inspire a wider confidence and afford a firmer guarantee for stability in the future than would the selection of any European Power.

The United States Government might well enquire, what is the scope of the obligations which they are invited to accept; and this involves the boundaries of the new state.

The question is one which it is in the power of that Government itself to formulate a reply.

In the course of the discussions that have been proceeding there has been no problem more earnestly debated or more difficult of solution than the boundaries best consonant with the interests of the Armenian State.

The President of the United States has consistently pleaded the cause of a larger Armenia; considerations with which the President is already familiar have inevitably compelled the partial curtailment of these aspirations; and the prospect of creating an Armenia which should include Cilicia and extend to the Mediterranean has for long been abandoned as impracticable.

There remained the questions what portions of the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, still in the possession of the Turkish authorities, could properly and safely be added to the existing Armenian State of Erivan, and what means of access to the sea should be provided in order to ensure to the new Armenia a self-sufficing national existence. In other words, it remained to be settled what should be the next boundaries on the West and South which should be inserted in the Peace Treaty with Turkey. The boundaries of Armenia on the North-West, and North, and North-East, with the adjoining States of Georgia and Azerbaijan it is hoped to settle by a mutual agreement between these Republics. In any case these do not call for mention here.

*Problem of  
Armenia's  
boundaries*

Upon the above questions there was much to be said upon both sides which need not be recapitulated in this Note.

Suffice it to say that an appeal to the decision of an independent and absolutely impartial arbiter was recognised as to the best available solution, and that it was decided to include in the appeal to the President of the United States a request to this effect. Whatever may be the answer of the United States Government on the larger subject of the Mandate, it is earnestly hoped that he will, in the interests both of Armenia and of the peace of the East, accept this honourable obligation.

In this expectation it has been agreed:—

(a) To make an appeal to President Wilson that the United States of America should accept a Mandate for Armenia within the limits set forth in Section V of the first print of the draft Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

(b) That, whatever may be the answer of the United States Government, on the subject of the Mandate the President of the United

States should be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia as set forth in the draft article below.

(c) That an article in regard to Armenia should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace in the following sense:—

Turkey and Armenia and the other High contracting Parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia, in the vilayets

of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent state of Armenia.

Pending the arbitration, the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia shall remain as at present.

The boundaries of Armenia on the north and east, that is between Armenia and Georgia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan shall be laid down by the Supreme Council at the same time as those between Armenia and Turkey, failing a spontaneous agreement on this subject between the three Caucasian States.

Irrespective of the mandate and the frontiers, there remain certain additional considerations to which the Supreme Council feel impelled to call the sympathetic attention of the United States Government. In whatever hands the destinies of Armenia may be placed, an interval must inevitably occur, after the conclusion of the Treaty with Turkey, in which the security and even the existence of the New State will be in peril, unless it can be assured of extraneous aid.

Its immediate needs will be two in number—provision of the military forces required to defend it against external attack, and provision of the financial means that will enable it to constitute an orderly administration and to develop its own economic resources. In the last resort both of these necessities may be summed up under the heading of financial assistance.

The question of military assistance is not thought to be so formidable as might at first sight appear to be the case.

The forces at present possessed by the Armenian Republic of Erivan have hitherto been to a large extent diverted—if not dissipated—in the unfortunate disputes with its neighbours on the north and the east. When these are composed—as may be hoped from an arrangement quite recently concluded between the three Caucasian Republics—there will be nothing to prevent a reconstituted Armenia from devoting its undivided energies to the vindications and maintenance of such frontiers as may be allotted to it.

The question has been anxiously examined of the extent to which the Allied Powers might themselves be able by the movement of troops to assure the prompt execution of the territorial clauses of the Treaty in the region of Armenia.

Arms and ammunition are already being provided, but it would raise false hopes on the part both of the Armenians and of their friends in all parts of the world, if it were generally believed that the Allied Powers could themselves spare troops for this purpose. The responsibilities entailed upon them in addition to their heavy obligations in Europe and elsewhere by the occupation or administration of territories that formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, and by the necessity of enforcing the Treaty in those parts of Turkey which are more accessible to their arms, will render impossible the assumption of military responsibilities additional to the tremendous burdens they have already assumed. Unless, therefore, Armenia can obtain immediate assistance from some other

Power she will be forced to rely in the main, so far as military defence is concerned, upon the forces she already possesses, augmented by such instructors and munitions as the Allies can supply.

Were, however, a volunteer contingent or a volunteer corps to be raised for her defence in America or in any foreign country it would no doubt be a welcome and invaluable incentive to her own patriotism. But the offer of trained and technical assistance and material aid on an organised scale by a great civilised state would be even more opportune and would enable her to employ her own manhood in her own defence in an effective way. It would be of the greatest value to know if the American Government or the American people will be at all disposed to render her this service.

The provision of credits, however, is even more urgent.

The Council of the League of Nations have had it in mind, we believe, to recommend the Assembly of the League to guarantee a loan to Armenia from all countries who are members of the League.

The Supreme Council have of course no knowledge of the response that may be returned to such an appeal, if it be made.

But even assuming a favourable reply, an interval must occur before effective aid could be given in this manner; it is uncertain whether the response would be adequate to the need; and in any case the appeal cannot, for reasons which are known, be addressed to the United States

*American loan suggested* Government. In these circumstances help might fail to be forthcoming in the very quarter where sympathy for the future Armenian State is most sincere and

active, where the burdens entailed by the War are believed to be less onerous than in any of the other recently belligerent countries, and where the resources of a state and a community, at once powerful and wealthy, have been least impaired.

It is not for the supreme Council to suggest to the United States Government by what means, whether by State action or by contributions, public or private, the desired financial aid to the Armenian Republic could best be afforded.

An American loan of a few millions sterling might be the means of setting Armenia at once upon her feet. On the other hand it is believed that there are many organisations and societies in America, that would gladly contribute to so excellent a cause. Nor should Armenians themselves be backward in coming forward in the hour of their country's need. They cannot expect and they do not desire to depend exclusively upon the mercy or the charity of others. Wealthy Armenians will, it is felt sure, contribute largely to that resuscitation of their country for which they have waited so patiently and amid sufferings so cruel and prolonged; and there may well be universal emulation in responding to an appeal than which a more deserving can rarely have been addressed to the heart and conscience of mankind.

It is not desired to urge upon the United States Government any unreasonable haste in arriving at a decision upon the momentous questions that have been submitted to them.

But it will be obvious to them that so long as these matters are held in suspense, the anxieties of Armenia will be extreme, and the pacification of

the Eastern world may be seriously and even disastrously postponed.

It would accordingly be an immense relief to all the parties concerned if the United States Government were in a position to give as early a reply as may be convenient to all or any of the questions which have here been submitted to them. Nor can the Supreme Council conclude without expressing a most earnest hope that that reply maybe affirmative in character."

In his reply, President Wilson accepted the position of an arbitrator, but he could go no further.

From the moment America repudiated any idea of accepting the mandate for Armenia, I was more than doubtful of the practicability of establishing and maintaining an independent Armenian State from sea to sea. Any settlement whose enforcement would necessitate military operations in the heart of Asia Minor would involve such a considerable and sustained toll on the resources of the Allies, that I felt convinced the Powers could not in their exhausted condition be prepared to face it. More particularly would that consideration apply in regions where the majority of the inhabitants were hostile, and where the terrain was suitable for prolonged guerilla warfare. In my view the waging by the Allies of any war in the interior of Anatolia was out of the question. That did not apply to regions contiguous to the sea and where the population was hostile to Turkish rule.

Constantinople had no Turkish force. It was occupied by Allied contingents—mostly British—who were adequate to quell any attempt at a Turkish

*Hopeless  
position  
of Armenia*



insurrection. The population was barely half Turk. The presence of the British fleet in the Bosphorus was sufficient to deal with any serious disturbance. It was in command of the sea that severed Europe from Asia and which was the centre of resistance. Thrace had an anti-Turkish majority. There were a few districts where the Turks constituted a majority of the population, but they were surrounded by localities which were predominantly Greek. The Turkish Army in Thrace had been disbanded. There were no organised or armed units left. The Greeks had a garrison that was equal to dealing with any riot or resistance. Kemal could not have sent over from Anatolia reinforcements of men or material to succour rebellion in European Turkey. Thrace therefore presented no serious military problem. The only result of an insurrection in that province would have been that the Turks would have been deprived—probably for ever—of their renowned capital. Kemal was shrewd enough to know that the Arab countries were irretrievably lost to the Turkish Empire. They might resent the interference of foreign mandatories and the immigration of Jews, but they were not hankering for the return of their Turkish misrulers.

Smyrna was left as a military anxiety and the Italian criticism concentrated on the creation of this new Greek enclave. Up to the date of the Treaty of Versailles the French were just as definitely in favour of adding the south-western corner of Asia Minor to the kingdom of Greece as were Britain and America. Could the Greeks defend this territory against Kemalist attacks? It was estimated that Mustapha Kemal could not have more than 80,000 men at his

*The problem  
of Smyrna*

disposal. The Turkish Army at the date of the Armistice was deprived of most of its equipment, especially in artillery. Its meagre arsenals were in Allied hands. The former War partners who kept it supplied with guns and ammunition were no longer in a position to do so. As to Bolshevik Russia, it was as much as it could do at that date to furnish its own armies with the minimum equipment to enable them to face their foes. Even the 80,000 troops of the Turkish Nationalist Army were in every respect inferior in equipment to the Greek Army of occupation in Smyrna. Veniselos had landed 90,000 men in the area of Greek occupation. Behind these he had large forces in Greece which had been provided by the Allies with everything that was necessary to enable them to take their places in the line of attack against the Bulgarians, Germans and Austrians who were entrenched in the Balkans. It was reckoned that at the end of the War the Greeks had under arms 300,000 men fully equipped. They were not only well trained, but they had experience of fighting, and fighting successfully, against a formidable enemy that had resisted the combined attack of French, British and Serbian troops for over three years. The General in command was an exceptionally able soldier. The staff officers were highly intelligent and trained to war in French military colleges. As long as the Allies were prepared to provide them with the necessary ammunition, they could have resisted any offensive which Kemal was in a position to launch against them. As far as the Greeks were concerned, they were not called upon to penetrate the fastness of Anatolia. All they had to do was to remain on the defensive and repel any attacks made upon their entrenched positions. Kemal

had neither the men, the artillery nor the ammunition for conducting such an offensive.

It was contended that the necessity for maintaining a large army to protect the province of Smyrna against the constant fear of attack would exhaust the limited resources of Greece. The answer of Veniselos was that the 1,000,000 Greeks dwelling in this district and the immediately adjacent island could provide 100,000 men in a few days to resist any invader. Under good Government the million would grow rapidly in this fertile region by attracting back the Greek refugees from Asia Minor. My experience of Veniselos was that he never over-estimated the number of men he could put in the field. He always exceeded his promises in that respect.

Mustapha Kemal could not muster large forces on the frontier without exciting alarm amongst the watchmen who would be patrolling the boundaries. Nothing therefore short of treason on the Greek side, or of an incompetency tantamount to treason, could have enabled the Turks of Anatolia to overrun Smyrna and drive the Greeks into the sea. The Supreme Council were therefore justified in adhering to their plans for the severance of the Arab countries and of Thrace and Smyrna from Turkey.

I have already expressed the doubts I felt about the wisdom of attempting to set up a Greater Armenia. We should have concentrated on the feasible. The Council overruled my views. I still think that effort, however laudable the purpose, was a blunder. But the French hung on to Cilicia until it was too late to prevent mischief. As to Adalia, the Italian Government never gave the scheme a chance. They did

not believe in the venture and they handled it like men of little faith—feebly and recklessly.

The draft of the Treaty when completed was presented to the Turks on April 24, 1920. Ultimately it was signed at Sèvres on August 10th.

*Treaty of Sèvres signed* The following is a summary of its chief provisions:—

A. TERRITORIAL: The frontiers of Turkey were drawn as follows:—

1. In Europe: Constantinople and a small hinterland north of the Bosphorus.

2. In Asia: Asia Minor, eastwards as far as the frontier of the new State of Armenia, and southwards to a line excluding the gulf of Alexandretta, and thence running due east to the banks of the Tigris.

A Neutralised Zone was set up surrounding the Straits—the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus—covering the waters themselves and the land on both sides, and the islands in the Aegean Sea near the mouth of the Dardanelles. This zone was placed under an International Commission, charged to secure free navigation for the ships of all nations in peace or war, save as decreed otherwise by the Council of the League of Nations.

The territories severed from Turkey were dealt with as follows:—

Greece was given the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and the parts of Turkey-in-Europe outside the Constantinople hinterland.

Armenia was set up as an independent State, with frontiers settled by the arbitration of President Wilson.

Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine were made independent States, subject to supervision by a

Mandatory Power appointed by the League—the Mandatory of Palestine having the duty of carrying out there the promises of the Balfour Declaration.

The Hedjaz was made an independent State.

Turkey renounced all rights of suzerainty over Egypt, the Soudan and Libya. She recognized the British Protectorate over Egypt and that of France over Tunis and Morocco.

The British annexation of Cyprus was accepted, and the Dodecanese Islands were ceded to Italy.

Smyrna and a large area of Western Asia Minor were placed under Greek control, with the option in five years of voting for inclusion in the Greek realm.

Kurdistan was accorded local autonomy, with the right to secede in one year from Turkey.

**B. FINANCIAL:** Turkey being a bankrupt State, the Treaty provided that its whole finances should be placed under the control of a Financial Commission, which should supervise its Budget, control its expenditure, secure the meeting of its external debt, and appropriate any surplus towards meeting the costs of the Army of Occupation and the war indemnity which Turkey was liable to pay.

The system of Capitulations whereby certain States had before the war secured extra-territorial status for their nationals in Turkish territory was re-established and extended to all the Allied Powers.

**C. INTERNATIONAL:** The Treaty opened with the Covenant of the League of Nations. In a later section the constitution of the International Labour Office was also inserted.

Frontiers of Turkey: —  
 Frontiers proposed at Smyrna: .....  
 Bands of Smyrna territory: [hatched pattern]  
 International zone of Shams: [dotted pattern]  
 Areas severed from Turkey shaded: [diagonal lines]

Measures for Turkey's disarmament were prescribed, and for the punishment of war criminals.

Protection of Minorities was guaranteed. All Turkish citizens of whatever nationality, language or religion were to be given equal civil and political rights, and educational and religious liberty.

The Allied Powers were given full rights of aerial navigation over Turkish territory.

M. Veniselos, who was satisfied with the decisions of the San Remo Conference, sent me a warm letter on April 26th:—

“My dear Prime Minister,

I desire most sincerely to express to you, and through you, to the British Government my deep gratitude, as well as that of my country, for all you have done to enable us to obtain the fulfilment of our national unity.

I feel however, that I am quite unable to give adequate expression to my feelings, for indeed, all that Greece has now realised of her legitimate claims, is due in major part, my dear Prime Minister, to your powerful and effective support, and no words of mine can efficiently express my country's deep sense of thankfulness to you.

I believe that the best way of giving practical evidence of our gratitude, is to prove worthy of your trust in us, and of your expectations as regards Greater Greece, which you so well expressed in the message you were good enough to transmit to me last December, through Sir John Stavridi.

By combining the culture of her old civilisation with the vitality and spirit of her younger generations, Greece will become a factor of progress, of peace and of order in the Near East, and will thus

By combining the culture of her old civilisation with the vitality and spirit of her younger generations, Greece, will become a factor of progress, of peace and of order in the Near East, and will thus prove that you have not given her your invaluable support in vain.

Believe me, my dear Prime Minister,

Ever yours sincerely and gratefully.

E. H. Venizelos





prove that you have not given her your invaluable support in vain.

Believe me, my dear Prime Minister,  
Ever yours sincerely and gratefully,  
E. K. VENIZELOS."

The map on p. 1339 will show clearly the distribution of the territory of the Turkish Empire which was contemplated by the Treaty of Sèvres. Why it was subsequently recast at Lausanne and non-Turkish populations, once liberated from Turkish misgovernment and persecution, were replaced under the sway of a race that never learned how to rule another people well or wisely, is a story which I hope to tell one day in my account of the betrayal of the Treaties by the Powers that framed them. Asia Minor for centuries made a rich contribution to the well-being of mankind. Under Turkish rule it made none of any appreciable moment. If the new Turkish nationalism reverses the whole traditions of Turkish Government since it butted into civilisation, it may yet repair the tragic blunder perpetrated by the cowardly surrender of Lausanne.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### THE TURKISH TREATY (*continued*)

#### THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SÈVRES TREATY

THIS history would be incomplete without a brief summary of the events that led to the retreat of the Allies from Sèvres to Lausanne.

The independent Armenian State was a hopeless project from the moment America refused to undertake the responsibility of protecting it. The French, whilst not prepared to give any military support to the Armenians, had insisted on including within its boundaries provinces which were overwhelmingly Turkish. Kemal's army soon swept the miserable army of Boghos out of existence. There was only the Greek Army left in Asia Minor to resist his growing power.

As the result of the War the Southern Slavs, the Roumanians, the Czechoslovaks, the Poles and the Arabs won a measure of emancipation

*Reason for  
the Greek  
failure*

for their races beyond the most sanguine dreams of their leaders. Why did the Greeks fall so far short of realising their aims and ambitions? The answer is to be found partly in the policy pursued during and after the War by their King and the reactionaries who supported him, and their utter incompetence when power was thrust by events into their hands. The explanation is also partly to be found in the treachery of some of

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SÈVRES TREATY 1343

the Allied Governments, who surreptitiously encouraged the Turks and helped to arm their forces.

But the most important element in the Greek failure was that the internal divisions, which throughout Greek history have been so fatal to Greek political achievement, once more intervened to deprive this gifted nation of a supreme chance.

When Veniselos returned to his country after the Treaty of Sèvres, and the Italian Pact resigning the Dodecanese to Greece had been signed,

*Triumph and  
fall of  
Veniselos* he carried with him two documents which in so far as the signature of the then most powerful nations in Europe

could guarantee the life and the limits of a State, reunited the Greek race for the first time since its conquest by the Turk centuries ago. Veniselos was acclaimed by the unanimous vote of the Greek Parliament as the saviour of his country. No political faction withheld from him its meed of gratitude. In a few weeks an incident occurred which revealed the hollowness and the falsity of that thanks. The young King Alexander, playing in the palace gardens with a couple of pet monkeys, was bitten by one of them. The wound festered and the poor King died in agony in a few days. It is strange but it is nevertheless a fact that the bite of an infuriated monkey changed the history of Greece and affected seriously the course of events in much more important countries. The tragedy was followed by a revival throughout Greece of the old sentiment for Constantine. The political factions who hated Veniselos took full advantage of that feeling to organise the downfall of the man they detested more than they loved Greece. There was an election. Veniselos stipulated that Constantine should not be recalled. He was

badly beaten at the polls and consequently had to resign office. War weariness on the part of the Greek nation had much to do with his defeat. The prostration of spirit which followed the intensive strain of the War produced a reaction which resulted in the defeat of all the War leaders, not alone in the defeated, but also in the victorious countries. Wilson, Clemenceau, Orlando, Sonnino and Veniselos were repudiated by the countries they had led to victory. My only solace is that my turn came last, after this notable array of national leaders had already been retired.

I felt the defeat of Veniselos as a severe blow to the whole of our Greek policy. I had a sincere and a deep conviction that the restoration of Greek civilisation in the Eastern Mediterranean would be a real contribution towards a sure peace. But I had a presentiment that this blow might well be a fatal one. I knew too well the elements that had rallied behind Constantine to overthrow the great Greek leader. They were a poor lot, quite inadequate to carry out a great national policy. I also knew of the change that had taken place in the attitude of France towards the Greek claims since the retirement of Clemenceau. Italy was always hostile. Labouring under these feelings, I wrote to M. Veniselos the following letter:—

“17th November 1920.

Dear Monsieur Veniselos,

I was deeply shocked and distressed to see the result of the Greek Elections. It almost makes one despair of Democracy.

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SEVRES TREATY 1345

I want now to assure you of the sympathy and gratitude and admiration which the British People feel towards you for all you have achieved in the last few years. No great leader could have stood more steadfastly than you have by the highest interests of his country and by the ideals for which the Allies fought in the Great War. I can assure you that your name will always be honoured in this country as one of Britain's best friends and one of Europe's greatest statesmen. Our hearts are with you in this difficult time. We shall never forget your tried loyalty during the great period when militarism threatened to overwhelm our liberties and when, practically alone, among the leaders of the smaller nations of Europe you never wavered in your support of the Allied cause. I hope and believe it will not be long before the people of Greece realise the mistake they have made and recall you to take charge once more of their affairs.

Yours ever,

D. L. G.

Monsieur Veniselos replied as follows:—

“Astoria Hotel, November 27th, 1920.  
Avenue des Fleurs,  
NICE.

My dear Prime Minister,

I can find no words to express to you my deep gratitude for the moral satisfaction you have given me by the letter you were kind enough to write. I was greatly moved by your expression of the feelings of the British people towards me.

*Veniselos  
remains  
hopeful*

Much as the result of the elections in Greece was unexpected, there is no reason to despair of 'democracy.' One must not condemn the Greek people who were clearly war-weary, because, after all, it is a fact that I found myself in the necessity to continue mobilization for two years after the armistice and there was no certain sign in view of an immediate demobilization.

To my mind the most important thing at the present time is to avoid King Constantine coming to the throne. He is a man who hates democracy and democratic nations, and so long as he is on the throne he will be, in fact, an absolute monarch directing his policy in accordance with his personal views and preferences; whereas, if Crown Prince George were raised to the throne it will allow constitutional government to continue in the country. I have no doubt, then, that even my political opponents will follow sincerely a friendly policy towards their Western Allies.

I am firmly convinced, as I have explained to Sir John Stavridi that, if England and France speak strongly to Athens giving the impression that they are absolutely unanimous, it is still possible to prevent the return of Constantine. In any case I sincerely trust that the French proposal of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres will, under no circumstances, be accepted.

Yours as ever,

E. K. VENISELOS."

It will be observed from the last paragraph that France had already hurried to propose a revision of the Treaty.

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SÈVRES TREATY 1347

Constantine was restored to the throne with the same unanimity as that which had been displayed by the same people when they drove him from it a little over two years before. His first act was to destroy the efficiency of the fine army that faced the Turk in Asia Minor. He eliminated the whole of the able young officers whom Veniselos had so carefully chosen, and whose leadership was responsible for the remarkable efficiency of the Greek troops as a fighting force. They were suspected of being partisans of the defeated Premier, and the fact that they had the confidence and affection of the troops did not count in mitigation of that crime. Constantine substituted for them material inferior in quality and experience. This step affected prejudicially the morale of the army. The Greek soldier is a brave man but he is also temperamental. It is only the stolid Northerner who goes on fighting notwithstanding his opinion as to the capabilities of his commanders. The Veniselos army was highly efficient in its organisation behind the lines as well as in its leadership in the field. The Constantine staff possessed neither of these attributes. His Ministry was made up of second-rate men. There was not a man amongst them who would rank in capacity, in drive, and least of all in inspiration, with Veniselos. This group of muddle-headed courtiers, having thus got rid of the best fighting officers in the army, dismissed the officers who had charge of the army supplies, and put in their place their own political favourites. The result was that the soldiers were badly fed and ill-clad. The army visibly deteriorated from day to day. To put heart into them, Constantine ordered a reckless and foolish offensive against Angora. The King was puffed up by the flatteries



of his sycophants into the belief that he was a military genius of the first order, and that every half-starved Greek soldier was thrilled with a new ardour by the knowledge that this famous warrior would once more lead.

I recall how much shocked Veniselos was with this mad outbreak of regal vanity. The troops were marched through ragged country into hopeless positions and were easily defeated by a worse equipped but better led force of Turks. In order to restore the fighting quality of this mob of defeated and dispirited men, Constantine bethought him of a grand expedient. He dismissed the General, and put at the head of his

*Greek forces  
routed in  
Asia Minor*

Army a man who once had a good reputation as a soldier but was now a mental case—General Hadjanestes. He was labouring under the delusion that his legs were made of sugar and that they were so brittle that if he stood up they might break.

As if this were not enough to shatter the spirit of any army, the vain-glorious monarch withdrew his picked troops from the Asiatic front and sent them to Europe in order to form a new army for the conquest of Constantinople. The pitiable remnant left behind went to pieces. When it was attacked the new officers were amongst the first to seek safety. Officers and men fled in a headlong rabble, leaving behind them guns, ammunition, and equipment. They ran so hard that the pursuing troops could not catch them up before they had embarked at Smyrna under the protection of the Allied battleships. When it was quite clear that the Greeks, under their new leadership, could not defend their recent possessions on the Asiatic side of the Aegean, the Allied Powers endeavoured to

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SEVRES TREATY 1349

make the best terms for them on the European side—in Thrace and the Islands. The Powers were quite strong enough with their navies to prevent Kemal's forces crashing over into Europe. But unhappily there was a division amongst the Allies, and that division was reflected even inside the British Cabinet. It was due to these differences of opinion that wholesale concessions on the Asiatic side were offered to Mustapha Kemal and they were accountable for the final humiliating surrender.

During the whole of this wretched business, some of the Allied Powers played a treacherous part.

*Treachery  
of France  
and Italy* The Italians sold arms to Mustapha Kemal to fight the Greeks, and were paid out of money supplied by Moscow. The French

Government negotiated a secret Treaty with Kemal behind the backs of the British Ministry. This enabled him to withdraw all his forces from the Armenian and Syrian front and fling them on the demoralised Greck Army. The British Government stood loyally by the Treaty they had negotiated in full concurrence with their Allies, and their troops held their ground in the positions which had been assigned to them on the Straits. When Kemal advanced to attack them, Poincaré withdrew the French troops from Chanak, leaving the British without any support on a vital flank. Reinforcements were hurriedly sent from Britain. The Mediterranean fleet steamed at full speed to aid the troops on the Asiatic shore. Several squadrons of aeroplanes were sent to Gallipoli and many batteries of heavy guns were planted on the heights which commanded the approaches to Chanak. It is admitted in the very able biography of Kemal written by R. C. Armstrong, that the Turks were too ill-equipped to attack,

and that had they done so they would have been beaten.

"The Turkish troops though blown up with the pride and excitement of victory were tired, in rags, short of ammunition, without big guns or the advantages of mechanical warfare.

The English troops were seasoned, their officers experienced, their positions strong and well-entrenched. Behind them lay a great armada of battleships with big guns, and aeroplanes, and behind that again all the might of the British Empire.

If the English meant to fight, the Turks would be beaten. But did they mean to fight? Were they bluffing? That was the question."

It was not a bluff. I certainly meant to fight and I was certain we should win. Had the Turks been checked in their victorious chase of a *British Government defeated on Chanak policy* broken and a broken-spirited army, they would have been easier to deal with. The Greek army had not been annihilated. The veterans of the Balkan War and the Great War had not been slaughtered. They could have been reformed and re-equipped. With the British troops behind them, this resuscitated army could have swept back Kemal's tired and ill-equipped forces. But the average Briton had had enough of fighting, and he was not prepared to fire another shot for any cause. There was a resurgence in the Conservative breast of the old admiration for the Turk and his masterful ways with the subject races.

This, acting upon a growing desire to see their party once more in power, proved an irresistible

impulse to pull down my Government. Liberals and Socialists, still writhing under their electoral defeat, disliked the Coalition and all its works, and they were in no mind to discriminate between good and evil deeds. Their old indignation against atrocities perpetrated against Greeks and Armenians did not weigh in the estimation of a hair against the darker outrage of the 1918 election! So the Government fell, and with it went first the liberation of Armenia and Asiatic Greece, and in the sequel the League of Nations and all the projects for substituting conciliation for armaments. Our troops were withdrawn in sight of the Turkish Army from the Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. The habit of surrender had been inculcated and our policy developed into a general retreat, and the retreat into and utter rout.

The first backward stagger was the humiliating Treaty of Lausanne, negotiated by Lord Curzon, which left the Christian populations of Asia Minor at the mercy of their old oppressors. Lord Curzon and the French, both of whom had insisted, against my urgent counsels, on setting up a larger Armenia, now abandoned the whole of it to the exterminators. The Greeks were driven out of the land which they had cultivated and made fruitful for centuries before the Turkish irruption. I end this chapter with the comment I then wrote on this abject, cowardly and infamous surrender (see Appendix). It was the first of the humiliating and calamitous capitulations which in the end have destroyed most of what was best in the Treaties of Peace that followed the sacrifices of the Great War. The negotiators of the Lausanne Treaty and their successors share with King Alexander's monkey the

*Humiliation  
of Lausanne  
Treaty*

calamity thus wrought by the policy which gradually disintegrated and rotted the structure that had been built up by the heroism of millions.

## APPENDIX

### *The Treaty of Lausanne*<sup>1</sup>

Reports from Angora state that the peace is hailed there as a great Turkish triumph; and so it is. The Turk is truly a great fisherman. If he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the most formidable Empire in the world. Unfortunately he is the worst of rulers, hence the trouble—his own and that of those who unhappily have drawn him as governor in the lottery of life.

The able correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* at the Lausanne Conference has supplied us from time to time with vivid pen pictures of the four greatest Powers of the world struggling in the toils of the squalid and broken remains of an Empire with an aggregate population equal to that of a couple of English counties that I could name. This is what he wrote about this Conference, which constitutes one of the most humiliating incidents in the history of Western civilisation:—

“The records of the present Conference present an even more marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. What was frayed before is threadbare now. The Allies have whittled away their own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. They

*Disgust of  
Daily  
Telegraph*

<sup>1</sup> Reprint of an article written July 25th, 1923.

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SEVRES TREATY 1353

have also—and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will have to give an account in the not distant future—gone back on their promises to small races, which are none the less promises because the small races have not the power to enforce their performance. The figure that the European delegates are cutting in Lausanne, and the agents of the *concessionnaires* in Angora—all alike representatives of the West—has been rendered undignified as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting.”

Since those distressing words were written the Powers have sunk yet deeper into the slough of humiliation.

*The Times* correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the West by this extraordinary Treaty. In order to gauge the extent of the disaster to civilisation which this Treaty implies it is only necessary to give a short summary of the war aims of the Allies in Turkey.

They were stated by Mr. Asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity in a speech which he delivered when Prime Minister at the Guildhall on November 9th, 1914:—

*Original  
Allied War  
aims in  
Turkey*

“It is not the Turkish people—it is the Ottoman Government that has drawn the sword, and which, I venture to predict, will perish by the sword. It is they and not we who have rung the death-knell of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe but in Asia. With their disappearance will disappear as I, at least, hope and

believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions of the earth."

In pursuance of the policy thus declared by the British Premier on behalf of the Allies a series of Agreements was entered into in the early months of 1915 between France, Russia, and ourselves, by which the greater part of Turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be partitioned at the end of the War. Cilicia and Syria were allocated to France; Mesopotamia to Britain; Armenia and Constantinople to Russia. Palestine was to be placed under the joint control of Britain and France. Arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved largely out of the desert—but including some famous cities of the East, Damascus, Homs and Aleppo—was to be constituted into a new Arab State, partly under the protection of France and partly of Britain. Smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to Greece if she joined her forces with those of the Allies in the War. The Straits were to be demilitarised and garrisoned. When Italy came into the War later on in 1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of Turkey being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in Southern Anatolia should be assigned to Italy for development.

What was the justification for breaking up the Turkish Empire? The portions to be cut out of Turkey have a population the majority of which is non-Turkish. Cilicia and Southern Anatolia might constitute a possible exception. In these territories massacres and misgovernment had perhaps succeeded

*Their  
justification*

## BREAKDOWN OF THE SEVRES TREATY 1355

at last in turning the balance in favour of the Turk. But in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated and developed before the War by a population which was Western and not Turanian in its origin and outlook. This population represented the original inhabitants of the soil.

The experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated clearly that the Turk could no longer be entrusted with the property, the honour, or the lives of any Christian race within his dominions. Whole communities of Armenians had been massacred under circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. And even after the War began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the Great Powers so ostentatiously proffered the hand of friendship at the first Lausanne Conference. Even while the Conference was in session, and the handshaking was going on, the Turks were torturing to death scores of thousands of young Greeks whom they deported into the interior. As "a precautionary measure" 150,000 Greeks of military age, of whom 30,000 were military prisoners, were in the previous year driven inland to the mountains of Anatolia. On the way they were stripped of their clothes, and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. It is not surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange of military prisoners, the Turks found the greatest difficulty in producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that two-thirds perished. The Allied Powers had every good reason for determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should cease to shock the world by repeated



exhibitions of savagery against helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate.

Apart from these atrocities, the fact that great tracts of country, once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by Turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable from the wilderness, alone proves that the Turk is a blight and a curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests of humanity to be treated as such. When a race which has no title to its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to its well-being, the nations have a right—nay, a duty—to intervene in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. This same duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of America overriding the prior claims of the Indian to the prairies and forests of the great West.

On the shores of the Mediterranean are two races with a surplus population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the Turkish Empire. Greece and Italy could claim that under their rule this vast territory thrived and prospered mightily. They now pour their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. Yet they are essentially Mediterranean peoples. The history of the Mediterranean will for ever be associated with their achievements on its shores and its waters. The derelict wastes of Asia Minor need them. Valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned to the desert weeds. Irrigation has been destroyed or neglected.

*Historic  
abilities  
of Greeks  
and Italians*

The Italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they were introduced into Asia would make cultivation again possible. There is plenty of scope in the deserts of Anatolia for both Italian and Greek. I was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. Had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women and children, where now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are periodically hunted down into nameless horror.

Yet another reason for the Allied decision was the bitter resentment that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the Turk towards Britain and France. They were naturally indignant that he should have joined their foes and slammed the gate of the Dardanelles in their face, and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. But he had not the thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. France and Britain had many a time extracted the thorn from the Turkish paw when he was limping along in impotent misery. They had done more. They had often saved the life of that Empire when the Russian bear was on the point of crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies.

I have set out shortly what the war policy of the Allies was in reference to Turkey. The Treaty of Sèvres considerably modified that policy in many vital aspects. By that Treaty, Constantinople, Cilicia, and Southern Anatolia were left to the Turk; Armenia

*Merits of  
the Sèvres  
Treaty  
proposals.*

was created into an independent State. There were many objections which could be raised to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they contemplated handing over in Cilicia and Southern Anatolia populations which in the main were Turkish and Moslem to Christian rulers. But in substance the modified plan of Sèvres was sound, and if carried out would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated by its terms for ever from Turkish rule. The world at large also would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious and intelligent Armenian and Greek populations of Turkey to renew the fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching man's store of good things. The barbarian invasion which withered that fertility was pushed back into the interior by the Treaty of Sèvres. The Treaty of Lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. I have explained the why and wherefore of Sèvres. But why Lausanne? It is a long and painful story—a compound of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst nations and their statesmen. And more than all, Fate happened to be in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. The Russian Revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of Turkey, and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. President Wilson was inclined to recommend that the United States of America should undertake the mandate for the Armenians. Had he succeeded, what a different story would now have been told! What a different story the generations to come would also tell! But his health broke down at the vital moment

and America would have none of his humanitarian schemes. Then came the departure of Soninno from the Quirinal. With him went for a momentous while the old dreams of Italian colonisation, which in the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. His successors were homelier men. I have still my doubts as to whether they served Italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated policy they pursued. The future may decide that issue. But whatever the decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there is another break-up in Turkey, the chance Italy has lost since 1919 will not be recovered. Will it ever come back?

There followed the French check in Cilicia, and the negotiations at Angora with Mustapha Kemal, which were both single-handed and under-handed; for the Allies were not even informed of what was going on. This was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would enable the Western Powers to deal effectively with the Turk. This unity was never fully recreated. There can be no reunion without confidence. There can be no trust in the West that is broken in the East. Much of the recent mischief in the Entente came from the clandestine negotiations at Angora.

The last fatal change was the Greek revolt against Veniselos. It is often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race since Pericles. In all he has undertaken he has never failed his people. Disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow his guidance. When King Alexander was killed by a monkey, the Greeks were called upon to decide between Constantine and Veniselos. Their

*Disaster of  
Veniselos'  
fall*

choice was ruinous to their country. No greater evil can befall a nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common sense. Before the advent of Constantine, Greece, with no aid and little countenance from the Powers, was able to hold the forces of Mustapha Kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the fastnesses of Anatolia. In encounter after encounter the Greek army, sufficiently well equipped, and led by men chosen for their military gifts, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of Angora. But with Constantine came a change. In the Greek army, courtiers were substituted for soldiers in the high command. French, British and Italian public opinion, with the memory of Constantine's treachery during the War still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude towards the Greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of Allied sentiment. Indifferent Powers became hostile; hostile Powers became active. The final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish march of the Greek army into the defiles of Asia Minor, followed by the inevitable retreat. It was consummated when Constantine for dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in Asia Minor a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. The Greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the French, once they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence courage. Before the Kemalist attack reached their lines the Greek army was beaten and in full retreat. With attack came panic, with panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. With the disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of Anatolia. That the history of the East, and probably of the West,

should have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of the comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every great tragedy.

All that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great policy. Western civilisation put up its last fight against the return of savagery into Europe, when in September and October of 1922 British soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, saved Constantinople from hideous carnage. The Pact of Mudania was not Sèvres, but it certainly was better than Lausanne. From Sèvres to Mudania was a retreat. From Mudania to Lausanne was a rout.

What next? Lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. Where is the next? No one claims that this Treaty was peace with honour. It is not even peace. If one were dealing with a regenerated Turk, there might be hope. But the burning of Smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders of tens of thousands of young Greeks in the interior, proved that the Turk was still unchanged. To quote again from the correspondent of *The Times* at Lausanne:—

“All such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief that the new Turk is but the old, and that the coming era of enlightenment and brotherly love in Turkey, for which it is the correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners’ point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos.”

The amazing legend that the Turk is a gentleman is dying hard. That legend has saved him many a

time when he was on the brink of destruction. It came to his aid in October last when the policy of this country was changed by the revolt of the Turcophile against the Coalition. The Turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of Armenians, and dishonoured myriads of Christian women who trusted to his protection. Nevertheless, the Turk is a gentleman! By his indolence, his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a garden to a desert. What better proof can there be that he is a real gentleman? For a German bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly saved his wretched life. All the same, what a gentleman he is! He treated British prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off in hundreds. Still, he is such a gentleman! He plunders, he slays, and outrages those who are unable to defend themselves. He misgoverns, cheats, lies, and betrays. For all that, the Turk is a gentleman! So an agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old Oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. Hence the black Treaty of Lausanne.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### MINORITIES

THE obligation to protect the minority populations which, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with the creation of the new States and the redistribution of large areas in Central Europe, were found to remain within boundaries to which they did not ethnically belong, was a responsibility which the Peace Conference was bound to undertake.

*Importance  
of protecting  
minorities*

Having regard to the confusion of races in some areas, no human ingenuity could avoid incorporating either in the new States created by the Treaties, or in those States like Roumania and Serbia, which were given a considerable accession of territories, a numerous population alien in language, origin and religion to the predominant race.

In the Central European States one could find areas, not only on frontiers but far into the interior, where there existed an inextricable mixture of races and a confusion of tongues that rivalled Babel. Sometimes the various races were apt to form groups or little communities of their own. But not infrequently in the same town or village there were huddled together Czechs, Magyars, Germans, Poles, Slovaks, Ruthenians—and everywhere Jews. Next-door neighbours in the same street might represent different nationalities. In the same household there was often a compound of races.



It was recognised very early in the course of the Peace Conference, that the question of the protection of the Minority population in the Succession States was one of paramount importance. There was common agreement amongst all the parties concerned that assurances for the protection of these minorities must be given as one of the essential conditions of a Peace settlement. Apart from the inherent justice of such a provision, we foresaw trouble in the future if any of these minorities were ill-treated. Dr. Benes, speaking before the Peace Conference, on February 5th, 1919, said:—

“To close the question of the German Bohemians, he wished to observe that the Czechoslovak Government had no intention whatever of oppressing them. It was intended to grant them full minority rights, and it was fully realised that it would be political folly not to do so. All necessary guarantees would be accorded to this minority.”

At the end of April, 1919, a Memorandum was put forward by the Economic Section of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference, in which it was suggested that some sort of guarantee should be exacted from the New States in reference to the interests of the transferred populations. The immediate case was that of Poland, a newly created State which incorporated, besides a large number of Jews, other nationalities such as Germans, Russians, etc. It was a delicate and complicated problem and one not to be settled in a hurry, and in order to give time for the working out of details, and as the Polish Treaty was to be signed at the same time as the German,

*Guarantees  
demanded  
from new  
Succession  
States*

namely, at the end of June, 1919, it was decided, in the case of Poland, to insert the following clause in the German Treaty:—

“Poland accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the said Powers to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. Poland further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the said Powers such provisions as they may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment of the commerce of other nations.”

In this connection, I myself stated about the same time, that I:—

“thought it essential that it should not be possible for the minorities to be treated in future as were the Roumanians in the Hungarian State, who were deprived of their language and their traditions.”

M. Bratiano, the Roumanian Prime Minister, in putting forward the territorial claims of Roumania to the Peace Conference, said, in the course of his plea for the addition to Roumania of Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia:—

“In their future political life, the rights of the minorities would assuredly be respected and they would be granted the greatest possible freedom.”

There was serious opposition by the small States, however, to the proposal, when it was first advanced,

of compulsory guarantees which the Great Powers could enforce. M. Bratiano took the lead in the revolt against what was said to be high-handed and unwarranted interference on the part of the Great Powers in the internal affairs of the smaller ones. The latter contended that the proposed terms constituted an infringement of their sovereign rights, to which no great Powers, not even Germany, would ever be subjected. At a plenary Session of the Conference on May 31st, the question was thrashed out. M. Bratiano was chosen by the Powers affected as their spokesman. His declaration has a very important bearing on existing controversies in Central Europe. It reveals the attitude adopted by the new States towards the question of minorities:—

“On the 27th May last, I addressed the following letter to M. Berthelot, Chairman of the Commission entrusted with the task of fixing the nature of the guarantees which should be provided for the protection of minorities included in the new States which are in process of formation in Europe, as well as those in other States which are about to receive accretions of territory:—

*Bratiano  
objects to  
compulsory  
guarantees*

‘Sir,

In reply to the letter which you were so good as to address to me on the 23rd May last, I have the honour to inform you that Roumania has assured to all her citizens, without distinction of race or religion, complete equality both of rights and of political and religious liberties. She regards as a Roumanian citizen any

individual born in Roumania, but not enjoying any foreign nationality, as well as the inhabitants of the territories newly united to Roumania, who were subjects of the States to which those territories hitherto belonged, with the exception of those who have expressed their desire to opt for a different allegiance.

Indeed, the Royal Government, in accordance with its principles and in agreement with the representatives of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina, have likewise decided to ensure the rights and liberties of minorities throughout the whole extent of the new kingdom by a wide administrative decentralisation such as will guarantee to populations of different racial origin their free development in the matter of language, education, and the exercise of their religion.

Generally speaking, Roumania is ready to accept any arrangements which all the States belonging to the League of Nations would admit on their own territories in this connection.

In all other circumstances Roumania would in no case be able to admit any interference by any foreign Governments in the application of her domestic laws.'

In this letter Roumania expresses her intention to give the widest recognition to the liberties of ethnical or confessional minorities. Her Delegates, taking their stand on these principles, voted, on the occasion of the constitution of the League of Nations, in favour of the guarantees suggested for the whole group of States which compose the

League; outside these general principles, however Roumania would be unable to consent to stipulations of a nature to limit her rights as a sovereign State, and in this connection she considers the rights of States to be the same for all.

In the very interest which the founders of the League of Nations necessarily possess in avoiding any inconsistency as regards the great principles by which the League is animated, it is essential that the leading members of that institution should abstain from any attitude which would not be identic towards all States.

Foreign intervention, as a matter of fact, even if it granted no liberties beyond those which the Roumanian State is determined to guarantee to all its citizens, might compromise the work of fraternisation which the Roumanian Government has taken as its aim.

On the one hand, certain minorities might consider themselves absolved from all gratitude towards the State, whereas it is precisely on the development of that sentiment that the State relies for cementing the brotherhood of the various races; on the other hand a tendency would arise towards the creation of two classes of citizens in the same kingdom; the one trusting in the care of the State for their interests, the other disposed to be hostile to the State and to seek protection outside its frontiers.

History is there to prove that the protection of minorities, regarded from this point of view, has done more to disintegrate States than to consolidate them. At the present moment the Conference of the Allies is bound to endeavour to establish, on

the basis of fraternity between peoples, the countries whose development is destined to ensure peace in Central and Southern Europe. Moreover, these same Allies, when the draft of the League of Nations was under discussion, withdrew Article 21, of which the following is the tenor:—

‘The High Contracting Parties agree to state that no obstacle shall be placed in the way of the free exercise of every belief, religion, or opinion, the practice of which is not incompatible with public order and morality, and that, within their respective jurisdictions, no one shall be disturbed in his life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness by reason of his adhesion to such belief, religion, or opinion.’

Because it was thought that this Article infringed State sovereignty, Roumania determined, in the interests of liberty and justice for all, as well as in that of her own internal development, to safeguard the rights of minorities; as an independent State she does not claim any exceptional treatment for herself, but she cannot, on the other hand, accept a special régime to which other sovereign States are not subjected.

For this reason she declares her readiness to insert in the draft Treaty, Article 5, Part 3, Section IV, the following text:—

‘Roumania grants to all minorities of language, race, and religion residing within her new frontiers rights equal to those which belong to other Roumanian citizens.’”

M. CLEMENCEAU, in replying to M. Bratiano, said:—

“as far as territory properly speaking is concerned, it must of course be understood that, whether regarded as the League of Nations or as separate Governments, we are unable to guarantee any portions of territory other than those which we have ourselves assigned, and that it is impossible for us to guarantee others.

*Clemenceau's  
reply*

I am very glad to know that, as regards the rights of minorities, M. Bratiano's opinion coincides precisely with our own. What we have to ascertain is whether in view of the past history of several peoples it may not be necessary to give, I will not say additional guarantees, but such guarantees of a more complete nature as may be admitted to be necessary. That is a question in regard to which we have got to take a decision, and I beg M. Bratiano and anyone else who may have observations of a like character to offer, to rest assured that there is no intention of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on the sovereign rights of any nations whatsoever, but rather to remember that, in the matter of minorities, everyone's history has not been quite the same. Some distinctions are necessary in this connection, so much so that we desire to humiliate no one when we suggest conferring a right of control, not on foreign Governments, as M. Bratiano states in his text, but on the League of Nations, whose control we all accept in our own territory in the circumstances to which M. Bratiano has alluded.

In this matter, therefore, there is no question of humiliating anyone or of encroaching on anyone's sovereignty.

. . . . .

M. BRATIANO pointed out that, according to the text distributed, the small States were to be controlled, not by the League of Nations, but by the Great Powers; the text read:—

‘Roumania likewise adheres to the insertion in a Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers of the measures which those Powers may consider necessary for the protection in Roumania of the interests of the inhabitants, etc. . . .’

It was, therefore, the Great Powers which were to intervene in order to safeguard the rights of minorities within the Kingdom of Roumania. That was the principle against which the modification proposed by M. Bratiano was made, because Roumania was an independent country before the War, and he could not believe that her attitude during the War warranted in the slightest degree any derogation from that political independence.”

The President (M. Clemenceau) admitted that:—

“M. Bratiano’s observation in regard to control being exercised by the Governments, in the place of the League of Nations, was in accordance with the text. He did not, however, think that it could be humiliating for Roumania to receive friendly counsel given her by States which were named, the



United States of America, Great Britain, Italy and France. No one of these States desired to exercise any improper power in Roumania. He added that rectifications of historical traditions which had been perpetuated in certain countries had been requested for a long time past, even in other Treaties, but it had been impossible to secure them. In these circumstances the text under criticism was rather in the nature of an encouragement and support."

M. BRATIANO, in order to justify the statement which he had read out, expressed himself in the following terms:—

*Bratiano  
not satisfied*

"As I do not wish to waste the time of the Conference I will refrain from any complete explanation of Roumania's policy in the past. I must, however, say that she does not deserve the situation which it is sought to impose on her to-day. In any case, we stand here—at least, we have always understood it in that way—before the Conference of the Allied and Associated Powers which have striven to establish the right to equality of great and small States, and to set up rules which may henceforth serve both as principles and precedents. Among those rules there are some in virtue of which it is sought to-day to establish classes of States which differ in the matter of sovereignty. On behalf of Roumania I am unable to admit this principle. There is no question here of friendly counsel, but of formal engagements. The Roumanian Government will always be willing to accept such advice, but counsels which are recorded in Treaties and in the form of precise

engagements between one Government and another cease to have the character of advice.

History supplies us with precedents in this connection: the Russians, for instance, interfered in the policy of Turkey for the protection of Christians, but the result so far as Turkey is concerned has been her dissolution. Such an attitude naturally commanded our sympathy, but it could only be logical if its final aim was to secure the independence of these peoples.

Except with this object in view, it is not possible, in the interests either of States or of minorities, to accept a rule of this nature. As I had the honour to state in the short summary which I read to you just now, we desire, together with you, to set up a new world to take the place of the old one. This new world must be established in such manner as to enable States to find in the persons of their citizens devoted sons and a life of brotherly concord. If minorities are conscious of the fact that the liberties which they enjoy are guaranteed to them, not by the solicitude for their welfare of the State to which they belong, but by the protection of a foreign State, whatever it may be, the basis of that State will be undermined. At the very basis of the new state of things which it is sought to establish, the seed is being sown of unrest, which is in contradiction with the aims which this Conference pursues.

Gentlemen, it is on behalf not only of the independence of the Roumanian State, but also of the two great principles which this Conference represents, that I have given expression to these remarks; one of those principles is that of peace, order and fraternity among the peoples of the same State, while the other is that of the equality of all

States, both great and small, in respect of their rights of domestic legislation. Those are the reasons for which I request you, on behalf of Roumania, not to impose conditions on her which she could not accept."

M. PADEREWSKI (Poland), explained the point of view of the Polish Delegation as follows:—

" . . . I state, on behalf of the Polish Government, that Poland will grant to all minorities of race, language and religion, the same rights as she does to her other nationals. *Poland's assurances* She will assure to those minorities all the liberties which have already been or may be granted to them by the great Nations and States of the West, and she will be ready to amplify those rights in the same degree as the League of Nations may consider desirable for the States which compose it.

I am convinced that these guarantees, when once incorporated in the fundamental laws of Poland by her Constituent Diet, will be in absolute harmony with the noble and lofty spirit which animates the great labours of the Peace Conference.

That is all I have to say."

M. KRAMAR (Czechoslovakia) made his statement in the following terms:—

"As regards minorities, I accept the proposed text, subject to some slight modifications. I request the deletion of two words which, in my opinion, are quite useless and might, on the other hand, cause us considerable inconvenience, because people

*Czech statement*

would consider our situation to be quite different from that which the President has indicated. We are ready to do everything possible for minorities in order to have peace at home, and we are perfectly ready to deal with this question together with the Great Powers. However, there are three words which I consider quite useless. It is stated:—

‘Czechoslovakia agrees to incorporate in the Treaty with the principal Allied and Associated Powers all measures which may be regarded as necessary for the protection in Czechoslovakia of the interests of the inhabitants who differ from the majority of the population in race, language or religion. . . .’

I ask for the deletion of the words ‘which may be regarded as necessary,’ because they are superfluous and even rather wounding to our feeling of independence. The result will be the same if they are omitted. It goes without saying that the Great Powers possess sufficient authority to ensure our acceptance of what we may be able to concede without fear for the sovereignty of our State; but there is no advantage in saying so in the Treaty.

THE PRESIDENT: If you will kindly underline the three words which you ask should be deleted and give me the text, I will bring it to the notice of the Assembly.

MR. KRAMAR: I shall have a few amendments to bring forward to the clauses submitted to us, which are very difficult for foreigners to understand. I shall not, however, press these points, because the Drafting Committee will no doubt examine

the question, and our amendments, with the courteous attention to which we are accustomed.

We wish, for instance, to give the Germans of Bohemia the right to opt for Austrian nationality, whereas, according to the text under consideration, that would not be altogether possible.

The other modifications which we propose are of a similar character to this one, and are designed to make the text clearer."

Speaking for the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, M. TRUMBITCH said:—

"As regards the question of minorities I must make substantially much the same observations as M. Kramar. We should like to delete *Yugoslavia* *lines up with* certain words from the official draft *Czecho-slovakia* and say that 'the Serb-Croat-Slovene State undertakes to determine in agreement with the principal Allied and Associated Powers, the necessary measures for protecting within the territories formerly belonging to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and ceded by the present Treaty to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, the interests of minorities.' The difference between the two texts is clear.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that the Serbian and Czechoslovakian claim?

M. TRUMBITCH: The Serbian claim is identical with that of the Czechoslovak-State. I will hand you, Mr. President, the text of our new proposal. Our request is that the principal Powers should come to an understanding with us for the insertion by common agreement of these provisions in a general Treaty.

The second question to which I should wish to call your attention is the limitation of the text as regards minorities to the territories formerly belonging to Austria-Hungary. We ask you not to extend that limitation to Serbia. The reason is clear: Serbia was an independent State: she had certain acquired rights; to-day it is not desirable to impose on former Serbian territories certain clauses which might interfere with the sovereign rights which she possessed as a State existing before the War.

I beg leave to offer you, Sir, the precise drafting which we should wish you to accept."

PRESIDENT WILSON then spoke:—

"Mr. President, I should be very sorry to see this meeting adjourn with permanent impressions such as it is possible have been created by some of the remarks that our friends have made. I should be very sorry to have the impression lodged in your minds that the Great Powers desire to assume or play any arbitrary rôle in these great matters, or assume, because of any pride of authority, to exercise an undue influence in these matters, and therefore I want to call your attention to one aspect of these questions which has not been dwelt upon.

*Wilson  
puts case  
for adequate  
guarantees  
in Treaty*

We are trying to make a peaceful settlement, that is to say, to eliminate those elements of disturbance, so far as possible, which may interfere with the peace of the world, and we are trying to make an equitable distribution of territories according to the race, the ethnographical character of the people inhabiting those territories.

SST 2

And back of that lies this fundamentally important fact that when the decisions are made, the Allied and Associated Powers guarantee to maintain them.

It is perfectly evident, upon a moment's reflection, that the chief burden of their maintenance will fall upon the greater Powers. The chief burden of the War fell upon the greater Powers, and if it had not been for their action, their military action, we would not be here to settle these questions. And, therefore, we must not close our eyes to the fact that in the last analysis the military and naval strength of the great Powers will be the final guarantee of the peace of the world.

In those circumstances is it unreasonable and unjust that not as dictators but as friends the great Powers should say to their associates:

*Appeal to  
the objectors* 'We cannot afford to guarantee territorial settlements which we do not believe to be right, and we cannot agree to leave elements of disturbances unremoved, which we believe will disturb the peace of the world'?

Take the rights of minorities. Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely to disturb the peace of the world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to minorities. And, therefore, if the great Powers are to guarantee the peace of the world in any sense is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary guarantee has been given?

I beg our friends from Roumania and from Serbia to remember that while Roumania and Serbia are ancient sovereignties the settlements of this conference are adding greatly to their territories. You cannot in one part of our transactions treat

Serbia alone and in all of the other parts treat the kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes as a different entity, for they are seeking the recognition of this conference as a single entity, and if this conference is going to recognise these various Powers as new sovereignties within definite territories, the chief guarantors are entitled to be satisfied that the territorial settlements are of a character to be permanent, and that the guarantees given are of a character to insure the peace of the world.

It is not, therefore, the interventions of those who would interfere, but the action of those who would help. I beg that our friends will take that view of it, because I see no escape from that view of it.

How can a Power like the United States, for example—for I can speak for no other—after signing this treaty, if it contains elements which they do not believe will be permanent, go three thousand miles away across the sea and report to its people that it has made a settlement of the peace of the world? It cannot do so. And yet there underlies all of these transactions the expectation on the part, for example, of Roumania, and of Czechoslovakia, and of Serbia, that if any covenants of this settlement are not observed, the United States will send her armies and her navies to see that they are observed.

In those circumstances, is it unreasonable that the United States should insist upon being satisfied that the settlements are correct?

*Appeal to the objectors*      Observe, M. Bratiano—and I speak of his suggestions with the utmost respect—suggested that we could not, so to say, invade the sovereignty of Roumania, an



ancient sovereignty, and make certain prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities.

But I beg him to observe that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Roumania by the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say: 'If we agree to these additions of territory we have the right to insist upon certain guarantees of peace.'

I beg my friend M. Kramar and my friend M. Trumbitch and my friend M. Bratiano to believe that if we should feel that it is best to leave the words which they have wished to omit in the treaty, it is not because we want to insist upon unreasonable conditions, but that we want the treaty to accord to us the right of judgment as to whether those are things which we can afford to guarantee.

Therefore, the impressions with which we should disperse ought to be these, that we are all friends—of course that goes without saying—but that we must all be associates in a common effort, and there can be no frank and earnest association in the common effort unless there is a common agreement as to what the rights and settlements are. Now if the agreement is a separate agreement among groups of us, that does not meet the object.

If you should adopt the language suggested by the Czechoslovakian delegation and the Serbian delegation—the Yugoslav delegation—that it should be left to negotiations between the principal Allied and Associated Powers and their several delegates, that would mean that after this whole conference is adjourned, groups of them would determine what is to be the basis of the peace of the

world. It seems to me that that would be a most dangerous idea to entertain, and, therefore, I beg that we may part with a sense, not of interference with each other, but of hearty and friendly co-operation upon the only possible basis of guaranty.

Where the great force lies there must be the sanction of peace.

I sometimes wish, in hearing an argument like this, that I were the representative of a small Power, so that what I said might be robbed of any mistaken significance, but I think you will agree with me that the United States has never shown any temper of aggression anywhere, and it lies in the heart of the people of the United States, as I am sure it lies in the hearts of the peoples of the other great Powers, to form a common partnership of right, and to do service to our associates, and no kind of dis-service."

There was no doubt that President Wilson's speech served to smooth the ruffled feelings of the representatives of the smaller Powers. M. Bratiano, in his reply to President Wilson, displayed a much more conciliatory spirit:—

"The eminent personality of President Wilson invests both his words and his advice with a specially authoritative character. I beg leave, in the name of the great principles which the President himself has proclaimed, to call his friendly attention to the apprehension lest the application in certain instances of principles, even with the best intentions, may bring about results precisely in contradiction with the end in view.

*Bratiano  
mollified but  
unconvinced*

As I said, there must emerge from the labours of this Conference results which do not admit of discussion. The Conference has accomplished a great work of justice; it has set up, not only guarantees against the enemy, but also equality of rights for all States, great and small. If principles such as those which it is sought to embody to-day in the Treaty with Austria had been inserted in the Statutes of the League of Nations, we should not have raised any objection. President Wilson will certainly admit that the Roumanian Delegation voted in favour of these principles being established once for all and as applicable to all. To act as it is proposed to act in the present Treaty means the establishment of varying degrees of sovereignty. Notwithstanding the feelings of friendship and profound admiration which I entertain for the Italian people, I am unable to conceive why, in identical circumstances, countries like Roumania or Serbia should be treated differently from Italy.

On the other hand, as I have likewise had the honour to explain, we are seeking to establish a life of brotherhood between the peoples which are compelled by their geographical situation to form themselves into a single State. It would be a cardinal error to make these friendly relations dependent on a third party, whatever it be.

Further, we must not lose sight of the fact that, even though men imbued with these principles are at the head of the Governments of the present Great Powers, it is quite possible that political evolutions will bring about the representation of those same States by other men, or that new interests may arise such as to make certain Governments deviate from their former attitude and

involve them in actions of which the mainspring will not reside in these great principles but rather in certain special interests.

It is undeniable that the Great Powers, by their sacrifices, have made certain the victory of the great cause common to us all. I may be permitted to add to the words pronounced by the President—words for which I thank him on behalf of all the small States—when he asserted that we can rely henceforward on the solicitude for our welfare of the great political factors, and that he wishes to guarantee the security of all of us; but I will add that the responsibility of each State in matters of independence and security nevertheless remains just as entire, whatever be its extent.

Thus, at the present moment, Roumania is compelled to provide with her own troops for the defence, not only of her own frontiers, but also of a cause which is a matter of concern for the whole of Central Europe. Therefore, even though the Great Powers have a more important part to play, in proportion to their size, the responsibility and duties of independent States, whatever their size, remain undiminished.

I beg the Representatives of the Great Powers, and especially President Wilson, not to limit those responsibilities by a dangerous application of the principles which are dear to us all.

It needs no effort to secure the recognition of the rights of minorities. There is no single State represented here which is not convinced of the necessity for respecting and developing those liberties; therefore, allow these States to develop themselves in the only atmosphere likely to render possible the consolidation of the general

political state which we are here to establish to-day.

Such are the feelings, alike of respect and gratitude for the services which they have rendered, which animate me in earnestly praying the Great Powers to examine, with all the attention demanded by such important principles, the proposals and declarations made by the Roumanian Government; it is necessary that these proposals should be accepted, for otherwise Roumania would no longer preserve in its entirety the independence which she enjoyed in the past for the settlement of her domestic concerns."

Thereafter the Minority Treaty was drafted for signature between the Poles and the Allies, and this document was the model upon which the Minority Treaties were subsequently framed for signature by Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Yugoslavia and Greece, and by Turkey.

*Polish  
Minorities  
Treaty serves  
as model*

In the Treaty itself, Poland promises "to conform her institutions to the principles of liberty and justice, and to give a sure guarantee to the inhabitants of the territory over which she has assumed sovereignty."

The Treaty secures to all inhabitants of Poland, whether citizens or not, "full and complete protection of life and liberty . . . without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion." Moreover, it promises to all inhabitants, "in territory which is or may be recognised as forming part of Poland," the right to Polish nationality and citizenship.

That is to say, all Germans, Austrians, Hungarians, Russians, Ruthenians or Jews, resident in the new

Poland, are entitled to become Polish citizens and to receive protection of life and liberty as such. If such people should *not* wish, however, to become Polish citizens, they had the right under the Minority Treaty to make a declaration abandoning Polish citizenship, within two years of the coming into force of the Treaty.

Another important Article said that:—

“Poland undertakes to put no hindrance in the way of the exercise of the right which the persons concerned have, under the Treaties concluded or to be concluded by the Allied and Associated Powers with Germany, Austria, Hungary or Russia, to choose whether or not they will acquire Polish nationality.”

And others, perhaps more important still:—

“All Polish nationals shall be equal before the law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion.

Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of professions and industries.

No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any Polish national of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

Notwithstanding any establishment by the Polish Government of an official language, adequate

facilities shall be given to Polish nationals of non-Polish speech for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, before the courts.

Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as the other Polish nationals.

In particular they shall have an equal right to establish, manage, and control at their own expense charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their religion freely therein."

The Polish Government was also obliged under the Treaty to provide, in primary schools, instruction for all children *in their own language*.

Owing to the large number of Jews in Poland, there were special clauses safeguarding the rights of the Jews in this new State. As M. Clemenceau, in the letter which he sent accompanying this Treaty, said:—

*Special  
protection  
for Jews*

"The information at the disposal of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers as to the existing relations between the Jews and the other Polish citizens has led them to the conclusion that, in view of the historical development of the Jewish question and the great animosity aroused by it, special protection is necessary for the Jews in Poland."

But, he added, these clauses "do not constitute any recognition of the Jews as a separate political community within the Polish State."

The Minority Treaties were prepared and submitted to the various States concerned in accordance with the original plans. In these treaties, as in every other Clause in the Peace Treaty, there was ample provision for revision if necessary. Briefly, they obliged the new States to do what the Italians promised to their own new subjects, in the Allied reply to the Austrian Delegation, September, 1919:—

“The Italian Government proposes to adopt a broadly liberal policy towards its new subjects . . . in what concerns their language, culture, and economic interest.”

The Treaty with the Czechoslovaks was identical with the Polish one, excepting that the clauses relating to Jews were omitted, and special clauses were inserted making the Ruthenians of the Carpathians autonomous, but assigning the region to Czechoslovakia.

The whole of the responsibility for seeing that the Minority Treaties were maintained was cast by the signatories upon the League of Nations. In explanation of this proceeding M. Clemenceau said in his letter which accompanied the Polish Treaty:—

*League  
charged with  
responsibility  
for fulfilment*

“Under the older system the guarantee for the execution of similar provisions was vested in the Great Powers. Experience has shown that this was in practice ineffective, and it was also open to the criticism that it might give to the Great Powers, either individually or in combination, a right to interfere in the internal constitution of the States affected which could be used for political



purposes. Under the new system the guarantee is entrusted to the League of Nations. The clauses dealing with this guarantee have been carefully drafted so as to make it clear that Poland will not be in any way under the tutelage of those Powers who are signatories to the Treaty."

It was the Members of the League, therefore, who became the public guarantors of the good behaviour of the Succession States towards their Minority populations.

The League, however, was not empowered by these instruments to assume general supervision over the internal administration of these States, nor could it interfere simply on a complaint of misgovernment from a portion of the population. What it could, and should do, was to act upon a complaint brought before it by any State which was a member, that the conditions which were laid down in the Minorities Treaties in assigning territories to the New States (as quoted above in the case of Poland) had not been observed.

The Tittoni Report, which was approved by the Council of the League of Nations on October 22nd, 1920, summed up the position of the League *vis-à-vis* the Minority problem briefly, as being:—

*Terms of the  
Tittoni  
Report*

"1. That the responsibility for seeing that the provisions of the Minorities Treaties were adhered to lay with the League.

2. That the provisions of the Minorities Treaties were inviolable."

The procedure for dealing with complaints was dealt with in this Report. It was subsequently

amended from time to time, and it now stands as follows:—

“When the Secretariat of the League receives a petition concerning a minority question, the petition is examined by the Secretariat in order to ascertain whether it fulfils the five conditions necessary to make it admissible. If it does, the petition is communicated to the State concerned. If this State for any reasons raises objections to the admissibility of the petition, the Secretary-General submits the question to the President of the Council, who may invite two other members of the Council to assist him.

If the State concerned so requests, this question of procedure may be put on the agenda of the Council.

If the petition is declared admissible, the State concerned must announce within three weeks of being informed of this fact whether it wishes to make any remarks or not. If it does, it must present its remarks within two months. This period of time may be prolonged on the authority of the President of the Council if the State concerned so requests and if the circumstances appear to make this necessary.

The petition, together with the remarks of the Government concerned, is then communicated to the members of the Council for purposes of information. Any State member of the League, may, by request, obtain copies of these documents. The President of the Council asks two other members of the Council to examine the documents with him. If one of these three members or any other member of the Council considers it necessary, the question may be brought before the Council.

The latter, once it has been made cognisant of the matter, may proceed in any manner and give any instructions that appear to it appropriate and effective in the circumstances. In case of a difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact between the State concerned and any State member of the Council, this difference will be considered as of international concern according to the terms of Article 14 of the Covenant, and the question may be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, whose decision will be final.”\*

On September 21st, 1922, proposals were approved by a Plenary Session of the Assembly of the League, which contained the following clauses:—

*League's  
decision  
in 1922*

“In case of difference of opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of the provisions of the Minorities Treaties between the Government concerned and one of the States Members of the Council of the League of Nations, the Assembly recommends that the Members of the Council appeal without unnecessary delay to the Permanent Court of International Justice for a decision in accordance with the Minorities Treaties, it being understood that the other methods of conciliation provided for by the Covenant may always be employed.”

“The Secretariat, which has the duty of collecting information concerning the manner in which the Minorities Treaties are carried out, should not only assist the Council in the study of complaints con-

\* “The League of Nations and Minorities,” p. 29.

cerning infractions of these Treaties, but should also assist the Council in ascertaining in what manner the persons belonging to racial, linguistic or religious minorities fulfil their duties towards their States.

The information thus collected might be placed at the disposal of the States Members of the League of Nations if they so desire."

It is interesting to note that this last proposal was added at the suggestion of Dr. Benes, who was one of the three members comprising the Committee which had been set up to examine the Minorities question.

An acknowledged expert on Central European matters, a short time ago said: "It is unhappily true that these Treaties have only been very imperfectly fulfilled." Alas, for the honour of the pledged troth of nations and the peace of Europe! that sentence is an understatement of a lamentable story of breach of faith. I personally protested at the Genoa Conference in 1922 against the treatment accorded to Minorities in some of the States which had accepted the Minority conditions of the Peace Settlement. The States whose conduct I impugned left their case in the hands of M. Barthou, the principal French delegate, who had received direct instructions by telegram from his Chief in Paris, M. Poincaré, to discourage all my efforts to redress the grievances of the Minority populations in the States which were then in alliance with France. M. Barthou delivered an angry reply to my speech. The little States were naturally very much pleased with his outburst. I received no support from Italy, and America had declined to enter the Conference.

*A breach  
of faith*

Some of these States must now regret their premature jubilation. France cannot be too pleased at the consequences.

Professor Seton Watson, in his able book, having examined the present position of the Minorities, points out the difficulties of re-drawing boundaries and altering the frontiers which were agreed upon at the Peace Conference. He dwells upon the impossibility of a clean cut in any one of the cases presented. He says:—

“ . . . on no frontier, save possibly the Italian, could a clear-cut, ethnic line of division be attained, and that, no matter how the frontiers may be drawn or re-drawn, very considerable minorities must in all cases remain on the wrong side of every one of them.”\*

The only solution, therefore, would appear to be the rigid enforcement of minority obligations, which entails the intervention of the League, and the possible strengthening of the powers of the League in this respect.

In the following Appendix I give a summary of the present position of Minorities in Europe. It is written by one of the best informed and least partisan of all the students of foreign affairs. In this striking document he gives a searching and scathing exposure of the flagrant disregard by the countries who signed the Minorities arrangement, of the pledges they thereby gave to the Powers at the Peace Conference.

\* “Britain and the Dictators,” p. 325.

## APPENDIX

WITH the exception of Austria, whose conduct in the matter down to the German annexation had been virtually blameless, except for a certain measure of indirect discrimination, mainly social, against the Jews, and, to a lesser extent, of Hungary (neither case being comparable to the barbarous persecution to which they have since been subjected in Austria), the record of all the other Austro-Hungarian States, who agreed to the provisions for protection of Minorities, has been, in varying degrees, an extremely unsatisfactory one. In all these cases there have been flagrant, direct and gross violations of the Minorities safeguards, either against some or against all of the Minorities. And in every case there has also been indirect persecution on a large scale, in the form of a subtle discrimination, sometimes in law and more generally in administrative practice, against the Minorities, or at least against some of them, in regard to such different aspects as participation in the public services, taxation, land reform, schools and other cultural institutions, and, last but not least, there has been in some flagrant cases a virtual denial of religious equality and freedom. The whole trend of the policy of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States has been towards centralisation, and the denationalisation of the racial Minorities, a policy in violent conflict with the pledges of various degrees of local autonomy given to those Minorities either under the Treaties, or outside, but in connection with their elaboration by the principal Allied and Associated Powers and the League of Nations.

Strangely enough, there exists no comprehensive and systematic record, compiled by the League, as the guardian of these Minority safeguards, but only scattered minutes and other documents, the bulk of them unpublished owing to the Hush! Hush! methods of dealing with Minority petitions adopted by the League Council after the first few years. Several flagrant instances of violations, whether founded or unfounded, of Minority rights have been dealt with, more or less openly, by the Council, but without being definitely settled by the Council in each instance. Such violations, however, have as a rule been dealt with, not under the Minorities procedure, but under Article Eleven of the Covenant, as calculated to endanger peace.

But any particular illustration of Minority disputes, which attained in their day a wide publicity, fails to give an adequate idea of the extent to which, by more subtle and persistent methods of discrimination by the Governments of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States, the proposed safeguards under the Minority Treaties have been circumvented and discarded. To show this it is necessary to examine the position of the Minorities in each of the countries concerned.

Poland is one of the worst offenders. She actually repudiated the Minority Treaty at Geneva in 1934,

*Poland's  
breaches of  
Treaty*

by a unilateral declaration, in which her delegate laid it down that the provisions of the Treaty would no longer be regarded as applicable to Poland, so long as all the Powers, meaning the Great Powers, declined to make it applicable to themselves.

One of her grossest breaches of faith relates to her treatment of the claim by the Ruthenes (or

Ukrainians), to local autonomy for at least Eastern Galicia. There are some  $6\frac{1}{2}$  millions of this race on her territory, of whom roughly half reside in Eastern Galicia, which, even under the old Habsburg monarchy enjoyed a limited measure of Home Rule. In June, 1919, the Supreme Council authorised Poland to occupy the territory, and to establish a Civil Government, but only "after having fixed with the Allied and Associated Powers an agreement, whose clauses shall guarantee as far as possible the autonomy of this territory, and the political, religious and personal liberties of the inhabitants. This agreement shall be based on the right of free disposition, which, in the last resort, the inhabitants of Eastern Galicia are to exercise regarding their political allegiance."

In March, 1923, the Conference of Ambassadors assigned Eastern Galicia to Poland in full sovereignty, this decision, however, being prefaced by a clause stating "that it is recognised by Poland that as regards the Eastern part of Galicia, the ethnographical conditions necessitate a régime of autonomy." By that time, it should be observed, Poland was also bound by the provisions of the Minority Treaty. Nevertheless, she has since had recourse to the most oppressive measures for Polonising the Ruthenes, the persecution in their case extending even to the religious domain. For the majority of the Ruthenes belong either to the Uniate Church or to the Orthodox, whereas the Poles are, of course, Roman Catholics. Needless to say, no attempt has ever been made by Poland to fulfil the pledge of local autonomy which conditioned the cession to her of Eastern Galicia. In 1930 the Polish persecution in Eastern Galicia took so violent a form that the problem of the



so-called "pacification" of that country was brought up before the League Council, owing to the pressure of British public opinion. But the Japanese *rapporteur* to the Council delayed consideration of the problem for over a year, when a supine resolution was passed, which left the situation in Eastern Galicia exactly where it was before, if not a little worsened.

Poland's persecution of her Jewish minority was, down to the economic crisis of 1929, intermittent and comparatively mild. Since then, however, it has steadily grown until it has reached the point when the Polish Government openly declare at Geneva that they must get rid of at least 2½ million of the 3½ million Jews now living within their borders. At the same time the Polish Government declare that they do not encourage, but repress, any violent attacks on the Jews. The truth is that, if not the Central Government, at any rate the local authorities, do tolerate if they do not incite Jew-baiting in varying degrees of violence. Nor can it be denied that there is now a wholesale discrimination against the Jewish minority in every sphere, in flagrant breach of the Minority Treaty.

By many authorities the most tragic instance of Minority oppression in violation of the 1919 Treaty is held to be that of the 600,000 Macedonians now resident within the borders of Yugoslavia. Of this community an overwhelming majority are of Bulgarian stock and language, in other words, Bulgaro-Macedonians. It was because of this fact that, at the Peace Conference, the Italian, British and American members of the New States Committee, when drafting the Yugoslav Minority Treaty, endeavoured, first to secure a special local régime for this area, and, when

*Yugoslavia  
oppresses  
Macedonians*

their efforts in this direction failed in the face of Franco-Yugoslav opposition, to ensure the appointment of a resident League Commissioner. But, once more, Franco-Yugoslav opposition defeated this proposal, which was raised again, and again, and finally defeated, owing to the same cause, in 1922. Ultimately the League Council would appear to have acquiesced in the Serbian contention that no Minority problem really existed in Macedonia, as the Macedonians could be regarded as overwhelmingly Serb in race and language! If any disproof were needed, one could easily turn to the troubles in this area before 1914, when it riveted on it for years the attention of the then Concert of the Great Powers of Europe. Whether, since the inclusion two years ago of the Bulgaro-Yugoslav Treaty of "perpetual amity," things have improved, it is difficult to say, as the outcome of this Treaty, as indeed of the Polish-German understanding of 1934, has been to cause both Governments to sacrifice in a large measure their respective Minorities.

Generally speaking, the lot of the minority in Yugoslavia, with certain exceptions pertaining to the six hundred thousand Germans, is perhaps harder than in any other of the Succession States. For these Minorities have to endure, both the terroristic methods introduced as a result of the dictatorial régime established by the late King Alexander in 1921—methods which apply equally to all Yugoslav subjects—and the special persecutions connoted by the policy of Serbisation *à outrance* pursued by Belgrade ever since the Great War. Occasionally there may have been a certain relaxation of the latter policy, in the case of either the Germans, or the Jews, when

*Terrorism and  
ruthless  
discrimination*

Belgrade has sought to use these two Minorities against the hated Magyars, also roughly half a million in number. On these occasions the Minorities have been allowed considerable cultural concessions, more particularly in relation to their schools. But, except for these temporary alleviations, the policy of discrimination against the Minorities has been ruthlessly exercised alike in Serbia proper, in Croatia and in Slovenia. In particular, since the 1929 régime, it has been impossible for the racial Minorities to put up candidates of their own for Parliament. They are just permitted to enter a few candidates for the Senate or Chamber on the Government Party lists, candidates who must be approved by the authorities, and in the case of the Magyars are regarded as renegades by their own people. In local Government elections the position of the Minorities has been slightly, but only slightly, better. Administratively, however, the sufferings of the Minorities are intense. There is no linguistic freedom, for instance. The only official language, in local as in Central Government, is Serbian, from the Ministries and Courts in Belgrade down to the lowest grades of the bureaucracy. All communications whether from or to the authorities must be written exclusively in Serbian, and officials are often forbidden to speak to the public in a Minority language. The use of any other language than Serbian in public, although non-official life, is largely banned. Everything is Serbised, down to the names of the streets and shops, and cinema captions. The insistence on the exclusive use of Serbian in all public life has served as an admirable pretext for excluding the Minorities from State appointments of all grades, but more particularly of the higher and middle grades.

In respect of education for the Minorities the Yugoslav Government have done the absolute minimum for the Minority languages, and then, only in the lower grade elementary schools where, in the third year, already Serbian supersedes the Minority language as the vehicle of instruction. At one time the German Minority schools, however, enjoyed certain privileges; and more recently an agreement between Yugoslavia and her Roumanian ally has led to privileges for the Roumanian schools in Yugoslavia. But, there is hardly any provision for the Minorities in the matter of secondary and higher education, except in the case of the Roumanian Minorities. The Magyars are, of course, the worst treated. Similarly, the Roumanian Orthodox Church is the only church in Yugoslavia which is not to-day completely under the control of the State. Otherwise, Yugoslavia has succeeded in paralysing the Minority Churches as National factors. Even the German-speaking and Magyar-speaking Roman Catholic priests in the corresponding Minority areas have been superseded by Croat or Slovene priests.

Yugoslavia has carried out even more brutally than Roumania the policy of transferring the wealth, and more particularly, the agricultural wealth of the country from the Minorities to the majority. A Government decree which forbids the ownership of land within a zone of roughly 30 miles from the frontier has fallen with particular severity on the Minorities, the bulk of whom naturally reside within the frontier areas. As the outcome, Minority members have been frequently expropriated without compensation, whilst elsewhere they have not received compensation on the same scale as expropriated landlords of the ruling race or races, e.g., Croat or Slovene.

Thus, discrimination in the matter of land reform against the local Minority is by no means limited to the case, generally quoted as a classic, of the Hungarian Optants in Roumania.

Regardless of the particular procedure under which they have come up before the League, and been disposed of, whether conclusively or not, the following might be regarded as among the worst violations of the Minority safeguards, viz:—

*A list of  
violations*

Poland's refusal to concede autonomy to the Ruthenians or Ukrainians of Eastern Galicia.

Yugoslavia's refusal to treat the Macedonians as other than Serbs in race and language.

As to Czechoslovakia, the failure of her rulers to implement their promises to the German Minority, has already provoked an international crisis. But in addition to that there is the refusal to concede autonomy to either the Slovaks (who, however, are not strictly speaking a Minority, but a partner in the Czechoslovak State) or to the Ruthenians of Carpatho-Ruthenia.

Roumania's discrimination against the Magyar and Russian or Jewish landowners (known as the Optants question), in carrying through land reform.

Lithuania's attempts to suppress the right of the Germans of Memel to the measure of Home Rule granted them under International Statutes.

Iraq's massacre of the Christian Assyrians.

The high-handed conduct of Roumania and Poland towards the Jewish Minorities, whom they have sought not only to deprive of their most elementary political, civic, cultural and economic rights, but to expel *en masse* from their respective

territories. Germany in Upper Silesia, and the Nazi régime at Danzig, are seeking to emulate this Polish-Roumanian example.

(It is useless to mention at this date the brutal maltreatment of their respective Minorities by Germany and Poland down to the German-Polish understanding of 1934, which took the handling of these differences away from Geneva. For many years before that date, Polish-German controversies on this topic had been the most frequent Minorities issue before the League Council and its Committees.)

But any particular illustration of Minority disputes, which attained in their day a wide publicity, fails to give an adequate idea of the extent to which, by more subtle and persistent methods of discrimination by the Governments of the Austro-Hungarian Succession States, the proposed safeguards under the Minority Treaties have been circumvented and discarded.

*Illustrations  
fail to show  
full oppression*

(1) The exaggerated insistence by almost all states upon the principle of absolute state sovereignty; (2) the tendency of multi-national states to pose as purely national; and (3) the resentment due to the inequality of obligation between the greater and lesser states, have blocked the efficacy of the League in this vital question. Procedure has been too slow, publicity has been lacking, and two proposals of the first importance—for a permanent Minorities Committee on the lines of the Mandates Commission, and for the appointment of resident agents of the League in the disputed areas—have hitherto been defeated.

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### CONCLUSION

I OFTEN meet my colleagues of the Peace Conference in the mysterious halls of dreamland. One night I hope to have a talk with them on their present opinions about the Treaties and their execution. I frequently imagine the line each of them would take were such a conversation to take place under existing conditions. I think Clemenceau's view of things would be more inexorable than it was in 1919. He would jerk out in his fierce staccato that Germany had behaved exactly as he had anticipated; that she had shammed paralysis in order to deceive the Allies—until she was ready to spring to arms once more; that she was now more powerful, more domineering, more dangerous, more ravenous than ever. As to the contents of the Versailles Treaty, he would only blame himself for giving in to President Wilson and myself on the question of the Rhineland. He would certainly be most scornful of the feebleness, amounting to treachery, displayed by his successors over German re-armament, the military occupation of the Rhineland, the annexation of Austria, the German gun emplacements on the Pyrenees, the German aerodromes and submarine bases on the Bay of Biscay, the German heavy artillery on both sides of the Straits of Gibraltar, and the Italian air and submarine bases on the French line of communications with North Africa. He would consign all these ditherers to Bolo's\* trench. If his

\* Bolo was a Frenchman who was shot as a traitor during Clemenceau's administration.

attention were called to it he would admit that these successors of his were reprehensible in dishonouring the specific pledges that he gave on the subject of disarmament. He would blame them not only for a breach of faith of which he was incapable, but for thereby furnishing Germany with a moral justification for her Treaty-breaking. As for the League of Nations, he would express no surprise at its failure. He would tell us that in hoping it would succeed, we were expecting too much of human nature. He had no faith in it, no hope for it, and no charity towards it.

President Wilson would not have changed his opinions in any particular. He would attribute the present condition of the world to the failure of the League, and that failure again to the action of his political enemies in the United States. If he has met Cabot Lodge in the shades, where spirits await their final destiny, he will have pointed out to him the agony of the world to-day and said "My friend, that is your doing." If his attention is called to the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the outrages committed by Italian bombers on Spain, he will reply that nothing Italy does causes him any surprise.

Orlando would, I think, acknowledge that he made a mistake in being rushed so easily to abandon the substantial gains guaranteed to Italy by the Treaty of Paris in the excitement roused by D'Annunzio's filibustering expedition to Fiume.

We should all agree that the Treaties were never given a chance by the miscellaneous and unimpressive array of second-rate statesmen who have handled them for the past fifteen years.

*No will power behind the Treaties* We should also all agree that the failure of a great deal of what is best and noblest in the Treaties has been entirely due to



the fact that there has been no will power or steady resolve behind their execution and that all the democratic countries were equally to blame for this exhibition of ineptitude and nervelessness. And all of us would be equally shocked at the spectacle of the great democratic countries, which in 1919 commanded universal respect and exercised almost irresistible sway on the destinies of nations, now shivering and begging for peace on the door-steps of two European dictators.

Let us examine whether or not the Treaties have achieved the aims which their framers strove and hoped to attain. To do this it is necessary to summarise the objects which they had in view:—

*Success or  
failure of  
Treaty aims*

#### 1. The vindication of international right.

Under this heading the aggressors were beaten. By the Armistice they were obliged to give up territory they had forcibly occupied, and by the Peace Treaties to pay heavy compensation for damage inflicted on the invaded countries owing to their lawlessness.

#### 2. The liberation of oppressed nations which had for centuries been victimised by the rapine of greedy and tyrannical Empires.

No Peace ever signed emancipated as many subject races. The Treaties constitute a charter of freedom for Poland, Alsace-Lorraine, Czechoslovakia, Transylvania, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and the many lands where dwell the Arabs of the Turkish Empire. From the estuary of the Vistula to the mouth of the Euphrates the despotisms of

generations were overthrown and cleared off the map. For the first time boundaries were fixed on the principle of government with the consent of the governed, and after taking evidence as to the wishes of inhabitants, shifted from one allegiance to another.

3. The breaking up of the huge armaments that were responsible for the War, and especially for its unparalleled destructiveness in human life and property. The Treaties stipulated that the aggressors were to set an example and that then the victorious countries were to follow.

The first part of this was achieved to the complete satisfaction of the Allies. As to the second part, with the exception of Britain, the victors were guilty of an outrageous breach of faith. In effect and in practice they repudiated the undertaking they had given.

4. War was treated as a crime against Society for which redress was to be made in respect of all damage inflicted on the victims of the aggressor, and for which the guilty were to be tried and punished by a tribunal responsible to the nations. Those who had transgressed the laws of war were to be tried and punished as criminals.

For this stipulation we found that the public attitude was not ripe for action. When war was denounced in pulpit, on platform and in the press as a crime, we discovered that the expression was rhetorical and had no ethical foundation in the conscience of mankind.

5. In the forefront of all the Peace Treaties was placed the establishment of a Society of Nations for the settle-

ment of international disputes by peaceable methods. The framers of the Treaties secured the adhesion of 42 nations, great and small, to a Covenant that would bind them to combine their forces against any transgressors who violated international right. They aimed at the substitution of the reign of law amongst nations for the endless national conflicts which had drenched continents with blood.

The weakness and the vacillation displayed in the direction of the affairs of the League of Nations has frustrated the purpose which the authors of the Treaties had in view in setting up this great and beneficent organisation.

6. A new international organisation was created in order to humanise the conditions of labour throughout the world.

This organisation has been one of the unchallengeable triumphs of the Treaty of Versailles.

7. The treatment of the German Colonies as an international trust administered for the benefit of the uncivilised peoples of these vast regions.

*This has been achieved and fairly administered.*

8. The conferring upon the League of Nations of full powers to revise any part of the Treaties where experience revealed that it was unjust or unworkable.

Up to the present the League has not exercised these powers, and most of the trouble in Europe to-day is due to its complete neglect of this important function which was cast upon it.

These are the essential aims and actual provisions of the Treaties. In what respect have any one of these enactments contravened the principles of equity and wise statesmanship? Such crudities and injustices as were revealed by experience in the Treaties, and which in their operation irritated and embittered nations, must inevitably creep into any arrangements which are patched up in a hurry on so vast a scale. They could have been removed under the revisionary provisions enacted for that purpose, provided these had been honestly applied.

Had the stipulations of these Treaties been faithfully and honestly interpreted and fulfilled, the dark military and economic menace now hanging over Europe would have been averted.

The League of Nations would have been an effective instrument for restraining national greed and rapacity. Inevitable differences of opinion over disputed frontiers or provocative incidents would have been settled by the authoritative influence of the League. Once the League had by its action established confidence in the equity of its judgments as a tribunal, and in its determination and power to enforce its decisions, its authority would be as unchallenged as that of the Courts of Justice in every civilised country.

Huge armaments would have been gradually dissolved and small armies like our own, adequate to policing the territories controlled by each country, would have been substituted.

The febrile armament race which exhausts the resources of nations, diverts their energies from profitable and beneficent development, and threatens to overwhelm the world in a more smashing calamity than the last, would have been avoided.

Where there has been failure it has been attributable to two causes. The first is the way in which the victorious nations who dictated the Treaties have broken the pledges they gave when the Treaties were signed:—

*Infraction  
of Treaties  
by  
Signalories*

1. They refused to carry out the solemn undertaking they gave to Germany that once she were disarmed they would follow her example.

2. In one case after another of wanton aggression against weak countries who were Members of the League, the Great Powers have failed to come to their aid and to check aggression.

3. Undertakings given as an integral part of the Peace settlement that the rights of minority races in a country would be respected have been shamelessly disregarded.

4. The revisionary provisions of the Treaties have been ignored.

The Treaties are not to be blamed for these events, but the dishonourable infraction of them. The permanence of a peace settlement depends not only on the justice of its provisions, but also on the wisdom and integrity of its interpreters. Vision, breadth of sympathy and outlook, restraint, honest dealing, courage and magnanimity were essential to the successful working of the Peace Treaties. These attributes were conspicuously absent amongst the men to whose lot fell the application and execution of the Treaties. Fate played a shattering part in the working of the healing and appeasing measures projected by the scheme of the settlement.

There were two personal misfortunes that prejudiced the success of the Treaties and they both

*Effect of  
Clemenceau's  
downfall*

occurred immediately after their signature. One was the defeat of Clemenceau by a combination of extremists on the Right and the Left, helped by the many men of no particular convictions whom he had offended in the course of a combative life. Clemenceau hated Germany—but he had beaten the Germans and recovered for France all they had taken away from her in 1870. Brave men do not stamp on prostrate foes. Moreover, he was a man who kept faith in any bargain he entered into. He was not an idealist and had no belief in such new diplomatic contraptions as the League of Nations. Hitherto experiments on these lines had been attempted by the Catholic Church. He disliked and distrusted that Church as much as he detested Germany—even more. Still he had pledged himself to give both the League and Disarmament a fair trial, and he was pre-eminently a man of his word—and he would have kept it. He gave a pledge in writing that as soon as the undertaking given by Germany in the Treaty to disarm was implemented, the Allies would follow suit. When the Council of Ambassadors in March, 1926, reported that Germany had carried out her obligations, had Clemenceau been then in office, I have no doubt he would have carried out his undertaking. But all the men who had framed that pledge, and the Covenant of the League, had left office years before Germany had fulfilled her part of the Treaty. Their successors dishonoured the pledge given in the name and on behalf of all the victorious nations. Hence the enormous re-armament programmes which are weighing down the nations to-day and menacing them with a catastrophe even worse than that from which they emerged broken and bruised in 1918.

Clemenceau's successors could plead in extenuation of their guilt that they had no responsibility for the Treaty. Surely a strange doctrine in International Law! It was the plea that von Bethmann-Hollweg might have put forward in 1914. He had not signed the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. It was therefore, as far as he was concerned, just a scrap of paper.

The most powerful figure in French politics after the retirement of Clemenceau was ex-President Poincaré. He disliked the Treaty intensely.

*Poincaré's  
sinister  
influence*

For several years after the withdrawal of Clemenceau, the policy of France was dominated by this rather sinister little man. He represented the vindictive and arrogant mood of the governing classes in France immediately after her terrible sacrifices and her astounding victory. He directly and indirectly governed France for years. All the Premiers who followed after Clemenceau feared Poincaré. Millerand was his creature. Briand, who was all for the League and a policy of appeasement, was thwarted at every turn by the intrigues of Poincaré. Under his influence, which continued for years after his death, the League became not an instrument of peace and goodwill amongst all men, including Germans; it was converted into an organisation for establishing on a permanent footing the military and thereby the diplomatic supremacy of France. That policy completely discredited the League as a body whose decisions on disputes between nations might be trusted to be as impartial as those of any ordinary tribunal in any civilised country. The obligations entered into by the Allies as to disarmament were not fulfilled. British Ministers put up no fight against the betrayal of the League and the pledges as to disarmament. Hence the Nazi Revolution, which has for the time

—maybe for a long time—destroyed the hopes of a new era of peaceful co-operation amongst free nations.

But it would be unfair to ascribe the failure of the more idealistic parts of the Peace Settlement entirely to the faults or delinquencies of European statesmanship. For another personal tragedy contributed to the breakdown of the most idealistic and constructive sections of the Treaty—the collapse of President Wilson. The first reeling blow given to the Covenant of the League and disarmament came from America. I have already pointed out in my chapter on Reparations how the Commission appointed to administer these Clauses had its character changed by the absence of a Chairman nominated by the only Allied Power which had put in no claim for damages, and had therefore no interest in the subject of reparation beyond the effect on the economic restoration of the world.

That is but one example of the harmful result of America's repudiation of her Chief Magistrate's signature to the Treaty. But it is when one comes to the most vitalising clauses of the Treaty, those which seem to provide guarantees against a renewal of the folly and iniquity of war, that it is seen how calamitous and enduring have been the consequences of America's secession. It is not too much to say that when the American Senate walked out of the League and slammed the door behind them, 50 per cent. of its power and influence vanished. The refusal of the United States to enter the Council of the Nations or to take any share of the responsibility for maintaining the Treaty she had negotiated, seriously crippled the influence and authority of the League. It injured one of the moral cells of the Covenant and weakened

*Defection  
of the  
United States*

*The League  
no longer  
impartial*



its right arm. It is not only that the impressive might of the greatest democracy in the world was withdrawn from the forces behind the Covenant. The damage done to the carefully planned structure of the Treaty as a whole was almost irreparable, for the balance was entirely changed. Its interpretation was left entirely in the hands of victorious belligerents with the animosities of centuries stirred and stimulated by the horrible wounds of the War. Britain was the nearest approach to impartiality and fairplay, but she was not free from resentment and wrath, for thousands of her merchant sailors had been brutally drowned on the high seas by pirates sailing under the German flag and acting under the orders of the German War Lords, and her actual War casualties numbered nearly 3,000,000 of her young men. America comparatively had not suffered much and she was entirely clear of all the national hatreds that poison the blood of Europe and render it such an easy victim of any pernicious germ floating in the air.

It may be asked whether we ought not to have foreseen this catastrophe? Even if we had suspected it, it would have been difficult to negotiate with the President of the United States for six months on the assumption that his authority in a compact he had entered into in the name of the United States with the greatest Powers of the world would be repudiated by his own countrymen. We anticipated that he might have to make concessions as to the constitution and powers of the League. But for those modifications we were prepared. Final rejection no one in Europe expected. Nor would it have occurred had it not been for another unexpected incident—a physical

*Treaty not  
given a  
fair trial*


breakdown of a kind which incapacitated the President from taking part in negotiation with the refractory members of the Senate, but left him with all his native stubbornness aggravated by his illness. No one foresaw that America would entirely withdraw her mighty hand from the working of the machinery which her leader had taken such a distinguished and noble part in constructing. No one foresaw that the leader would be reduced to helplessness when the machine was in peril of destruction from the hammers of his foes. Between the retreat of America and the treacheries of Europe the Treaties of Peace were never given a fair trial.

No treaty can guarantee humanity against universal perfidy. Every peace settlement is necessarily built on the foundation of the shifting sands of human interests, human ambitions and human passions. No international policy, however wisely and skilfully designed, and however well built it may be, can long endure until humanity digs down to the bedrock of an eternal ideal, and the edifice itself, built on that immutable basis, is concreted with the binding power of accepted law. Until that stage is reached in the evolution of civilised society, no Alliance or League will be anything more than a voluntary group of vigilantes who have come together for mutual protection against threats and acts of violence, pillage and murder. Such an organisation dissolves and disperses when the immediate emergency has passed away. The permanent overlordship of an international body guided by principle and precedents which have the force of law with adequate sanctions behind, will only come gradually by successful experience. There will be many set-backs. We are passing

*International  
law must  
prevail*

#### 1414 THE TRUTH ABOUT PEACE TREATIES

now through a bad period of retrogression owing to selfish, ill-directed and feeble leadership. But one day the world will throw up men whose wisdom, courage and inspiration will lead the nations to another and more sustained effort for rebuilding the toppling and fissured temple of peace.



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COMPILED BY  
M. B. ELLIOTT, M.B.E.



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